In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. M. S. and J. L. B., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0329

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
A. M. S. and J. L. B., Parents.

Filed August 30, 2021
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-JV-20-2220

Matthew Ralston, Ralston Legal LLC, Golden Valley, Minnesota (for appellant -mother
A.M.S.)

Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, John A. Bowen, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent Wright County Health and Human Services)

Lynda Larson, Becker, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
On appeal from the termination of her parental rights, mother argues that (a) the
record does not support the district court’s determination that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family; (b) the district court should have continued the trial to allow
mother to participate in person; and (c) the record does not support the district court’s
determinations that she is a palpably unfit parent, and that she failed to rebut the
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presumption of palpable unfitness arising from a prior involuntary termination of her
parental rights. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2019, ap pellant-mother A.M.S. gave birth to E.V.B. (the child). Two
days later, respondent Wright County Health and Human Services (the county) received
notice of the child’s birth. The county received notice because mother’s parental rights to
three other children had been involuntarily terminated in 2016. The child was placed on a
72-hour hold, but was returned to mother’s custody following the development of a safety
plan.
In November 2019, the county filed a petition alleging that the child was a child in
need of protection or services (CHIPS). Three days later, the child’s father, J.L.B., was
arrested for allegedly committing domestic assault against mother. The child was present
at the time of the assault. As a result of the assault , a domestic-abuse no-contact order
(DANCO) was issued that prevented father from contacting mother.
In December 2019, mother admitted to the CHIPS petition. On January 3, 2020, the
child was removed from mother’s care and placed in foster care after the county made a
request for immediate removal due to concerns about mother’s mental health. Following
an emergency protective -care hearing, the district court found that the child would be
endangered if he were to remain in mother’s care and that out -of-home placement was in
his best interests. The district court noted that the county had considered reasonable efforts
to prevent the child’s removal from mother’s care, but those efforts “did not adequately
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address the safety of the child.” The district cou rt transferred custody of the child to the
county, and the child has remained in foster care since January 3, 2020.
Mother has a long history of significant mental-health issues, complicated by her
apparent inability to remain compliant with treatment. In 2015, mother’s three older
children were adjudicated CHIPS and placed in out -of-home placement due to concerns
regarding mother’s mental health and how that impacted her ability to parent . The
symptoms of mother’s mental illness included episodes of ps ychosis, paranoid delusions,
and bizarre behavior. Her case plan required her to address her mental -health needs, but
she failed to do so and her parental rights to her three older children were involuntarily
terminated in August 2016.
In April 2016, mother was civilly committed due to mental illness, and her medical
providers received authorization for the involuntary administration of neuroleptic
medication. She remained in intensive, residential treatment until October 2016. Her
mental health again deteriorated after the end of her commitment such that, i n January
2018, mother’s family brought her to the emergency room based on concerns about her
behavior. After being admitted to the hospital, mother continued to exhibit delusional and
paranoid behavior, which resulted in the filing of another petition for civil commitment.
The district court stayed an order of commitment on the conditions that she reside with her
mother, work with an Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) 1 team, and remain
medication compliant.

1 The ACT team advocates for mother and assists her with things such as medication
management, general support, and making sure her basic needs are covered. The goal of
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After the child was removed from mother’s care in January 2020 , mother and her
case worker developed an out-of-home placement plan that identified the goals that mother
must achieve to be reunified with the child. T he plan identified five goals for mother:
(1) address her mental-health symptoms; (2) remain free and sober from all non-prescribed,
mood-altering substances; (3) demonstrate the ability to parent the child and meet his needs
in an emotionally healthy and appropriate manner; (4) remain law -abiding, including
refraining from contact with father due to the DANCO; and (5) cooperate with the county
on services aimed at assisting reunification. The county then arranged for services for
mother to assist in meeti ng these goals, including a parenting -capacity assessment,
parenting-skills education, and mental -health programming. Mother failed to progress
with the programming, and her mental health deteriorated as time went on.
On May 4, 2020, the county file d a petition to terminate parental rights (TPR) of
mother. The petition alleged that mother was palpably unfit to parent and that reasonable
efforts had failed to correct the conditions that led to out -of-home placement. Mother
denied the petition. Following two continuances, the district court scheduled the TPR trial
for January 13, 2021. At a hearing held a couple of months before trial , the district court
discussed whether the trial would be held in person or remotely due to the COVID -19
pandemic. The county indicated that it had no objection to holding the trial remotely and,
when the district court asked if it was the agreement of the parties that the trial would be
held remotely, mother did not object or otherwise disagree. Despite mother’s agree ment

