State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0308

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ronald Holmes, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed December 27, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-19975

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina A. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his 88 -month prison sentence for felony drive -by shooting,
arguing that the sentence violated his plea agreement and was calculated with an incorrect
criminal-history score. Because appellant’s criminal -history score was calculated
incorrectly but the imposition of a guidelines sentence did not violate his plea agreement,
we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
Appellant Ronald Holmes, Jr. was charged with one count of felony drive -by
shooting in August 2019. He was charged with making terroristic threats in a separate
district court file in October. He entered a guilty plea to both of these charges in a
combined plea hearing in July 2020.
At the plea hearing, respondent State of Minnesota reported that the parties had
reached a global settlement of several criminal matters 1 involving Holmes. The state
outlined the terms of the plea agreement to be:
a plea to the drive-by shooting . . ., and a plea to the threats of
violence . . . . The other three cases would be dismissed at
sentencing. There would be an agreement for a 60-month
prison commit. That would be on the drive -by shooting case.
The presumptive sen tence in that case is 88 months. The 60
months is a downward durational departure. The parties will
agree on grounds for that, in particular, no injury to any parties
and the actual victim in the case was not identified and is not
part of this case.

1 Holmes had also been charged in three other criminal cases that were a ctive at the time
of the plea hearing.
Holmes’s counsel agreed with these terms. The plea petition which Holmes filed that same
day also related similar terms —that he would plead to drive -by shooting and making
terroristic threats, the other three cases would be dismissed, and he would be sentence d to
“60 months commit concurrent.”
Holmes entered a guilty plea on both offenses, and the district court accepted his
pleas after a lengthy inquiry by his counsel. During this inquiry, his counsel reaffirmed his
desire to request release from custody pending sentencing, and that there was no agreement
with the state as to his release. However, his counsel indicated that the state agreed Holmes
could “ask the judge how she would like to rule in that, as it relates to that issue.” And if
the state were to agree to release, it would be with several conditions, and “even if the State
agrees to those things, the judge has the final say as it relates to that issue.” Holmes
indicated his understanding. At the end of the inquiry and waiver of rights, the st ate
indicated “that’s all correct, Your Honor.”
After the district court accepted his pleas and entered convictions for both offenses,
Holmes made his request for release. His counsel indicated that he would accept
conditional release with home monitoring, and “is agreeing that the Court can sentence him
to the high end of the box . . . as it relates to the more serious offense” if he violated
conditions the district court may impose. The state reiterated that “this plea agreement did
not include that top of the box if he violates and all those conditions of release,” and that
the state “did not make it part of the plea agreement that he has to stay in, but we also never
got to the point of making it part of the plea agreement that he does get out.”
The district court ultimately granted his request. It ordered release without bail
subject to several conditions, including that he remain law abiding and submit to electronic
home monitoring. The district court also informed Holmes that if he violated his
conditional release, he was “looking at top of the box” for sentencing, with consecutive
sentences on the two offenses. The state then requested that, “because we’re kind of
modifying the plea agreement with this potential for top of the box if he violat es,” that
Holmes’s counsel “make a record that he is accepting that condition of release that his
sentence can be the maximum by law if there’s any substantial violation pending
sentencing.” His counsel agreed, and Holmes indicated his understanding that if he fails
to meet the conditions, “the judge will be able to sentence, per your agreement . . . to the
high end of the box on both cases.”
Holmes violated the conditions of his release in October and November. At
sentencing in December, the state asserted its understanding that due to the violations, the
district court was “free to sentence anywhere the Court sees fit within the guidelines,” and
requested a sentence between 75 and 88 months for the drive -by-shooting offense and 27
months concurrent for terroristic threats. Holmes requested the 60-month sentence per the
plea agreement. The district court indicated that she would “consider the 60 months,” but
that she had told Holmes “if he violated any condition . . . of his conditional release, that I
would not be able to sentence him to the 60 months.”
