A21-0403

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0330
A21-0403

Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party by Ken Martin, its Chair,
Appellant,

vs.

Steve Simon, in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of the State of Minnesota,
Respondent

and

Noah J. McCourt,
Appellant,

vs.

Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon, in his official capacity,
Respondent.

Filed January 3, 2022
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-CV-20-4066, 62-CV-20-3913

Charles N. Nauen, David J. Zoll, Kristen G. Marttila, Rachel A. Kitze Collins,
Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., Minneapo lis, Minnesota (for appellant Minnesota
Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party); and

Amarita K. Singh, Simon J. Trautmann, Trautmann Martin La w PLLC, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant Noah J. McCourt)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Allen Co ok Barr, Stephen D. Melchionne, Assistant
Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

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Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. A First Amendment challenge to a statut e is not ripe when there is no credible
threat of prosecution under that statute.
2. The criminal penalties of Minnesota Statutes sections 201.014 (2020) and
204C.14 (2020), which punish un lawful voting as a felony, do not apply to voting in
precinct caucuses.
OPINION
JESSON, Judge
In First Amendment challenges to the Minn esota law that limits who can vote at
precinct caucuses to “eligible voters,” appellants separately sued the Minnesota Secretary
of State. Appellants alleged that the ca ucus-eligibility statute violates their First
Amendment freedom-of-association rights. It does so, they asserted , when it excludes
potential caucus attendees, such as “dreamers,” minors, and individuals whose civil rights
have not been fully restored after a felony, who wish to participate at a caucus but are
ineligible to vote in a primary or general election. The district courts dismissed both
actions, concluding that the challenges were not justiciable as they were not ripe for review.
The appellants filed separate appeals, which we consolidated. Because there is no credible

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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threat of prosecution against the parties fo r violation of the cau cus-eligibility statute—
making this action nonjusticiable—we affirm.
FACTS
During every general-election year, members of the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-
Labor Party (the DFL) come together in neig hborhood-level gatherings to discuss issues
and organize at the local level. At these precinct caucuses, participants may introduce
resolutions on issues that they wish to see included in the DFL party platform and the DFL
constitution, as well as vote to elect local part y leadership. Caucus attendees also vote to
elect delegates and alternates to the district conventions, who in turn endorse candidates
and select DFL leadership.
But Minnesota law limits which caucus a ttendees may vote in a precinct caucus,
stating “[o]nly those individuals who are or will be eligible to vote at the time of the next
state general election, may vote or be elected a delegate or officer at the precinct caucus.”
Minn. Stat. § 202A.16, subd. 1 (2020) (emp hasis added) (caucus-eligibility statute).
Crucial to appellants the DFL and Noah McCourt, Minnesota Statutes section 201.014 (the
election-eligibility statute)—the statute that determines voter eligibility at election time—
prevents from voting “dreamers” (noncitizens who immigrated to the United States as
young children), minors, and indi viduals who have not been fu lly restored to their civil
rights after a felony conviction. Both these statutes are reproduced on the Minnesota
Secretary of State website.

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Parties
The DFL is a major political party in Minnesota. McCourt is an active member of
the DFL. He is the outreach and inclusi on officer for the DFL Disability Caucus and
inclusion officer for the Saint Paul Young DFL. But because he was convicted of a felony
and is currently serving a five-year sentence on probation, he is in eligible to vote in a
primary or general election. Thus, under the caucus-eligibility statute, he is currently
ineligible to vote in a precinct caucus.
Secretary of State Steve Simon (Simon or secretary) is responsible for the oversight
of elections, which includes promulgating rule s governing the eligibility and registration
of voters in Minnesota and maintain ing the registered voter lists. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 201.091, subd. 2, (requiring secretary to prepare list of registered voters), .221
(requiring secretary to provide rules for maintaining voter registration records) (2020).
Procedural History
The DFL and McCourt sued Simon in sepa rate actions, alleging that the caucus-
eligibility statute is unconstitutional because it violates their freedom-of-association rights
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1 Additionally, McCourt
raised a claim that the statute violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In both cases Simon moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Minn. R. Civ. Pro. 12.02(a), (e).
The DFL and McCourt separately also moved for summary judgment. The district courts

