Original Jurisdiction

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-0338

Original Jurisdiction

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action
against Herbert Azubuike Igbanugo, a Minnesota Filed: April 26, 2023
Attorney, Registration No. 0191139 Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Timothy M. Burke, Senior Assistant Director, Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Herbert A. Igbanugo, Minneapolis, Minnesota, pro se.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. The referee’s findings and conclusions that the attorney committed
misconduct in seven matters by neglect, failing to notify clients, failing to explain legal
issues, collecting unreasonable fees, collecting improper availability fees, failing to issue
or to promptly issue refunds of unearned fees, failing to have measures to ensure lawyers
and non-lawyers at his firm conformed with professional obligations, and providing false
and misleading information were not clearly erroneous.
2. The referee’s evidentiary decisions were not an abuse of discretion.
3. The attorney failed to establish that the disciplinary process violated his
constitutional rights.
2
4. An indefinite suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for
10 months is the appropriate discipline for the attorney’s misconduct.
Suspended.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.
The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (the Director)
petitioned for disciplinary action against respondent-attorney Herbert Azubuike Igbanugo,
alleging 54 violations of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. After conducting
an evidentiary hearing, the referee’s factual findings concluded that Igbanugo committed
50 rule violations across 7 client matters. These violations included failing to act with
diligence, failing to notify clients of important updates, failing to properly explain legal
issues to clients, collecting unreasonable fees (including availability fees when he was
already retained to perform legal services), failing to issue prompt refunds of unearned
advanced fees, failing to refund unearned advanced fees, failing to take reasonable steps to
make sure the firm had measures to ensure all lawyers and non-lawyers complied with
professional obligations, and providing false and misleading information. The referee
found five aggravating factors, no mitigating factors, and determined Igbanugo’s
constitutional rights were not violated during the disciplinary process. The referee
recommended that Igbanugo be suspended from the practice of law for 10 months.
Igbanugo challenges the referee’s findings, conclusions, and evidentiary decisions
and argues the proceedings and investigation violated his constitutional rights. The
Director contends that the recommended discipline is too lenient and asks us to suspend
3
Igbanugo for a minimum of 1 year. We conclude that the referee’s findings and
conclusions were not clearly erroneous, the referee’s evidentiary decisions were not an
abuse of discretion, and Igbanugo’s constitutional rights were not violated. We also
conclude the appropriate discipline given Igbanugo’s misconduct is an indefinite
suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for 10 months.
FACTS
Igbanugo was admitted to practice law in July 1988 and has primarily practiced in
immigration law. In 2006, Igbanugo started his own firm, Igbanugo Partners International
Law Firm. Igbanugo hired Jason Nielson as an associate attorney in 2013, and Nielson
became a junior partner in 2014. 1 The misconduct in this case occurred in seven client
matters between 2011 and 2019. We begin by briefly summarizing Igbanugo’s
misconduct.
A.C-G., M.D., and O.O.C. Matters
We address the A.C-G, M.D., and O.O.C. matters together because the facts and
Igbanugo’s actions in each case are similar. A.C-G., M.D., and O.O.C. are Mexican
nationals who entered the United States without inspection. They each have U.S.-citizen
children. The clients told Igbanugo they did not have legal status but wanted legal
residency. Igbanugo told the clients they could obtain legal residency through their
U.S.-citizen children.

1 The Director petitioned for disciplinary action against Nielson based, in part, on two
client matters that are also included here. W e suspended Nielson for a minimum of 30
days in July 2022. In re Nielson, 977 N.W.2d 599, 614–15 (Minn. 2022).
4
Each client entered a retainer agreement with Igbanugo’s firm that contemplated
form I-130 petitions and form I -601A waivers. 2 Each retainer agreement called for
availability-retainer fees. Igbanugo or his employees falsely told each client that their
U.S.-citizen children were qualifying relatives for the purposes of the I-601A waiver. 3
Igbanugo filed a form I-130 with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) for each client and USCIS approved the forms.
After form I-130 approval, Igbanugo or his employees reiterated, falsely, that the
clients’ U.S.-citizen children were qualifying relatives for an I-601A waiver. After
collecting necessary materials from the clients for the I-601A waivers, Igbanugo notified
each client that their children were not qualifying relatives, and as a result they were
ineligible for an I-601A waiver.
Each client paid Igbanugo large sums of money for services he did not complete ;
Igbanugo did not refund the unearned retainer money to these clients. In M.D.’s case, the
National Visa Center (NVC) invoiced Igbanugo’s firm because more than a year passed
without any action on M.D.’s I-130 petition. Because of the inaction, the forms and fees
associated with M.D.’s I-130 had to be resubmitted to NVC; Igbanugo never notified M.D.

2 We explained these forms in more detail in Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 604. An I-130
Petition for Alien Relative Form is filed with United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) “ to establish a qualifying family relationship with a relative (foreign
national).” Id. An I-601A Application for Provisional Unlawful Pretense Waiver is used
to request a waiver of unlawful presence in the United States based on a substantial
hardship to a qualifying relative (I-601A waiver). Id.

3 A “qualifying relative must be a U.S. Citizen or lawful permanent resident who is a
parent or spouse of the foreign national. A child may not be a qualifying relative.”
Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 604–05 (footnote omitted).
5
of this invoice. Igbanugo also admitted to O.O.C. that he mistakenly told her she was
eligible for an I-601A waiver.
In May 2016, A.C-G., M.D., and O.O.C. sued Igbanugo and his firm (joint
litigation). The jury found Igbanugo liable for breach of contract, violations of the
Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, and legal malpractice. The district court awarded each
client cumulative damages. Igbanugo appealed, the court of appeals affirmed, and we
denied review.
I.A.D. and D.E.F.L. Matter
In the I.A.D. and D.E.F.L. matter, I.A.D and D.E.F.L. retained Igbanugo in February
2018 because they lacked legal status but wanted to become legal residents. Igbanugo
falsely told the couple they could gain permanent residency through their U.S.-citizen
child. The couple entered a retainer agreement that called for two I-130/I- 485 one-step
adjustments based on their child, I-601 forms if necessary, and general immigration
counseling.4 Less than a month after retaining Igbanugo, the couple hired new counsel,