the ACT team is to allow mother to remain in the community and avoid the need for another
civil commitment or hospitalization.
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to a remote trial, mother filed an objection , one week prior to trial, seeking an in-person
trial either through a continuance or an exception to the pandemic restrictions on in-person
proceedings. The district court denied the motion.
At trial, the county presented testimony from the psychologist who performed the
parenting-capacity assessment, the nurse who provided parenting -education classes, and
mother’s case worker. The psychologist testified that mother “was in almost complete
denial” about her mental -health concerns. His report indicates that mother “intentionally
ignored, or could not remember” her previous diagnostic and psychological assessments,
and that she gave such conflicting information during those assessments that it was
“difficult, if not impossible to form a definitive diagnosis .” He ultimately opined that the
best diagnostic profile he could offer was the information provided in a prior diagnostic
assessment, that mother had depressive disorder with psychotic features, bipolar disorder,
trauma and stress -related disorder, obsessive -compulsive disorder, and histrionic,
narcissistic, and antisocial personality features. At trial, the psychologist testified that ,
based on his assessment, he did not support reunification.
The nurse and case worker similarly did not support reunification based on mother’s
lack of progress with her parenting skill s and inability or unwillingness to accept and
address her mental-health conditions. Both testified that mother was a challenge to work
with, did not demonstrate the ability to safely parent the child, and exhibited symptoms of
deteriorating mental health during the CHIPS case. Finally, the county presented evidence
that, despite the DANCO and provision in her out-of-home placement plan that required
mother to abide by the DANCO and have no contact with father, mother had become
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pregnant with and given birth to another child with father. Mother, two of her family
members, a family friend, and a member of the ACT team testified in support of mother.
On February 16, 2021, the district court terminated mother’s parental rights. Mother now
appeals.
DECISION
On appeal from a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we review
“the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review
its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily te rminating
parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. ,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “We give
considerable deference to the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights. But we
closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and
convincing.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008)
(citation omitted).
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O. , 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). “The child’s best interests, however,
remain the paramount consideration in every termination case.” Id. The petitioner must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground exists for terminating
parental rights. In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996).
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by terminating her parental
rights for three reasons. First, she argues that the record does not support the district court’s
determination that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Second, she
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argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request for a continuance
to postpone the TPR trial until it could be held in person. Finally, she argues that the record
does not support the district court’s determination that mother is palpably unfit to parent.
We address each argument in turn.
I. The county was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
Mother first argues that the record does not support the district court’s determination
that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. We review the district court’s
determination that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family for an abuse of
discretion. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321-23 (Minn. App. 2015),
review denied (Minn. July 20, 2015).
Generally, after a child has been adjudicated CHIPS and removed from the care of
a parent, the county must make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(a) (2020). But, under Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(2), the county is not required to
make reaso nable efforts at reunification upon a prima facie showing that “the parental
rights of the parent to another child have been terminated involuntarily.”
Here, it is undisputed that mother’s parental rights to her three older children were
involuntarily te rminated in 2016. T he district court thus correctly concluded that the
county was not required to make reasonable efforts toward reunification under Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(a)(2) and we therefore reject mother’s argument on this issue.2 See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 8 (2020).

2 The district court also found that, while not required, the county had made reasonable
efforts at reunification, which included providing mother with parenting-skills classes and
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II. The district court did not violate mother’s due -process rights by holding the
TPR trial remotely.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion and violated her due -
process rights by denying her request for a continuance and holding the trial remotely.
Generally, we review the denial of a continuance for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare
of A.Y.-J., 558 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1997).
But “[w]hether a parent’s due-process rights have been violated in a [ TPR ] proceeding is
a question of law, which we review de novo.” In re Welfare of Children of D.F .,
752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008).
Parents in a TPR proceeding are entitled to the due-process protections of the United
States and Minnesota Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7;
In re Welfare of H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981). In assessing the process due
in any particular case, the courts must balance “the interests involved in the specific case
under consideration.” Id. Ultimately, the “amount of process due varies with the
circumstances of the case,” and “both the interests of the parent and the child are considered
along with the circumstances of the particular case in an effort to determine which of these
interests is to predominate.” Id. at 825-26.
Mother argues that the district court violated her due-process rights by denying her
request to continue the trial until it could take place in person. In H.G.B., the supreme
court held that a parent does not necessarily have a constitutional right to attend a TPR

