David William Reynolds, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0282

David William Reynolds, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 7, 2021
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-18-1322

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Benjamin G. A. Olson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal from the po stconviction court’s denial of his petition for
postconviction relief, appellant argues that (1) he did not validly waive his constitutional
right to counsel and (2) either probable cause did not support the search warrant to obtain
2
his DNA, or police did not validly execute the search warrant, such that the district court
erred by not suppressing the DNA evidence. Appellant also makes several arguments in
his pro se brief. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant David William Reynolds kept 40 to 60 cats around his property near Deer
Lake in Otter Tail County, Minnesota . Neighbors complained of excess feces from the
cats on their properties and on the beach. The Otter Tail County Public Health Department
worked with the Otter Tail County Humane Society (Humane Society) to set live traps on
appellant’s neighbors’ properties, including near the cabin of M.L. and J.L., to remove the
cats. Appellant strenuously objected to these efforts.
The Humane Society received an anonymous letter around July 5, 2017 , objecting
to its interf erence with “the Reynolds’ cats. ” The letter stated essentially that the cats
should roam free and threatened that “[i]f any of our cats don’t come home, it will take 5
fire departments to put out the fire.” A few weeks later, M.L. and J.L. returned to Deer
Lake to find their deep fat fryer’s propane tank next to their cabin with a char mark from
the tank going up the side of the cabin.
A police detective investigated and hypothesized that appellant tried to burn down
M.L.’s and J.L.’s cabin. As part of the investigation, the detective spoke with appellant
who used the word “roam” when describing that he had heard of a federal law allowing
cats to roam to hunt. The detective obtained and executed a search warrant for appellant’s
DNA for comparison to DNA from the propane tank. The detective collected insufficient
DNA from the propane tank for testing , but DNA collected from the envelope containing
3
the anonymous letter matched appellant’s DNA. Based on this and other evidence,
respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant in an amended complaint with first -
degree arson (count I), second -degree arson (count II), and three count s of felony animal
cruelty (counts III-V).
Appellant appeared before five different district court judges in the course of this
matter. At each proceeding, the district court asked appellant if he would represent himself.
Each time, appellant indicated that he would. The district court advised him several times
that he might benefit from having a lawyer. The prosecutor also discussed the risks of self-
representation with appellant at least twice.
At a hearing early in the proceedings, the prosecutor expressed concern that count I
could involve com mitment to prison. The prosecutor discussed this with appellant and
suggested that the district court appoint standby counsel. Appellant confirmed that he did
not want an attorney “unless [the district court] can find a common law attorney.” The
district court responded that it cannot find him an attorney . It did not appoint standby
counsel. The district court then explained appellant’s offenses and the maximum penalties
and suggested that appellant would benefit from having a lawyer given those offenses and
penalties.
Appellant also completed two written waiver-of-counsel forms. On both forms, he
stated that he never received or read the complaint and did not understand his charges. He
listed no crimes where he could list his charges. H owever, on the first form, he checked
answer boxes stating that he “read and understood” the benefits of representation, the
disadvantages of self -representation, and other pretrial rights. Also on the first form, he
4
wrote question marks by questions asking whether he understood the benefits of
representation and his other pretrial rights. He wrote at the bottom of both forms that he is
a freeborn, sovereign citizen.
Appellant represented himself at a jury trial in November 2018. The district court
warned that he must follow the rules of court and that it would not give him much leeway.
He said he understood, “so long as you understand that I’m a common law citizen and
not . . . an equity court or corporation citizen.” The state presented its witnesses and
evidence, and appellant testified in his own defense. The jury found him guilty of all
charges.
The district court convicted appellant and sentenced him to 48 months in prison on
count I, 13 months on count III, 15 months on count IV, and 17 months on count V, but
stayed execution of the sentences.1 Appellant later violated the conditions of the stay, and
the district court executed the sentences. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. In January
2021, he filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, which the postconviction court,
the same judge who presided over appellant’s trial, denied. This appeal follows.
DECISION
A convicted person may seek postconviction relief by filing a petition claiming that
the conviction “violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of the United
States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2020). The petitioner bears the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief by a preponderance of evidence. Crow v. State,

1 The district court determined that count II was a lesser-included offense of count I.
5
923 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 2019). We review the denial of a postconviction petition for an
abuse of discretion. Pearson v. State , 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). In doing so,
we review legal issues de novo and the postconviction court’s factual findings for clear
error. Id.
I. Appellant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel.