4 Form I-485 is an application to register a permanent resident or adjust status, but
foreign nationals must establish they were admitted or paroled, or into the United States to
be eligible. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., OMB N o.
1615-0023, Form I-485, Instructions for Application to Register Permanent Residence or
Adjust Status 11 (2023). Being “waved through” means the inspecting immigration officer
allowed the foreign national to enter the United States without providing documentation;
the foreign national must prove the facts of the wave through to show they were admitted
lawfully. Policy Manual, Chapter 2 – Eligibility Requirements, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigr. Servs. (last visited Dec. 13, 2022), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-
7-part-b-chapter-2 [opinion attachment]. An I-601 waiver can be completed to request
waiver of inadmissibility grounds if a foreign national is inadmissible because they
previously sought immigration benefits through fraud or misrepresentation. U.S. Dep’t
Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., OMB No. 1615-0029, Form I-601,

6
terminated Igbanugo’s representation, and requested a full refund. Igbanugo agreed to
refund the couple some money within 60 days, but his refund calculation included work
the firm performed after the couple terminated his representation.
Na E.S. Matter
In the Na E.S. matter, Na E.S.’s father (A.E.S.) contracted with Igbanugo in March
2016 on Na E.S.’s behalf for an adjustment of status. In July 2016, Igbanugo met with Na
E.S. and told her it would take years for her visa to process. By this time, she had paid
Igbanugo over half the contract price. Igbanugo issued Na E.S. a partial refund in
September 2016. In a 2018 e-mail exchange with A.E.S., Igbanugo claimed he was not
obligated to refund the family any money on Na E.S. ’s contract, even though rules of
professional conduct require unearned fees to be refunded at the end of representation.
Nl E.S. Matter
Na E.S. (the subject of the previous matter) and Nl E.S (the subject of this matter)
are siblings; A.E.S. is also Nl E.S.’s father . During the same March 2016 meeting
discussed above between A.E.S. and Igbanugo, the two also discussed Nl E.S.’s
immigration status. A.E.S. emphasized that Nl E.S. would turn 21 in June 2016, so they
wanted to act quickly to get Nl E.S.’s visa application approved before Nl E.S.’s birthday.
A.E.S. also informed Igbanugo that Nl E.S.’s passport was expired. Igbanugo indicated he
could adjust Nl E.S.’s status before his birthday, and they entered into a retainer agreement

Instructions for Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility 1, 11 (2022)
[hereinafter OMB No. 1615-0029]. The applicant must show that refusing their admission
to the United States will cause extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. OMB No.
1615-0029, at 7.
7
that called for an advanced parole form I-131 (a visa application), and consular processing
or adjustment of status, if eligible. The family knew that Nl E.S. needed to renew his
Egyptian passport before the visa application could be submitted. Nl E.S aged out of the
preferred visa category in June 2016, but Igbanugo did not notify the family. Igbanugo
instead continued to compile information for the visa application for which Nl E.S. was
now ineligible. In October 2018, Igbanugo’s firm submitted Nl E.S.’s visa application
under the category for which Nl-E.S. was ineligible, and the embassy e-mailed the family
explaining that Nl E.S. aged out of that category.
In November 2018, A.E.S terminated Igbanugo’s representation and requested a full
refund. Igbanugo admitted his firm made a mistake in processing the visa application,
explained the documentation gathered would still be useful for a different visa category,
informed A.E.S. he was not due any refund, and offered to complete consular processing
once Nl E.S’s visa became current. In January 2020, after consulting with the Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Igbanugo issued the family a partial refund, but the
money order was mailed to an outdated address and never reached the family.
M.G. and S.M. Matter
M.G. and S.M. are Mexican nationals and most recently entered the United States
in 1996. The couple has three U.S.-citizen children. When M.G. entered the country at a
border checkpoint, an immigration agent stopped the vehicle and asked if they were
citizens. The driver said yes, M.G. nodded her head affirmatively , and the agent let them
enter the United States. S.M. crossed the border through a river and did not pas s through
a border checkpoint.
8
In 2012, S.M. received a notice to appear from the Department of Homeland
Security claiming that S.M. was in the country illegally. M.G. and her adult child consulted
with Nielson in January 2017 and gave him S.M.’s notice to appear letter. Nielson told
them he could help them obtain legal status. After the initial meeting, the couple met with
Igbanugo, explained how they entered the country, and Igbanugo told them he could help
them obtain legal status. The couple entered a contract with Igbanugo for I-130
petitions/I-485 application for wave-through entries, and a birth certificate issue.
M.G. terminated Igbanugo’s representation in August 2019 and requested a full
refund. Igbanugo had not filed any forms in the couple’s case. Igbanugo replied,
explaining that his firm had billed over half of the contract fee, so he would refund the
couple the remainder of the contract fee after deducting the firm’s billed hours. Igbanugo
stated he would issue the partial refund within 60 days, but the couple did not receive a
refund for about 4 months.
Disciplinary Proceedings
The Director filed a petition for disciplinary action against Igbanugo in March 2021
related to the matters above. Igbanugo filed an answer to the petition and we appointed a
referee. Igbanugo moved to exclude all evidence from the joint litigation and argued the
Director was estopped from raising any identical issues that were litigated during Nielson’s
disciplinary hearings (Nielson matter). Igbanugo moved to dismiss the disciplinary
petition, alleging that his constitutional due process, equal protection, free speech, and
Fourth Amendment rights were violated. In a prehearing order, the referee determined that
both the joint litigation and the Nielson matter would be admitted, that he would
9
independently review those matters, and that he would rule on Igbanugo’s constitutional
claims after the evidentiary hearing.
The referee held a 2-week evidentiary hearing. The referee heard testimony from
Igbanugo’s former clients and their family members, as well as from Igbanugo and Nielson.
The referee also heard from four expert witnesses—one called by the Director and three by
Igbanugo. The parties admitted hundreds of exhibits.
The referee issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation for
discipline that was 55 pages long and included a 15-page memorandum. The referee found
Igbanugo’s and Nielson’s testimony not credible. The referee concluded Igbanugo violated
multiple rules of professional conduct in each client matter. 5 The referee found no
mitigating factors and five aggravating factors: (1) lack of remorse, (2) indifference about
restitution, (3) the clients’ vulnerability, (4) substantial experience practicing law, and
(5) prior discipline. The referee recommended an indefinite suspension with no right to
petition for reinstatement for 10 months.
The referee also found Igbanugo “offered no specific evidence to support any of
[the constitutional] claims.” The referee explained that Igbanugo did not offer “any
evidence to support” his due process and equal protections claims of selective enforcement,