1 While the DFL is the involved political party here, the caucus-eligibility statute applies
to all political parties that hold caucuses.
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dismissed for failure to state a claim, conc luding that there is no threat of the caucus-
eligibility statute being enforc ed by Simon, and th at Simon does not have the power to
enforce it. Because the district court addr essing the DFL’s lawsuit found the case should
be dismissed, it did not reach the DFL’s motion for summary judgment.
The DFL and McCourt appeal.
ISSUE
Are appellants’ challenges to Minnesota Statutes section 202A.16 (2020) (the
caucus-eligibility statute) justiciable?
ANALYSIS
Under the Minnesota Constitution, courts do not issue advisory opinions.
State v. Arens, 586 N.W.2d 131, 132 (M inn. 1998) (noting that we “only decide actual
controversies”). Nor do we “decide cas es merely to establish precedent.”
Schowalter v. State, 822 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Instead, we
require “the presence of a justiciable controversy” to our exercise of jurisdiction. Id. One
aspect of justiciability is ripeness, which is a doctrine designed to prevent the courts “from
entangling themselves in abstract disagree ments over administrative policies” through
avoidance of premature adjudication. Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’ n v. Dep’t of Interior ,
538 U.S. 803, 807 (2003) (quo tation omitted). Justiciability re quires that a case be ripe
which, in the context of a statutory challenge like this one, means the law “is, or is about
to be, applied to [the plaintiff’s] disadvantage.” Baertsch v. Minn. Dep’t of Revenue, 518
N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1994) (quoting St. Paul Area Chamber of Com. v. Marzitelli , 258
N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn. 1977)).
6
The DFL and McCourt argue that the district courts erred in concluding that they
failed to state claims on whic h relief could be granted because their challenges to the
caucus-eligibility statute were not ripe for review. We review de novo a case, like this one,
dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Hebert v. City of Fifty
Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008). In doing so, we consider only the facts alleged
in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and construing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Id.
In their complaints, the DFL and McCourt challenged the caucus-eligibility statute
as violating their First Amendment freedom-o f-association rights due to a threat of
enforcement from the secretary sh ould ineligible voters vote or be elected at the caucus.
Part of their fear of reprisal is premised on the punishments in the election-eligibility statute
and Minnesota Statutes section 204C.14 (unlawful-voting statute). Because the DFL and
McCourt argue that the felony penalties contained in the election-eligibility and
unlawful-voting statutes apply to the caucus- eligibility statute—and because the ripeness
analysis here requires us to determine whether a credible threat of prosecution exists—we
begin with interpreting these statutes. Then , with those interpretations in mind, we
consider whether the challenge to the caucus-eligibility statute is ripe for review.
Statutory Interpretation
Our interpretation of whether the felony pun ishments in two statutes apply to the
third turns on the inte rplay (or lack thereo f) among three statutes : the caucus-eligibility,
election-eligibility, and unlawful-voting statut es. We begin with the caucus-eligibility
statute, which states in part that “[o]nly those individuals who are or will be eligible to vote
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at the time of the next state general election, may vote or be elected a delegate or officer at
the precinct caucus.” 2 Minn. Stat. § 202A.16, subd. 1. But the only enforcement
mechanism in this caucus statute lies with the other caucus participants, stating that “[i]n
case the right of a person to participate at the caucus is challenged, the question of the right
to participate shall be decided by a vote of the whole caucus. A person so challenged may
not vote on the question of the person’s right to participate.” Id., subd. 3 (emphasis added).3
Because voter eligibility for caucuses turns on the electi on-eligibility statute, we
look next at Minnesota Statutes section 201.014, which explains the requirements for who
is eligible to vote:
Subdivision 1. Requirements. Except as provided in
subdivision 2, an individu al who meets the following
requirements at the time of an election is eligible to vote. The
individual must:
(1) be 18 years of age or older;
(2) be a citizen of the United States; and
(3) maintain residence in Minnesota for 20 days
immediately preceding the election.

