In re the Marriage of: William T. Bienemann, petitioner, Respondent,

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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0340

In re the Marriage of: William T. Bienemann, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Yelena Y. Bienemann,
Appellant.

Filed March 7, 2022
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-19-842

Sean A. Shiff, Sean A. Shiff, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael P. Boulette, Seungwon R. Chung, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant-wife challenges the district court’s marriage-dissolution order , arguing
that the district court (1) overstated respondent -husband’s nonmarital property;
(2) erroneously awarded wife less spousal maintenance than it found she needed ;
(3) abused its discretion by denying wife’s request for need -based attorney fees ; and
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(4) abused its discretion by failing to allocate some of husband’s nonmarital property to
wife. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
Appellant Yelena Bienemann (wife) and respondent William Bienemann (husband)
married in 2000. Wife grew up in the former Soviet Union, had degrees in mathematics,
and worked as a math teacher and software consultant. Wife moved to the United States
to marry husband. Throughout the parties’ marriage, wife took care of the home and was
a stay-at-home parent to the parties’ minor child. Husband is a self-employed salesperson.
Husband’s income , as well as the inheritance and gifts that husband received fro m his
family, allowed the parties to enjoy a comfortable standard of living during the marriage.
Husband filed for dissolution of the parties’ marriage in February 2019. Lengthy
dissolution proceedings followed. The parties tried the issues of property division, spousal
maintenance, child support, custody, and parenting time in June 2020. The district court
granted joint legal custody of the parties’ child but gave husband sole physical custody
with the parties’ home designated as the child’s primary residence. The district court found
husband, who sold apparel to retailers on a commission basis, to be voluntarily
underemployed and set his annual income at $90,000. It also found wife, who taught math
at a Russian -language charter school nine months out of the year, to be voluntarily
underemployed and set her annual income at $31,000. The district court awarded
permanent spousal maintenance to wife. It also accepted husband’s offer to pay education
or training costs of up to $2,500 per year for two years to enable wife to increase her earning
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capacity. Because of the financial disparities between the parties, the district court
determined that wife would not pay any child support.
The district court awarded the parties’ homestead to husband after find ing that the
parties purchased it with the sale proceeds of husband’s prior inherited properties and that
most of the remaining mortgage on it had been paid off with husband’s inheritance from
his mother. It also awarded husband his Ford truck, his boat, his hunting-club membership,
which the district court found h usband had purchased with inherited funds, and all other
personal property currently in his possession. Husband also received the assets in two
Baird trust accounts (the trust accounts) comprising $1,377,298 and $283,671, which the
district court found husband inherited from his mother upon her death in 2017. Husband
received a third Baird account with $146,369 in funds inherited from his mother’s IRA (the
inherited IRA account). Finally, husband received two annuities inherited from his mother
and a $227 -per-month pension upon retirement earned and vested before the parties’
marriage.
Wife received her Mercedes vehicle and all other personal property currently in her
possession.
The parties rec eived their individual Wells Fargo accounts and half of their joint
checking accounts. Overall, the district court determined the total marital property to be
worth $191,270.40 and awarded each party half of that amount. After subtracting the value
of her Mercedes from wife’s portion, and adding $20,000 from husband to furnish her new
home, the district court awarded wife a $90,635 .20 equalizer payment. The district court
denied both parties’ motions for attorney fees.
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Wife, proceeding self-represented, sought posttrial relief and moved for amended
findings or a new trial (amended-findings motion). The district court summarily denied
that motion. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court erred by overstating husband’s nonmarital property.
Wife first argues that the district court overstated husband’s nonmarital property by
(1) treating income reinvested into husband’s trust and inherited IRA accounts as
nonmarital; (2) ignoring wife’s marital interest in the homestead arisin g from
improvements made and paid for during the marriage ; and (3) failing to apportion any of
the homestead’s market-based appreciation to the marital estate. Wife also argues that the
district court failed to hol d husband to his burden of tracing nonmar ital property. We
discuss each issue in turn.
However, as an initial matter, we first address husband’s argument that wife
forfeited her nonmarital-property claims by failing to raise them at the district court. We
generally do not consider issues that were not presented to and considered by the district
court. See Toth v. Arason , 722 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. 2006). Wife repeatedly raised
issues relating to t he marital share of the homestead and husband’s failure to trace
adequately his nonmar ital property during trial and in her amended-findings motion, so
those issues are properly before us on appeal. Wife acknowledges, however, that she did
not directly raise the issue of marital investment income from husband’s trust and inherited
IRA accounts. While we generally do not consider issues not raised at the district court,
we may review them in the interest of justice. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04; Oanes v.
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Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Minn. 2000). Review is particularly appropriate
here, when the source and nature of husband’s funds are necessarily related to the district
court’s overall assessment of the marital property and when wife repres ented herself at
various times before the district court.1 See Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W2d 727,
729 (Minn. 1987) (noting that courts provide some l eeway to self-represented litigants).
We therefore consider all of wife’s claims regarding husband’s nonmarital property.
Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law which we review de
novo, but we defer to the district court’s underlying findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. Gill v. Gill , 919 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2018). All property acqui red by
either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be marital property. Id. at 302. To
overcome this presumption, a spouse has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property is nonmarital. Id. Nonmarital property includes property which
“(a) is acquired as a gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance made . . . to one but not to the other
spouse,” or “(c) is acquired in exchange for or is the increase in value of property ”
described in clause (a). Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(a), (c) (2020). Marital property is
equitably divided between the parties, while nonmarital property remains with the spouse
to whom it belongs. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2020).