5 Specifically, the referee found Igbanugo committed 50 rule violations, including:
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 in five matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(a)(3) in two matters,
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(b) in four matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) in seven
matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b)(2) in seven matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct
1.15(c)(4) in six matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(d) in three matters, Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 5.1(a) in three matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.3(a) in three matters, Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 5.3(b) in three matters, and Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) in seven matters.
10
failed to show the Directo r’s petition was based on protected speech, failed to prove a
Fourth Amendment claim, and failed to allege due process violations that the Director’s
petition was not sufficiently clear or specific or that the Director fabricated evidence to
frame him.
Igbanugo challenges many of the referee’s findings and conclusions, challenges
some of the referee’s evidentiary rulings, and argues that the disciplinary process violated
his constitutional equal protection, due process, and First Amendment rights. Both
Igbanugo and the Director challenge the recommended discipline. Igbanugo contends no
discipline is warranted, and the Director asks us to suspend Igbanugo for at least 1 year.
ANALYSIS
I.
Igbanugo timely ordered a transcript, so the referee’s findings of fact and
conclusions are not binding. Rule 14(e), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility
(RLPR). We nevertheless extend “great deference” to the referee’s findings and
conclusions. In re MacDonald, 906 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn. 2018) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “We review the referee’s findings of fact and
application of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct to the facts of the case for clear
error.” In re Nielson, 977 N.W.2d 599, 608 (Minn. 2022). “A referee’s findings are clearly
erroneous when they leave us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Igbanugo’s challenges to the referee’s findings and conclusions are voluminous.
Despite their length and breadth, we reject the majority of Igbanugo’s challenges for the
11
same three reasons. First, many of these challenges are forfeited because they are
conclusory statements that Igbanugo did not support with legal citation or record evidence.6
In re McCloud, 955 N.W.2d 270, 280 n.12 (Minn. 2021) (deeming an argument forfeited
because the attorney provided “no argument or citation to authority supporting this
conclusion”). Second, while Igbanugo attempts to support some of his arguments with
record evidence, the evidence he cites either does not support his argument or does not
comport with what Igbanugo claims, rendering the arguments unsupported. Third,
Igbanugo bases several of his arguments on his or Nielson’s testimony. The referee ,
however, determined their testimony was not credible, and we defer to the referee’s
findings on credibility. In re Kennedy, 946 N.W.2d 568, 578 (Minn. 2020) (“[W]e defer
to the referee’s findings when the referee’s findings rest on disputed testimony or in part
on credibility, demeanor, and sincerity.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Minn. 2009) (holding that a referee
may reject testimony).
The remainder of Igbanugo’s arguments are challenges to the referee’s findings
about (A) immigration law, (B) Igbanugo’s admissions of wrongdoing, and (C) the
availability of retainer fees. We will address each of these categories in turn.
A.
We begin with the referee’s findings and conclusions about immigration law.
Igbanugo argues the referee’s findings and conclusions are based on a misunderstanding

6 We have identified at least 18 challenges that fall into this category.
12
and misstatements of immigration law. Igbanugo makes four arguments that fall into this
category: (1) because a form I-130 cannot be revoked, any instances of misconduct based
on that contention are erroneous; (2) the referee conflated adjustment of status and consular
processing; (3) adjustment of status was available to I.A.D. and D.E.F.L.; and (4) Igbanugo
did not fail to act with diligence and promptness on Nl E.S.’s case.
1.
The referee concluded Igbanugo failed to act with diligence and promptness by
allowing M.D.’s and O.O.C.’s I-130 forms to be revoked or rescinded and that he failed to
tell these clients that the forms would need to be refiled. Igbanugo argues these findings
are erroneous because NVC cannot revoke a form I-130. Igbanugo agrees that noncitizens
must resubmit their forms to NVC after a year of inaction but claims this is not the same
as being required to submit new forms for approval to USCIS.
We recently discussed the same I-130 process in Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 604 n.1.
We explained how and when NVC terminates registration I-130 petitions:
To maintain visa availability when [NVC] receives an approved I-130
petition, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 203(g) has a 1-year
contact requirement, providing that the beneficiary and/or counsel must
communicate intent to be lawfully admitted to the U.S. with [NVC] yearly.
Failure to communicate within 1 year after the I-130 petition is approved
means risk of termination of the petition and the beneficiary would lose its
benefits, such as a priority date. A beneficiary notified of possible
termination may state the preference to continue pursuing the immigrant visa
application with the understanding that the beneficiary must resubmit all
required fees and documents to continue with immigrant visa processing.

13
Id.7 Accordingly, NVC terminates registration of approved I-130 petitions if they are
inactive for over a year, and this termination has consequences for the beneficiaries,
like the loss of priority dates. Id.; see also Immigrant Visa Processing: Step 2 NVC
Processing, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/the-immigrant-visa-process/
step-1-submit-a-petition/step-2-begin-nvc-processing.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2023)
[opinion attachment]. Igbanugo does not point to evidence that supports his contention the
NVC does not terminate I-130s. Accordingly, the referee’s findings that clients’ I-130s
were revoked or terminated by NVC and any conclusions based on those findings, are not
clearly erroneous.
2.
The referee, relying on expert testimony and reports, made detailed findings about
the immigration processes involved in this case. The referee explained that “adjusting a
person’s status as a qualifying relative in an immigration proceeding involves a three-step
process.” The referee stated the first step is filing a form I-130, a petition for alien relative,
to show that the client has a citizen relative and that “[a]n approved I-130 simply
documents the foreign national’s relationship to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent

7 We referenced a number of websites in Nielson that discuss “[t]he full breadth of
requirements” for I-130 petitions. 977 N.W.2d at 604 n.1. These websites include: U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, https://www.uscis.gov/i- 130 (last visited Mar. 2,
2023); U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/national-visa-center/nvc-
contact-information.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2023); Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM
504.13-2(B), available at https://fam.state.gov/fam/09FAM/09FAM050413.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2023). Copies of these websites are attached to the Nielson opinion.
14
resident.” The second step, the referee noted, is filing an I-601A waiver to request that the
government waive grounds of inadmissibility or removal because it will create substantial
hardship to a qualifying relative—a citizen parent or spouse of the immigrant. After the
I-130 petition and I-601A waiver are approved, the referee found the immigrant completes
the third step, consular processing, which requires them to leave the country and apply “at
the local U.S. consulate for a visa or a green card, and hav[e] an interview.” The referee
also separately described that the form I-485, an application to register permanent residence
or adjust status, is a one-step adjustment form that a foreign national can pursue if they
reside in the United States and hold legal status, but an opening for the foreign national to
become a permanent resident must be currently available.
Igbanugo claims that the referee conflated adjustment of status and consular
processing because the referee labels adjustment of status as a three -step process, rather
than a one-step process. Igbanugo’s argument lacks merit. The referee specifically
referred to the three-step process as “adjusting a person’s status as a qualifying relative,”
which is distinct from the referee’s later description of the form I-485 “one-step
adjustment.” The Director’s expert’s testimony and report support the referee’s findings
describing the three-step adjustment of status through a relative and one-step permanent
resident adjustment of status processes . The referee’s description of the three-step
adjustment of status process is consistent with how we described this same process in
Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 604. Given the record support and the lack of any evidence from
Igbanugo that these explanations are inaccurate, the referee’s findings based on these
processes are not erroneous.
15
3.
When discussing I.A.D. and D.E.F.L.’s case, the referee explained the I-601 waiver
process. Specifically, if a foreign national is inadmissible for permanent residency because
they previously sought an immigration benefit through fraud or misrepresentation, they
can complete an I-601 waiver to request a waiver of the grounds for their
inadmissibility. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., OMB
No. 1615-0029, Instructions for Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility 1,
11 (2022) [hereinafter OMB No. 1615 0029], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/document/forms/i-601instr-pc.pdf [opinion attachment]. The referee
explained that the applicant must demonstrate that a refusal of admission would “cause
extreme hardship to the applicant’s U.S .-citizen spou se or parent,” which “is the same
definition as the definition for the I-601A provisional waiver.” Consequently, the referee
concluded that a U.S. -citizen “child will not be considered a qualifying relative for
purposes of the I-601.” Based on these findings, the referee concluded that neither I.A.D.
nor D.E.F.L. had a qualifying relative for an I-601 waiver and that Igbanugo violated Minn.
R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) (requiring fees to be reasonable) and 8.4(c) (prohibiting conduct
involving dishonesty or misrepresentation) by charging the couple to pursue relief “that
was unavailable as a matter of law.” Igbanugo argues these findings and conclusions are
erroneous because I.A.D. and D.E.F.L. could adjust their status another way under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(i).
Igbanugo’s argument fails for two reasons. First, Igbanugo did not explain how 8
U.S.C. § 1255(i) would support I.A.D. and D.E.F.L.’s eligibility to adjust status. Second,
16
whether the couple was eligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) is irrelevant because their contract
with Igbanugo did not cover this route to adjust status and the record does not reflect that
Igbanugo discussed this process with them. Instead, I-601 waivers (the route to adjust
status that the retainer agreement contemplated) were not available to the couple because
they were ineligible. The Director’s expert testimony and report mirror the referee’s
findings about the I-601 waiver request, and who can be a qualifying relative. The expert
testified that both an I -601 and I-601A require a U.S.-citizen parent or spouse—not a
child—to be a qualifying relative. The couple testified that Igbanugo told them they could
adjust status through their U.S.-citizen child without any conditions; the couple also
testified that they did not have U.S.-citizen parents or spouses. The evidence, therefore,
shows that Igbanugo’s contract pursued relief that the couple was in eligible for because
they did not have a qualifying relative, and Igbanugo collected payment for these services.
Accordingly, the referee’s findings and conclusion that Igbanugo committed misconduct
by charging the couple to pursue relief “that was unavailable as a matter of law,” are not
clearly erroneous.
4.
The referee concluded Igbanugo violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 (failing to act
with reasonable diligence and promptness) because his firm represented Nl E.S. for “over
two years,” and the representation resulted only in the filing of a visa application for a visa
category that Nl E.S. aged out of 3 months after retaining Igbanugo. Igbanugo argues this
conclusion is erroneous and misleading because Nl E.S.’s father was responsible for
17
getting Nl E.S. a passport, which was a requirement to get an F2A visa, and it was the
family’s tardiness in obtaining a passport that caused the delay.
There are two visa application categories relevant here: F2A and F2B. F2A is the
preference category for unmarried children under 21 who have a parent that is a lawful
citizen or resident; F2B is a lower preference category for unmarried children over 21 who
have a parent that is a lawful citizen or reside nt. See Green Card for Family Preference
Immigrants, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (last visited April 18, 2023)
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-eligibility/green-card-for-family-preference
-immigrants [opinion attachment].
Igbanugo’s argument is unpersuasive. The family sought Igbanugo’s services 3
months before Nl E.S.’s birthday, emphasized that Igbanugo must act quickly to request a
visa before Nl E.S.’s birthday, and told Igbanugo that Nl E.S.’s passport had expired.
Nl E.S.’s older brother confirmed that the family was tasked with obtaining a new passport.
Even knowing Nl E.S. did not have a valid passport, Igbanugo still promised the family
that he would adjust Nl E.S.’s status before his birthday.
Igbanugo, however, did not file any paperwork or take formal action in the case
before Nl E.S.’s 21st birthday. Instead, the firm compiled documentation for the F2A visa
application until July 2018—over 2 years after Nl E.S. lost eligibility for the preferred visa
category—and then submitted the F2A application in October 2018 even though Nl E.S.
was clearly ineligible. Igbanugo, therefore, did not take any formal action in Nl E.S.’s case
for over 2 years despite promising the family he would act quickly. Given this record
18
evidence, the referee’s conclusion that Igbanugo failed to act with reasonable diligence is
not clearly erroneous.
B.
We turn now to Igbanugo’s challenge regarding his admissions of wrongdoing.
Igbanugo admitted in writing to two clients that he or his firm made a mistake in handling
their cases. 8 The referee described these communications and “found it troubling” that
Igbanugo made these admissions to the clients and then “attempted to retract the
admission[s] at the [disciplinary] hearing.” The referee found Igbanugo’s testimony at the
disciplinary hearing “untruthful,” “evasive and misleading,” “self-serving and not
credible.” Igbanugo argues the findings about his admissions of wrongdoing are clearly
erroneous given his testimony in the Nielson matter.
Igbanugo’s testimony about his admissions of wrongdoing at his own evidentiary
hearing was similar to the testimony he provided in the Nielson matter. At his own hearing,
Igbanugo testified that his admission of wrongdoing to one client occurred because he was
“parroting what she s aid to [him]”; his other admission of wrongdoing was “bedside
manner,” and he was trying to “appease the client” by accepting fault. The referee received
Igbanugo’s testimony in the Nielson matter as an exhibit in this case and considered it
before issuing findings and conclusions. We defer to the referee’s credibility determination

