James Johanning, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0313

James Johanning,
Appellant,

vs.

Summit Orthopedics, Ltd.,
Respondent.

Filed December 13, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-20-1082

Steven Andrew Smith, Matthew A. Frank, Laura A. Farley, Nichols Kaster, PLLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Sara G. McGrane, Zachary A. Alter, Felh aber Larson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
This appeal follows the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of appellant’s
action under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.50

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
(2020). In his complaint, appellant alleged that respondent discriminated against him on
the basis of a disability in violation of the MHRA when it failed to hire him after making
a conditional offer of employment. Respondent subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion, concluding, in part, that appellant failed
to meet “his burden of showing that he is di sabled.” Because the evidence construed in
appellant’s favor fails to support his claim that he has a “disability” within the meaning of
the MHRA, we affirm.
FACTS1
This action arises from appellant James Johanning’s application to work as a
physician assistant (PA) for respondent Summit Orthopedics Ltd. Summit is a healthcare
organization that focuses on orthopedic care. Its facilities include multiple surgery centers
as well as walk-in “OrthoQUICK” clinics, at which no surgeries are performed.
Johanning is a PA who spec ializes in orthopedics. He began working as a PA in
1998. Johanning also suffers from alcohol use disorder, commonly known as alcoholism.
According to Johanning, his alcoholism has never impacted his work.
Johanning was diagnosed with alcoholism in 2013 after being convicted of driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Joha nning was sober for approximately two and a
half years after his 2013 conviction, but then relapsed and began abusing alcohol again. In
January 2018, Johanning was convicted of a second DUI. Johanning then entered a 28-day

