Peggy J. Green, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0316

Peggy J. Green,
Relator,

vs.

Hazelden Foundation,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed September 27, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 41062490-3

Peggy J. Green, Amery, Wisconsin (pro se relator)

Keri Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Empl oyment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Hazelden Foundation, Center City, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Relator Peggy J. Green challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge
(ULJ) dismissing her unemployment-benefits administrative appeal as untimely. Because
Green failed to substantially comply with the appeal deadline, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 4, 2020, respondent Hazelden Foundation discharged Green for medical-
privacy violations after she released confidential medical records pertaining to the incorrect
patient. Green applied for unemployment bene fits from respondent Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED). DEED then issued two determinations
of ineligibility, the second of which is at issue in this appeal.1
On July 27, 2020, DEED mailed Green the second determination of ineligibility,
stating that she was ineligib le for unemployment benef its due to her employment
misconduct and that any administrative appeal of that determination had to be filed by
August 17, 2020. Green appealed that determination of inelig ibility 109 days after that
deadline, on December 4, 2020. On December 21, 2020, the ULJ dismissed her appeal as
untimely.

1 Although the first determina tion of ineligibility is not in the record before us, DEED
represents that, on July 13, 2020, DEED issued a determin ation of ineligibility reducing
Green’s benefits for the weeks between June 21, 2020, and August 8, 2020, because Green
received a retirement payment upon her di scharge from the Hazelden Foundation. Green
appealed that determination, and the ULJ made a decision on that appeal on September 3,
2020. That decision is not before us.

3
Green filed a request for reconsideration, arguing that she was unaware that the
employment-misconduct determination of ine ligibility entailed a sepa rate hearing and,
further, that any disclosure of medical in formation was unintentional. The ULJ denied
Green’s request for reconsideration, finding that DEED mailed the second determination
of ineligibility to the addre ss provided by Green and that DEED did not receive any
correspondence from Green that could be reasona bly interpreted as an appeal before the
statutory deadline.
Green appeals.
DECISION
The only issue on appeal is whether the ULJ properly dismissed Green’s appeal as
untimely. “A determination of eligibility or determination of ineligibility is final unless an
appeal is filed by the applicant or employer within 20 calendar days after sending.” Minn.
Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f) (2020). “The date of mailing co mmences the time for appeal.”
Smith v. Masterson Pers., Inc. , 483 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Minn. Ap p. 1992). If an appeal is
untimely, the ULJ “must” dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 1(a)(c) (2020); Stassen v. Lone Mountai n Truck Leasing, LLC , 814 N.W.2d 25, 29
(Minn. App. 2012).
“[A] ULJ’s decision to dismiss an appeal as untimely is a question of law, subject
to de novo review.” Godbout v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 827 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn.
App. 2013). Typically, the statutory time period “is absolute and unambiguous,” Semanko
v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 244 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. 1 976), and “there are no statutory
provisions for extensions or exce ptions to the appeal period,” Kennedy v. Am. Paper
4
Recycling Corp., 714 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Minn. App. 2006). However, in In re Murack, we
determined that the governor’s Executive Order No. 20-05 for the COVID-19 peacetime
emergency suspended strict co mpliance with the 20-day administrative appeal deadline.
957 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Minn. App. 2021). “The suspension of strict compliance did not,
however, eliminate the deadline.” Id. at 125. Rather, substantial compliance was required.
Id. at 130. We explained:
A party may be said to have substantially complied with a
statute where she has a reasona ble explanation for failing to
strictly comply, has taken steps to comply with the statute, and
has generally complied with the statute’s purpose; and there is
reasonable notice and a lack of prejudice to other parties.

Id. Because Green’s failure to comply with the appeal deadline occurred during the
peacetime emergency, we address whether Gree n was in substantial compliance with the
deadline. See id. at 125.
The substantial compliance standard may relax the 20-day administrative deadline,
but it does not eliminate it or permit noncompliance without reason. Id. The record shows
that Green filed her appeal 10 9 days after the statutory 20- day deadline. Green explains
that she found the process “very confusing” an d that she “just did not realize that these
were separate issues”—presumably referring to the two determinations of ineligibility.
Even if confusion in these circumstances were a reasonable explanation for failing to
strictly comply, Green points to nothing in th e record showing that she took any steps to
comply with the appeal requirement over th e statutory period following notice of the
determination or the 109 days. We conclude that Green did not substantially comply with
the appeal deadline under Murack.
5
Green also asserts that sh e “filed an Appeal on time, through [her] account on the
website, which [she] could not print or copy and paste, and do not see this anywhere.” It is
unclear whether Green is referring to an appeal of the first determination of ineligibility or
the second. To the extent that Green is claiming that she appealed the second determination
of ineligibility—the only dete rmination at issue here—the argument is forfeited because
Green did not present this argument to the ULJ. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988).
Finally, Green argues that she did not intentionally commit privacy violations and
therefore did not engage in employment misconduct. But, when a ULJ dismisses an appeal
for lack of jurisdiction because it is untimely, we may only consider whether the relator’s
appeal was timely. See Christgau v. Fine , 27 N.W.2d 193, 199 (Minn. 1947). Because
Green’s appeal was not timely, even under the substantial- compliance standard, the ULJ
did not err by dismissing the appeal.
Affirmed.