State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0342

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Artavies Raymone Moore,
Appellant.

Filed August 22, 2022
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-21051

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
On direct appeal from his convictions of terroristic threats and unlawful firearm
possession, and following a remand for postconviction proceedings, appellant argues that
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the district court erred in denying his petition to withdraw his guilty pleas without an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Artavies Moore
with seven counts, including unlawful possession of a firearm, second-degree assault, first-
degree aggravated robbery, fleeing a peace officer, giving a false name to a peace officer,
first-degree burglary, and terroristic threats. Appellant later pleaded guilty to the
terroristic-threats and unlawful-firearm-possession charges. The district court dismissed
the other counts pursuant to a plea agreement and sentenced appellant to 24 months in
prison for the terroristic-threats conviction and a concurrent 60 months in prison for the
unlawful-firearm-possession conviction.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal but later asked this court to stay his appeal so he
could pursue postconviction relief. This court granted the stay. Appellant then petitioned
for postconviction relief, asserting that he did not voluntarily enter his guilty pleas. He
submitted an affidavit to support his argument that his guilty pleas were involuntary
because of his suspected COVID-19 symptoms, his father’s hospitalization with cancer,
his best friend’s death, and his use of depression and anxiety medications. The district
court denied appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. Thereafter, this court
dissolved the stay and reinstated this appeal.

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DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief. We review a postconviction court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief for
an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012).
A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made
clearly erroneous factual findings. Legal issues are reviewed
de novo, but our review of factual issues is limited to whether
there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the
postconviction court’s findings.

Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017) (quotations and citation omitted).
We will not reverse the postconviction court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn. 2001).
When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue
postconviction relief, the postconviction court’s decisions are reviewed using the standard
that would apply on direct appeal. State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 146 (Minn. 2007).
A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it. Perkins v.
State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn. 1997). But a defendant may be able to withdraw a
guilty plea in two circumstances. First, a postconviction court must allow a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea at any time if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Second, a postconviction court may allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing “if it is fair and just to do so.” Id.,
subd. 2. Appellant did not seek to withdraw his guilty pleas before sentencing, so the
manifest-injustice standard applies.
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“A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. To be constitutionally valid,
a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted). A guilty plea is not valid if any of these three
requirements have not been met. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2007). A
defendant bears the burden of showing his guilty plea was not valid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
at 94. The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
Appellant argues that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas because he entered
them involuntarily. The voluntariness requirement ensures that a guilty plea is not in
response to improper pressures or inducements. Id. at 96. Whether a guilty plea is
voluntary is determined by considering all relevant circumstances. State v. Danh , 516
N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994).
Appellant challenges the voluntariness of his guilty pleas on three bases. First, he
argues that his guilty pleas were in voluntary because he pleaded guilty due to his fear of
contracting COVID-19 in the jail. But the Minnesota Supreme Court has rejected the claim
that pleading guilty out of fear renders a plea involuntary when the defendant offers no
support in the record for the argument. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (holding that the
defendant’s fear of receiving the death penalty did not render his guilty plea involuntary
because the record showed acceptance and understanding of the plea). The Minnesota
Supreme Court has also rejected the claim that a guilty plea negates voluntariness when
the defendant competently understands the proceedings and fails to tell the district court
about feared or suffered medical conditions influencing his plea decision. Perkins, 559
N.W.2d at 690-91.
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Here, appellant’s alleged fear of contracting COVID-19 in the jail did not render his
guilty pleas involuntary. Like the defendant in Raleigh, appellant allegedly pleaded guilty
out of fear and offers no support in the record for the argument that this renders his pleas
involuntary. In fact, the record shows that appellant accepted and understood his pleas.
After appellant’s counsel described the plea agreement, appellant assured the court that he
wanted to plead guilty:
THE COURT: Then most importantly, [appellant], big
decision you’re making by going forward this morning with
this agreement. My job isn’t to tell you to take the agreement
or not. It’s to make sure you understand what the agreement is
and the rights you’re giving up to get there.
Is what you’ve been talking to [your counsel] about the
same as what I’ve just heard from him?

APPELLANT: Yes, it is.

THE COURT: All right. You know the rights you’re giving
up, the responsibilities you’re taking on, the things that each
person must consider when they’re making such an important
decision? Comfortable that you have thought about those
things?

APPELLANT: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: And do you want to go forward on the basis we
talked about? Because once you go forward, as [your counsel]
has told you, it’s pretty hard to go back.

APPELLANT: Yes.

Appellant voluntarily entered his guilty pleas because the record shows acceptance and
understanding of the pleas.
Moreover, appellant’s alleged fear of contracting COVID-19 in the jail did not
negate the voluntariness of his guilty pleas because he failed to tell the district court about
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his fear of COVID-19 influencing his plea decision. Appellant did not express any
concerns about COVID-19 before pleading guilty. After pleading guilty, appellant only
expressed concerns about COVID-19 to support his request for “house arrest.”
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: [T]he argument is primarily this.
[Appellant] is concerned about health care, Judge. He was
actually on the precautions list last week. They thought that he
might have COVID since he was exhibiting some symptoms.
He went to the hospital, got some treatment. His test
came back negative. But obviously there are concerns about
the health conditions, not because of anybody’s fault, but just
the nature of the virus at the jail.
I think that’s [appellant’s] primary concern, Judge, is
about his safety and stuff. I know, Judge, that there had been
issues as far as treatment and non-appearance and stuff
beforehand. He has been in custody now for the last two and a
half months.
So it’s not like he’s in the throes of withdrawal or using
or anything. So that’s the reason for his request. Did I miss
something, [appellant]? Is there more than that?

