Mary Skarsten-Dinerman, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0280

Mary Skarsten-Dinerman,
Appellant,

vs.

Milton Skarsten Living Trust,
Respondent.

Filed December 27, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Swift County District Court
File No. 76-CV-20-232

Casey Swansson, Jon Saunders, Anderson Larson Saunders Klaassen Dahlager & Leitch,
P.L.L.P., Willmar, Minnesota (for appellant)

Michelle K. Kuhl, Kay Nord Hunt, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Donald A. Wilcox, Wilcox Law Office, Benson, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying her petition for modification
of a trust and her request for costs, expenses , and attorney fees. Appellant, a beneficiary
of the trust, sought to modify the trust to allow the immediate sale or distribution of the
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trust’s real property assets. The district court denied the petition, finding the proposed
modification to be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. Appellant argues that
the district court abused its discretion by denying her petition to modify the trust, erred by
failing to consider extrinsic evidence related to the settlor’s intent, and abused its discretion
by denying her request to recover costs, expens es, and attorney fees from the trust. We
affirm.
FACTS
The Milton Skarsten Living Trust (the trust) was created in 2003 by Milton Skarsten
(Milton), who passed away in 2017. 1 The trust named Milton’s six adult children,
including appellant Mary Skarsten-Dinerman, as its beneficiaries. The trust further
provided that the trust assets were to be divided into equal shares to create one share for
each beneficiary.
The trust assets originally consisted of fo ur parcels of land. Milton, who was the
original trustee, sold some of the land before his death. Th e land now held by the trust
consists of 507 acres of farmland. As of August 2020, the farmland was valued at
$1,961,200, which reflects about a five-percent decrease in value from 2019 to 2020. The
land has been leased for many years and the current farmland lease was expected to produce
a 2.7% annual rate of return in 2021.
The terms of the trust provide specific inst ructions to the trustee regarding the use
and disposition of the trust assets, including the land, upon Milton’s death. The trust directs

1 We refer to Milton Skarsten by his first name for clarity and for consistency with the
district court’s and the parties’ usage.
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the trustee to pay any funeral expenses, estate taxes, and other debts out of the trust. The
remaining balance of each share of the trust estate “shall be retained in trust for the benefit
of the beneficiaries” or their issue. Thereafte r, the trustee is to distribute equal shares of
the trust’s net income to the beneficiaries or their issue “no less frequently than annually.”
The annual distributions continue until three of Milton’s children pa ss away. Upon the
death of the third of Milton’s children, the tr ustee is directed to distribute the remaining
balance of each share of the trust estate to the three surviving beneficiaries and by right of
representation to the issue of any deceased beneficiary. If any deceased beneficiary leaves
no surviving issue, the deceased beneficiary’s share goes to the surviving beneficiaries or
their issue.
The terms of the trust specifically address the potential sale of the land in two places.
First, Paragraph IX of the trust document st ates: “Except as expressly permitted by this
paragraph, no sale of real es tate included in the trust esta te shall be permitted after my
death.” The referenced excep tion allowed for the sale of a portion of the land upon
Milton’s death, but only if the liquid assets of the trust estate were insufficient to pay
Milton’s funeral expenses, estate taxes, and other specified debts. Second, Paragraph VII
of the trust document gives one of Milton’s daughters the right to occupy an existing
residence located on one of the properties rent-free and prohibits selling that property
without her consent. In add ition to these specific referenc es to real estate, the trust
document also includes a general provision in Paragraph VIII.E that requires the trustee to
exercise prudent judgment and care “[i]n acqui ring, investing, rei nvesting, ex changing,
retaining, selling, and managing” the trust property. (Emphasis added.)
4
In the summer of 2019, three of Milton’s six children created special needs trusts
for themselves, naming Skar sten-Dinerman as trustee. 2 Each of the adult children with
special needs trusts assigned their beneficiary interests in the trust to their special needs
trusts.
Approximately one year later, Skarsten-Dinerman filed a petition to modify the trust
to allow the farmland held by the trust to be sold and th e proceeds distributed to the
beneficiaries. The petition was brought pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 501C.0411(b), .0412(a)
(2020), which allow courts to modify tr usts under certain circumstances.
Skarsten-Dinerman asked the co urt to modify the trust for the following reasons: (1) the
value of the farmland held by the trust had decreased due to “the farming economy
[suffering] over the last several years”; (2) this decrease in value would “predictably result”
in reduced rent payments for the farmland and reduced income to the beneficiaries; and
(3) the term of the trust requiring distribution after the first three beneficiaries pass away
would create an unequal outcome, because the first three beneficiaries to pass away would
“realiz[e] very little benefit” while the surviving beneficiaries would benefit substantially.