1 Counsel represented wife at trial but wife submitted her amended-findings motion pro se.
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A. The district court erred by failing to treat income ear ned on husband’s
nonmarital trust and inherited IRA accounts as marital property.

Wife argues that the district court erred by failing to treat income earned by
husband’s nonmarital trust and inherited IRA accounts as marital property. We agree.
Generally, income produced during a marriage from a nonmarital investment, such
as interest and dividends, is marital property. See Gottsacker v. Gottsacker , 664 N.W.2d
848, 854 (Minn. 2003); Swick v. Swick , 467 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn. App. 199 1), rev.
denied (Minn. May 16, 1991) . Appreciation in the value of nonmarital property, by
contrast, is marital only if it is the result of active management of the property during the
marriage. Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 650 (Minn. 2008).
The district court determined that husband’s two Baird trust accounts and inherited
IRA Baird account were nonmarital property after finding that they were inherited from
husband’s mother after her death in 2017 and awarded them to husband. The parties’ tax
returns of record indicate that the trust accounts earned over $60,000 in interest and
dividend income between 2017 and the dissolution valuation date in March 2019 .2
Evidence regarding the inherited IRA account likewise indicates that it earned income
through interest and reinvested dividends. In awarding husband all of the assets in the
Baird accounts, the district court did not distinguish the principal of the investments and
their growth due to ap preciation, which are nonmarital property, from the dividend and
interest income earned from the investments, which is marital property.

2 The parties’ tax returns show $25,040 and $8,379 in dividend and interest income,
respectively, for 2018, and $19,756 and $10,590 in dividend and interest income for 2017.
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Husband argues that the district court did not err because wife did not show that the
increase in value in these accounts resulted from active investment decisions by husband.
Husband cites Ranik v. Ranik, 383 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Minn. App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn.
May 22, 1986), for the proposition that interest in nonmarital funds remains nonmarital if
it is kept separate from marital funds and is not the product of active management during
the marriage. But the active-versus-passive distinction applies to increases in value due to
appreciation of the nonmarital asset , not to increases from interest and dividend
reinvestment, which are considered income produced from the nonmarital asset . See
Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 854 . And we have confirmed since Ranik that dividend
reinvestment and interest income generated from a nonmarital asset during a marriage is
marital property. See Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 706 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that
shares acquired by dividend reinvestment are marital property); Swick, 467 N.W.2d at 332-
33 (holding interest on certificate of deposit during marriage is income and thus marital
property). The district court therefore erred by concluding that the total increase in the
Baird accounts was all husband’s nonmarital property . We accordingly remand to the
district court to determine what increase in the accounts came from reinvested dividends
or interest and to apportion it to the marital estate.
B. The district court erred by failing to account for m arital improvements
to the homestead.