APPELLANT: And I’ll be going to a house that is not even
near Minneapolis. It’s in Big Lake. And the person that I am
going with I’ll be watching kids. I won’t be around none of this
gang stuff. I won’t be doing nothing. I just want to be able to
see my mom and see everybody, give everybody a chance to
come and see me.

Although appellant did not tell the district court about his fear of COVID-19
influencing his plea decision, appellant suggests that the district court should have inferred
this from his hesitation during the plea colloquy. After discussing the enhanceability of
the offense, a ppellant’s counsel asked appellant about his plea to the terroristic threats
charge:
Q: Are you still comfortable going forward?

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A: Not really. But I just don’t want to be sitting in this – I’m
just trying to get out of here.

Appellant suggests his hesitation shows he pleaded guilty in order to leave the county jail
and avoid exposure to COVID-19. As the plea colloquy continued, however, appellant
clarified the enhanceability of the offense “kind of changed my mind, but I am going to
just do the plea.” Appellant’s counsel then followed up on this statement:
Q: [Y]ou can’t have it both ways. Either it changes your mind,
or it doesn’t. I understand this is a lot to think about. But what
the court just wants to know is you understand this is an impact
of your plea. Do you still want to go forward?
A: Yeah.

Appellant did not express any concerns about COVID-19 in this exchange with his counsel.
Based on this exchange, the district court could not have reasonably inferred that
appellant’s fear of COVID-19 influenced his plea decision.
For these reasons, appellant failed to show that his guilty pleas were involuntary due
to his fear of contracting COVID-19 in the jail.
Second, appellant argues that his guilty pleas were involuntary because he pleaded
guilty while under stress concerning his father’s hospitalization with cancer and his best
friend’s recent death. But stress about personal circumstances is not a sufficient basis to
find a guilty plea involuntary. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (rejecting the claim that
extreme stress renders a plea involuntary when the facts show acceptance and
understanding of the plea). Moreover, appellant did not mention these circumstances at
the plea hearing but raised this argument for the first time in his petition and affidavit. And
appellant cites no authority permitting a plea withdrawal under these circumstances, nor
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have we found any. Finally, as discussed above, the facts show that appellant accepted and
understood his pleas.
Third, appellant argues that his guilty pleas were involuntary because he was taking
depression and anxiety medications. Use of depression and anxiety medications is not a
sufficient basis to find a guilty plea involuntary unless the medications affected the
defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings. See Perkins, 559 N.W.2d at 691
(rejecting the claim that a guilty plea negates voluntariness when the defendant
competently understands the proceedings and fails to tell the district court about
medications taken). The record shows that appellant completely understood the
proceedings, and he failed to tell the district court that he was taking depression and anxiety
medications.
In addition, appellant cites no authority for the argument that his guilty pleas were
in response to improper pressures or inducements due to his stress about his father’s
hospitalization with cancer and his best friend’s recent death or his use of depression and
anxiety medications. Appellant failed to show that his guilty pleas were in response to
improper pressures or inducements, and therefore, he failed to show that his guilty pleas
were involuntary. See Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017) (“[A] plea is
involuntary when it is induced by coercive or deceptive action,” such as “actual or
threatened physical harm, . . . mental coercion,” or “a promise by the prosecutor that goes
unfulfilled or was unfulfillable from the start, such as a plea agreement involving the
promise of an illegal sentence.” (quotations omitted)); see also Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96
(stating that a plea is voluntary when it is made without “improper pressure or coercion”).
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Because appellant’s asserted bases for withdrawal fail, appellant has not shown that
his guilty pleas were involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. Thus, appellant
has failed to show that his guilty pleas were not valid. He is therefore not entitled to
withdraw his guilty pleas “to correct a manifest injustice.”
Appellant also argues that the district court erred by making credibility
determinations regarding his asserted bases for withdrawal when denying his petition
without a hearing. Specifically, appellant contends that the district court should have held
an evidentiary hearing to consider the testimony of appellant and potential witnesses and
“to properly assess the weight of the evidence.”
A postconviction court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a petition for
postconviction relief “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding
conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2020). Allegations in a petition for postconviction relief must be more
than argumentative assertions without factual support. State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593,
599 (Minn. 2007). The facts alleged in the petition are to be considered as true and must
be construed in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d
417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018). An evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no material
facts in dispute that must be resolved to determine the postconviction claims on the merits.
Powers v. State, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005). “When a petitioner alleges facts that,
if true, are legally insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief, the postconviction court
need not hold an evidentiary hearing.” Greer v. State, 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn. 2013)
(quotation omitted). The burden rests with “the petitioner to allege facts that, if proven,
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would entitle him to the requested relief.” Wilson v. State, 726 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Minn.
2007) (quotation omitted). The postconviction court’s decision to deny an evidentiary
hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d 766, 770
(Minn. 2014).
The district court found that appellant’s guilty pleas were voluntary. As previously
discussed, review of the record comports with the district court’s finding and shows no
material facts in dispute. Appellant’s asserted bases for withdrawal, even if true, are legally
insufficient to entitle him to withdraw his guilty pleas. If appellant knew of witnesses who
had relevant informati on, or had additional facts to support his argument that his guilty
pleas were involuntary, he could have included them in his petition and affidavit. An
evidentiary hearing is not a vehicle to permit appellant to conduct discovery of the
testimony of pot ential witnesses or factual support for his claim. The district court
therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant’s guilty pleas were voluntary.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s
petition to withdraw his guilty pleas without a hearing because the petition and the files
and records of the proceeding conclusively show that appellant is entitled to no relief.
Affirmed.