8 To O.O.C., Igbanugo wrote, “It is true that we made a mistake in bringing you in
after the form I-130 was approved and stating that you were eligible for an I -601A
waiver/consular processing.” To Nl E .S., Igbanugo wrote, “Due to the change of case
managers over a lengthy period of time . . . it was lost that the visa category changed from
F2A to F2B when [Nl E.S.] turned 21.”
19
regarding Igbanugo’s testimony, especially in cases like this, “where the referee’s findings
rest on disputed testimony or in part on respondent’s credibility, demeanor, or sincerity.”
See Kennedy, 946 N.W.2d at 576 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Given Igbanugo’s admissions of wrongdoing and our deference to the referee’s credibility
determination, the referee’s findings are not clearly erroneous.
C.
Finally, we address Igbanugo’s challenges related to his fee agreements. In each of
the client matters, the referee found Igbanugo violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b)(2)
(addressing availability fees) and 1.5(a) (requiring fees to be reasonable) by collecting
advanced fees from the clients as an “availability fee” when he was already obligated to be
available because he was already retained to perform legal services. Igbanugo argues these
conclusions are erroneous because none of the clients actually agreed to an availability fee,
and regardless of the contract language, the fee was immediately orally modified to a down
payment, which is permissible. 9 Igbanugo supports his argument by claiming that the
clients testified that their initial payments were down payments, that the fee was due
immediately or very shortly after signing, and that the referee called these fees “advanced
fees,” which he posits is another term for down payment.

9 The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct do not use the phrase “down
payment” when addressing attorney fees. Those rules, however, do allow lawyers to
receive a payment for their legal services in advance of performing those services. See
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b), 1.15(c)(5). Presumably, that is what Igbanugo means when
he refers to a “down payment.”
20
Igbanugo’s argument is unper suasive. First, as the D irector points out, all the
contracts at issue reference an “availability retainer fee” and do not indicate that the fee is
understood as a down payment or as anything other than an availability fee. Second,
Nielson testified that there is no writing that confirms the parties modified the contracts.
Lastly, Igbanugo’s references to the record mischaracterize his clients’ testimony. While
some clients reference d the initial payment they made as a down payment, none of the
clients testified that they orally modified the contracts or agreed that the availability fee
would be a down payment. Accordingly, the referee’s findings regarding these fee
agreements are not clearly erroneous.
II.
We move now to Igbanugo’s arguments r egarding the referee’s evidentiary
decisions. “A referee’s evidentiary rulings will only be reversed for an abuse of
discretion.” In re Butler, 960 N.W.2d 540, 547 (Minn. 2021). “A court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Thomas, 891 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn. 2017) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Igbanugo argues the referee abused his discretion by (A) not properly reviewing the
joint litigation and Nielson matter independently, and (B) admitting evidence about
Igbanugo’s finances and refusing Igbanugo’s offer of rebuttal evidence on this topic. The
Director argues none of these decisions were an abuse of the referee’s discretion. We
consider each claim in turn.
21
A.
We first address Igbanugo’s argument about the joint litigation and Nielson matter.
Relying on In re Morris, 408 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Minn. 1987) and In re Murrin, 821 N.W.2d
195, 205 (Minn. 2012), Igbanugo contends that the referee had to independently consider
these matters because they concern clients and contracts that are also at issue in his case.
Igbanugo claims the referee committed “a manifest error and abuse of discretion” by
“ignor[ing] every shred of favorable testimony and evidence” from the Nielson matter,
while clearly relying on the joint litigation to make his determination. As support,
Igbanugo notes the referee did not quote from or cite to the exhibits from the Nielson matter
in the order. The Director argues Igbanugo’s argument “is meritless” because Igbanugo
cites no authority (and no authority exists) to support the assertion that the referee ignored
the Nielson matter just because the referee did not cite to the exhibits.
Murrin and Morris relate to collateral estoppel in disciplinary matters. “Collateral
estoppel is the binding effect of a judgment [on] matters actually litigated and determined
in one action on later controversies between the parties involving a different claim from
that on which the original judgment was based.” Murrin, 821 N.W.2d at 205 (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a plaintiff asserts collateral estoppel to
prevent a defendant from relitigating an issue, it is offensive collateral estoppel. Id. In
Morris, we held that offensive collateral estoppel is improper in disciplinary proceedings;
the Director cannot use collateral estoppel offensively to preclude the attorney who is
subject to discipline from relitigating issues. 408 N.W.2d at 862–63. We do, however,
22
permit “a referee to independently consider the transcripts and other documentation from
prior proceedings involving the attorney misconduct.” Murrin, 821 N.W.2d at 205.
In Murrin, the referee did not give collateral-estoppel effect to judges’ conclusions
that Murrin had violated certain rules and court orders in cases they presided over, but
agreed to independently review documents related to these proceedings. Id. Murrin
litigated the relevant conclusions and contested the admonishments contained in the
judicial orders at his disciplinary hearing . Id. (“The hearing transcript is replete with
Murrin’s explanations as to why his conduct was proper in the cases giving rise to those
orders.”). We concluded that even though the referee cited to “excerpts from the court
orders in his findings of fact, there [was] no indication in the record that the referee failed
to independently review the facts of [ those] cases and the facts presented during the
hearing.” Id.
Here, the referee issued a pretrial order concluding that because there was no final
decision on the merits in the Nielson matter at the time, the elements of collateral estoppel
were not met. The referee concluded that based on Morris, Igbanugo could introduce the
transcripts and other evidence from the Nielson matter, and the referee would
independently review the underlying facts. The referee noted during the hearing that the
determinations in the Nielson matter were not binding. The referee admitted the transcripts
from the Nielson matter into evidence. Igbanugo points to no evidence, other than the
referee’s lack of citation to the Nielson matter, to support his contention that the referee
23
failed to review the matter independently. 10 As there is no evidence that the referee did
not properly and independently consider the Nielson matter, the referee did not abuse his
discretion.
B.
Next, Igbanugo claims the referee improperly admitted irrelevant financial evidence
about Igbanugo’s post-2013 tax liens and a 2014 contract for deed regarding his home .
Igbanugo also argues that because this evidence was not disclosed to him before the
hearing, he “lacked time or reasonable opportunity” to rebut the evidence.
Igbanugo’s argument is not persuasive. Igbanugo claimed during the evidentiary
hearing that he lacked financial motive to be dishonest and charge unreasonable fees of his
clients, and the Director offered this contested financial evidence to counter Igbanugo’s
assertion. Relevant evidence is evidence with a “tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence” more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Minn. R. Evid. 401. Given that Igbanugo stated he did not have a financial motivation to
keep unearned fees, and the financial evidence admitted spanned time that overlapped with
the misconduct at issue, the evidence was relevant. And Igbanugo was able to rebut this
evidence. In his redirect testimony at the hearing, Igbanugo discussed his finances and
gave the referee explanations for the financial evidence submitted by the Director.