1 The facts as presented in this opinion are either based on undisputed evidence or disputed
evidence construed in the light most favorable to appella nt, the party against whom
summary judgment was granted. See, e.g., Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.
1993).
3
inpatient treatment program. After completing that program, Johanning participated in an
outpatient treatment program for nine months, from which he graduated in January 2019.
Following his 2018 DUI conviction, the bo ard of medical practice conducted an
investigation into Johanning’s PA licensure. The board dismissed the matter in early
October 2018 based on Johanning’s participa tion in Minnesota’s He alth Professionals
Services Program (HPSP). HPSP is a program for medical practitioners with
chemical-dependency issues that involve s providing support and monitoring work
performance while allowing practitioners to continue practicing in the medical field.
Johanning Seeks Employment with Summit
In September 2018, Joha nning applied for an “Ort hoQUICK PA” position with
Summit. Johanning interviewed for the position with Brent Osgood, who was then a lead
PA with Summit, and Chad Nelson, who was then Summit’s director of clinic operations.
During the interview, Johanning informed Osgood and Nelson about his recent treatment
for alcoholism. According to Johanning, he also told Osgood and Nelson about his 2013
and 2018 DUI convictions and his participation in HPSP. Following the interview,
Kimberly Quigley, a human resources ma nager at Summit, offered Johanning the
OrthoQUICK PA position. J ohanning declined the offer be cause the position’s evening
work schedule would limit his ability to spend time with his children.
In late October 2018, Qu igley emailed Johanning about an available “float PA”
position. Float PAs at Summit perform work in various PA roles and “float” across all of
Summit’s physician teams and locations. Johanning expressed interest in the role. Summit
did not require Johanning to reinterview for the job, and Johanning received an offer letter
4
from Summit for the position in early November. Johanning’s start date was scheduled for
December 10.
Because the float PA positio n involved performing surgical work, Summit’s offer
was conditioned on Johanning receiving privileges at Summit’s surgery centers. To obtain
privileges, Summit required Johanning to submit to a “credentialing” process. Summit’s
credentialing department handles this review process internally. On November 14,
Johanning submitted his credentia ling application. On the application form, Johanning
disclosed his two DUI convictions and a convi ction in 2013 for viol ating an order for
protection. With respect to the two DUI co nvictions, Johanning indicated that both were
related to his alcoholism. He also explaine d the treatment that he sought after each DUI,
including inpatient and outpa tient treatment, and he stated that he was currently
“voluntarily enrolled in HPSP.” Johanning’ s credentialing application was reviewed by
Dr. Peter Daly, who was then the outgoing medical director for Summit’s surgical centers,
and Dr. Eric Khetia, who was then the incoming medical director for the surgical centers.
On December 4, just under one week before Johanning’s start date, Johanning sent
an email to Quigley and Nelson in which he stated that he had attached a “work site monitor
form.” The body of the email indicated that Summit would need to designate one of its
employees as a worksite monitor as part of Johanning’s participation in HPSP. This was
the first time Quigley had heard that Johanni ng’s participation in HPSP required Summit
to assign a worksite monitor. Later that day, Johanning and Quigley spoke on the phone.
Quigley expressed surprise that Johanning’s participation in HPSP would require Summit
5
to provide a monitor. According to Johanning, her demeanor “went very cold,” and she
almost immediately said, “Well, we’re going to put your start date on hold.”
The next day, December 5, Johanning and Quigley spoke on the phone again.
Quigley informed Johanning that Summit was rescinding his job offer. Johanning asked
Quigley, “Is this because I was in treatment for alcoholism? Are they rescinding because
of that?” Johanning recalls that Quigley responded, “Yes.” She then added, “It’s just too
recent,” and, “Perhaps in the future.”
On December 13, Joha nning sent an email to Quigle y and Nelson requesting that
Summit provide written documentation explaining that his job offer was rescinded and its
rationale for the decision. Summit then sent Johanning a letter stating that it had rescinded
the offer because “[t]hrough the credentialing process, it was determined that the Summit
Orthopedics Surgery Centers were unable to grant you privileges.” The letter further
stated: “As a full time float Physician Assistan t, privileges at our Surgery Centers are a
requirement of the position. As a result, our conditional offer of employment was
rescinded . . . .”
District Court Action
Johanning filed suit, alle ging a single count of empl oyment discrimination in
violation of the MHRA. Specifically, Joha nning asserted that Summit discriminated
against him on the basis of a “disability” within the meaning of th e MHRA when it
rescinded its offer of employment for the floa t PA position because of his alcoholism.
During discovery, the parties deposed Johanning, Osgood, Nelson, Quigley, Dr. Daly, and
Dr. Khetia. Dr. Daly, Dr. Khetia, and Quig ley each testified that Summit had denied
6
privileges to Johanning through the creden tialing process solely due to Johanning’s
criminal background and the recency of it. Quigley specified that the decision to rescind
the float PA offer “essentially . . . came down to the criminal background that
Mr. Johanning had and the recency of the DUI in January of 2018.”
Summit moved for summary judgment. Joha nning opposed the motion. The district
court granted the motion and dismissed Johanning’s complaint.
Johanning appeals.
DECISION
Johanning argues that the district cour t erred by granting summary judgment to
Summit. We review summary-j udgment decisions de novo. City of Waconia v. Dock ,
961 N.W.2d 220, 229 (Minn. 2021). The district court shall grant summary judgment when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01; Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164,
172 (Minn. 2021). “A genuine issue of mate rial fact exists when there is sufficient
evidence regarding an essential element to permit reasonable persons to draw different
conclusions.” St. Paul Park Ref. Co. v. Domeier , 950 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted). When reviewing a summary-judgment decision, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. To survive summary judgment,
the nonmoving party must pres ent specific, admissible evid ence that demonstrates a
genuine issue of material fact. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul , 817 N.W.2d 150, 163
(Minn. 2012). We may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground. Id.
7
Under the MHRA, it is an unfair employment practice for an employer to refuse to
hire a person because of a disa bility. Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2. To prevail on an
employment-discrimination claim under the MHRA, a plaintiff must show (1) the plaintiff
has a “disability” as defined by the MHRA, and (2) employment discrimination within the
meaning of the MHRA on the basis of the di sability. Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.03, subd. 12,
363A.08, subd. 2. Discrimina tory intent can be shown e ither by “direct evidence” of
discrimination or by evidence that satisfies the three-part framework set out in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Banking,
632 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2001). “Direct evidence is that which shows a specific link
between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to
support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated
the adverse employment action.” St. Martin v. City of St. Paul, 680 F.3d 1027, 1033 (8th
Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted) (discussing di rect evidence in context of analogous
disability-discrimination analysis under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)).
Absent direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must proceed under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542. To meet the first part of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must esta blish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. A prima facie case requires a showing that (1) the plaintiff belongs to
a protected class; (2) the plaintiff applie d and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite the plaintiff’s qualification, the plaintiff was
rejected; and (4) after the plaintiff’s rejection, the position remained available or was given
to someone else with the plaintiff’s qualifications. Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons Co.,
8
532 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 1995 ). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden
then shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate and no ndiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. Hansen v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc. , 813 N.W.2d 906, 918
(Minn. 2012). If the employer offers such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to provide sufficient evidence showing that the employer’s proffered explanation was
pretextual. Id.
The district court granted Summit’s su mmary-judgment motion on a number of
alternative grounds. The district court firs t concluded that Joha nning had not met his
burden to demonstrate that he has a disability within the meaning of the MHRA. The
district court also determined that Johanning had not presen ted sufficient direct evidence
of discrimination. And it concluded that Johanning could not establish a prima facie case
under the McDonnell Douglas framework because Johanning was not qualified for the float
PA position. The district court further dete rmined that Summit’s decision to rescind the
float PA offer was permitted under the MHRA because the decision was based on a “bona
fide occupational qualification.”
Johanning challenges the district court’s summary-judgment decision on each of
those grounds. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Johanning has failed to
meet his burden to bring forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he has a “disability”
within the meaning of the MHRA. As a result, there is no genuine issue of material fact
on this essential element of his MHRA clai m and the district court properly granted
summary judgment on that basis alone. We therefore do not reach Johanning’s remaining
arguments.
9
To succeed on a disability-discrimination claim under the MHRA, an individual
must have a “disability ” within the meaning of the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.08,
subd. 2 (prohibiting employment discrimination based on disability). The MHRA defines
“disability” as “any condition or ch aracteristic that renders a person a disabled person.”
Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 12. “[D]isabled person” is in turn defined as “any person
who (1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially limits one or more
major life activities; (2) has a re cord of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having
such an impairment.” Id.
The district court determined that Joha nning did not present any evidence in
opposition to Summit’s motion for summary judgment demo nstrating that Johanning
satisfies any of those three definitions. On appeal, Johanning contends that he established
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whethe r he fits the first and third definitions. We
address each argument in turn.
First Definition—Impairment that Materia lly Limits One or More Major Life
Activities

