Blama Jamie Koilor, Jr., petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0286

Blama Jamie Koilor, Jr., petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed October 25, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Bryan, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-17-3619

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Elijah Peter Hartsell, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal from the postconviction c ourt’s denial of appellant’s petition to
withdraw his guilty plea, appellant argues th at his plea was unintelligent. Because
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appellant lacked sufficient knowledge regarding the deportation consequences of his guilty
plea, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
On October 9, 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Blama Jamie
Koilor Jr. with three counts of theft under Minnesota Statutes section 609.52, subdivision
2(a) (2016), and one count of motor-vehicle theft under subdivision 2(a)(17). On January
29, 2018, Koilor filed a “Petiti on to Enter Plea of Guilty in Felony Case” and agreed to
plead guilty to theft of a motor vehicle. According to the plea petition, the state agreed to
dismiss the remaining counts, and to reco mmend a “Stay of Imposition, credit for time
served, $1,000 + costs, restitution, 5 years supervised probation.” One sentence in the plea
petition stated, “My attorney has told me and I understand that if I am not a citizen of the
United States, my plea of guilty may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of natu ralization as a United States c itizen.” Koilor also filed an
Alford1 addendum to his guilty plea, asserting hi s innocence, but agreeing that there was
“a substantial likelihood” that he would be found guilty based on th e evidence the state
presented.
At the plea hearing, the district court read the charged offe nse to which Koilor
agreed to plead guilty. The di strict court described the o ffense as a felony, asking the
following question: “[T]o the charge contained in the second amended complaint, in Count

1 An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining innocence of the
charged offense because there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find the defendant guilty
at trial. State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977) (discussing North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970)).
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4, that on September 5, 2016, in Clay Coun ty, you committed the felony offense of theft
of a motor vehicle, in violation of Statute 609.52, Subd. 2(a)(17), how do you plead: Guilty
or not guilty?” Koilor stated, “Guilty.” Later during the hearing, the attorney for the state
confirmed that the offense was a felony, asking whether Koilor understood “that the count
to which you’re pleading guilt y to is a felony offense.” Koilor answered “Yes.” The
district court asked Koilor if there was anythi ng in the petition that he did not understand
or agree with, and Koilor replied “No.” At th e plea hearing, Koilor also testified that he
was born in Liberia, but Koilor answered “Yes ” when the state’s attorney asked whether
he was “a citizen of the United States.” Ko ilor then acknowledged the anticipated trial
evidence and confirmed that he believed a jury would find him guilty of the charged felony
offense based on that evidence.
Prior to sentencing, the district court ordered a presentence investigation report
(PSI). Under the heading “Offense Level” in the PSI, the author of the report indicated
that Koilor pleaded guilty to a felony. Elsewhere, the PSI refers to the offense as a “felony
theft offense.” The PSI noted that, based on Koilor’s criminal history score of zero, the
sentencing guidelines supported a presumptive stayed sentence of twelve months and one
day. The author recommended that Koilor “be sentenced to 12 months and 1 day with a
Stay of Adjudication and be placed on Supervised Probation for up to 5 years.” Regarding
Koilor’s immigration status, the PSI indicated that Koilor was “born in Liberia and moved
to the United States when he was 15 years old. ” Koilor reported that his family lived in
Philadelphia and that he had not had contact with them since early 2017. At the sentencing
hearing the parties did not discuss the immigration history detailed in the PSI. The district
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court stayed adjudication of the charged offense and placed Koilor on supervised probation
for up to five years.
Koilor violated his probation, and on September 17, 2018, the district court revoked
the previous stay of adjudication but granted a stay of imposition. Koilor again violated
his probation, and on December 12, 2018, the district court revoked the stay of imposition,
and imposed the guidelines sentence noted in the original PSI: a sentence of 12 months and
one day. The district court stayed execution of this sentence, required Koilor to serve 90
days in the county jail, and placed Koilor back on supervised probation. Koilor violated
his probation a third time, and on April 22, 2 019, Koilor appeared in court and requested
to execute his sentence. The district court granted Koilor’s request, revoking the stay of
execution and ordering Koilor to serve what remained of the previously imposed guidelines
sentence. Shortly after this revocation hearing, the United States Department of Homeland
Security began removal proceedings against Koilor.
On November 25, 2019, Koil or filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief.
Koilor argued that he was no t informed “of the clear immi gration consequences of his
guilty plea,” and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The public defender’s
office then assisted Koilor with his petition and f iled a supplemental petition for
postconviction relief on the basis that his plea was unintelligent. At the evidentiary hearing
that followed, Koilor indicated that he wanted to “withdraw” his pro se motion requesting
relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel2 and that he wished to “proceed only on the