10 Notably, the referee found that Igbanugo’s testimony in this case lacked credibility.
Igbanugo’s testimony in the Nielson matter was similar to his testimony in this case. It is
unsurprising, therefore, that the referee may not have been persuaded by Igbanugo’s
testimony in the Nielson matter. Furthermore, if the referee did not find the evidence
persuasive or relevant, he would have no reason to cite to the evidence in his findings and
conclusions.
24
After the hearing, Igbanugo moved to file additional rebuttal evidence, but the
referee denied Igbanugo’s request. Igbanugo also claims this denial was an error.
Igbanugo does not explain how the referee’s conclusion was against logic and the facts in
the record or was based on an erroneous view of the law. As the referee detailed in his
robust analysis, Igbanugo’s motion was untimely and did not reasonably explain why the
evidence was not submitted at the hearing, and the evidence was relevant only to the
collateral issue of motive and allowing the evidence would have been prejudicial to the
Director. Accordingly, the referee’s decisions to admit financial evidence and deny
Igbanugo’s untimely request to submit additional rebuttal evidence were not an abuse of
discretion.
III.
We next consider Igbanugo’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated
throughout the discipline process.11 The only argument that is not forfeited is Igbanugo’s

11 Igbanugo claims that the referee improperly prejudged his constitutional claims at
the start of the evidentiary hearing and excluded all evidence related to these claims,
resulting in Igbanugo being unable to make his constitutional arguments before the referee.
The record does not support these claims. Igbanugo submitted an 89-page brief on his
constitutional claims before the hearing. The referee provided only his “preliminary
thoughts” on the constitutional arguments during the hearing. Igbanugo answered
questions about these claims at the hearing. Igbanugo admitted that he could not point to
any facts showing racial discrimination to the extent his constitutional arguments were
grounded in that allegation. In his findings and conclusions, the referee determined that
the constitutional claims were meritless after thoroughly analyzing each claim. Igbanugo
therefore had an adequate opportunity to develop his constitutional arguments.

25
claim that his due process rights were violated.12 Specifically, Igbanugo claims the charges
against him “were not sufficiently and clearly specific to afford him proper notice” because
the Director’s petition is “a potpourri of false and misleading statements” of fact and
immigration law.13 Igbanugo further asserts some of the allegations in the petition were
too vague.
“When we exercise disciplinary jurisdiction, the action . . . is neither criminal nor
civil; rather, it is an inquiry . . . to determine if sanctions should be imposed.” In re Garcia,
792 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Minn. 2010). “While disciplinary proceedings are not encumbered
by technical rules and formal requirements, this court observes due process in exercising
disciplinary jurisdiction.” In re Gherity, 673 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2004). The
disciplinary charges must “be sufficiently clear and specific and the attorney must be

12 Igbanugo also argues the Director violated his equal protection and First
Amendment rights through her selective prosecution of Igbanugo and her failure to
prosecute the opposing counsel in the joint litigation. We have never held that an attorney
may raise an equal protection or other constitutional defense based on selective prosecution
in a disciplinary proceeding and we need not decide that issue here because Igbanugo failed
to support his argument with any legal citation or analysis, other than a general reference
to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, this argument is forfeited, and we decline
to address it. See McCloud, 955 N.W.2d at 280 n.12 (deeming an argument forfeited
because the attorney provided “no argument or citation to authority supporting this
conclusion”).

13 Igbanugo argues in his reply brief that the petition did not charg e him with
intentionally providing false information to clients for financial gain and that this charge
was improperly added during the evidentiary hearing. Because Igbanugo did not raise this
argument in his principal brief, it is forfeited. See Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda,
789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010) (holding that issues not raised or argued in a principal
brief cannot be raised in a reply brief). Moreover, the petition clearly alleged violations of
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) (engaging “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation”) in each client matter.
26
afforded an opportunity to anticipate, prepare and present a defense” at the disciplinary
hearing. Id.
The disciplinary charges against Igbanugo were thorough and specific: the 52-page
petition identifies the specific rules Igbanugo allegedly violated and the facts supporting
those allegations, and Igbanugo filed a 160-page answer. See Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 611
(determining an attorney received due process when a specific and factually-supported
17-page petition was filed, and the attorney filed an answer). Additionally, Igbanugo filed
numerous prehearing motions and received a 2-week-long evidentiary hearing, during
which Igbanugo offered many exhibits, testified on his own behalf, and called several of
his own witnesses. See id. (determining that an attorney received due process when he
“had the benefit of an evidentiary hearing before a neutral fact -finder,” “presented
witnesses on his own behalf, cross-examined witnesses testifying against him, and admitted
exhibits into evidence”). Accordingly, Igbanugo’s procedural due process rights were not
violated.
14