Johanning contends that he established that he is a “disabled person” within the
meaning of the first definition because he demonstrated that he has an “impairment which
materially limits one or more major life activities”—namely, his alcoholism. Summit does
not appear to dispute that Johanning’s alcoho lism is an impairment but does dispute that
Johanning identified any major life activity limited by his alcoholism. For the purposes of
this appeal, we assume, withou t deciding, that Johanning’s alcoholism is an impairment
within the meaning of the MHRA. We address only J ohanning’s contention that a
10
reasonable jury could find, based on the su mmary-judgment record, that his alcoholism
materially limits one or more major life activities.
The MHRA does not define the terms “materially limits” or “major life activities.”
Where the MHRA does not de fine a term, “Minnesota ha s sought guidance in the
interpretations of federal an tidiscrimination statutes when the state law provisions in
question are similar to provisions of the federal statutes.” Gee v. Minn. State Colls. &
Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minn. App. 20 05). The MHRA and ADA both require a
plaintiff to show that their impairment lim its them in a major lif e activity, although the
ADA applies a “substantially limits” standard that is more stringent than the MHRA’s
“materially limits” standard. Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th
Cir. 2004). Major life activities are “activities that are of central importance to daily life.”
Gee, 700 N.W.2d at 553 (quo tation omitted) (reciting federal definition under ADA).
These activities include, but are not limited to , “caring for onesel f, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Id. (quotation
omitted). A major life activity is “materially limited” when it is “greatly impeded.”
Sigurdson, 532 N.W.2d at 228-29.
In his opposition to Summit’s motion for summary judgment, Johanning did not
bring forth any evidence demonstrating a grea t impediment to any major life activity.
Johanning also did not identify any particular major life ac tivity that is limited by his
11
alcoholism. His own deposition testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to him, fails
to demonstrate such evidence. Johanning testified as follows:
Q: And then other th an the time . . . participating in the AA
program or the spirituality add itional pieces, other than the
time component, does your prev ious alcoholism impact your
daily activities in any way?
A: No.
Q: Able to get dressed, able to work, able to think?
A: Yes.
. . . .
Q: So prior to your sobriety two and a half years ago, did
you have any impairments or impa ct at work because of your
alcoholism?
A: I continued to perform very well at work. I did not have
any impact at work. I remained in very good standing with
good reviews at work.
Q: Would your drinking tend to start after work?
A: Yes.
Q: And did you ever drink so much that it impacted you the
next morning where you had difficulties at work in the
morning?
A: I would say there was some mornings I did not feel well,
but I was always able to perform my job very well.
Q: So despite not feeling well, it didn’t actually impact
your performance at work; is that true?
A: That’s true.

