Candi Lemarr, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0320

Candi Lemarr,
Appellant,

vs.

Brown County,
Respondent.

Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Brown County District Court
File No. 08-CV-20-978

Joseph A. Gangi, Farrish Johnson Law Office, Mankato, Minnesota; and

James J. Kuettner, Kuettner Legal, P.L.L.C., Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant)

Charles W. Hanson, Brown County Attorney, New Ulm, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Brown County deputy sheriff searched Candi Lemarr’s rural property after
receiving reports that she wa s keeping malnourished anim als. A veterinarian who

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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accompanied the deputy determined that several animals were underweight and
malnourished. The deputy informed Lemarr that he intended to seize 11 animals and gave
her the opportunity to voluntarily surrender her interests in thos e animals. She agreed to
do so. Lemarr later filed an action in district court to seek the return of the seized animals,
arguing that she was under duress at the time she surrendered her interests in the animals.
The district court determined that Lemarr is not entitled to a hearing on the validity of the
seizures of the animals because she was not under duress when she surrendered her
interests in the animals. We conclude that th e district court did not clearly err in making
that finding. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2020, Lemarr operated a business calle d Sapphire Equestrian Farms on rural
property near the city of Sleepy Eye. She owned horses, which were used for riding lessons
and by local competitive riding teams, as well as donkeys and one miniature horse.
In November 2020, the Brow n County Sheriff’s Office r eceived a complaint that
Lemarr was keeping “emaciated and malnouris hed” animals on the property. Deputy
Sheriff Reed sought and obta ined a court-ordered warrant to search and investigate
pursuant to a statute that authorizes investig ations by law enforcement into reports of
cruelty to animals. See Minn. Stat. § 343.22, subds. 1, 2 (2020).
On November 23, 2020, Deputy Reed, anot her deputy, and a veterinarian went to
Lemarr’s property to investigat e, arriving at appr oximately 1:00 p.m. Deput y Reed met
and introduced himself to Le marr and Lemarr’s 20-year-old son and informed Lemarr of
the purpose of his investigation. The two deputies were joined by two additional law-
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enforcement officers, who arrived later in the afternoon. Deputy Reed and the other
representatives of the county remained on the property until approximately 5:45 p.m.
After their arrival, Deputy Reed and the veterinarian were given a “tour” of Sapphire
Farms by Lemarr. They inspected the premises, including the paddocks, barns, and places
where animal feed was stored. They also inspected the animals. The veterinarian scored
each animal on the Henneke Body Conditioning Scale, which can be used to estimate an
animal’s weight and nourishment. The scale ranges from 1 to 9, with 1 being “skeletal”
and 9 being “grossly overweight.”
During and after their inspections, Deputy Reed and the veterinarian had various
conversations with Lemarr and her son. In those conversations, Lemarr discussed the
potential dispositions of various animals. For example, Lemarr asserted that one horse that
was in her care should be given to her farri er, who knew the owner. Lemarr stated that
some horses should not be seized because they were being held for third parties who would
be picking them up that day. Lemarr stated that she and her son wanted to keep some
horses that they had “h ad forever” and that she wanted to keep certain other horses that
were essential to her business. At one po int, Lemarr asked, “If you wanna take [the
miniature horse and donkeys] and we can be left with riding horses so my business doesn’t
go under, then can we do it that way?”
After speaking with Lemarr, Deputy Reed an d the veterinarian decided to seize 11
animals. Specifically, they seized seven animals that had received Henneke scores of 2½
or lower. They also decided to seize four animals that had r eceived scores of 4, which is
near the mid-point of the Henneke scale, but were volunteered for seizure by Lemarr.
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Deputy Reed provided Lemarr with thr ee documents entitled “Notice of Seizure,”
“Request for Hearing or Voluntary Surrender,” and “Surrender and Release Form.” The
first document states that 11 animals would be seized and held at the Minnesota Hooved
Animal Rescue Foundation, a no n-profit organization near the city of Zimmerman. The
second document described two op tions. Lemarr placed a check mark next to the option
that stated:
I voluntarily relinquish all ownership, privileges, rights, and
title of the animal(s) described on the Seizure Notice. I hereby
give the animal(s) described on the Seizure Notice to the entity
listed on this notice for whatever disposition this entity deems
best. I realize, by doing so, the security amount is waived.

Lemarr did not check the option that stated:
I do not voluntarily relinquish ow nership to the animal(s) and
instead request a hearing to determine whether or not the
seizure or impoundment was substantially justified by law and
to prevent disposition of the animal(s) until the court has made
its determination. I understand my request for a hearing must
be made within ten (10) days of the date of seizure. (Minn.
Stat. sec. 343.235, subd. 3b .) I understand, to prevent
disposition of the animal, I or a person claiming an interest in
the animal may post security in an amount sufficient to provide
for the animal’s actual costs of care and keeping. The security
must be posted within ten days of the seizure inclusive of the
date of the seizure.