2 Appellate courts have analyzed claims of ineffective assistance of guilty-plea counsel
separately from claims regarding whether a person intelligently pleaded guilty. E.g., State
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argument that his plea was not intelligently entered.” Koilor testified that he did not discuss
deportation consequences of his plea with his attorney. Specifically, Koilor testified that
no one advised him that his guilty plea would re sult in deportation. In addition, Koilor
testified regarding his mistaken belief about his citizenship status at the time of the guilty
plea. Koilor stated that he came to the United States at the age of 15 and believed he was
a citizen at the time of the plea because his parents had become citizens. Since the time of
his guilty plea, Koilor learned from an immigration official that he was not a citizen. This
official informed Koilor that because his parents became c itizens after he turned 18, their
naturalization did not automatically make Koilor a citizen as well. Koilor testified that he
did not know there was an age limit. When as ked if he would have pleaded guilty if he
had understood his immigration status, Koilor replied “No” and that if he “knew it would
trigger a removal proceeding . . . [he] would have probably went to trial and it would have
been a different outcome.”
The district court denied Koilor’s petition for postconvic tion relief. The district
court determined that Koilor received a “general warning about the potential immigration
consequences of his plea,” and concluded that this warning was sufficient. Koilor appeals.

v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. 1994) (addressing claim of ineffective assistance of plea
counsel as part of the voluntariness of the pl ea). In this case, both parties agree that a
failure to provide an adequate advisory rega rding deportation renders a plea unintelligent
and invalid. Therefore, we do not address th e effectiveness of couns el’s assistance or
determine whether constitutionally competent counsel would have taken any additional
steps to verify or determine Koilor’s citizenship status.
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DECISION
Koilor challenges the intelligen ce of his plea, relying on Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 369 (2010), to argue that specif ic, detailed advice about the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea was required. Because Padilla applies and Koilor was not
advised of the clear deportation consequences of pleading guilty to felony theft, we reverse.
A defendant has no absolute right to with draw his guilty plea, but withdrawal is
mandated if it is necessary to avoid a manifest injustice, such as when the plea is not
accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007).
Whether a plea is intelligent depends on what the defendant knew at the time that the guilty
plea was entered, Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017), and requires that
the defendant understand the charges brought, the rights waived, and the consequences of
entering a guilty plea, State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 96 (M inn. 2010), including
immigration consequences, Campos v. State , 816 N.W.2d 480, 482-83 (Minn. 2012)
(stating that in Padilla, the United States Supreme Court held that a person’s constitutional
rights “include[] the right to be informed a bout the deportation consequences of a guilty
plea”). We review conclusions regarding the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 94.
The Supreme Court recognized that “[i]mmigration law can be complex,” and there
will “undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the depo rtation consequences of a
particular plea are unclear or uncertain.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. Where the applicable
immigration statutes cannot provide certainty regarding deportation, the Constitution only
requires that the defendant be informed of a general risk of adverse immigration
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consequences. Id. at 369. However, in those situati ons where the charged offense is one
for which the deportation consequence is “truly clear,” the general advisory is not enough:
Padilla establishes that criminal-defense attorneys must
take some affirmative steps before allowing a noncitizen client
to accept a plea deal. First, at a minimum, an attorney must
review the relevant immigration statutes to determine whether
a conviction will subject the defe ndant to a risk of removal
from the United States. Second, if conviction of the charged
offense clearly subjects the defendant to removal from the
United States, the attorney ha s a constitutional obligation to
advise the defendant of this fact before he or she enters a guilty
plea. If it does not, then a general advisory warning about the
possible immigration conseque nces of a guilty plea is
sufficient.

Sanchez v. State, 890 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Minn. 20 17) (applying and explaining Padilla).
To determine whether Padilla and Sanchez require a more specific and strongly worded
advisory, a district court reviews “the relevant immigration statutes.” Id. When that review
reveals that the charged offense is one of the select group of crimes for which deportation
is certain, then a general advisory is not sufficient. Id.
In this case, the parties agr ee that Koilor received only a general advisory prior to
entering a guilty plea. The parties also agree that Koilor was charged with and entered an
Alford plea to felony theft of a motor vehicle under Minnesota Statutes section 609.52,
subdivision 2(a)(17), which carried a maxi mum sentence of five years imprisonment,
yielded a presumptive guidelines term of 12 months and on e day, and ultimately resulted
in an executed sentence of 12 months and one day. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
previously determined that this specific offense is an aggravated felony under federal law.
Campos, 816 N.W.2d at 484 n.3 (“Additionally, a theft offense (including receipt of stolen
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property) or burglary offense fo r which the term of imprison ment is at least one year
constitutes an aggravated fe lony under the [Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)].”
(quotation omitted)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2018) (establishing that a
conviction for an aggravated felony renders a noncitizen automatically removable from the
United States). Therefore, th e Constitution required an advi sory that was never given
regarding the consequences of his guilty plea,3 and Koilor’s guilty plea was not intelligent.
The state argues that the heightened advisory was not required in this case because
there was a lack of clarity regarding whether Koilor was a United States citizen.4 We are
not convinced for two reasons. First, Koilo r’s misunderstanding does not change the
certainty that a conviction for the charge d theft offense rendered him automatically

