State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0275

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

Joel Clarence Velisek,
Appellant.

Filed February 7, 2022
Reversed
Jesson, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-19-3521

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.

SYLLABUS
Minnesota Statutes section 171.24, subd ivision 5 (2018), which prohibits persons
from operating a motor vehicle after license cancellation, does not apply to persons
operating motor vehicles on private property.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
OPINION
JESSON, Judge
A sheriff’s deputy observed appellant (who had a cancelled driver’s license) drive
his vehicle in his mother’s driveway and a rrested him for driving after cancellation as
inimical to public safety. The questions in this case are whether that arrest was authorized
and, if not, whether evidence obtained after the arrest s hould have been suppressed.
Because we conclude that the arrest was not authorized and the evidence—which was
necessary to prove the offenses—should have been suppressed, we reverse appellant’s
convictions of driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety and first-degree driving
while impaired (DWI).
FACTS
A sheriff’s deputy visited a ppellant Joel Clarence Velisek at his mother’s home to
fill out an annual predatory-offender registration form. When the deputy arrived, Velisek
was standing in his driveway next to a runni ng car. After helping Velisek complete the
form, the deputy drove several m iles away before realizing that he should have informed
Velisek that he had to update certain information with law en forcement within five days.
He tried to call Velisek, and when his calls went unanswered, he re turned to Velisek’s
mother’s home.1 As the deputy approached, he saw Velisek driving the car in the driveway
toward the road, but Velisek stopped before he reached the road. Because the deputy knew

1 The deputy arrived at 8:26 a.m. to complete the form and returned at 8:46 a.m.
3
Velisek’s license was cancelled as inimical to public safety, he arrested Velisek for driving
after cancellation.
During the arrest, the deputy observed that Velisek sp oke rapidly and slurred his
words. After taking Velisek to jail, the depu ty obtained a search warrant for a blood or
urine sample, which tested positive for methamphetamine.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ve lisek with one count of first-degree
DWI2 and one count of driving after cance llation as inimical to public safety. 3 Velisek
then moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of his arrest, arguing that because
he drove only on a private driveway, the deputy lacked probable cause to arrest him. The
district court denied Velisek’s motion.
The state then amended its complaint to add a second count of first-degree DWI. 4.
Velisek stipulated to the prosecution’s case to obtain review of the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress evidence. 5 The district court found Velisek guilty of one count
of first-degree DWI and of dr iving after cancellation. It sentenced him to 57 months’
imprisonment for DWI and one year in jail for driving after cancellation. Velisek appeals.