Wife argues that the distri ct court further erred by failing to account for
approximately $200,000 in marital improvements to the homestead. Again, we agree.
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Improvements to nonmarital property made by the parties during the marriage are
presumed to be marital property. Dorweiler v. Dorweiler, 413 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Minn.
App. 1987) (citing Faus v. Faus , 319 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Minn. 1982) ). Any increase in
value to nonmarital property resulting from marital improvements is also marital, while an
increase in value due solely to market-based appreciation is nonmarital. Id. at 576.
The parties testified at trial about a 2017 addition and renovation to their homestead.
Husband’s exhibits includ ed a receipt from the renovations describing $193,000 in
expenses, and husband testified about additional renovation-related costs not included on
that receipt. Husband testified that the parties paid for most of the renovation with funds
from the parties’ joint account that held husband’s employment income. The homestead
appraisal noted the improvements and indicated that the y contributed to the property’s
good condition.
The district court’s findings did not mention the improvements at all. The distri ct
court merely found that husband had purchased the homestead for $535,000 with
nonmarital funds plus a marital $275,000 mortgage, $32,574 .55 of which the parties paid
down before husband satisfied the remaining balance with his nonmarital inheritance. I t
found that the homestead had a value of $650,000, did not account for any marital
improvements, awarded the marital estate only the $32,574 .55 mortgage pay-down, and
found that the rest of the homestead’s equity of $617,425.45 was husband’s nonmarital
property.
Husband argues that wife failed to answer husband’s discovery requests supporting
her denial of husband’s nonmarital interests and failed to provide evidence at trial that
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improvements to the homestead caused the increase in the homestead’s value. But
husband, not wife, has the burden of showing that the entire increase in the homestead’s
value was nonmarital, and husband’s own evidence showed that the parties made
substantial improvements to the homestead with funds that were marital , or at least
presumed to be marital, and that those improvements contributed to the homestead’s good
condition at the time of its appraisal. Because improvements to the homestead made during
the marriage and any increase in value due to those improvements were marital property,
or at least presumptively marital property, the district court erred by awarding the entire
value of the homestead’s increased value to husband without addressing the value of the
marital improvements to the home. We therefore remand to the di strict court to make
further findings regarding the extent to which the improvements to the home were marital
and to equitably divide any marital interest it identifies.
C. The district court erred by failing to apportion the m arital estate its
share of the homestead’s market-based appreciation.

Wife argues that the district court erred by failing to apply the formula set forth in
Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1981), to ensure that the marital estate received
its share of the homestead’s appreciation. Wife’s argument has merit.
When marital equity is created in a nonmarital property as a result of parties using
marital funds to reduce the mortgage balance, the marital estate is entitled to its share of
the property’s market-based appreciation. See Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 102 -03
(Minn. 2002). Characterizing a property’s market -based appre ciation as entirely
nonmarital even though there is some marital equity in the property deprives the marital
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estate of any return on its investment. Id. at 103. The marital estate’s share of the
property’s appreciation is determined by applying the Schmitz formula. Id. Under the
Schmitz formula,
[t]he present value of a nonmarital asset used in the acquisition
of marital property is the proportion the net equity or
contribution at the time of acquisition bore to the value of the
property at the time of purchase multiplied by the value of the
property at the time of separation.

Brown v. Brown , 316 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1982) (summarizing formula applied in
Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d at 750). The remaining equity increase is considered marital property
and distributed accordingly. Id.
The district court did not apply the Schmitz formula to the homestead’s appreciation.
It simply credited the marital estate $32,574 .55 for the marital mortgage pay -down and
distributed the remaining balance of the equity of $617,425.45 to husband. This was error.
The marital estate is entitled to its share of the homestead’s appreciation.
Husband argues that the district court did not err by failing to apply the Schmitz
formula because wife did not raise the issue at trial or provide evidence demonstrating how
much of the appreciation belonged to the marital estate. We are unpersuaded. As discussed
above, wife raised the general issue of the marital share of the homestead before the district
court, and to the extent that she did not explicitly raise the Schmitz formula issue at trial,
we address it now in the interest of justice. Husband’s related argument that wife did not
provide evidence demonstrating how much of th e appreciation belonged to the marital
estate is equally unavailing. Because property acquired during marriage is presumed
marital, husband had the burden to establish what portion of the homestead, including what
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portion of its appreciation , was nonmarital. With at least $32,574 .55 of marital equity in
the homestead, on remand the district court should apply the Schmitz formula to give the
marital estate its share of the homestead’s appreciation.
D. The district court did not clearly err by finding that husband traced his
nonmarital interest in the homestead’s final mortgage payment and the
flow of nonmarital equity between the parties’ homes.