At the time the petition was filed, all six of the beneficiaries of the trust (Milton’s adult
children) were still living. The petition assert ed that allowing for the sale of the trust
property before three of the trust beneficiaries passed away would not be inconsistent with
Milton’s intent or a material purpose of the trust. The petition indicated that all the

2 Special needs trusts, discussed in more deta il below, allow persons with a disability to
receive medical-assistance payments from the state despite having funds held in a separate
trust. Norwest Bank of N. D., N.A. v. Doth , 159 F.3d 328, 330 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2018).
5
beneficiaries consented to the proposed modification. The petition also sought to recover
costs, expenses, and attorney fees from the trust.
Skarsten-Dinerman later filed an amende d petition asking the court to modify the
trust to “permit and instruct the [t]rustee to distribute the real property assets” of the trust
to the six beneficiaries immediately (rather than waiting until the death of the third
beneficiary), arguing that this distribution would not violate the prohibition on selling the
real property assets in the trust. (Emphasis added.) The amended petition asserted that all
beneficiaries supported the proposal.
The current trustee, who was appointed in 2017, objected to the proposed
modification on behalf of the trust. He asse rted that Milton’s intent in creating the trust
was to preserve the land for his children and ensure “that it would remain intact to provide
a continuing source of income for them.” Th e trustee asserted that allowing the sale or
distribution of the land would therefore directly contradict a material purpose of the trust.
The district court denied Skarsten-Diner man’s petition to modify the trust. It
concluded that “[t]he material purpose of the [t]rust was for all real property contained in
the [t]rust to remain unsold, providing annual payments to the beneficiaries.” Though the
district court found the trust “ambiguous with respect to the sale of the real property assets,”
it ultimately concluded that Skarsten-Dinerman’s proposed modification was inconsistent
with Milton’s intent and a materi al purpose of the trus t. The district court also held that
the trust should not be ordered to pay Skarst en-Dinerman’s costs, expenses, and attorney
fees.
Skarsten-Dinerman appeals.
6
DECISION
Skarsten-Dinerman raises th ree arguments on appeal. She first argues that the
district court abused its discretion by denying her petition to modify the trust. Second, and
alternatively, she argues that the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing to consider extrinsic evidence related to the settlor’s intent. Finally, she argues
that the district court abused its discreti on by denying her request to recover costs,
expenses, and attorney fees from the trust. We address each argument in turn.
I. Trust Modification
Skarsten-Dinerman challenges the district court’s denial of he r petition to modify
the trust. We review a district court’s deci sion on whether to modify a trust for an abuse
of discretion. In re Ruth Easton Fund, 680 N.W.2d 541, 547 (Minn. App. 2004). “Factual
issues embedded in a discretionary determ ination are reviewed for clear error.” Id. And
legal issues, including the interpretation of trust documents, are reviewed de novo. Id.
Skarsten-Dinerman argues that the district court erred in its identification of a
material purpose of the trust and abused its discretion by denying her petition to modify
the trust under Minn. Stat. § 501C.0411(b) base d on that interpretation. She also argues
that unforeseen circumstances favor modifying th e trust and that the district court abused
its discretion by failing to allo w modification under Minn. Stat . § 501C.0412(a) on that
basis as well. We address each argument in turn.
Modification under Minn. Stat. § 501C.0411(b)
Skarsten-Dinerman first argues that the modification she proposes is consistent with
a material purpose of the trust, which in her view is “to ensure that the [t]rust assets [are]
7
employed in a manner to best provide for the financial support of the Skarsten children.”
On this basis, she contends that the district court erred when it concluded that modification
of the trust is inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. We are not persuaded.
A court may modify a noncharitable irrevocab le trust if all of the beneficiaries
consent and the court concludes that “modific ation is not inconsistent with a material
purpose of the trust.” Minn. Stat. § 501C.04 11(b). To determine a material purpose of a
trust, we look to the plain la nguage of the trust document. See In re Tr. of Boright ,
377 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn. 1985) (finding that the terms of the trus t instrument and its
amendment revealed the purpose of that trust). A trust’s material purpose is a reflection of
the settlor’s intent. In re Tr. of Tufford, 145 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Minn. 1966). Because all of
the beneficiaries consent to the proposed modification here, determining whether the trust
can be modified depends on the material purpose(s) of the trust as a reflection of Milton’s
intent.