Appellant argues that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently waive his
right to counsel because the district court did not advise him of the risks of self -
representation. We are not persuaded.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the
right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6. A criminal defendant’s
waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Jones,
772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009). Before waiving the right to counsel, defendants
should be advised of the risks of self-representation to ensure “[they] know what [they are]
doing and [their] choice is made with eyes open.” State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 173
(Minn. 1997) (quoting Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541
(1975)).
Defendants ordinarily must complete a written waiver of their right to counse l.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4) (stating that defendant must enter written waiver); Minn.
Stat. § 611.19 (2020) (“[W] aiver shall in all instances be made in writing, signed by the
defendant, except . . . if the defendant refuses to sign the written waiver.”). Before
accepting a waiver of counsel, the district court must advise the defendant of the following:
6
(a) nature of the charges;
(b) all offenses included within the charges;
(c range of allowable punishments;
(d) there may be defenses;
(e) mitigating circumstances may exist; and
(f) all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the
consequences of the waiver of the right to counsel,
including the advantages and disa dvantages of the
decision to waive counsel.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4); see also State v. Rhoads , 813 N.W.2d 880, 885 -86
(Minn. 2012). However, whether the defendant’s waiver is valid depends on the facts of
each case and context of the entire record. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 889. Even if the district
court fails to conduct an on -the-record waiver inquiry, we will not reverse when the
circumstances, including the “background, experience, and conduct of the accused,”
demonstrate a valid waiver. Id. We review the postconviction court’s finding of a valid
waiver of counsel for clear error. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504; Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 596.
Here, while the district court’s on-the-record inquiry covered much of the Minn. R.
Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4), advisory, the inquiry did not discuss that “there may be defenses”
or that “mitigating circumstances may exist” or some other “consequences of the waiver.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4)(d)-(f); see Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 885-86 (requiring
“comprehensive” inquiry). However, other circumstances show that appellant knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived counsel, including appellant’s background,
experience, and conduct, Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 886, 889, and his opportunities to discuss
waiving counsel with the prosecutor. Here, appellant has a college education. He has some
experience with the justice system, including four criminal traffic matters and several civil
property disputes. He has been represented by an attorney in prior matters and appears to
7
have represented himself in a jury trial. Further, appellant engaged in disruptive conduct
during several proceedings. He asserted that the district court lacked jurisdiction over him
because he is a “sovereign citizen.” He also interrupted and talked over the district court.
This made it difficult for the district court to advise him comprehensively of his ri ghts.
Finally, although appellant never had independent counsel advise him regarding waiver,
see State v. Garibaldi, 726 N.W.2d 823, 828 (Minn. App. 2007) (considering appellant’s
opportunity to discuss waiver with independent counsel in determining validity of waiver),
the prosecutor twice discussed self-representation with appellant. These facts show that
appellant knew of the disadvantages of self-representation.
Additionally, appellant completed two waiver-of-counsel forms. These forms cover
the relevant warnings of Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). And we interpret appellant’s
indications that he did not understand certain aspects of those forms , such as writing
question marks and failing to list his charges, as an assertion of his sovereign -citizen
philosophy rather than confusion about the nature of the charges and risks of self -
representation. Further, none of the cases on which appellant relies involve a defendant
who filed a written waiver, distinguishing them from this case.
Appellant argues that his case is similar to Garibaldi. There, we concluded that
Garibaldi provided an invalid waiver because he did not make a written waiver, never
discussed waiver with a nonprosecutor , and no one comprehensively examined him
regarding the factors set out in rule 5.04. Garibaldi, 726 N.W.2d at 825 -26. While there
are similarities between this case and Garibaldi, a significant difference is that , here,
appellant waived his right to counsel in writing. Further, unlike Garibaldi, who never fired
8
his attorney or affirmatively stated he didn’t want one, appellant consistently stated he
wanted to proceed without counsel. Appellant’s comparison to Garibaldi is not persuasive.
Appellant argues that his statement that he did not want an attorney “at this point”
and his request for a “common law attorney ” show he did not validly waive counsel. But
we review this statement and request in the context of the entire record, which shows that
appellant said he had been “skinned” by other attorneys and wished to proceed on his own.
Further, the postconviction court noted that appellant’s request for a common law attorney
appeared to be a request for an attorney who would agree with and present his legal
arguments, rather than a request for representation generally . Additionally, throughout
these proceedings, the district court strongly recommended that appellant find a lawyer,
explained the seriousness of the potential penalties, stated that appellant could apply for a
public defender, and warned that appellant must follow the same rules as a lawyer.
Appellant nevertheless declined representation.
Although the district court’s inquiries of appellant could have been more
comprehensive, the record supports the postconviction court’s finding that appellant
provided a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel.
II. Although appellant forfeited his argument that probable cause did not support
the search warrant, it fails on the merits.