Finally, wife argues that the district court did not hold husband to his burden of
tracing his nonmarital interests. We are not persuaded.
Whether a party adequately traced a nonmarital interest is a question of fact which
we review for clear error. Kerr v. Kerr, 770 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. App. 2009) (citation
omitted). “When marital and nonmarital assets have been commingled, the party asserting
the nonmarital claim must adequately trace the nonmarital funds . . . to establish their
nonmarital character.” Id. “Simply routing the funds through a joint account does not
transform nonmarital property into marital property. And tracing property to its nonmarital
source does not require intricate detail.” Risk ex rel. Miller v. Stark, 787 N.W.2d 690, 696-
97 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotations and citations omitted).
Many of wife’s tracing claims repeat wife’s prior arguments which we have already
concluded have merit. But wife also broadly argues that husband failed to address the
significant commingling of his nonmarital inheritance in the parties’ joint accounts.
First, wife argues that husband’s 2017 transfer of the proceeds of his mother’s trust
into the parties’ joint checking account commingled his nonmarital inheritance assets with
marital assets and that husband failed to adequately trace his nonmarital proceeds into his
BMO account. The district court found the following:
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• On May 15, 2017, the parties’ joint Wells Fargo account had
$22,750.55.
• On May 16, 2017, husband inherited $505,725 from his mother
which he deposited into the joint Wells Fargo account.
• On May 18, 2017, husband transferred $100,000 of his
inherited funds to his BMO account.
• On July 25, 2017, husband transferred another $200,000 of his
inherited funds from the Wells Fargo account to his BMO
account.
• On September 11, 2017, Husband took $125,000 of his
inherited funds in his BMO account and deposited them back
into the joint Wells Fargo account. Husband also took another
$125,000 from his nonmarital Baird trust account and
deposited it into the joint Wells Fargo account.
• On September 13, 2017, a $242,425 payment from the joint
Wells Fargo account fully satisfied the remaining b alance of
the homestead mortgage.

Although Husband commingled his nonmar ital inheritance with marital assets, the record
supports the district court’s findings that husband adequately traced his nonmarital funds
through the accounts and into the mortgage payoff. Its findings are not clearly erroneous.
Wife also argues that husband failed to meet his burden of tracing the flow of
nonmarital equity between the parties’ homes. Wife challenges husband’s testimony that
they used nonmarital proceeds from the sale of h usband’s inherited Michigan home to
purchase the ir 15th Ave nue home, because that home purchase occurred before the
Michigan property sale.3 Husband testified that he completed the purchase with a bridge
loan from his mother, and the district court credited that testimony. See Chamberlain v.
Chamberlain, 615 N.W.2d 405, 414 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that credible testimony can

3 The parties moved into husband’s inherited Michigan home upon their marriage in 2000.
They then moved to the 15th Avenue home in 2003 and moved from the 15th Avenue home
to their homestead in 2006.
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be sufficient to prove a nonmarital claim), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000). Because we
defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, wife’s claim fails.
II. The district court abused its discretion by awarding wife less spousal
maintenance than it found she needed.