The district court denied Holmes’s request for a downward durational departure and
sentenced him to an 88-month prison commitment on the drive -by shooting and a
concurrent 27 months for the terroristic-threats offense. Holmes appeals.
DECISION
Holmes contends that his 88 -month sentence is a breach of the plea agreement,
entitling him to specific performance of a 60-month sentence instead. See State v. Brown,
606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (“On demonstration that a plea agreement has been
breached, the court may allow withdrawal of the plea, order specific performance, or alter
the sentence if appropriate .”). Specifically, he argues that the condition of the plea
agreement stating that he could be sentenced according to the guidelines if he vi olated his
conditional release was invalid as an impermissible intrusion by the district court into plea-
agreement negotiations, leaving only the agreement for a 60 -month sentence in exchange
for his guilty pleas. See Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 2018) (stating that
“a district court judge should not participate in the plea bargaining negotiation itself”). We
are not persuaded.
We determine whether a plea agreement has been breached by looking to “what the
parties to the plea bargain reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.” Brown,
606 N.W.2d at 674 (quotation omitted). We conduct this review de novo. See State v.
Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Minn. 2004) (applying de novo review to the “interpretation
and enforcement of plea agreements”). Upon review, we are satisfied that the state
participated in the addition of the guidelines -sentence condition to Holmes’s pl ea
agreement, and that he reasonably understood his 60-month sentence to be contingent upon
complying with conditional release.
At the outset of the plea hearing, the parties concurred as to the basic terms of the
agreement: a guilty plea in two cases, di smissal of three additional cases, and a
recommendation for a 60 -month sentence with an agreement that grounds exist for a
downward durational departure. But there was an additional component to the negotiations
revealed by Holmes’s counsel —that the state would not oppose his request for release
pending sentencing but would insist upon conditional release, with the details left to the
district court’s discretion. Holmes then requested such release and proposed “that the
Court can sentence him to the high end of the box . . . as it relates to the more serious
offense” if he violated his release. The district court accepted this proposal and ordered
conditional release. The state then asked to ratify Holmes’s understanding of this
finalization of their agr eement—because they “modif[ied] the plea agreement with this
potential for top of the box if he violates” —to ensure there was “a record that he is
accepting that condition of release that his sentence can be the maximum by law if there’s
any substantial violation pending sentencing.” His counsel agreed and Holmes indicated
he understood that his contemplated 60-month sentence was contingent on complying with
his conditional release.
We are satisfied that this record supports the interpretation that the district court was
merely determining an aspect of Holmes’s sentence that the plea agreement “left to its
discretion,” which it is free to do. See State v. Meredyk, 754 N.W.2d 596, 604 n.4 (Minn.
App. 2008). Accordingly, we are guided by our own precedent that when an appellant’s
“plea agreement included conditions and he did not comp ly with those conditions, the
district court had no obligation to impose the sentence in the plea agreement and did not
violate the plea agreement by imposing a different sentence.” State v. Montez, 899 N.W.2d
200, 204 (Minn. App. 2017). The district cou rt thus did not violate Holmes’s plea
agreement, and he is not entitled to specific performance of a 60 -month sentence. We
therefore affirm the imposition of a guidelines sentence.
However, the parties agree that Holmes’s guidelines sentence was calculat ed
incorrectly according to State v. Robinette, 944 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. App. 2020), aff’d, 964
N.W.2d 143 (Minn. 2021), which stated that the 2019 amendments to the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines apply to all cases that were pending as of the effective date of the
amendments. Under these amendments, Holmes was incorrectly attributed a full custody-
status point for probation relating to a gross misdemeanor instead of one-half of a criminal-
history point. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.a (Supp. 2019). His correctly calculated
criminal-history score is three. See i d. Because his sentence was calculated using an
incorrect criminal-history score, we reverse and remand for resentencing using the correct
criminal-history score of three. See State v. Stewart , 923 N.W.2d 668, 6 80 (Minn. App.
2019) (reversing and remanding for resentencing with instructions to use the correct
criminal-history score), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2019).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.