State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0325

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Corey Michael Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed December 27, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-20-349

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
On appeal from his convictions of felony domestic assault and threats of violence,
appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of domestic
assault, and (2) the district court erred by requiring him to register as a predatory offender.
We affirm appellant’s convictions, but reverse and remand for resentencing because
appellant was erroneously required to register as a predatory offender.
FACTS
By a second amended complaint, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant
Corey Anderson with fourth -degree criminal sexual conduct, felony domestic assault -
harm, domestic assault by strangulation, and threats of violence. At trial, evidence was
presented that Anderson lived in St. Paul with his girlfriend , A.R., and their two young
children. S.S., A.R.’s 17 -year-old daughter from a previous relationship, also lived with
the couple. S.S. testified that she routinely helps care for her two younger siblin gs and
sometimes sleeps with her one-year-old brother on a couch on the main level.
On the evening of December 26, 2019, S.S. attempted to go to sleep with her little
brother on the couch, but the baby was fussy, so A.R. took him into her room. Shortly
thereafter, Anderson came back with the baby. Although the baby was still fussing, S.S.
fell asleep while Anderson cared for the baby.
S.S. claimed that she was awakened by Anderson grabbing her “butt cheek.”
According to S.S., Anderson apologized and then went back in the bedroom. S.S. observed
the baby asleep “in his usual sleeping spot,” and then used her cellular phone to call her
mother and tell her what happened.
A.R. testified that when Anderson returned to the bedroom, he told her that he
“accidentally grabbed” S.S.’s leg. After speaking with S.S., A.R. told Anderson that she
did not believe his version of the events and the couple began to argue. According to A.R.,
Anderson grabbed her by the throat with both hands and choked her. A.R. the n hit
Anderson with a dish, prompting him to release her. A.R. claimed that Anderson told her
that he was going to kill her and then pushed her down the basement stairs. Although A.R.
caught herself on the banister, she scraped her back in the process.
After Anderson fled the house, A.R. called 911. The police subsequently arrived at
the scene and spoke to both A.R. and S.S. One of the responding officers testified that he
observed red marks on A.R.’s neck and ear. And an officer who conducted a follow -up
interview with A.R. testified that he was told by A.R. that she injured her toe during the
altercation, but he could not recall if she mentioned injuring her back.
The jury saw photographs of the injuries to A.R.’s neck and back and heard a
recording of a forensic interview i n which S.S. described the altercation between her
mother and Anderson. The jury also saw clips from a responding officer’s body camera in
which A.R. stated that Anderson grabbed her throat and knocked her down the steps. And
the district court admitted relationship evidence related to incidents in which Anderson (1)
threatened to kill A.R. in April 2019; (2) rolled up a car window on A.R.’s arm in March
2019; and (3) hit A.R. and threw her against a wall in November 2018.
Anderson stipulated that he h ad two prior domestic -related offenses , which
supported the felony level domestic -abuse charge. But he did not testify or call any
witnesses.
The jury acquitted Anderson of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct and domestic
assault by strangulation, but found him guilty of felony domestic assault-harm and threats
of violence. The district court then sentenced Anderson to 18 months in prison, but stayed
execution of that sentence and placed him on probation for three years. The district court
also ordered Anderson to register as a predator y offender for ten years. This appeal
follows.
DECISION
I.
Anderson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of
felony domestic assault -harm. When evaluating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, the
reviewing court “carefully examine[s] the record to determine whether the facts and the
legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the [jury] to reasonably conclude that
the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was
convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). We
view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the conviction, . . . [and] assume the jury
believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v.
Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted).
Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, directly proves the existence of a fact
without requiring any inferences by the factfinder. See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40
(Minn. 2016) (stating that “direct evidence . . . allows the jury to find the defendant guilty
without having to draw any inferences”) . Circumstantial evidence, on the other han d, is
“evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did
not exist” and “always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with
direct evidence.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
When analyzing a claim under the circumstantial evidence standard, this court
applies a two-step standard of review. State v. S ilvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn.
2013). First, we identify the circumstances proved. State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88
(Minn. 2014). In doing so, “we construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved the
defense witnesses.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, we “determine whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). We independently examine “the
reasonableness of [the] inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved” and
“give no deference to the fact finder ’s choice between reasonable inferences.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Anderson was found guilty of felony domestic assault -harm under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242 (2018). That statute provides that whoever “intenti onally inflicts or attempts
to inflict bodily harm upon” a family or household member is guilty of assault. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 1(2). The offense is enhanced to a felony if the individual “violates the
provisions of this section . . . within ten years of the first of any combination of two or
more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions.” Id., subd. 4.
Anderson argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because
the state failed to prove that he acted with the required mens rea. “[T]he mens rea element
of assault-harm, ‘intentional,’ requires only the general intent to do the act that results in
bodily harm.” State v. Dorn , 887 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 2016) (citing State v. Fleck ,
810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (holding that assault-harm is a general-intent crime)).
“[I]n proving the mens rea element of general-intent crimes, the [s]tate need not show that
the defendant meant to or knew that she would violate the law or cause a particular result.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “Generally, intent is proven circumstantially by drawing
inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the
circumstances.” State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997).