14 Igbanugo also makes a substantive due process argument, though the argument is
difficult to decipher. Igbanugo makes arguments that we addressed in the evidentiary
section. Because Igbanugo provides no legal citation supporting his contention that these
evidentiary decisions amounted to separate, constitutional violations, his substantive due
process arguments related to these rulings are forfeited. See McCloud, 955 N.W.2d at 280
n.12 (deeming an argument forfeited because the attorney provided “no argument or
citation to authority supporting this conclusion”).
Igbanugo also claims that when prosecutors misstate the law, it is unfair and violates
due process, so the Director’s numerous purportedly false statements about immigration
law violated Igbanugo’s substantive due process rights. While Igbanugo does support this
argument by citing to federal case law, Igbanugo failed to raise this argument in his
principal brief, so the argument is forfeited. See Anda, 789 N.W.2d at 887 (holding that
issues not raised or argued in a principal brief cannot be raised in a reply brief).
Consequently, both of Igbanugo’s substantive due process arguments are forfeited.
27
IV.
Finally, we consider the appropriate discipline for Igbanugo’s misconduct. The
referee recommended an indefinite suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement
for 10 months. Igbanugo argued during oral argument that no discipline is warranted. The
Director argues an indefinite suspension of at least 12 months is warranted given the nature
of the misconduct, the vulnerability of the clients, and the presence of multiple aggravating
factors.
Although we give great weight to the referee’s recommendation for discipline, we
retain the “ultimate responsibility for determining appropriate discipline.” In re Montez,
812 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2012). The purpose of disciplinary sanctions is to protect the
public and judicial system and to deter future misconduct by attorneys—not to punish the
attorney. In re Vaught, 693 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 2005). We consider four factors
when imposing discipline: (1) the nature of the misconduct; (2) the cumulative weight of
the disciplinary violation; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal
profession. Butler, 960 N.W.2d at 552. We also consider aggravating and mitigating
factors. Id. Additionally, we consult similar cases and attempt to impose consistent
discipline, but the proper discipline is ultimately determined “based on the unique facts
and circumstances of each case.” In re Matson, 889 N.W.2d 17, 25 (Minn. 2017) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A.
We begin with the nature of Igbanugo’s misconduct. Igbanugo’s misconduct
involves his representation of clients in immigration matters. We have held that such
28
misconduct has “potentially grave consequences” and can put clients at “risk for
deportation or removal.” In re Fru , 829 N.W.2d 379, 388 –89 (Minn. 2013). We have
suspended and disbarred lawyers for such misconduct. Id. at 388–89. Igbanugo’s
misconduct also includes numerous false statements to clients, which “is misconduct of the
highest order and warrants severe discipline.” See In re Ruffenach, 486 N.W.2d 387, 391
(Minn. 1992) (“Honesty and integrity are chief among the virtues the public has a right to
expect of lawyers.”). Igbanugo also failed to perform work on client matters and failed to
communicate with clients, which constitute s client neglect and “independently warrants
discipline.” In re Capistrant, 905 N.W.2d 617, 620–21 (Minn. 2018); see also In re
Rymanowski, 809 N.W.2d 217, 224 (Minn. 2012) (“Depending on the severity, client
neglect alone may also warrant indefinite suspension or disbarment.”). “We have also
recognized that the failure to communicate with clients can be serious misconduct.”
Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 612.
B.
We next consider the cumulative weight of Igbanugo’s disciplinary violations. We
distinguish between “a brief lapse in judgment or a single, isolated incident and multiple
instances of misconduct occurring over a substantial amount of time.” In re Pearson¸
888 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The referee found Igbanugo committed 50 rule violations between 2011 and 2018.
Igbanugo’s actions, spanning multiple years and multiple client matters, clearly involve
multiple instances of misconduct over a substantial amount of time. See Capistrant ,
905 N.W.2d at 621 (concluding that while misappropriation only occurred once, the
29
misconduct was neither a “brief lapse in judgment” nor a “single, isolated incident”
because other misconduct spanned 2 years).
C.
Next, we evaluate the harm that Igbanugo’s misconduct caused to the public and to
the legal profession. In assessing harm, we consider how many and to what extent clients
were harmed. In re Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 308 (Minn. 2011). The Director contends
that Igbanugo’s clients paid large sums of money, suffered hardships to make payments,
and suffered emotional turmoil based on Igbanugo’s actions. Igbanugo argues that the
narrative that his clients suffered financial hardship to pay his fees is not true, and that they
would have been required to make these sacrifices regardless of who they obtained as an
attorney. Additionally, Igbanugo seems to suggest he did not harm his clients because he
did not “afflict false hope”; rather, he gave them the requisite hope given that he is
“successful [in] upwards of 90%” of his actions.
Igbanugo’s actions resulted in significant harm to his clients. Someone from each
client’s family testified about the financial impact Igbanugo’s actions caused on these
families, and his clients testified about the emotional distress and turmoil Igbanugo caused
them. For example, O.O.C. testified that her family made sacrifices to pay Igbanugo: they
never went out to eat, they had to get rid of utilities like cable, and they fell behind on rent
payments. O.O.C. also testified that she was shocked when Igbanugo told her she could
not adjust her status—she thought she was misunderstanding him and felt “like the building
was falling apart and that all [her] hope and all the happiness that [she] had” just dropped
30
away. O.O.C. explained she felt “[g]uilt, sadness, [and] rage,” and it was a “pretty
stressful” experience for her entire family.
Igbanugo’s misconduct was also detrimental to the public’s respect for the legal
profession and the judicial system as a whole. In re Jaeger, 834 N.W.2d 705, 710 –11
(Minn. 2013). Igbanugo made numerous false statements to his clients. See In re Sea,
932 N.W.2d 28, 36 (Minn. 2019) (holding that an attorney’s false statements to the court
and others undermined public confidence in the judicial system). Additionally, Igbanugo
lacked diligence and promptness. Neglect undermines the public’s “confidence in the legal
profession, which harms the public, the legal profession and the justice system.” In re
Paul, 809 N.W.2d 693, 705 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Consequently, harm to Igbanugo’s clients and the legal profession favors more significant
discipline.
D.
To determine the appropriate discipline, we also must examine any mitigating and
aggravating factors. The referee found no mitigating factors and Igbanugo does not make
any arguments about mitigating factors.
The referee found five aggravating factors: (1) lack of remorse, (2) indifference to
restitution, (3) client vulnerability, (4) substantial experience in the area of law, and
(5) prior discipline. Igbanugo challenges only one of them—lack of remorse. 15