mental-health programming. Because the county was not required to make reasonable
efforts at reunification, we need not review this determination.
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proceeding in person. Id. In H.G.B., a father was not able to attend or observe the hearing
that resulted in the termination of his parental rights because he was incarcerated, but the
supreme court concluded that his due -process rights were not violated because he was
represented at the hearing by an attorney and was allowed to submit testimony by
deposition. Id. Here, by contrast, mother was able to observe and participate in the hearing,
albeit the hearing for both the county and mother was remote. Thus, any alleged burden
on mother’s due-process rights in this case would appear to be less than in H.G.B.
In addition, the rules of juvenile protection procedure provide that “[b]y agreement
of the parties, or in exceptional circumstances upon motion . . . or on the court’s own
initiative, the court may hold hearings and take testimony by telephone or interactive
video.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 11.02. On March 13, 2020, the Governor of Minnesota
issued an executive order declaring a peacetime emergency in response to the pandemic.
Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-01, Declaring a Peacetime Eme rgency and Coordinating
Minnesota’s Strategy to Protect Minnesotans from COVID -19 (Mar. 13, 2020 ). That
peacetime emergency was extended many times, and remained in effect during trial . See
Emerg. Exec. Order No. 21-04, Extending the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency Declared
in Executive Order 20-01 (Jan. 13, 2021 ); see also Order Governing th e Continuing
Operations of the Minnesota Judicial B ranch, No. ADM20 -8001 (Nov. 21, 2020). We
conclude that the COVID-19 pandemic was an “exceptional circumstance” allowing for a
remote trial under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 11.02.
Mother argues, however, that “there exists no compelling state interest in having a
trial during a pandemic when an in-person trial is not possible” and that clearing the court’s
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case docket and adhering to timelines “do not amount to a compelling state interest
outweighing constitutional rights.” We disagree with mother’s narrow characterization of
the court’s interests. The court’s interests, as set out in statute and the rules of juvenile
protection procedure, include balancing the rights of the parents with the b est interests of
the child. In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). To that end,
“[w]here the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are paramount.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020).
The supreme court has explained that, “[u]nder our law, children are not to be kept
waiting, uncertain who will raise them or where they will grow up.” In re Welfare of Child
of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Minn. 2014). At the time of the TPR trial, the child had
already been in out -of-home placement for over a year. It would plainly be contrary to
both the child’s best interests and stated aim of providing a “speedy” resolution in juvenile-
protection matters to continue the trial indefinitely until the trial could be held in person.
Rather, the district court’s decision to hold the trial remotely struck an appropriate balance:
in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 8 (2020), mother was afforded the
opportunity “to be heard, to present evidence material to t he case, and to cross -examine
witnesses appearing at the [TPR trial],” while also serving the child’s interest in a definitive
resolution to the case and certainty about his permanent home.
Moreover, we note that “prejudice as a result of the alleged violation is an essential
component of the due process analysis.” In re Welfare of Child of B.J. -M., 744 N.W.2d
669, 673 (Minn. 2008). Mother argues that “the practical realities of a remote hearing
make it more difficult for a parent and her attorney to communicate privately and
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continuously throughout the proceedings .” She asserts that she and her attorney were
“unable to communicate as freely as they would in an in-person trial,” but does not cite to
any specific instances in which she wished to speak with her attorney and was unable to do
so. Her generalized contention that the remote nature of the hearing made communication
more difficult is insufficient to establish the existence of prejudice as a result of the alleged
due-process violation. On this record, we conclude that the district court did not violate
mother’s due-process rights by denying her request for a continuance and instead holding
the trial remotely.
III. The district court did not err in determining that mother is palpably unfit to
parent.