3 The state does not dispute Koilor’s contenti on that the failure to provide an adequate
advisory regarding deportation renders a plea unintelligent and invalid. Instead, the state’s
argument presumes the existence of Koilor’s constitutional right to know the deportation
consequences of his guilty plea. Because the state accepts this premise and because we are
limited to the arguments as they are presented to us, for purposes of our review in this case,
we will assume without deciding that Padilla abrogated the portion of Alanis v. State, 583
N.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Minn. 1998), that held th at ignorance of deportation consequences
does not entitle a criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. See, e.g., Campos, 816
N.W.2d at 486-87; see also Sanchez , 890 N.W.2d at 720 (n oting abrogation of Alanis);
Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Minn. 2016) (same).
4 To the extent that the stat e’s argument can also be interp reted as questioning whether
Koilor pleaded guilty to a felony offense, we cannot agre e. The plea petition, the plea
colloquy, the PSI, and the guideli nes analysis all show that the state and Koilor believed
the offense was a felony level offense at the time of the plea and prior to the sentencing
hearing. There can be no uncertainty regardi ng the offense level in this case, given the
number and frequency of these references and the absence of any suggestions to the
contrary. In addition, the district court u ltimately imposed a sentence of more than one
year, and federal immigration law makes aggravated felonies deportable regardless of how
much time passes between an admission and a conviction. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (requiring deportation fo r any person “who is convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time after admission” (emphasis added)).
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deportable under federal law. While there may be aspects of the facts or the law that are
unclear in a particular case, Padilla and Sanchez do not permit the general advisory in the
face of just any legal or factual uncertainty. Rather, they require a review of “the relevant
immigration statutes,” such as section 1227, to determine whether the charged offense is
one for which deportation is certain.
Second, because Koilor had no knowledge of the deportation consequences of his
decision when he agreed to plead guilty , and because both parties agree that failure to
provide an adequate adviso ry regarding deportation rende rs a plea unintelligent and
invalid, Koilor’s mistaken belief regarding his citi zenship supports reve rsal rather than
affirmance. See, e.g., State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn. 2000) (remanding
to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea or re sentencing where the de fendant was mistaken
that the offense was not subject to a mandatory conditional release term); State v. DeZeler,
427 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1988) (remanding to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea where
the defendant mistakenly believed that the presumptive sentence would be a stayed
sentence, rendering the plea invalid); State v. Benson , 330 N.W.2d 879, 880-81 (Minn.
1983) (remanding to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea where the defendant was mistaken
regarding the applicable criminal history score); see also State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379,
384 (Minn. App. 2011) (“A district court’s failure to comply with a rule 15 inquiry warrants
plea withdrawal under the manifest-injustice standard when the failure denies a defendant
a constitutional right.”). After the plea, Koilor discovered that he was not a citizen in the
same way that the defendants in Jumping Eagle, DeZeler, Benson, and Lopez learned of
their own mistaken beliefs regarding the consequences of their guilty pleas. Post-Padilla,
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and given the arguments presented in this case, we must provide the same remedy to Koilor
that was constitutionally required for defend ants who enter guilty pleas with incorrect
understandings of the direct consequences of their decisions.
For these reasons, Koilor’s mistaken understanding as to his citizenship status5 and
the absence of an advisory regarding the clear deportation consequences of pleading guilty
to an aggravated felony, render his guilty plea unintelligent and, therefore, invalid.
Reversed and remanded.

5 As noted above, we do not address whethe r Koilor’s plea counsel had any obligation to
determine Koilor’s citizenship status because Koilor withdrew this argument. Instead, our
decision is limited to whether Koilor intelligently entered his plea and a review of what
Koilor knew at the time that the guilty plea was entered. See Dikken, 896 N.W.2d at 877.
In addition, our decision is limited to the specific facts of this case, including the testimony
provided at the ev identiary hearing that Koilor did no t discuss deportation consequences
of his plea with his attorney and that Koilor learned from an immigration official after the
plea that he was not a citizen.