15 Given that Igbanugo only addresses one aggravating factor, we likely need not
consider the remainin g factors. Even so , we briefly address them. “[I]ndifference or
unwillingness to make restitution” is an aggravating factor, and the referee made multiple

31
We consider an attorney’s lack of remorse to be an aggravating factor. In re Winter,
770 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. 2009). Igbanugo claims that he apologized to his clients, but
the only “evidence” he points to are his apologies to clients during his cross-examination
of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Igbanugo’s statements, however, were not enough
to be sincere or to prove that the referee’s finding of this aggravating factor was erroneous.
Moreover, Igbanugo’s clients testified that he never apologized to them. The referee’s
finding that Igbanugo lacked remorse therefore is not clearly erroneous.
E.
Finally, we consider similar cases “to ensure that our disciplinary decision is
consistent with prior sanctions.” In re Nathanson, 812 N.W.2d 70, 80 (Minn. 2012). Many
cases provide insight in determining the appropriate discipline for Igbanugo.

findings that Igbanugo failed to refund his clients promptly or accurately after termination
of representation. In re Udeani, 945 N.W.2d 389, 398–99 (Minn. 2020).
We have held that the vulnerability of immigration clients is an aggravating factor.
See Fru, 829 N.W.2d at 390 (explaining that “[w]e are particularly troubled by the fact that
Fru’s misconduct threatened the immigration status of many of his clients,” and that those
“clients were vulnerable and depended on him to guide them through the complex —and
often punitive—maze of federal immigration law” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Substantial experience practicing law is also an aggravating factor. In re Tigue,
900 N.W.2d 424, 432 (Minn. 2017). Igbanugo’s 34-years of experience as an attorney is
substantial and particularly noteworthy because much of his experience was practicing
immigration law. See In re Ulanowski, 800 N.W.2d 785, 802 (Minn. 2011) (finding 6 years
after admission to practice law and 2 years of full-time practice at the time of his first act
of misconduct was an aggravating factor); In re Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Minn.
2001) (holding that 15 years of practice aggravated the sanction).
Finally, prior discipline is an aggravating factor. See, e.g., Capistrant, 905 N.W.2d
at 622 (finding that previous discipline “weighs heavily” because it was for similar
conduct). Igbanugo has four instances of prior discipline.
32
In Fru, an immigration attorney committed misconduct across eight client matters
by engaging in a pattern of neglect, incompetence, and noncommunication; lying to several
clients and the court; disobeying court rules; failing to properly handle client funds;
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law ; and failing to cooperate with discipline
investigations. 829 N.W.2d at 381–87, 389. The selfish nature of the misconduct, the
attorney’s lack of remorse, and the vulnerability of clients aggravated the misconduct. Id.
at 389–90. We imposed a 2-year suspension. Id. at 391. Igbanugo’s misconduct spanned
a similar amount of client matters and encompassed some of the same forms of misconduct.
Igbanugo, however, did not disobey court rules, fail to properly handle client funds, engage
in the unauthorized practice of law, nor fail to cooperate with discipline investigations.
In In re Walsh, the attorney committed misconduct in five client matters over the
span of 8 years by lacking diligence, acting in bad faith, chronically violating court orders
and rules, and ma king a false statement to opposing counsel. 872 N.W.2d 741, 749–50
(Minn. 2015). The attorney’s continued misconduct during disciplinary proceedings, lack
of remorse, and substantial experience aggravated the misconduct. Id. We imposed a
6-month suspension. Id. Igbanugo’s actions affected a similar number of clients over a
similar course of years, but Igbanugo’s rule violations are more voluminous, and
Igbanugo’s case involves more aggravating factors.
In Udeani, an immigration attorney committed various forms of misconduct across
16 client matters by providing incompetent representation, neglecting clients, failing to
communicate with clients, failing to return unearned fees, failing to properly supervise
nonlawyers, failing to safeguard funds and maintain trust-account related records, ignoring
33
a conflict of interest, and failing to cooperate in disciplinary investigations. 945 N.W.2d
at 396–97. The attorney’s misconduct was aggravated by his history of prior discipline,
the similarity of current and prior misconduct, committing misconduct while on probation,
the vulnerability of clients, a lack of remorse, and failure to cooperate with disciplin ary
proceedings. Id. at 398. We imposed a 3-year suspension. Id. at 399–400. Igbanugo’s
actions did not rise to the level of this case; Igbanugo’s case involves fewer clients, fewer
rule violations, and fewer aggravating factors.
In Nielson, a lawyer from Igbanugo’s firm committed multiple rule violations in
two client matters by failing to keep the clients informed, fail ing to explain matters to
clients, failing to ensure non-lawyers acted in a manner compatible with professional
obligations, and giving clients false and misleading information. 977 N.W.2d at 607. The
attorney’s misconduct was aggravated by the clients’ particular vulnerability and a lack of
remorse. Id. at 613. We imposed a 30 –day suspension. Id. at 614. Igbanugo’s case is
more severe than Nielson; Igbanugo committed many more rule violations across more
client matters, and Igbanugo’s case involves more aggravating factors.
We believe that a suspension is appropriate based on the facts and circumstances of
this case. In addition, significant aggravating factors are present and there are no mitigating
factors. We therefore agree with the referee that the appropriate discipline is an indefinite
suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for 10 months.
34
Accordingly, we order that:
1. Respondent Herbert Azubuike Igbanugo is suspended from the practice of law,
effective 14 days from the date of this opinion, with no right to petition for reinstatement for
10 months.
2. Respondent may petition for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 18(a)–(d), RLPR.
Reinstatement is conditioned on successful completion of the written examination required
for admission to the practice of law by the State Board of Law Examiners on the subject of
professional responsibility, see Rule 18(e)(2), RLPR; Rule 4.A.(5), Rules for Admission to
the Bar (requiring evidence that an applicant has successfully completed the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination), and satisfaction of continuing legal education
requirements, see Rule 18(e)(4), RLPR.
3. Respondent shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspension
to clients, opposing counsel, and tribunals), and shall pay $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24,
RLPR.
Suspended.