Wife next argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding wife $300
less per month in its conclusions of law than it found she needed in its findings of fact. We
agree.
The district court may grant spousal maintenance if it finds that one spouse lacks
sufficient property to provide for their reasonable needs or is unable to provide adequate
self-support through appropriate employment. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2020). A
district court’s grant of spousal maintenance must be in an amount that it deems just after
considering all relevant factors. Id., subd. 2. The district court, in essence, balances the
recipient’s needs with the obligor’s ability to pay. Maiers v. Maiers, 775 N.W.2d 666, 668
(Minn. App. 2009). We review a district court’s spousal -maintenance award for an abuse
of discretion. Schmidt v. Schmidt , 964 N.W.2d 221, 226 (Minn. App. 2021). A district
court abuses its discretion if it resolves the discretionary question in a manner that is against
logic and the facts on the record. See Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2021).
The district court awarded wife permanent spousal maintenance after considering
the statutory factors and finding that her limited financial resources, age, long absence from
her profession, limited English skills, diminished earning capacity, and health challenges
supported her need for maintenance and that husband could meet his and their child’s needs
while paying maintenance to wife. In its findings of fact, the district court found that wife
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needed permanent spousal maintenance of $3,800 per month by calculating wife’s monthly
expenses as $6,302 and her projected monthly salary as $2,583 ($6,302 - $2,583 = $3,719,
rounded up to $3,800). The district court also explicitly referred to the $3,800 amount as
“Husband’s spousal maintenance obligation” in its child -support analysis and determined
that it would impose no child -support obligation on wife , because “given her projected
income of $6,383 from maintenance and her salary, she will only have $81 remaining after
deducting her projected monthly expenses of $6,302.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, in its
Child Support Guidelines Worksheet, it once again listed husband’s spousal -maintenance
obligation to wife as $3,800. But in its conclusions of law, the district court ordered that
“husband shall pay wife the sum of $3,500 per month as and for spousal maintenance.”
The district court never explained the $300 difference.
Generally, the district court’s maintenance award in its conclusions of law prevails
over the inconsistent maintenance amount in its findings of fact. See Dailey v. Chermak,
709 N.W.2d 626, 631-32 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2006). But here,
that conclusion is contrary to logic and several of the district court’s explici t findings.
Rather, it is apparent that the $3,500 in the conclusions of law is a clerical error of
substituting an “8” for a “5” and that the correct spousal -maintenance amount is $3,800.
See Johnson v. Johnson , 379 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Minn. App. 1985) (A “clerical error” is
“an error of form made by the court itself . . . in drafting the order or judgment.”). This
court may correct clerical errors on appeal. See id.; Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.01.
Husband argues that the $3,500 figure was neither a clerical err or nor an abuse of
discretion. Husband asserts that the lower $3,500 amount is logical because at that time he
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had a monthly income of $0. But that argument contradicts the district court’s explicit
findings that husband did have the ability to meet his needs while paying maintenance
because he was voluntarily un deremployed and was capable of earning a higher income .
Husband also relies on the district court ’s denial of wife’s posttrial amended -findings
motion which in part challenged the $300 discrepancy. While the district court stated that
it had “carefully reviewed all of [ wife’s] requests and [found] that none have merit ,” we
note that wife filed a 98-page motion, and the district court never explicitly addressed this
discrepancy in its terse, one -page order.4 We conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to correct this clerical error in a conclusion of law that is contrary to
logic and all of its clear and consistent factual findings in the record. We therefore remand
to the district court to correct its error and set wife’s permanent spousal maintenance at
$3,800 per month.

4 We are troubled by the district court’s cursory approach to many of wife’s claims. The
district court adopted, nearly verbatim, almost all of husband’s proposed findings regarding
his nonmarital property. “Verbatim adoption of a proposed rulin g raises questions about
whether the district court independently evaluated the evidence and whether the ruling
adopted . . . is sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review.” Suleski v. Rupe , 855
N.W.2d 330, 339 (Minn. App. 2014). Later, t he district court chastised husband for
submitting posttrial proposed findings that were “totally inadequate” but then proceeded to
“adopt his proposal in its entirety, and if the Court of Appeals finds this effort to be lacking
and refers the matter back, it should be clear where the fault lies.” But the district court is
ultimately responsible for “assur[ing] that findings and conclusions —whether they be the
court’s alone, one or the other party’s, or a combination—are always detailed, specific, and
sufficient enou gh to enable meaningful review.” Bliss v. Bliss , 493 N.W.2d 583, 590
(Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).
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III. The district court abused its discretion by denying wife’s request for need-
based attorney fees without making any findings supporting its denial.

Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request for
need-based attorney fees without making findings. We agree.
We review a district court’s deni al of need -based attorney fees for an abuse of
discretion. See Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 825 (Minn. 1999). A district court “shall”
award attorney fees if it finds:
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith
assertion of the party’s rights in the proceeding and will not
contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the
proceeding;
(2) that the party from whom fees . . . are sought has the
means to pay them; and
(3) that the party to whom fees . . . are awarded does not
have the means to pay them.

Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2020). A lack of findings on the statutory factors is not fatal
when review of the district court’s order reasonably implies that it considered the relevant
factors, had familiarity with the history of the case, and had access to the parties’ financial
records. Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Minn. App. 2001).
Here, the district court denied wife’s request for $20,000 in need-based attorney fees
without making any findings on the statutory factors . Husband asks us to infer from the
district court’s summary denial that it found the statutory requirements were not met
because wife’s conduct increased the cost and length of litigation and she will receive
sufficient assets to pay her own fees.
We are not persuaded. The district court’s findings could support awarding need-
based attorney fees. Although husband argues wife’s conduct increased the cost and length
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of litigation, the district court considered husband’s motion for conduct -based fees and
denied it. The district court’s findings also suggest that husband has the means to pay while
wife does not. The district court frequently noted that husband could earn a high salary
and live comfortably on his inheritance, whereas wife could only survive with permanent
spousal maintenance and would be made “destitute” if she had to pay child support.
Given the district court’s findings on the parties’ relative financial situations and the
order’s silence on wife’s conduct, along with the complete lack of findings on the statutory
factors, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion. We therefore reverse and
remand for the district court to evaluate properly wife’s need-based attorney-fee request.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to allocate some of
husband’s nonmarital property to wife.

Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by declining to allocate any
of husband’s nonmarital property to wife.5 We are not persuaded.
If the district court finds that either spouse’s resources or property “are so
inadequate as to work an unfair hardship, the [district] court may, in addition to the marital
property, apportion up to one-half of the [nonmarital] property. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd.
2. That one party will be in a superior financial condition due only to nonmarital holdings
is an improper basis for an unfair -hardship finding. See Robert v. Zygmunt , 652 N.W.2d
537, 546 (Minn. App. 1990). A disparity between the parties’ postdissolution assets also

5 Wife conceded at oral argument that she raised this argument in the alternative if we did
not reverse on the other issues.
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does not support a claim of hardship. Id. It is “an unusual case” in which nonmarital
property is distributed. Dammann v. Dammann, 351 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Minn. App. 1984).
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by leaving her with barely
$100,000 in assets while husband left with over $2,000,000. The district court noted that
it had made its de cisions regarding the parties’ incomes, spousal maintenance, child
support, and property division with the goal of preserving husband’s parents’ testamentary
intent while still ensuring it gave wife the financial resources to which she was entitled .
Although there is a disparity in the parties’ postdivision assets, the division is not so severe
as to require apportionment of nonmarital property.
Wife cites to cases in which we affirmed a district court’s invasi on of nonmarital
property after determining that one spouse would suffer undue hardship: Frederiksen v.
Frederiksen, 368 N.W.2d 769, 775 (Minn. App. 1985) (affirming award of 10% of
husband’s nonmarital property when parties were married 28 years and wife had serious
health problems); Roel v. Roel, 406 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. App. 1987) (affirming award
of 40% of husband’s nonmarital asset when wife spent 30 -year marriage as homemaker,
lacked work experience, and had health problems); Hanson v. Hanson, 378 N.W.2d 28, 30
(Minn. App. 1985) (affirming award of husband’s nonmarital property because marital
property was nominal after short marriage and wife moved from Taiwan).
But unlike Hanson, the marital property here is not nominal. Additionally, we noted
in Roel that the district court’s nonmarital-property apportionment bolstered its decision
not to award wife permanent spousal maintenance. 406 N.W.2d at 622. Here, the district
court awarded wife over $3,000 as monthly permanent maintenance. In Frederiksen, the
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district court found that wife had no marketable skills, had been repeatedly hospitalized
due to chemical dependency and serious health problems, and still might not meet her needs
even with maintenance and nonmarital property. 368 N.W.2d at 775. Here, although the
district court found that wife’s age, health issues, and outdated skills permanently
diminished her earning capacity, it also found that wife could earn at least $31,000 per year
and that she would be able to pay her expenses with her income. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to apportion some of husband’s
nonmarital assets to wife.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.