Appellant argues that probable cause did not support the search warrant for his DNA
because law enforcement did not have a DNA sample to compare to appellant’s DNA, and
the warrant did not show a “fair probability” that DNA evidence would be found on the
propane tank. We disagree.
9
A. Appellant forfeited this argument.
Defendants forfeit their right to challenge a search warrant by failing to raise the
issue in the district court. State v. Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. App. 1996) (citing
State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash , 141 N.W.2d 3, 11 (Minn. 1965) ); see also State v.
Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863 , 866 -67 (Minn. 2015) (stating that defendant may forfeit
constitutional errors if defendant fails to object timely). This rule ensures that a record is
developed in the district court. Johnson v. State , 673 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2004)
(Johnson I ). In determining forfeiture, w e also consider whether the party had an
opportunity to raise the issue below. Id.2
Here, appellant failed to object to the search warrant in the district court , despite
having the opportunity to do so at the omnibus hearing an d at trial. The parties did not
develop a record on this issue before the district court. We therefore conclude that
appellant forfeited this argument.
However, it does not appear that this issue unfairly surprised the state because it
requires a limited record, consisting solely of the warrant application and legal argument.
Cf. Johnson I, 673 N.W.2d at 148 (addressing issue constituting primarily issue of law in
interests of justice because it would not unfairly surprise other party). We therefore address
the probable-cause issue in the interests of justice. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (stating
that we may review any other matter as the interest of justice may require).

2 Appellant relies on factors discussed in State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. 2014)
(Johnson II). But that case is inapposite because it arose in the context of the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s authority to hear issues first raised in a direct sentencing appeal.
10
B. Probable cause supports the warrant.
Probable cause exists if there is “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place” based on the totality of the circumstances. State
v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 204-05 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)). In reviewing whether probable cause exists, we look
to the four corners of the warrant application. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 205. We afford great
deference to the issuing judge’s probable -cause determination but ensure that the issuing
judge had a substantial basis for finding that probable cause existed . State v. Jones, 678
N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2004).
Here, the warrant application reflects the following facts . Appellant knew about
and objected to the Humane Society trapping cats on his neighbors’ property. Traps on
M.L.’s and J.L.’s property were visible from the public road. The Humane Society
received an anonymous letter in early July 2017, threatening that “it will take 5 fire
departments to put out the fire” if any of the cats “don’t come home.” The letter used the
word “roam” in reference to the cats. Appellant also used the word “roam” while speaking
to the detective to describe the federal protections he believed cat s possessed. M.L. and
J.L. came to their cabin in late July 2017, finding a char mark on their cabin due to a fire
from their propane tank which had been moved near their cabin . The affiant planned to
compare appellant’s DNA to DNA that “may be” found on M.L.’s and J.L.’s propane tank.
The totality of the circumstances described in the warrant application show a fair
probability that evidence of the arson, namely, the identity of the perpetrator, might be
11
found through obtaining appellant’s DNA and comparing it to any DNA found on the
propane tank. See Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 204-05.
Appellant cites to State v. Gathers , 190 A.3d 409, 412 (N.J. 2018) for the
proposition that , in order to obtain a search warrant, the state must establish a fair
probability that DNA would be found on other evidence for comparison to the DNA to be
obtained through the search warrant. This argument is not persuasive. First, Gathers is a
New Jersey state case and is therefore not binding authority. Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co.,
344 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1984). Second, appellant cites no authority, and we are aware
of none, adopting the Gathers rule in Minnesota. We therefore conclude that probable
cause supports the search warrant and that the postconviction court did not abuse its
discretion by denying appellant relief on this claim.
III. Appellant forfeited his argument that law enforcement exceeded the scope of
the search warrant.

Appellant also argues that law enforcement exceeded the scope of the search
warrant for his DNA by entering his curtilage and home to obtain his DNA. Appellant
forfeited this argument.
Defendants may forfeit their right to challenge the execution of a search warrant by
failing to raise the issue in the district court. State v. Brunes, 373 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn.
App. 1985) , review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1985) . Here, appellant failed to make this
challenge in the district court, and the parties did not develop this issue in the district court.
Johnson I, 673 N.W.2d at 147. And, unlike the probable -cause issue, the record for this
issue is more complex than a single document.
12
Appellant asserts that the parties agreed to use a police report describing the warrant
execution and states that the facts are “largely not in dispute.” But we are unable to confirm
this assertion because the parties did not develop this issue below. I t is not our role to
develop the record, find facts , or assess credibility . See In re Welfare of M.D.O. , 462
N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990) (stating that we are error-correcting court that does not try
case de novo); see also State v. McCormick, 835 N.W.2d 498, 510 (Minn. App. 2013). We
therefore conclude that appellant forfeited this issue and decline to address it.
IV. Appellant’s pro se arguments lack merit.
In his pro se supplemental brief, appellant appears to argue that (1) the DNA
evidence was contaminated; (2) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct ; and
(3) the county is retaliating against him for being a whistleblower. We are not persuaded.
A party may forfeit a claim by failing to support it with argument or authority.
Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 26, 2017). Except for one case cited for the proposition that individuals have
constitutional rights as citizens, appellant cites to no legal authority for his arguments.
Additionally, this court generally does not consider issues n either presented to nor
considered by the distric t court . Thiele v. Stich , 4 25 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) .
Appellant raised none of these arguments before the district court. Appellant therefore has
forfeited these arguments. We have nevertheless carefully reviewed his arguments in light
of the record and conclude that they are without merit.
Affirmed.