The only effects of his alcoholism that Joha nning identified at any point in his deposition
testimony were that his drinking caused him to be “not as ac tive” after work and “not as
motivated to be taking trips with [his] kids or doing things as a family,” and that his sobriety
required him to separate socially from “sever al acquaintances.” But, even assuming
socializing constitutes a major life activity , Johanning’s deposition testimony does not
support a conclusion that hi s ability to socialize was gr eatly impeded. Moreover,
Johanning has not argued, either to the district court or on appeal, that his alcoholism has
12
materially limited his ability to socialize. In sum, according to Johanning’s own deposition
testimony, his alcoholism did not affect his major life activities in any material way.2
On appeal, Johanning contends that his alcoholism materially limits his
“brain function,” which is listed as a major life activity under the ADA. See
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2018). And he contends that th e following evidence
demonstrates that his alcoholism materially limits his brain function: he has been diagnosed
with alcoholism; he testified that his alcoholism was a “lifelong disease”; he has completed
treatment for alcoholism; he was receiving o ngoing treatment and job monitoring during
the fall of 2018; and he has a history of re lapsing. Summit urges us not to consider
Johanning’s brain-function argument because Johanning did not raise this argument before
the district court. Summit also argues that the ADA provision on which Johanning relies
to assert that brain function is a major lif e activity under the MHRA does not apply to
MHRA claims.
We generally consider only issues that were presented and considered by the district
court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). This principle applies where a
party “rais[es] the same general issue litigat ed below but under a different theory.” Id.