2 Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.24, subd. 1(1), .20, subd. 1(2) (2018) (stating that it is a crime to
drive while “under the influence of a controlled substance”).
3 Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5.
4 The additional DWI charge was with referen ce to Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20,
subdivision 1(7) (2018), which specifies that it is a crime for a person to drive if “the
person’s body contains any amount of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II, or
its metabolite, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols.”
5 Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4.
4
ISSUES
I. Was there probable cause to arrest Velisek for driving after cancellation as inimical
to public safety when Velisek drove only on a private driveway?
II. Was there probable cause to arrest Velisek for attempted driving after cancellation
as inimical to public safety?
III. Even if there was no probable cause to arrest Velisek, does the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule apply?
ANALYSIS
Both the United States and Minnesota constitutions guarantee people the right to be
free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 10. Accordingly, a warrantless arrest is unreasonable unless it is supported by both
probable cause and an exception to the warrant requirement. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 694-95 (Minn. 1997);
see Minn. Stat. § 629.34, subd. 1(c)(1) (2018) (warrantless-arrest statute) (authorizing
warrantless arrest for offense committed in officer’s presence). Here, the state asserts that
probable cause and the warrantless-arrest stat ute supported Velisek’s arrest. Probable
cause exists “when a person of ordinary care a nd prudence, viewin g the totality of
circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and st rong suspicion that a specific
individual has committed a crime.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011)
(emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). And if adequate suspicion does not exist, evidence
obtained in violation of this Fourth Amendment protection must usually be suppressed
5
under what courts refer to as the exclusionary rule. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178
(Minn. 2007).
Here, Velisek argues that the deputy lacked probable cause to arrest him for driving
after cancellation and that the evidence the deputy obtained af ter arresting him must be
suppressed. If we agree with Velisek, the state contends that there was probable cause to
arrest Velisek for attempted driving after canc ellation. And the state alternatively argues
that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule shou ld apply because the deputy
relied on court precedent authorizing Velisek’s arrest under these circumstances. We
address each issue in turn.
I. The deputy did not have probable cause to arrest Velisek.
Velisek contends that Minnesota Statut es section 171.24, subdivision 5 (the
cancellation statute), prohibits a person whose license is cancelled from driving only on
streets or highways. He therefore argues that the deputy did not ha ve probable cause to
arrest him because he drove the vehicle only on a private driveway.
This argument raises a question of stat utory interpretation, which we review
de novo. Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020). Our goal in interpreting
statutes is to ascertain and effe ctuate the legislature’s intent. Id. When interpreting a
statute, we first determine whether it is ambiguous, meaning that it is subject to “more than
one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Gibson , 945 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted). If the statute does not defi ne a phrase, we look to the plain meaning
and context of that phrase to determine whether it is ambiguous, id. at 858, including
looking to other sections in the same chap ter to avoid conflic ting interpretations,
6
State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 250 (Minn. 2008); see also Cent. Hous. Assocs.
LP v. Olson, 929 N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (Minn. 2019) (a pplying this principle to determine
whether a statute’s meaning is plain). If the language is unamb iguous, we apply the
statute’s plain meaning without resorti ng to further statutory construction. Gibson,
945 N.W.2d at 858.
Turning to the language here, the cancellation statute provides that a person is guilty
of gross misdemeanor driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety if, among other
things, “the person disobeys [an order cancelling the person’s license] by operating in this
state any motor vehicle , the operation of which re quires a driver’s license , while the
person’s license or privilege is canceled or denied.” Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5(3)
(emphasis added).
When applying the rules of statutory interpretation, we conclude that the
cancellation statute is unambiguous. By its plain language, a driver violates the law when
the vehicle operated is one for which a license is required. We therefore turn to Minnesota
Statutes section 171.02, subdivi sion 1(a) (2018) (the license-requirement statute), which
sets forth the circumstances in which a license is required to operate a motor vehicle. The
license-requirement statute provides that “a person shall not drive a motor vehicle upon a
street or highway in this state unless the person has a valid license.” Minn. Stat. § 171.02,
subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). In turn, a “street or highway” includes “every way or place”
between property lines that is “open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for purpose
of vehicular traffic.” Minn. Stat. § 171.01, su bd. 48 (2018). In othe r words, a license is
required only when a vehicle is operated on a street or highway—not when operated on
7
private property. See Minn. Stat. § 171.02, subd. 1(a). Had the legislature intended the
license-requirement statute to apply more broadly, it could have included broader
geographical controls. Cf. Montella v. City of Ottertail , 633 N.W.2d 86, 90 (Minn.
App. 2001) (noting that legislature could have used “food” instead of “meals” to include
other food service establishments in statute’s coverage); Arlandson v. Humphrey,
27 N.W.2d 819, 823 (M inn. 1947) (stating that, if the legislature intended to include
persons on eligibility lists in addition to “officer[s] or employee[s],” it could have done so).
It did not do so. Accordingly, incorporating the license-requirement statute’s explanation
of when a license is required, the plain la nguage of the cancellati on statute covers only
situations in which a person operates a motor vehicle on a street or highway.
Further, although not mentioned by the parties, Minnesota Statutes section 171.04,
subdivision 1(10) (2018) (the license-ineligibility statute), states that the commissioner of
public safety shall not issue a driver’s li cense “to any person when the commissioner has
good cause to believe that the operation of a motor vehicle on the highways by the person
would be inimical to public safety.” (Emphasis added.) This statute—which also confines
prohibited operation to that occurring on highways—bolst ers our conclusion that the
cancellation statute does not apply when people operate vehicles on private property.
We are not persuaded otherwise by the inclusion of the phrase “in this state” in the
cancellation statute. Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5(3). Although this language shows that
the cancellation statute could apply anywhere in the state, the subsequent phrase “the
operation of which requires a driver’s license” limits its reach. Id. That reach extends only
to circumstances when a vehicle which requires a driver’s license is operated. Under the
8
license-requirement statute, those circumst ances do not include operation on private
property. See Minn. Stat. § 171.02, subd. 1(a). We also note that the phrase “in this state”
appears in both the license-requirement statute and the cancellation statute. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 171.02, subd. 1(a), .24, subd. 5(3). But despite the broad language of “in this state,” the
license-requirement statute nevertheless requires a license only for vehicles operated on
streets and highways. That statute’s subsequent phrase “street or highway” limits its reach.
It follows that we should interpret the ca ncellation statute in a similar manner: the
subsequent limiting phrase narro ws its otherwise broad reach. 6 See Auto-Owners Ins.
Co. v. Second Chance Invs., LLC, 827 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Minn. 2013) (stating we generally
give the same language used throughout a statute the same meaning).
Although we base our decision on the plain language of the cancellation statute, we
observe that our decision aligns with the unique status of private property in our society.
A person’s rights on their own property are different from—and often stronger than—that
person’s rights on public property. See, e.g. , State v. Oquist , 327 N.W.2d 587, 591
(Minn. 1982) (recognizing that expectation of privacy in items placed in garbage can is lost
once garbage is outside curtila ge of private residence); cf. Minn. Stat. § 609.06,