Subd. 2. Not eligible. The following individuals are not
eligible to vote. Any individual:
(1) convicted of treason or any felony whose civil
rights have not been restored;
(2) under a guardianship in which the court order
revokes the ward’s right to vote; or
(3) found by a court of law to be legally
incompetent.

2 “Eligible voter means an individual who is eligible to vote under [the election-eligibility
statute].” Minn. Stat. § 200.02, subd. 15 (2020).
3 We note that “participate” in subdivision 3 could be read as broader than voting or being
elected as a delegate at a caucus. But becaus e this challenge is a bout whether the felony
punishments of other election-related statutes apply specifically to the first subdivision of
the caucus-eligibility statute, which deals only with participation by voting, we do not need
to reach that question.
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Subd. 3. Penalty. Any individual who votes who knowingly
is not eligible to vote is guilty of a felony.

Minn. Stat. § 201.014.
Finally, the unlawful-voting statute criminalizes certain activities, stating:
Subdivision 1. Violations; penalty. No individual shall
intentionally:
(a) misrepresent the individual’s identity in applying
for a ballot, depositing a ballot in a ballot box or
attempting to vote by means of a voting machine
or electronic voting system;
(b) vote more than once at the same election;
(c) put a ballot in a ballot box for any illegal
purpose;
(d) give more than one ballot of the same kind to an
election judge to be placed in a ballot box;
(e) aid, abet, counsel or pr ocure another to go into
any precinct for the purpo se of voting in that
precinct, knowing that the other individual is not
eligible to vote in that precinct; or
(f) aid, abet, counsel or pr ocure another to do any
act in violation of this section.

A violation of this section is a felony.

Minn. Stat. § 204C.14, subd. 1.

With these three statutes in mind, we turn to our standard of review. We review
issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 535
(Minn. 2013). The objective of statutory interpretation is to “effectuate the intention of the
legislature,” reading the statute as a whole. Id. at 536; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020).
Our first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute’s language, on
its face, is ambiguous. Christianson, 831 N.W.2d at 536. A statute is only ambiguous if
its language is “subject to more th an one reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 537. To
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determine whether a statute is ambiguous, we analyze “the statute’s text, structure, and
punctuation.” State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 921 (Min n. 2019). We may also
consider the canons of interpretation, incl uding the ordinary-meaning canon, where we
construe the words of the statute according to their plain meaning. State v. Riggs , 865
N.W.2d 679, 682 (2015); Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020).
As our standard of review dictates, when deciding wh ether the penalties in the
election-eligibility and unlawful-voting statutes apply to caucus voting, we begin with the
plain language of these laws. That language references only elections. See, e.g., Minn.
Stat. § 201.014, subd. 1 (stating that an individual must “maintain residence in Minnesota
for 20 days immediately preceding the election.” (emphasis added)). And the unlawful-
voting statute is housed in the chapter of the Minnesota code title “Election Day Activities.”
Minn. Stat. ch. 204C (2020) (emphasis added). There is no mention of caucuses in either
statute. This is critical because, looking to their ordinary meanings, there is a notable
difference between “elections” and “caucuses.”4 A caucus is defined as “a meeting of the
local members of a political party especially to select delegates to a convention or register
preferences for candidates running for office,” whereas an election is defined as “the act or
process of electing someone to fill an office or position.” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 295, 575 (5th ed. 2011). 5 While the caucus system