The third document identified the 11 animals that were seized. Lemarr signed the second
and third documents. Deputy Reed presented these documents to Lemarr while they were
sitting in the front seat of Deputy Reed’s squad car. Before Lamarr signed the documents,
Deputy Reed told her that sh e could choose to either cont est the seizures in court or
voluntarily relinquish her interests in the anim als as well as her right to challenge the
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seizures. The conversation lasted approximately 15 minutes and was recorded by Deputy
Reed’s body-worn video-camera.
Seven days later, Lemarr’s attorney sent a letter to the district court to request a
hearing on the validity of the seizures of the animals. In response, the county moved to
dismiss Lemarr’s action on the ground that she had voluntarily surrendered her interests in
the animals. Lemarr filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion in which she
argued that she did not voluntarily surrender her interests in the animals because her
decision to do so was made unde r duress, and she a gued further that she is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the seizures were proper. In support of her
response, Lemarr submitted five affidavits of persons who expresse d support for Lemarr
and praised her skill as a caretaker of horses.
In mid-December 2020, the district court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing
on the limited issue of duress. Lemarr called her therapist as a witness. The therapist
testified that Lemarr sometimes experiences “d issociation” in response to stress, which
could lead to lapses in attention and general confusion, even though Lemarr might appear
outwardly calm.
Lemarr testified on her own behalf. She testified that, while the deputies and the
veterinarian were at her property on November 23, 2020, she “started panicking” when she
was told that the county was there to seize animals. Lemarr testified that her “head started
spinning” and that she “couldn’t think straight” during the conversation with the deputies
and veterinarian. Lemarr testified that she had limited memory about what had happened,
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what she had been told, and what she had said to the deputies, except that she recalled that
she could “either give [the animals] up” or they were “just going to take them.”
The county called Deputy Reed, who testifie d about the investigation at Lemarr’s
property and the seizures of animals on November 23, 2020. He testified that Lemarr told
him she was “kind of stressed” but that she a ppeared coherent. He testified that Lemarr
asked genuine questions, showed concern for which horses w ould be taken, and engaged
in conversation with them. He also testified that Lemarr wa s free to leave the deputies’
presence at any time and did so on multiple occasions. He testified that Lemarr was in the
front seat of his squad car when she signed the documents because she entered the car of
her own volition. The deputy indicated that he reviewed the documents with Lemarr and
told her that she was not requ ired to sign any of them, that he would seize animals
regardless of whether Lemarr signed the document s, and that she would have a right to a
hearing on the seizures if she did not consent. The county al so introduced into evidence
seven video-recordings made by Deputy Re ed’s body-worn camera, including a video-
recording of the conversation between Deputy Reed and Lemarr while they were sitting in
Deputy Reed’s squad car.
In January 2021, the district court filed an order in which it determined that Lemarr
was not under duress when she surrendered he r interests in the se ized animals and,
consequently, that she is not entitled to a hearing on the question whether the seizures were
proper. Lemarr appeals.

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DECISION
Lemarr argues that the district court e rred by finding that she was not under duress
when she surrendered her interests in the seized animals.
This action is governed by state statutes c oncerning cruelty to animals. A district
court must issue a warrant authorizing a law- enforcement officer to conduct a search and
an investigation if there is probable cause to believe that the statute has been violated.
Minn. Stat. § 343.22, subd. 1. The district court may require that a veterinarian accompany
the law-enforcement officer. Id. The law-enforcement officer may “retain in custody . . .
any property or things which are specified in the warrant, including any animal if the
warrant so specifies.” Id., subd. 2. A seized animal “may be immediately disposed of” if
it is “suffering and is beyond cure thro ugh reasonable care and treatment.” Id., subd. 3.
Otherwise a seized animal “may be humanely disposed of” after 10 days. Minn. Stat.
§ 343.235, subd. 1 (2020); see also Minn. Stat. § 343.22, subd. 3. Within 10 days of the
seizure of an animal, “a person claiming an in terest in the animal” may request a hearing
“to determine the validity of the seizure a nd impoundment.” Minn. Stat. § 343.235,
subd. 3(b). A district court “may authorize the return of the animal” if “(1) the animal is
physically fit” and “(2) the person claiming an interest in the animal can and will provide
the care required by law for the animal.” Id., subd. 3(c).
In this case, the county argued to the district court that, because Lemarr voluntarily
surrendered all her interests in the seized animals, she no lo nger is “a person claiming an
interest in” the animals and, thus, is not entitled to a hearing on the validity of the seizures.
See id., subd. 3(b). The district court did not e xpressly state that Lemarr is not “a person
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claiming an interest in” the seized animals. But that is the implication of the district court’s
determination that Lemarr is not entitled to a hearing. On appeal, Lemarr does not
challenge the premise that she surrendered her interests in the seized animals. Rather, she
argues that her surrender of her interests in the seized animals is invalid because she acted
under duress. Accordingly, we focus on the issue of duress.
Lemarr relies primarily on Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc. , 42 N.W.2d 404 (Minn.
1950), in which the supreme court defined duress as “coercion by means of physical force
or unlawful threats which destroys the victim’s free will and compels him to comply with
some demand of the party exerting the coercion.” Id. at 407. To determine whether a
person was under duress, the key question is “whether the coercion was of such a character
as to overcome the free will of the victim.” Id. Because duress is governed by a subjective
standard, “[t]he test is not the nature of th e threats, but rather the state of mind induced
thereby in the victim.” Id. But a finding of duress requi res either “physical force or
unlawful threats, which destroys one’s free will and compels compliance with the demands
of the party exerting the coercion.” St. Louis Park Inv. Co. v. R.L. Johnson Inv. Co., Inc.,
411 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 30, 1987). “Because a
person has a right to threaten to do that which he has a right to do, a threat to bring an
action to enforce a lawful demand, or one whic h he in good faith believes to be lawful,
does not constitute duress.” Wise, 42 N.W.2d at 407. The existence of duress is a question
of fact. Id. at 408. Accordingly, this court applie s a clear-error standard of review to the
district court’s findings. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832
N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013).
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The district court made 26 paragraphs of findings of fact concerning the events that
occurred at Lemarr’s property on November 23, 2020, and Lemarr’s state of mind. In its
conclusions of law, the district court recited the applicable caselaw concerning duress and
summarized its reasoning as follows:
The actions of Investigator Reed in this case do not
amount to duress. Plaintiff had the option of allowing the
animals to be removed involuntarily and demanding a court
hearing. There is no indicatio n that Plaintiff was suffering
from dissociation during her cont act with Investigator Reed;
she spoke clearly and lucidly a nd asked relevant questions.
Plaintiff was allowed to consult with her son and was free to
leave the property and did so. C ontrary to her testimony that
Investigator Reed isolated her in his vehicle, her son spoke to
her through an open window. Pl aintiff volunteered to allow
Mini-Bit and the three donkeys to be taken. She discussed with
the veterinarian which animals could go and which she would
keep; her decisions were rationally focused on keeping the
animals that would allow her to continue to offer riding lessons
and releasing the animals that were not income producers.