2 We also note that Johanning has not argued that his alcoholism materially limits the major
life activity of working. He did not argue that his ability to work has been limited by his
need to have a worksite monitor or that his alcoholism has affected his working life in any
other way. To the contrary, he testified in his deposition that his alcoholism “did not have
any impact at work.” Because Johanning has not raised an argument that his alcoholism
materially limits his ability to work, we cannot conclude that he meets the statutory
definition of having a “disability” on that basis.
13
Because Johanning raises his brain-functio n theory for the firs t time on appeal, his
argument is not properly before this court.
Even if we were to consider Johanning’s brain-function theory and assume that it is
a major life activity under the MHRA, none of the evidence identified by Johanning raises
a genuine dispute of material fact as to wh ether Johanning’s brain function is materially
limited by his alcoholism. Under federal law, alcoholism is not a per se disability.
Bailey v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1168 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing analogous ADA
standard); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge , 932 F.Supp.2d 683, 688 (M.D. La.
2013) (“[T]here is no per se rule [under the ADA] that categorizes recovering alcoholics
and drug addicts as disabled or handicapped, and a case-by-case evaluation is necessary.”).
And evidence of a diagnosis is not sufficient by itself to establish a qualifying disability.
Samuels v. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist. , 437 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing ADA
standard). Given the similarities between the ADA and MHRA definitions of “disability,”
we discern no reason to depart from the case -by-case evaluation that is required by the
federal law. Therefore, merely pointing to evidence that Johanning has struggled with
alcoholism and has received a di agnosis and treatment for the disorder is insufficient to
demonstrate that the impairment greatly impedes his brain function. In other words, he has
not provided any evidence to show how, in terms of his own experience, his alcoholism
limits his brain function or any other major life activity.
We therefore conclude that Johanning di d not present evidence to support a finding
that he meets the first definition of “dis abled person” under the MHRA. Based on the
summary-judgment record, the di strict court correctly concluded that there is no genuine
14
issue of material fact regarding the first av enue for demonstrating a disability under the
MHRA.
Third Definition—Regarded as Disabled
In the alternative, Johanning argues that he satisfied the third definition of “disabled
person” under the MHRA because a reasonabl e juror could find that Summit regarded
Johanning as a person with a disability due to his alcoholism. Again, we disagree.
As an initial matter, the parties dispute the showing that a plaintiff must make to
establish that the plaintiff is “regarded as” a person with a disability under the statute.
Summit contends that Johanning needs to show that Summit regarded Johanning as having
an impairment that materially limits one or more major life activities. Johanning counters
that he needs to show only that Summit regarded his impairment (here, his alcoholism) as
a disability whether or not Summit regarded his impairment as materially limiting one or
more major life activities.
To resolve this dispute, we must interp ret the language of Minn. Stat. § 363A.03,
subd. 12, which defines the te rm “disability” and in turn th e phrase “disabled person.”
“The first step of statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute’s language, on
its face, is ambiguous.” Hagen, 963 N.W.2d at 169 (quotatio n omitted). A statute is
ambiguous only “if its language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id.
(quotation omitted). To determ ine whether a statute is ambiguous, we “construe the
statute’s words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quotation
omitted). If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous, its plain language controls.
Hall v. City of Plainview, 954 N.W.2d 254, 269 (Minn. 2021).
15
As set forth above, Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 12, defines a “disability” as “any
condition or characteristic that renders a person a disabled person.” And a “disabled person
is any person who (1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially limits
one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded
as having such an impairment .” Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 12 (emphasis added).
Considering the entire provision, the use of th e phrase “such an impairment” in the third
definition of “disabled person” plainly refers to “a physical, sensory, or mental impairment
which materially limits one or more major life activities” as provided in the first definition.
The plain language of the statute theref ore requires a plaintiff proceeding under a
regarded-as theory of disability to show that the employer re garded them as having an
impairment that materially limits one or more major life activities . We note that this
interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 12, is consistent with how federal courts and
this court, in one nonprecedential opinion, have understood the statute in recent years. See,
e.g., St. Martin , 680 F.3d at 1034 (“[T]he facts here do not show how [St. Martin]
was materially limited in the major life activity of working or regarded as such.”);
Fischer v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 16 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1016 n.4 (D. Minn. 2014) (“The
MHRA defines an individual ‘regarded as’ disabled as one whom others regard as having
an impairment ‘which materially limits one or more major life activities.’”); Conn v. Bic
Graphic USA Mfg. Co. , No. A18-2112, 2019 WL 4594673, at *4 (Minn. App. Sept. 23,
2019) (noting that the evidence “falls short of creating a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Bic viewed [Conn] as being materially limited in the much broader category of
participating in a major life activity”).
16
We are not persuaded otherwise by Johanning’s argument that we should interpret
the “regarded as” language as used in Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 12, in the same manner
as the current federal definition of “regar ded as” included in the ADA. When it was
originally enacted in 1990, the ADA “regarded as” language was similar to the language
found in the MHRA. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327, 329-30 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102). In 2008, however, Congress
amended the ADA definition of “disability” to include the following provision:
An individual meets the requir ement of ‘being regarded as
having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that
he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this
chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity.

ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No . 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)) (emphasis added). The MHRA has not undergone any similar
revision. Nonetheless, Johanning urges this court to apply the ADA standard, as amended
in 2008, to MHRA claims. Based on the current ADA language, Johanning argues that, to
show that Summit regarded him as a person with a disability, he needs to demonstrate only
that Summit “rescinded Johanning’s job offer because of his alcohol use disorder,” and
does not need to demonstrate that Summit regarded his alcoholism as materially limiting a
major life activity.
Minnesota appellate courts have frequently “sought guidance in the interpretations
of federal antidiscrimination statutes when the state law provisions in question are similar
to provisions of the federal statutes.” Gee, 700 N.W.2d at 553. But “[w]hen provisions of
17
the MHRA are not similar to provisions of federal anti-discrimination statutes,” state courts
“have departed from the federal rule in [their] interpretation of the MHRA.” Kolton v. Cty.
of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Minn. 2002). Here, the MHRA and ADA provisions are
not similar. The ADA provision expressly provides that a plaintiff meets the regarded-as
standard if they were subjected to an adve rse employment action because of an actual or
perceived impairment “whether or not the impairment . . . is perceived to limit a major life
activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (3)(A). The MHRA definiti on of “disability” contains no
such language. Accordingly, Johanning’s interpretation of Minn. Stat . § 363A.03,
subd. 12, is not reasonable. The only reasonable interpretation of the Minnesota statute is
that it requires a plaintiff attempting to meet the “regarded as” definition of “disabled
person” to show that the employer regarded them as having an impairment that materially
limits one or more major life activities.
Applying that standard to the present case, we conclude that Johanning has failed to
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Summit regarded Johanning’s
alcoholism as materially limiting a major life activity. Johanning has not identified, either
to the district court or to this court, any specific major life activity that Summit purportedly
believed to be limited by his alcoholism. He therefore has not presented sufficient evidence
to support a finding that he meets the third definition of “disabled person” under the
MHRA, and he cannot survive summary judg ment under his regarded-as theory of
disability.3

3 Johanning argued for the first time during oral argument that Summit regarded his
alcoholism as materially limiting the major life activity of “working.” We do not consider
18
Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that Johanning has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact
either as to whether he has an impairment that materially limits a major life activity or as
to whether Summit regarded him as having such an impairment. For those reasons,
Johanning cannot, as a matter of law, show that he ha s a “disability” w ithin the meaning
of the MHRA. Because this issue is dis positive of his appeal, we need not reach
Johanning’s remaining arguments. The distri ct court did not err by granting summary
judgment in favor of Summit. In reaching this determination, we again emphasize that our
conclusion is based solely on the record of this particular case.4
Affirmed.

arguments raised for the first time during oral argument. Getz v. Peace, 934 N.W.2d 347,
353 n.3 (Minn. 2019). Even if we were to consider this argume nt, Johanning failed to
present any evidence that Summi t regarded him as unable to perform any job other than
the float PA position. See State by Cooper v. Hennepin Cty. , 441 N.W.2d 106, 112-13
(Minn. 1989) (noting that regarded-as claim alleging major life activity of working requires
showing that one was regarded as pr ecluded from more than a single job), superseded by
statute on other grounds, 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 280, § 1, at 1100.
4 We note that our resolution of this case is not meant to su ggest that the alleged conduct
by Summit is not troubling. We have decided this case on the specific record before us,
which demonstrates that Joha nning failed to present eviden ce that he has a “disability”
within the meaning of the MHRA. Our conclu sion is not intended to preclude litigants
from establishing a disability under the MHRA based on alcoholism, provided that there is
sufficient evidence to show a material limitation of a major life activity.