4 The Minnesota Statutes do not defi ne either “caucus” or “election.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 200.02 (2020) (providing definitions for Minnesota election law).
5 Black’s Law Dictionary reflects these same definitions. A caucus is defined as “a private
meeting of representatives from a political party who assemble to nominate candidates and
decide party policy.” Black’s Law Dictionary 272 (11th ed. 2019). And election is defined
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may constitute a key ingredient in Minnesota’s political process, these definitions highlight
the considerable weight and consequences of elections compared to caucuses—with
punishments that reflect that weight. Given the ordinary accepted meanings of the words
“election” and “caucus,” we conclude that the penalties in these election statutes
unambiguously apply to elections, not caucuses.
Our plain-language interpretation is bolst ered by the enforcemen t provision in the
caucus-eligibility statute. The enforcement identified in that provision, albeit not criminal,
enables the caucus members to vote to preclude someone from participating in the caucus
if there is a violation. Minn. Stat. § 202A .16, subd. 3. And wh ile the caucus-eligibility
statute does reference the election-eligibility st atute when discussing voter eligibility, the
parties do not point to—nor do we find—how the punishments for election-related activity
apply to caucuses, in contrast to the ex plicit enforcement meas ure given to caucus
participants.
In sum, we conclude that by the plain language of the statutes, the criminal penalties
in the election-eligibility statute and the unlawful-voting statute do not apply to the caucus-
eligibility statute.
Ripeness
With the interpretation of these statutes in mind, we next consider whether the DFL
and McCourt’s claims are ripe for review.

as “the process of selecting a person to occupy an office . . . , membership, award, or other
title or status.” Id. at 654.
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Ripeness is based on the principle that courts will consider only redressable injuries.
State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Minn. App. 2007). To establish a
justiciable controversy in a declaratory ju dgment action challenging the constitutionality
of a law, a plaintiff “must show a direct and imminent injury” stemming from the allegedly
unconstitutional provision. McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 808 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn.
2011) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). St ated another way, one must establish that
a law “is, or is about to be, applied to [their] disadvantage.” Baertsch, 518 N.W.2d at 25
(emphasis added) (quoting Marzitelli, 258 N.W.2d at 588).
Minnesota caselaw provides guidance regard ing when a statute is “about to be
applied” to a party. For example, in Baertsch, the supreme court held that a statute
providing a tax scheme for health care provi ders was “about to be applied” to the
appellants’ disadvantage when the Minnes ota Department of Revenue sent a letter
expressing its intent to enforce that statut e. 518 N.W.2d at 25. And similarly in
McCaughtry, the supreme court reasoned that an administrative-warrant statute was “about
to be applied” against the appellants because the city had already fi led three applications
for administrative warrants and presumably would act upon them if granted. 808 N.W.2d
at 339-40. But Minnesota caselaw is silent as to the application of this “about to be applied
to [their] disadvantage” test for ripeness wh en it comes to assessi ng a First Amendment,
pre-enforcement challenge.
And that is just the challenge we have here—appellants fear the enforcement of the
statute that limits caucus participation to elig ible voters but acknowledge that no one has
been charged with a felony for voting in a caucus. Accordingly, we have a pre-enforcement
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challenge. The DFL asserts that this fear chills their freedom to associate with minors,
dreamers, and individuals, including McCourt, whose civil rights have not been fully
restored—groups of people the party would othe rwise allow to vote or be elected during
caucuses. This amounts, appellants claim, to an unconstitutional in terference with their
First Amendment rights.
While Minnesota has yet to explicitly addr ess ripeness in this First Amendment
context, we observe that in federal law the standard ripeness showing is relaxed in cases
involving the chilling of Fi rst Amendment rights. See, e.g., Kansas Jud. Rev. v. Stout ,
519 F.3d 1107, 1116 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Our ripe ness analysis is relaxed somewhat in the
context of a First Amendment facial challenge, however, because an unconstitutional law
may chill free speech.” (quotation omitted)); Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 31
(1st Cir. 2007) (stating that when free speech is at issue ripeness requirements are relaxed);
Wm. Grayson Lambert, Toward A Better Understandi ng of Ripeness and Free Speech
Claims, 65 S.C. L. Rev. 411, 463 (2013) (“[T]he normal ripeness test is relaxed in these
cases because of the importance of free speech rights and the need to protect speech from
any potential chilling effect.”). Accordingly, where First Amendment rights are at stake,
“a plaintiff need not have been actually pros ecuted or threatened with prosecution” to
establish ripeness. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 627 (8th Cir. 2011). Rather,
speech is “reasonably chilled”—at least enough to render a case “ripe”—when a plaintiff
shows “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional
13
interest, but proscribed by [the] statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution.”6
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289,
299 (1979)). When analyzing whether a “credi ble threat of prosecution” exists, federal
courts have considered the history of the stat ute’s enforcement, as well as how recently it
was enacted. See, e.g., id.; St. Paul Area Chamber of Com. v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481, 486
(8th Cir. 2006).
To evaluate the appropriateness of the “credible threat of prosecution” ripeness test,
we turn to Minnesota caselaw which addresses the right at issue here: the First Amendment
right of freedom of association. Courts in Minnesota have emphasized the importance of
this right, including where owners of seve ral Twin Cities gyms denied employment and
promotions to people who did not share their religious faith. State by McClure v. Sports &
Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Minn. 1985). This right was upheld when the
supreme court declared a statute unconstituti onal because it required that any candidate
who filed for a partisan municipal office as an “Independent” declare that they would not
accept any other party’s suppo rt for their candidacy. Minnesota Fifth Cong. Dist.
Indep.-Republican Party v. State ex rel. Spannaus , 295 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. 1980).
There, the court explained that a political party enjoys the “pre cious associational
freedoms” to further its common political goals, and that the freedom of association is “at
the heart of the rights protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 652.