Lemarr challenges the district court’s orde r primarily by contending that her free
will was overcome by the stressful events that occurred on November 23, 2020. In essence,
Lemarr reiterates the arguments that she presented to the district court. Her contention is
contrary to several of the district court’s find ings of fact. For example, the district court
found that Deputy Reed arrived in civilian clothes and an unmarked squad car, that Lemarr
offered to show Deputy Reed and the veterinarian around the property, and that Lemarr
engaged in a conversation with Deputy Reed and the veterinarian in which they “discussed
which animals Plaintiff was willing to surre nder and which she wanted to keep.” The
district court also found that Lemarr voluntarily took a seat in the fr ont of Deputy Reed’s
squad car, did not express any confusion or misunderstanding, and did not “stare into space
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or break down.” The district court noted the testimony of Lemarr’s therapist but discounted
it on the ground that the therapist was not pr esent at Lemarr’s property on November 23,
2020.
These findings of fact are supported by the record. In particular, the video-recording
captured by Deputy Reed’s body-worn camera captured Le marr’s conversations with the
deputies and the veterinarian and shows her acti ng in a way that is in consistent with her
testimony and consistent with the district court’s findings. For example, the video-
recording shows Lemarr engaging in a discussion with Deputy Reed about which animals
should be removed and which animals should stay on the property. In addition, the video-
recording of Deputy Reed and Lemarr sitting in the squad car indicates that Lemarr was
under control and able to carry on a meaningful conversation. The video-recording shows
that Deputy Reed explained the documents to her carefully, with out rushing her, and
informed her that she was not required to sign the documents and could contest the seizures
in court if she did not sign.
Lemarr also contends that she was unde r duress because Deputy Reed made an
unlawful threat. Specifically, she contends that Deputy Reed stated that he would seize all
of her animals even though he was authorized to seize only those animals that had been
neglected. Lemarr does not identify with specificity the evidence of a statement by Deputy
Reed that he would seize all of the animals. In addition, the warrant is not in the evidentiary
record. We must assume that the warrant is consistent with the authorizing statute, which
permits a law-enforcement officer to seize “any property or things,” including “any animal
if the warrant so specifies. ” Minn. Stat. § 343.22, subd. 2. Thus, Lemarr cannot
demonstrate that Deputy Reed made a statement that exceeded the authority provided by
the warrant.
Before concluding, we note that Lemarr also argues that the district court erred by
depriving her of her right to due process. In response, the county argues that Lemarr has
not preserved a due-process argument because she did not present it to the district court.
The county is correct; Lemarr did not make a due-process argument in the district court.
"It is an elementary principle of appellate procedure that a party may not raise an issue or
argument for the first time on appeal and thereby seek appellate relief on an issue that was
not litigated in the district court." Doe 175 ex rel. Doe 175 v. Columbia Heights Sch. Dist.
No. 13, 842 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. App. 2014) (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,582
(Minn. 1988)). "[I]f an appellant fails to preserve an argument or issue in district court
proceedings, the issue or argument is forfeited and may not be asserted in an appellate
court." Id. at 43. Because Lemarr has not preserved her due-process argument, it has been
forfeited and may not be considered on appeal.
In sum, the district court did not err by denying Lemarr' s request for a hearing on
the validity of the seizures of the animals.
Affirmed.
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