Anderson contends that because intent is proven circumstantially, the
circumstantial-evidence standard of review is applicable. He also contends that because
the jury acquitted him of the domestic -assault-by-strangulation offense, “evidence
presented by the [s]tate about the strangulation conduct is inconsistent with the verdict and
[cannot] be considered.” Assuming, without deciding, that these arguments have merit, we
conclude that, even without consideration of the strangulation evidence, there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
At trial, the state proved the following circumstances: (1) Anderson and A.R. were
in a romantic relationship and lived together in St. Paul; (2) on or about December 26,
2019, the couple got into an argum ent; (3) the argument became physical and Anderson
told A.R. that he was going to kill her; (4) Anderson pushed A.R. down the basement stairs,
causing A.R. to scrape her back; (5) after pushing A.R. down the stairs, Anderson left the
scene; and (6) Anderso n had engaged in abusive conduct towards A.R. on three prior
occasions.
Anderson argues that the “circumstances proved do not exclude a rational
hypothesis that the contact between Anderson and A.R. at the stairs was accidental or
unintentional contact a s Anderson was trying to leave the apartment.” To support his
claim, Anderson relies on two statements recorded on the responding officer’s body
camera. In one statement, A.R. told th e officer that Anderson pulled her into the kitchen
and knocked her dow n the steps and “that’s how he was able to get out the door.” In
another statement, A.R. told the officer that she and Anderson were “tussling” in the
kitchen and then he pushed her down the steps and left. And Anderson points out that A.R.
never told the responding officer that her back was injured as a result of being pushed down
the stairs. Thus, Anderson argues that the “evidence as to the pushing and how it facilitated
his exit from the house, combined with [his] prompt 911 call and cooperation with police,
support[s] a reasonable inference that any physical contact with A.R. at the stairs was not
intended to be a battery.”
Anderson’s argument is unpersuasive. It is well settled that this court will not
overturn a conviction based on mere speculation. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 330
(Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). Here, the proposition that A.R. fell down the stairs as a
result of accidental contact with Anderson is conjecture based on no evidence. Instead, the
evidence shows that Ander son threat ened to kill A.R. and then pushed her down the
basement stairs, causing an injury to her back. And evidence of Anderson’s prior abusive
behavior towards A.R. provided additional proof that Anderson intended to push A.R.
down the stairs. Therefo re, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain
Anderson’s conviction of domestic assault-harm.
II.
Anderson argues that the district court erred by requiring him to register as a
predatory offender. Contrary to its position before the dis trict court, the state now agrees
with Anderson. The state requests reversal of the registration requirement.
Whether a defendant’s conduct requires predatory offender registration is a question
of law reviewed de novo. See State v. Lopez, 7 78 N.W.2d 7 00, 705 (Minn. 2010)
(reviewing de novo the application of Minn. Stat. § 243.166 to undisputed facts). Even
when parties agree that the district court erred, appellate courts independently review the
legal issue. State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673-74 n.7 (Minn. 1990).
Minnesota Statutes sections 243.166 and .167 (2018) govern predatory offender
registration. Section 243.166, subdivision 1b, provides an enumerated list of circumstances
requiring registration. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b. An individual is required to register
as a predatory offender when the person was charged with one or more enumerated offenses
and “convicted of . . . that offense or another offense arising out of the same set of
circumstances.” Id., subd. 1b(a)(1). Anderson’s charged offense of fourth-degree criminal
sexual conduct is an enumerated offense requiring registra tion. Id., subd. 1 b(a)(1)(iii).
Domestic assault-harm and threats of violence are not offenses requiring registration. See
id., subd. 1b.
Anderson argues that the district court erred by requiring him to register as a
predatory offender because neither the domestic -assault offense, nor the threats -of-
violence offense, arose out of the same set of circumstances as the fourth-degree criminal-
sexual-conduct charge that resulted in an acquittal. We agree. In Lopez, the supreme court
rejected arguments that predatory-registration is required when the convicted offense and
the charged offense arise out of “related circumstances” or where the two share a “single
related circumstance.” 778 N.W.2d at 706. Instead, the supreme court held that the “same
set of c ircumstances” phrase contained in section 243.166, subdivision 1b , means that a
person must register as a predatory offender when the “same general group of facts” gave
rise to both the convicted offense and the charged offense. Id. The circumstances nee d
not be identical in all respects, but there must be sufficient “overlap with regard to time,
location, persons involved, and basic facts.” Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Berry,
959 N.W.2d 184, 188 (Minn. 2021) ( restating that the “test of time, location, persons
involved, and basic facts is the correct framework, and a district court’s consideration of
whether predatory registration is required must include at least these factors”).
Here, both the alleged sexual assault of S.S. and the offense of domestic abuse-harm
against A.R. occurred at the same location. And there is some overlap in the same basic
facts because the argument between A.R. and Anderson that resulted in the domestic
assault was precipitated by Anderson’s alleged sexual contact with S.S. But the offenses
involved separate victims—S.S. was the alleged victim of the alleged sexual assault, and
A.R. was the victim of the domestic abuse. Moreover, the offenses were separated by time.
The record reflects that the alleged sexual contact was brief and occurred before Anderson
assaulted A.R. And although the argument between Anderson and A.R. was precipitated
by the alleged sexual assault, there is no further overlap in the basic facts. Finally, the state
agrees that t he two offenses did not arise from the same general group of facts.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s imposition of the predatory -offender-
registration requirement and remand the case for resentencing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.