6 All parties agree that this test, as set out in 281 Care Comm., is the appropriate test, but
no Minnesota case has adopted it as such.
14
Given the Minnesota Supreme Court’s de ference to “precious associational
freedoms,” we are persuaded that the standard ripeness showing should be relaxed in cases
involving the chilling of First Amendment rights. Accordingly, a plaintiff who chooses to
self-censor based on a statute in this contex t must demonstrate that their choice was
objectively reasonable. To do so, they need to establish a credible threat of prosecution.7
Were appellants faced with that credible threat here? To consider this question, we
turn to the constellation of factors courts consider in assessing that threat—or lack thereof.
First, we consider the histor y of the statute’s enforcement, including the time since the
statute was enacted or amended. Gaertner, 439 F.3d at 486. Here, it is uncontested that
the caucus-eligibility statute has never been enforced in the 40-plus years since enactment.
This is unlike cases such as Gaertner or 281 Care Comm. where the enforcement statutes
in question were enacted or amended only a handful of years before the threat of
enforcement was brought to a court. Gaertner, 439 F.3d at 484 (addressing statute enacted
in 1988); 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 628 (addressing statute amended in 2004).

7 Our decision to apply this more relaxed ri peness test for pre-enforcement challenges to
statutes abridging First Amendment rights is bolstered by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision to follow federal law in the related justiciability doctrine of standing and apply an
“injury-in-fact” analysis. Enright v. Lehmann, 735 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 2007) (“An
injury-in-fact is a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest.”
(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))). Although we note that
the injury-in-fact federal cases are from the related justiciability doctrine of standing, and
not the ripeness doctrine, Minnesota requires an injury-in-fact for both doctrines. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 25 N.W.2d 474, 478 (1946) (“ The party who invokes the
power [of the court] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement.” (emphasis added)); McCaughtry, 808 N.W.2d at 337-38 (requiring direct
and imminent injury to establish ripeness).
15
Next, we assess whether prosecution has be en threatened. Once again, here the
parties agree that there has never been even a threat of enforcement from any past
secretaries of state for a violation of the caucus-eligibility statute. Cf. Mangual v. Rotger-
Sabat, 317 F.3d 54, 59-60 (1st Ci r. 2003) (finding a credible threat of enforcement when
an officer threatened to f ile suit against a newspaper and a reporter). Nor does the
secretary’s website constitute a threat of enforcement—it merely recites the current law. It
does not threaten to enforce it.
Still the DFL argues that the secretary could file an in junction or start a civil
investigation against a political party. However, this secretary has firmly announced that
he will not do so. He goes so far as to assert that he does not have the authority to enforce
the caucus-eligibility statute. 8 Which leads us to an a dditional consideration—a firm
disavowal of any intent to prosecute (or take civil action which arguably might constitute
enforcement) by the secretary. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302 (explaining that the threat of
prosecution may exist when a state has not disavowed any intention of invoking a criminal
penalty); see also Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project , 561 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (citing this
statement in Babbit).
Finally, we note that chilled sp eech is more likely if ther e is criminal enforcement
as opposed to civil enforcement. See, e.g., 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 631 (concluding

