Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State of Minnesota v. Jose Arriage Soto, Jr. 855 N.W.2d 303
- Riley v. State 792 N.W.2d 831
- State of Minnesota v. Jacob Miles Solberg 882 N.W.2d 618
- State v. Rund 896 N.W.2d 527
- State v. Pegel 795 N.W.2d 251
- State v. Walker 913 N.W.2d 463
- State v. Trog 323 N.W.2d 28
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0323
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Tywan George Christopher,
Appellant.
Filed December 13, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge
Scott County District Court
File Nos. 70-CR-20-13214, 70-CR-19-19398, 70-CR-19-16014, 70-CR-19-13858
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistan t County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the final judg ments of conviction for multiple counts of
violating an order for protection and violating a no-contact order, appellant Tywan George
2
Christopher challenges his sentences, arguing th at the district court abused its discretion
by denying his motion for a dispositional departure. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ch ristopher in four separate complaints,
but the district court held one plea hearing for all four cases. At the plea hearing,
Christopher pleaded guilty to tw o counts of violating an orde r for protection in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, su bd. 14(a) (2018), and two count s of violating a no-contact
order in violation of Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1) (2020).1
At the sentencing hearing, Christop her moved for a downward dispositional
departure, arguing that he was particularly amenable to probation. The district court denied
Christopher’s motion and sent enced Christopher to presumptive sentences under the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelin es. For the first incident, th e district court sentenced
Christopher to 21 months’ probation. 2 For the second, third, and fourth incidents, the
district court sentenced Christopher to imprisonment for 24 , 27, and 30 months,
respectively. The district court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently.
Christopher appeals.
1 With respect to the two counts for violati ng a no-contact order, the 2018 statute was in
effect for one count while the 2020 statute was in effect for the other. Because the statute
in effect in 2018 is identical to 2020, the opinion refers to the more recent version.
2 Christopher chose to execute this sentence.
3
DECISION
Christopher’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion for a downward dispositional departure.
District courts have broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
305 (Minn. 2014). We review a district c ourt’s sentencing decision for an abuse of
discretion. See id. at 307-08. A district court “abuses its discretion when its decision is
based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley
v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
The district court’s sentencing discre tion is limited by the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines, which prescribe sentences that are “presumed to be appropriate.” Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020) 3; see Soto , 855 N.W.2d at 308 (citi ng this provision of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines). A distri ct court may depart from a presumptive
sentence only if “identifiable, substantia l, and compelling circumstances” warrant
departure. State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.1). To maintain uniformity and proportionality in sentencing, departures
from the presumptive se ntence are discouraged. State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 532
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
If a defendant requests a downward dispositi onal departure, a district court must
determine whether “mitigating circumstances are present” and, if so, whether “those
3 The 2019 version of the sentencing guidelines apply to the order-for-protection violations
and one of the no-contact-order violations. The 2020 version applies to the other no-contact
order violation. Because the por tions cited in this opinion are identical between the two
versions, the opinion refers to the more recent version.
4
circumstances provide a substantial and co mpelling reason not to impose a guidelines
sentence.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308 (quot ations omitted). But “t he mere fact that a
mitigating factor is present in a particular case does not obligate the court” to grant a
dispositional departure. State v. Pegel , 795 N.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Minn. App. 2011)
(quotation omitted). We reverse a district court’ s refusal to depart on ly in a “rare” case.
State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation omitted).
The guidelines provide a nonexclusive list of mitigating circumstances that may be
used to support a departure, including whethe r the defendant is particularly amenable to
probation. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7) (2020). District courts apply the Trog factors
when evaluating whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation. See State v.
Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). These fa ctors include the defendant’s age, prior
record, remorse, cooperation, attitude in court, and support from family and friends. Id.
Christopher argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that
he was not particularly amenable to proba tion. Christopher’s ar gument fails for two
reasons. First, even if the district court had found that Christopher was particularly
amenable to probation, it wa s not required to depart from the presumptive sentence. See
Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 253-54.
Second, the record supports the district court’s determination that Christopher is not
particularly amenable to probation. The dist rict court explained its reasons for denying
Christopher’s motion for a downward dispositional departure, stating:
I simply don’t have facts before me establishing that you will
remain law abiding when you had an order for protection
violation in 2019, were releas ed, and then there was another
5
one, and then there was another one, and then there was another
one. You know, I have you on probation in Dakota County and
the probation officer asking for you to just serve a jail sentence
and be discharged because they don’t believe you’re amenable
to probation. I don’t have a file before the court that I can use
to make findings that you are amenable to probation
unfortunately.
The record reflects that Christopher ha s several prior offenses including both
felonies and misdemeanors. He has a long hist ory of drug use. An d Christopher was on
probation for gross-misdemeanor domestic assault and violation of a no-contact order when
he committed these offenses. Christopher’s probation supervisor stated in the presentence
investigation report that Christopher
is very personable and well-intended at times, but lacks follow
through. [The probation superv isor] stated Mr. Christopher
often seems like he is ready to make lasting change but tends
to be unpredictable and cannot maintain stability for more than
a few months at a time. Based on [the probation supervisor’s]
experience with Mr. Christo pher [the probation supervisor]
would have a difficult time ad vocating for any type of
departure. Mr. Christopher admi tted to his fourth probation
violation in the Dakota County cases in March 2020.
On this record, the district court’s findi ng that Christopher is not particularly
amenable to probation is fully supported, and the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Christopher’s motion for a downward dispositional departure.
Affirmed.