We review a district court’s interpretation of a trust document de novo. In re Tr. of
Schwagerl, 965 N.W.2d 772, 779 (Minn. 2021). The goal in interpreting a trust document
is “to ascertain and give eff ect to the [settlor]’s intent” by looking at the document as a
whole. In re Stisser Grantor Tr. , 818 N.W.2d 495, 502 (Minn. 2012). When a trust
document is unambiguous, we ascertain the settlor’s intent from its language, without
looking to extrin sic evidence. Id. When a trust document is ambiguous, courts
may consider extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity. Bolander v. Bolander ,
703 N.W.2d 529, 550 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. dismissed (Minn. Oct. 28, 2005). Language
is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. at 554.
8
Here, the district court concluded, without explanation, that the trust is “ambiguous
with respect to the sale of the real property assets,” but it ultimately determined that “[t]he
material purpose of the [t]rust was for all real property contained in the trust to remain
unsold, providing annual payments to the be neficiaries.” The district court therefore
concluded that Skarsten-Dinerman’s proposed modification to allow the sale or distribution
of the land at this time is inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.
We agree with the district court’s ultimate conclusion but disagree that an ambiguity
exists regarding the sale of the real estate a ssets held by the trust. Based on our de novo
review of the terms of the trust, we conclude that the trust document is unambiguous with
regard to both the sale of the real estate held by the trust and that a material purpose of the
trust was to provide annual paym ents to the trust beneficiar ies until three of them passed
away. Specifically, the plain language of th e trust document transfers certain farmland
assets to the trust and directs the trustee to distribute the income generated from those assets
to the beneficiaries in equal shares at leas t “annually” after Milton’s death. The trust
document explicitly states in Paragraph IX that “no sale of real estate included in the trust
estate shall be permitted after [Milton’s] death,” except under expressly permitted
circumstances not present here. The trust do cument also explicitly states in Paragraph
VI.D. that “[u]pon the death of the third of the above name d beneficiaries to die, the
remaining balance of each share of the trust estate . . . shall be distributed.” Reading the
document as a whole, its plain language shows that Milton’s intent, and therefore a material
purpose of the trust, was to retain the farmland as a continuous source of income for his six
children until three of them had passed away.
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Skarsten-Dinerman’s alternative interpretation—that Milton intended to ensure that
the trust assets were employed in a manner to best provide for the financial support of the
Skarsten children—disregards the specific manner in which Milton wanted the real estate
assets in the trust to benefit his children. When Milton established the trust, he expressly
decided to require the farmland to be retained by the trust to provide an ongoing source of
income for his beneficiaries. And Milton’s intent controls, even if the beneficiaries
disapprove of his choice. See In re Trusteeship Under Agreement with Mayo ,
105 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn. 1960) (“One of the court’s highest duties is to give effect to
the [settlor]’s dominant intention . . . .”). A llowing the sale or distribution of the trust
property before expressly permitted by the trust document would frustrate Milton’s intent
and a material purpose of the trust.3
We are not persuaded otherwise by Skarst en-Dinerman’s contention that the trust
document shows that Milton did not intend to prohibit the sale of the trust property where
selling it would provide a superior financial benefit to the beneficiaries (at least in
Skarsten-Dinerman’s view). To support her contention, Skarsten-Dinerman cites to select
provisions of the trust document. None of the provisions that Sk arsten-Dinerman cites
contradict or countermand the provision prohibiting the sale of the trust property under the

3 As noted above, Skarsten-D inerman’s amended pe tition asked the court to modify the
trust by distributing the trust assets to the beneficiaries, arguing this would not violate the
prohibition on selling the real property in the trust. While distributing the real property
held by the trust would not run afoul of the trust provision regarding sale of the real
property, it would run afoul of the material purpose of the trust identified above—to hold
the property in trust to provi de annual payments to the be neficiaries until three of them
passed away. Thus, the distinction between selling the real propert y and distributing the
real property does not change our analysis.
