State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0311

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Demarco Dante Wilson,
Appellant.

Filed December 27, 2021
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-8885

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appellant Demarco Dante Wilson appeals his conviction of fifth -degree drug
possession, arguing that the district court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress
the evidence based on the district court’s conclusions that (1) the emergency exception to
the warrant requirement applied, and (2) the police acted within the emergency exception
when opening his car door. Because we see no error in the denial of the motion to suppress,
we affirm.
FACTS
Just after midnight on April 7, 2020, t wo Brooklyn Center police officers, Officer
Gauldin and Sergeant Peterson, responded to a 911 call reporting that a person was passed
out behind the wheel of a running car at a gas station. The officers arrived on the scene and
parked their squad cars on either side of Wilson’s car “to prevent him from driving away
in case he wakes up.” Officer Gauldin testified that when he drove into the gas station
parking lot his high beams shined in Wilson’s face and that the gas station canopy lights
above Wilson’s car were on. Sergeant Peterson testified that after looking in the interior of
Wilson’s car with a flashlight he couldn’t see anything that would indicate what was going
on inside the car. Sergeant Peterson testified that the car was running while in park and
Wilson did not wake up when the flashlight was shone in the car.
Officer Gauldin approached Wilson’s vehicle and opened the driver -side door.
Officer Gauldin testified he opened the door to determine whether there was a “medical
emergency or if [Wilson] was under the influence of some sort of a drug or alcohol due to
3
him being passed out and not responsive to the light.” After opening the door, Officer
Gauldin “immediately located” two baggies of white powder in the driver-side door; the
content of these baggies was later identified as cocaine. Officer Gauldin arrested Wilson
when he observed Wilson was awake and n o longer believed Wilson had a medical
emergency.
Wilson was charged with felony fifth -degree drug possession under Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2018). Wilson motion ed to have the drugs suppressed , but the
district court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The district court concluded
that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement “justified [the officers] initial
approach of [d]efendant to determine whether he needed medical assistance.” The district
court also found that the plain view doctrine applied to the seizure of the cocaine because
Officer Gauldin “immediately observed two baggies of what he believed, in his training
and experience, was cocaine inside the door.”
Wilson waived a jury trial and stipulated to the prosecution’s case. The district court
found Wilson guilty of fifth-degree drug possession in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025,
subd. 2(1). Wilson appealed.
DECISION
When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, this court applies a clearly
erroneous standard of review to factual findings and a de novo standard of review to
conclusions of law. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures. U. S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1 § 10. Warrantless
4
seizures are “presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions applies.” State v. Milton , 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). “In determining whether a seizure has occurred, the court determines
whether a police officer’s actions would lead a reasonable person under the same
circumstances to believe that she was not free to leave.” State v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18, 21
(Minn. App. 2 005). An exception to this rule applies in emergency situations. Id. at 23.
“Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not
bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably
believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” Id. (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
Here, the parties agree that the officers seized Wilson when they parked their squad
cars in a way that prevented Wilson from leaving. The district court, however, found the
emergency exception applied to this situation because the officers seized Wilson with the
intent “to determine whether he needed medical assistance.” Wilson argues the district
court erred in its factual findings supporting the application of the emergency exception
because Sergeant Peterson waited for Officer G auldin before approaching the vehicle ;
Officer Gauldin’s testimony about Wilson being nonreactive to the squad car high -beams
is inaccurate; and Officer Gauldin did not “inquire into Wilson’s wellbeing as would be
expected if he were truly concerned.” These facts, Wilson argues, show that the emergency
exception did not apply.
“Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire eviden ce, we are left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Andersen¸784 N.W.2d
5
320, 334 (Minn. 2010). The district court found that “[u]pon review of all the circumstances
of the encounter, the [c]ourt finds that Officer Gauld in opened the driver’s door to check
on [d]efendant’s welfare and that he was justified in doing so.” In making this finding, the
district court credited Sergeant Peterson’s testimony about waiting for Officer Gauldin
before approaching Wilson because “sometimes slumpers fight when they wake up, and he
wanted to ensure everyone’s safety.” 1 The district court also noted that Officer Gauldin
“loudly said ‘hello’” after opening the car door and before he saw the cocaine.
Wilson is correct in noting the body camera footage shows the headlights of Officer
Gauldin’s squad car were not on when he pulled into the gas station and thus Officer
Gauldin’s testimony about being concerned about the lack of reaction to the headlights is
incorrect. Both officers, however, used their flashlights to investigate the car to try to
determine the nature of the situation. In considering all the evidence, we are not left with a
firm conviction that a mistake occurred.
Wilson next argues that Officer Gauldin exceeded the scope of the emergency
exception by opening the car door without first knocking on the glass. Minnesota caselaw
has analyzed situations when officers approached parked vehicles with sleeping or
unconscious drivers behind the wh eel without reaching the conclusion the scope of the
emergency exception was exceeded . See Overvig v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 730 N.W.2d
789, 792 -93 (Minn. App. 2007) , rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 7, 2007) ; see also State v.
Volkman, 675 N.W.2d 337, 341-42 (Minn. App. 2004). In Lopez, the court held it was

1 Police refer to individuals who are unconscious behind the wheel of a car as “slumpers.”
6
proper to perform a welfare check on a person who was asleep or unconscious behind the
wheel in a parking lot. 698 N.W.2d at 23-24. In Overvig, Volkman, and Lopez, the factual
scenario differed from this case b ecause in each of those cases the officer “tapped” or
“pounded” on the window before opening the door. Overvig, 730 N.W.2d at 790; Volkman,
675 N.W.2d at 339; Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 21. Wilson argues that attempting to rouse him
in this way was required before opening the door because it was a “less intrusive means.”
However, as t he district court concluded, “there is no general requirement that officers
must perform certain minimal investigative steps prior to opening the car door.”
Given the support in the record for the district court’s factual finding that Officer
Gauldin “opened the driver’s door to check on [d]efendant’s welfare,” we do not find any
clear error. The district court notes that no evidence is present which suggests “Officer
Gauldin opened the driver’s door to search for incriminating evidence.” The district court
also relied on the factual finding that Officer Gauldin shined his flashlight in Wilson’s face
for about two seconds. Officer Gauldin and Sergeant Peterson took reasonable steps to
rouse Wilson before opening the door. Because the record supports the conclusion that the
officers opened Wilson’s car door to check on his welfare , the officers did not exceed the
scope of the emergency exception.2
Affirmed.

2 Wilson also argues for the first time on appeal that the state failed to establish the cocaine
was plainly visible in the driver-side door when it was seized. Because we do not consider
issues raised for the first time on appeal, we do not reach a decision on this issue. See State
v. Roby, 463 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Minn. 1990).