6 We note that the phrase “in this state” appears elsewhere throughout the drivers’-license
statutes, often to describe the jurisdiction in which a person must obtain a license.
See Minn. Stat. §§ 171.01-.60 (2020). In one cont ext, it appears that the phrase “in this
state” has broader meaning than we give it here. See Minn. Stat. § 171.20, subd. 2(a)
and (b) (stating that a resident whose license “to operate a motor vehicle in this state has
been suspended, revoked, or cancelled, shall not operate a motor vehicle in this state under
license, permit, or registration certificate issued by any other jurisdiction”). But unlike the
cancellation and license-requirement statutes, ther e is no other phrase in section 171.20
that limits the geographical reach of “in this state” in that statute. Id.
9
subd. 1(4) (2020) (authorizing use of force to resist trespass on lawfully possessed real
property). As the United States Supreme Court has noted, people have the right to retreat
to their homes and “there be free from un reasonable governmental intrusion.”
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (quotation omi tted). And this principle extends
to the private property surrounding a person’s home, which is the situation here. Id. at 6-7
(defining curtilage, or area immediately surro unding the home, and noting that it is also
protected under the Fourth Amendment).
Still, the state argues that we should apply the reasoning in State v. Bauman ,
552 N.W.2d 576, 577 (Minn. App. 1996), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 20, 1996), to driving on
private property. In Bauman, we addressed the drivin g-after-revocation statute. 7
552 N.W.2d at 577. We reasoned that the phrase “the operation of which requires a driver’s
license,” which appears in the driving-after-revocation statute, modifies the motor vehicle
being driven rather than the nature of the driver’s operation of it. Id. (citing Minn.
Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (1994)). We noted that the only geographic restriction in the statute
is that the operation be “in this state.” Id. And we therefore held that driving in a public
parking lot with a revoked license violates the revocation statute, implicitly indicating that
a public parking lot is sufficientl y akin to a “street or highway” that driving there with a
revoked license violates the revocation statute. Id. at 577-58. In Bauman, a sheriff’s

7 The 1994 revocation statute’s language is almost identical to that in the 2018 revocation
statute: a person commits misdemeanor driving after revocation if the person disobeys an
order revoking his license “by operating in this state any motor vehicl e, the operation of
which requires a driver’s license, while the person’s license or privilege is revoked.” Minn.
Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (1994); see also Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (2018) (containing
identical language).
10
deputy had stopped the defendant, whose license was revoked, while he backed his vehicle
out of a parking space in the county courthouse parking lot after he had just pleaded guilty
to a prior driving-after-revocation charge. Id. at 576.
In determining whether to follow Bauman’s reasoning, we note that the parties
acknowledge that doing so here would require us to extend that decision. 8 We agree.
Bauman fails to resolve the precise question we face here: whether a vehicle operated on
private property is one for which a driver’s license is required.9 Private property is unlike
a street or highway, and it is unlike a public parking lot—it is not op en to public use.
See Minn. Stat. § 171.01, subd. 48. And neither Bauman nor the state gives us reason—
particularly in light of the plain language of the cancellation statute—to extend Bauman’s
conclusion to the context of an individual’s conduct solely on private property.10
In sum, because a driver’s license is not required to operate a motor vehicle on
private property, the deputy lacked probable cause to be lieve that Velisek committed a
crime by “operat[ing] a motor vehicle, the op eration of which requires a driver’s license”
in violation of the cancellation statute. Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5. Velisek’s arrest for
driving after cancellation was therefore unauthorized, and the evidence obtained as a result
of his arrest should have been suppressed.

8 The state made this acknowledgement at oral argument.
9 We also observe that Bauman addresses the revocation context rather than the
cancellation context.
10 We emphasize that we do not overrule Bauman. That decision remains good law: thus,
a person violates the revocation statute by driving in a public parking lot while the person’s
license is revoked. Our decisi on today simply declines to ex tend that holding to apply to
driving on private property with a cancelled license.
11
II. Because the state did not provide legal authority for its attempt argument, we
decline to determine whether the deputy had probable cause to arrest Velisek
for attempted driving after cancellation.