Finally, mother argues that the record does not support the d istrict court’s
determination that she is palpably unfit to parent. On appeal, we will affirm a district
court’s decision to terminate parental rights if at least one statutory ground for termination
is proved by clear and convincing evidence and if termination is in the child’s best interests.
In re Welfare of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 2008). “We give
considerable deference to the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights. But we
closely inquire into the sufficiency of t he evidence to determine whether it was clear and
convincing.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385 (citation omitted).
A district court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it finds
that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and
child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific
conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly
relating to the parent and child relationship either of which are
determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable
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future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2020). The statute creates a presumption,
applicable in this case, that a parent is palpably unfit “upon a showing that the parent ’s
parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily terminated. ” Id. The
presumption can be rebutted by a showing that would “justify a finding of fact” that mother
was not palpably unfit to parent. R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137.
Here, mother claims that she brought forward sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption and that the district court’s determination that she was palpably unfit to parent
the child is not supported by the record. Mother’s argument focuses on the fact that she
“had four witnesses testify that she is not the same person that she was years prior,” was
progressing in her case plan and with programming, and had obtained stable housing for
herself and the child. We are not persuaded. Regardless of whether mother m ade a
sufficient showing to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness, we conclude that the
district court’s determination of palpable unfitness is supported by substantial evidence in
the record, independent of any presumption.
The district court in thi s case made very thorough findings of fact and fully and
carefully analyzed the legal issues. The district court detailed the substantial evidence in
the record of mother’s mental-health history, which shows that mother suffers from severe
and persistent mental illness with periods of hallucinations and, of the greatest significance
here, that mother fails to be compliant with treatment. Mother’s family members testified
that she was a different person when she took her medication, but the record indicates that
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mother repeatedly failed to take the medications needed to treat her illness. The district
court observed that “remaining medication compliant is one of the most important steps
[mother] can take in addressing her mental health” but that mother “did not consistently
take the medication she was prescribed, even with daily oversight from the ACT team.”
At trial, mother admitted that she had stopped taking her medication, stating “[a]s a person,
I have the right not to take a medication.” Mother also continued to deny or minimize her
mental-health issues. Thus, mother displayed a current unwillingness at trial to
acknowledge her mental-health needs and remain medication compliant.
With regard to the district court’s findings on the issue of mother’s parenting ability,
all three of the county’s witnesses—the psychologist who conducted the parenting-capacity
assessment, the nurse who provided the parenting -education classes , and mother’s case
worker—opposed reunification. Mother’s argument that she w as able to parent is based
on her own testimony, which the district court found not to be credible, and the testimony
of a member of mother’s ACT team. The district court found the ACT team member to be
less credible because her job was to serve as an advocate for mother and that “no adequate
foundation existed for [the team member’s] opinions” regarding mother’s parenting skills.3
The district court’s findings that mother failed to progress with programming are
also amply supported in the record. In support of the findings, the district court pointed to

3 The district court noted that the ACT team member had only recently been hired into that
job and tha t her prior professional experience was as a speech therapist and weight -loss
counselor.
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the testimony of the professionals who worked with mother to the effect that mother’s
participation in the programming was sporadic, “surface-level[,] and often antagonistic.”
Finally, with regard to the district court’s determination that mother was palpably
unfit, the district court noted that mother’s case worker, mental-health professionals, and
even members of her family and ACT team expressed concern over her deteriorating
mental health during the pendency of the case. The district court further noted that mother
exhibited signs of her deteriorated mental health at trial, had difficulty following even basic
questions, and that her testimony was at tim es rambling and non -responsive. As one
example, the district court noted that in response to a question about whether J.L.B. was
also the father of her new baby, mother responded, “Greg Ward is not the father to my kid
and what were you saying? Nor is his dad.” The county had not mentioned Greg Ward.
Mother’s case worker explained that it is unknown if Greg Ward is a real person, but that
he is “part of [mother’s] symptomatology” and that mother brings him up when she is
experiencing mental-health symptoms.
On this record, we conclude that the district court ’s determination that mother was
palpably unfit to parent the child is supported by the record. The child was removed from
mother’s care and placed in foster care due to the significant concerns about the status of
mother’s mental health. At the time of trial , mother continued to deny or minimize these
concerns, remained medication non -compliant, an d actively exhibited s ymptoms of her
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mental illness. The record therefore supports at least one statutory basis for termination,
and the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating mother’s parental rights. 4
Affirmed.

4 The district court also terminated mother’s parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5) (2020), after determining that reasonable efforts failed to correct the
conditions that led to out -of-home placement. Because the record supports the district
court’s termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), we need not address this
determination.