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current circumstances. First, Skarsten-Din erman cites to the general language in
Paragraph VI establishing the trust “for the benefit of the beneficiaries named herein” and
the language in Paragraph VIII that requires the trustee to use j udgment and care in
“acquiring, investing, . . . selling and managing” trust assets. This la nguage is general in
nature and does not override the more specific language in Paragraph IX that precludes the
sale of real estate after Milton’s death except in circumstances not applicable here. Second,
Skarsten-Dinerman points to Paragraph VII. This paragraph gives Debra Sackey, one of
Milton’s daughters, the right to occupy a residence on a designated trust parcel and requires
Sackey’s consent to any sale that would affect her right of occupancy. It further provides
that the “right of occupancy shall not be affected by [Milton’s] death or by the distribution
of asset[s] from the trust.” But the provision contains no language that authorizes the sale
or the distribution of the designated parcel or any other property. The sale or distribution
of that parcel (and the other parcels) is governed by the other provisions of the trust
discussed above. The language cited by Skarsten-Dinerman, therefore, fails to support her
contention that her proposal to allow the immediate sale or distribution of the trust property
would be consistent with Milton’s intent. As Skarsten-Dinerman acknowledged in her
original petition, the plain language of the trust document does not authorize the trustee to
sell or distribute the trust’s real property at this time without modification.
Having determined that a mate rial purpose of the trust is to retain the farmland to
provide a source of annual income for the beneficiaries and to distribute the land only after
three of them have passed away, we turn to the proposed modification to the trust. The
record reflects that the real property in the trust is still generating income—a 2.7% annual
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rate of return—for the benefit of the Skarsten children, all of whom are living. In other
words, the record refl ects that the farmland is providing a stable and reliable source of
income as intended by Milton. And providing a stable and reliable source of income does
not require obtaining a maximum possible return on investment. Therefore, either the sale
or the distribution of the trust’s real propert y assets at this time would conflict with a
material purpose of the trust to retain the la nd as a source of income for the beneficiaries
until three of the beneficiaries have passed away , even if selling or distributing the trust
assets would better serve the beneficiaries’ current financial needs. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Skarsten-Dinerman’s
petition to modify the trust under Minn. Stat. § 501C.0411(b).
Modification under Minn. Stat. § 501C.0412(a)
In the alternative, Skarst en-Dinerman argues that the district court abused its
discretion by not granting her petition for mo dification based on what she asserts are
unanticipated changed circumstances. A c ourt may modify a trus t if, “because of
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor,” modification will “further the purposes of the
trust.” Minn. Stat. § 501C.0412(a). The mo dification “must be made in accordance with
the settlor’s probable intention.” Id.
Even though Skarsten -Dinerman cited Minn. Stat. § 501C.0412(a) to the district
court, the district court did not explicitly a ddress this section of the trust modification
statute. Instead, the district court simply found that “[n]othing has fundamentally changed
since Milton Skarsten made his value judgment s in setting up the [t]rust as he did,” and
12
denied Skarsten-Dinerman’s petition to modify the trust. 4 By doing so, the district court
implicitly rejected Skarst en-Dinerman’s request to modify the trust based on
changed circumstances under Minn. Stat. § 501C.0412(a). See Hogenson v. Hogenson ,
852 N.W.2d 266, 275 (Minn. App. 2014) (“B ecause this argument was presented to the
district court, but the district court did not issue a ruling on it, we assume the argument was
implicitly rejected when the district court granted [the opposing party’s] motion. . . .”).
On appeal, Skarsten-Diner man contends that the following unanticipated
circumstances justify modifying the trust: (1) the creation of special needs trusts for three
of the trust’s beneficiaries, and (2) the decreas e in the value of the trust’s farmland assets
along with the “negligible” rate of return the trust receives by renting the land. We address
each circumstance in turn.
With respect to the first circumstan ce, Skarsten-Dinerman argues that the
establishment of the special needs trusts for three of the beneficiaries was unforeseen and
had an impact on the trust that supports the proposed modification. Special needs trusts
allow a person with a disability to receive medical-assistance payments from the state
despite having funds held in a separate tr ust that would otherwise disqualify them on
financial grounds. Norwest Bank , 159 F.3d at 330; 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A). The
person with a disability remains eligible for medical assistance and can use the funds in the
special needs trust “as a supplement to enhance the quality of their [ life]” so long as the

4 Skarsten-Dinerman argues that because the district court failed to consider the issue, we
should remand the matter back to the district court for further consideration. But because
the district court at least implicitly rejected the changed-circumstances argument, there is
no basis to remand to the district court for further consideration of this issue.
13
special needs trust includes a pay-back provi sion that provides for reimbursement of the
state after the beneficiary’s death if funds remain in the special needs tr ust at that point.