Having determined that the deputy lacked probable cause to arrest Velisek for
driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety, we turn next to the state’s alternative
argument that the deputy had probable cause to arrest Velisek for attempted driving after
cancellation. Velisek asserts that this issue is not properly before us.
We begin by acknowledging that a respondent may de fend a judgment on any
ground so long as there is factual and legal support for the alternative ground and deciding
the issue would not expand the relief granted to the respondent. State v. Grunig ,
660 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Minn. 2003) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 29.04, subd. 6) (concluding
that court of appeals erred by failing to c onsider state’s alternative argument). This
principle applies to cases in which a defenda nt stipulates to the prosecution’s case under
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Pr ocedure 26.01, subdivision 4. See State v. Poehler ,
921 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Minn. App. 2018) (applying Grunig to affirm conviction on
alternative basis after trial unde r rule 26.01, subdivision 4), aff’d, 935 N.W.2d 729
(Minn. 2019).
Here, the record contains sufficient facts to addre ss the attempt argument and
addressing the attempt argument will not expand the relief granted to the state. However,
the state cited no cases addressing attempted driving after cancellation or a similar offense.
Nor are we aware of other cases addressing attempted traffic offenses. And the state argues
only that the deputy c ould have arrested Velisek for su ch an offense b ecause the deputy
has a duty to prevent crime and statutory auth ority to arrest a person for attempting an
12
offense within the de puty’s presence. See Minn. Stat. § 629.34, subd . 1(c)(1). But that
statute does not provide legal guidance for a determination of whether Velisek attempted
to drive after cancellation.
We conclude that the state failed to provide adequate legal support for its alternative
argument and therefore decline to consider it. See Grunig, 660 N.W.2d at 136 (requiring
adequate legal support for appellate c onsideration of newly raised issue); see also
Scheffler v. City of Anoka , 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 26, 2017) (stating that a party forfeits an argument that is based on mere assertion and
unsupported by legal authority).
III. The good-faith exception does not apply.
As another alternative to support Velisek ’s convictions, the state argues that the
deputy acted in reasonable reliance on existing precedent, namely Bauman, authorizing his
actions. Velisek responds that this issue, too, is not properly before us. And on the merits,
Velisek argues that Bauman does not qualify as binding appellate precedent for purposes
of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
We begin by noting that this issue does not suffer the same defe ct that caused our
disinclination to address the attempt issue. The state adequately briefed this issue. Given
that the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a narrow good-faith excep tion, we have no
doubt as to its viability in Minnesota law should we determine that it applies on these facts.
See State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 871 (Minn. 2015) (adopting good-faith exception
for circumstances when law enforcement acts in objectively reasonable reliance on binding
13
appellate precedent). We therefore conclude that the good-faith-exception issue is properly
before us and address its merits.
Illegally obtained evidence usually must be suppressed. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d
at 178. But Minnesota recognizes a good-faith exception to this exclusionary rule when an
officer relies on binding appellate precedent that authorizes the officer’s actions at the time,
even if that precedent is later overturned after the incident at issue. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d
at 871. The binding precedent must specifica lly authorize the officer’s actions, and the
officer may not extend the law to other or unsettled areas of law. Id. at 876-77.
Bauman does not qualify as that binding precedent here. It does not authorize arrests
for driving after cancellation on private property. And the supreme court in Lindquist held
that the good-faith exception applies narrowl y: only when binding appellate precedent
specifically authorizes law enforcement’s actions. 11 Id. Because we determined that we

11 We note the similarity of this rule to th e parameters establishe d by the United States
Supreme Court for determining when qualified immunity applies. In that context, the
Supreme Court stated that a government official is not entitled to qualified immunity if the
official violates a statutory or constitutional right and the unlawfulness of the official’s
action was “clearly established” at the time. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577,
589 (2018). Existing precedent must more than merely suggest that the official’s actions
were unlawful. Id. Rather, precedent must so clearly define the rule establishing that the
officer’s actions were unlawful that any reasonable officer would know his conduct in the
situation was unlawful. Id. This requires much sp ecificity in the rule, id., which is
particularly important in the Fourth Amendment context when it is difficult to determine
how various legal doctrines apply to unique factual situations. Kisela v. Hughes ,
138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152-53 (2018). Analogousl y, in the Fourth Am endment context of
exceptions to the exclusionary ru le at issue in this case, the rule established by precedent
must be clear and precise about what law enforcement activity is specifically authorized.
Bauman does not meet that standard here.
14
would have to extend Bauman in order to apply its holding to this case, the good-faith
exception does not apply here.
DECISION
Because a person cannot be arrested for dr iving after cancellation as inimical to
public safety after driving solely on privat e property, the deputy did not have probable
cause to arrest Velisek for that offense. And we decline to address the state’s argument
that the deputy could have arrested Velisek for attempted driving after cancellation because
it is not properly before us. Finally, the good-faith exception does not apply because there
is no binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing the deputy’s actions in this case.
Because Velisek’s arrest was unauthorized, the evidence the deputy obtained as a result of
that arrest should have been suppressed. We therefore reverse Velisek’s convictions.
Reversed.