8 We do not reach the question of whether any secretary of state could use their general
powers to enforce the statute or otherwise punish a caucus-goer or political party. Nor do
we reach the issue of whether civil actions might constitute “prosecution” for ripeness
purposes. The important point here is that there is no threat of enforcement now—in either
a criminal or civil context—fro m the current secretary. We are not closing the door on
future challenges to this statute based on a different factual scenario.
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that a challenge to a crimin al statute implicating First Amendment rights was ripe for
chilled-speech challenge); Gaertner, 439 F.3d at 487 (same); United Food & Com.
Workers Int’l Union v. IBP, Inc. , 857 F.2d 422, 430 (8 th Cir. 1988) (same); Epperson v.
State of Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1968) (same). But because we interpret the statutes
criminalizing certain election-related activit y as not applying to the caucus-eligibility
statute, there are no criminal ramifications for a violation.
In sum, considering the history of enforc ement, the threat of enforcement, the
secretary’s view of their enforcement author ity, and the lack of criminal penalties, the
enforcement void surrounding the caucus-eligibility statute is a far cry from cases where a
credible threat of prosecution has been found.9 Gaertner, 439 F.3d at 487. And without a

9 As a matter of public policy, McCourt highlights many racial disparities in the economy,
education, and incarceration, including felony disenfranchise ment, but fails to connect
these to the caucus-eligibility statute. Disenfranchisement at the general election level, and
how it affects democracy, is not at issue here.

Additionally, McCourt alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
because he was unaware (and thus did not have notice) that a felony would affect his First
Amendment right to association. Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 786 (Minn. 2014)
(“The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful ma nner.”). But the secretary had no obligation
to inform McCourt at his criminal hearing of his rights to participate in caucuses. And not
only does McCourt agree that the disenfranchi sement of someone w ho is convicted of a
felony is constitutional, he also agrees that his criminal proceeding satisfied the notice and
hearing requirements for procedural due process with regard to depriving him of his right
to vote in a general election. McCourt does not explain why the notice of the deprivation
of one right would be satisfied through his criminal proceeding but the other would not.

Also, McCourt contends that if he violated the caucus-e ligibility statute, he would
by default violate his probation, which he asserts is anothe r way that his freedom of
association is impermissibly chilled. But since the founding of the state someone who
commits a felony loses certain civil rights—including the right to vote—until restored
through other means. See Schroeder v. Simon , 962 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. App. 2021)
17
showing of past, present or threatened enforcement, the DFL and McCourt did not establish
that there was a credible threat of prosecu tion should they violate the caucus-eligibility
statute. Without this showing, this pre-enforcement challenge is not ripe for review. To
hold otherwise would violate the principles of justicia bility, as we would be issuing an
advisory opinion addressing hypothetical harms.
DECISION
For this First Amendment, pre-enforcement challenge to be properly before the
district court, it must be ripe for review. To be ri pe in this context, a plaintiff needs to
establish that its decision to chill their fre edom-of-association right is based a credible
threat of prosecution. The criminal penaltie s of Minnesota Statutes sections 201.014 and
204C.14, which by their plain language do not apply to voting in precinct caucuses, do not
contribute to a credible threat . And this lack of criminal penalties, combined with an
enforcement void across 45 years, leads us to c onclude that there is no credible threat of
prosecution should appellants violate the ca ucus-eligibility statute. As a result, the
appellants’ challenges to the ca ucus-eligibility statute are not ripe, and the district court
properly dismissed these lawsuits.
Affirmed.

(explaining the history of voter disenfranchisement in Minnesota), rev. granted (Aug. 10,
2021). That McCourt’s probation could limit his ability to participate in a caucus is not
constitutionally impermissible.