Norwest Bank , 159 F.3d at 330. Sk arsten-Dinerman emphasizes that if the three
beneficiaries without special needs trusts pass away first and leave no descendants, the trust
property will be distributed to the beneficiaries with special needs trusts and placed in those
trusts. When those beneficiaries pass away, so me or all of the funds may then go to the
state as reimbursement for medical services paid for by the state. But the state’s ultimate
interest in the special needs trusts is speculative because it depends on which beneficiaries
pass away first. Further, the st ate would still have an interest in the trust assets under the
proposed modification because the proceeds fro m any sale of the trust assets would be
placed in the special needs trusts. And ultim ately, the state’s interest would simply
constitute repayment after the beneficiaries’ deaths for medical assistance received during
their lifetimes. This outcome, which benefits the beneficiaries of the special needs trusts
as intended, is not a changed circumstance that justifies modifying the trust.
Second, Skarsten-Dinerman argues that the recent decrease in the value of the
farmland held by the trust and the low rate of return from renting the farmland are
unforeseen circumstances that support modifica tion of the trust. Th is argument is not
persuasive either. Milton was a farmer who likely would have anticipated fluctuations in
the farm economy, yet he chose to place his land in the trust as a source of steady income
for his children in the future. As discussed above, the trust is still earning income by leasing
the land. Further, the valu e of the land may fluctuate upward before the trust property is
ultimately distributed. Finally, and most importantly, even assuming these circumstances
14
relating to the farmland were unforeseen, selli ng or distributing the land at this time as
Skarsten-Dinerman proposes would thwart a ma terial purpose of the trust: to provide the
beneficiaries with a continuing source of annual income from the farmland.
Having determined that a material purpose of the trust was to retain the land as a
source of continuous income for the beneficiarie s and that selling or distributing the land
held by the trust at this time would be contrary to that purpose, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied the reques t for modification of the trust under Minn.
Stat. § 501C.0412(a). Even unanticipated circumstances do not justify modifying a trust if
the proposed modification will not “furth er the purposes of the trust.” Minn.
Stat. § 501C.0412(a).
In sum, we conclude that the district cour t did not err in its determination that the
provision of annual income to the beneficiaries is a material purpose of the trust. Based on
that interpretation, the district court did no t abuse its discretion by denying the motion to
modify the trust under Minn. Stat. § 501C.0 411(b). Nor did it abus e its discretion by
refusing to modify the trust under Minn. Stat. § 501C.0412(a).
II. Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence
In the alternative, Skarsten-Dinerman argues that the district court’s order denying
her petition to modify the trust should be reversed and remanded because the district court
erred by construing the terms of the trust without first holding an evidentiary hearing. She
contends that the district court should have held a hearing to consider extrinsic evidence of
Milton’s intent regarding the sale of real es tate from the trust because the district court
15
determined that the trust was ambiguous “with respect to th e sale of the real property
assets.” This argument is unavailing for two independent reasons.
First, appellate courts generally will not consider matters not previously presented
to and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
Skarsten-Dinerman did not reques t an evidentiary hearing before the district court. She
also did not argue that an evidentiary heari ng was required. Nor did she argue that the
district court should have looked beyond the trust document to determine Milton’s intent.
Skarsten-Dinerman has therefor e forfeited this argument by failin g to raise it before the
district court.
Second, even if Skarsten-D inerman had properly rais ed the issue below, an
evidentiary hearing is unnecessary to determine Milton’s intent. As discussed above, based
on our de novo review, we conclude that th e trust document is unambiguous with respect
to both its relevant material purpose and the sale of real estate held by the trust. When a
trust document is unambiguous, courts ascerta in the settlor’s intent from its language,
without looking to extrinsic evidence. Stisser, 818 N.W.2d at 502. Therefore, we discern
no basis to reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
III. Costs, Expenses, and Attorney Fees
Skarsten-Dinerman also challenges the dist rict court’s determination that the trust
should not be ordered to pay Skarsten-Dinerman’s costs, expenses, and attorney fees for
this litigation. We will not reverse a district court’s denial of a request for attorney fees
absent an abuse of discretion. In re Margolis Revocable Tr., 765 N.W.2d 919, 928 (Minn.
App. 2009). A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous
16
view of the law or reaches a decision inco nsistent with the fa cts in the record. Stisser,
818 N.W.2d at 508.
Minn. Stat. § 501C.1004 (2020) governs a beneficiary’s ability to recover attorney
fees from trust assets. Lund ex. rel. Revocable Tr. of Lund v. Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274, 286
(Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2019). The statute provides that “[i]n a
judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court, as justice and equity
may require, may award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, to any
party from the trust that is the subject of the judicial proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 501C.1004.
In Lund, this court held that the common-law standard for aw arding attorney fees also
continues to apply to a trustee’s motion for attorney fees, though it did not explicitly extend
that holding to a beneficiary’s motion for attorney fees. 924 N.W.2d at 286.
Under the common-law standard, a court ma y award attorney fees to a beneficiary
when the litigation is (1) nece ssary to resolve ambiguous language in the trust document,
(2) essential to proper administration of the trust, and (3) conducted in good faith, without
unnecessary expense or delay, for the prim ary benefit of the trust as a whole. In re
Campbell’s Trs. , 258 N.W.2d 856, 867-68 (Minn. 1977) (quoting In re Atwood’s Tr. ,
35 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1949)). The trust document in dispute “must be sufficiently
ambiguous to require litigation to establish [its] meaning and effect.” Id. at 868. And fees
are awarded “[i]n the sound and cautiously exercised discretion of the court . . . not as a
matter of right.” Id. at 867 (quoting Atwood, 35 N.W.2d at 740).
17
Here, the district court held that “[t]he [t]rust should not be ordered to pay the costs,
expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees incu rred by” Skarsten-Dinerman. The district
court reached this conclusion without providing a detailed explanation of its reasoning.
Skarsten-Dinerman argues that because the district court did no t provide explicit
findings or discuss the common-law standard in denying her request for attorney fees, the
matter should be remanded to th e district court to make ad ditional findings and consider
that standard. Skarsten-Diner man also argues that the comm on-law factors weigh in her
favor. And she asserts that the district court erred as a matter of law by seeming to deny
her request because she did not prevail in the litigation. See In re Van Dusen Marital Tr.,
834 N.W.2d 514, 527 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. June 26, 2013) (recognizing
that “[a] party need not prevail to be awarded attorney fees and costs”).
We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by denying
Skarsten-Dinerman’s request for costs, expenses, and attorney fees. First, under both
Minn. Stat. § 501C.1004 and co mmon law, litigation fees are awarded according to the
district court’s discretion and not paid to tr ust beneficiaries as a matter of right. Minn.
Stat. § 501C.1004; Campbell’s Trs., 258 N.W.2d at 867. The district court could have
reasonably concluded that justice and equity did not require orde ring the trust to pay
Skarsten-Dinerman’s fees under Minn. Stat. § 501C.1004. The district court could also
have reasonably concluded, under the common -law standard, that the litigation was not
essential to the administration of the trust or beneficial to the trust as a whole.
Second, while a party need no t prevail to be awarded a ttorney fees, the district
court’s discretion in making that decision sti ll “depends in part on the reasonableness of
18
the party’s arguments,” which may be refl ected in the outcome of the litigation.
Van Dusen, 834 N.W.2d at 527. And to justify awarding attorney fees to the beneficiary,
the trust document must be sufficiently ambigu ous to require litiga tion to establish its
meaning and effect. Campbell’s Trs., 258 N.W.2d at 868. He re, the litigation was not
necessary to establish the meaning and effect of ambiguous language in the trust document.
Rather, as Skarsten-Dinerman acknowledged in her original petition, she sought to modify
the trust document’s original unambiguous terms because the trust document does not
authorize the trustee to sell or distribute the trust’s real property under the current
circumstances.
Third, Skarsten-Dinerman did not ask the district court to consider the common-law
factors in her original request. Accordingly, the absence of such an analysis by the district
court in its decision does not support reversal. We review a district court’s decision in light
of the information and arguments before the district court, and a party cannot obtain review
of “the same general i ssue litigated below but unde r a different theory.” Thiele,
425 N.W.2d at 582. Thus, for the reasons explained above, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Skarsten-Dinerman’s request to recover costs,
expenses, and attorney fees from the trust.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that the district c ourt did not err in its identification of a
material purpose of the trust. Therefore, it did not abuse its discretion by denying
Skarsten-Dinerman’s petition to modify the trust based on that interpretation under Minn.
Stat. §§ 501C.0411(b), .0412(a). In addition, there are no grounds to reverse and remand
19
the matter to the district court to consider extrinsic evidence of the settlor’s intent, because
the terms of the trust are unamb iguous with respect to a mate rial purpose of the trust.
Finally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
the trust should not be ordered to pay the costs, expenses, a nd attorney fees incurred by
Skarsten-Dinerman through this litigation.
Affirmed.