Michael John Husten, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0348

Michael John Husten,
Appellant,

vs.

Paul Schnell, Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections,
Respondent.

Filed December 13, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-20-3939

Bradford Colbert, Legal Assi stance to Minnesota Prisoners, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney Genera l, Corinne Wright-MacLeod, A ssistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
SYLLABUS
The “favorable termination rule,” adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
applies in state court to require that an incarc erated individual obtain habeas corpus relief
before pursuing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if success on those claims would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.
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OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and
his constitutional challenge to his indeterminat e sentence. Because the district court did
not err in determining that appellant’s sectio n 1983 claims are precluded by his failure to
prevail on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and that his challenge to the administration
of his sentence is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2012, appellant Michael Husten was co nvicted of second-degree murder for an
offense he committed in 1975. Based on his plea agreement, the district court imposed an
indeterminate sentence of up to 20 years in prison. Minn. Stat. § 609.19 (1974) (providing
sentence up to 40 years’ imprisonment). When the offense was committed, individuals
who were sentenced to indeterminate sentences of less than life imprisonment were eligible
for parole. Minn. Stat. § 609.12, subd. 1 (197 4). Under this indeterminate sentencing
scheme, a prisoner could be paroled at the discretion of the Minnesota corrections
authority. Minn. Stat. § 243.05 (1974). For crimes committed on or after May 1, 1980, a
determinate sentence applies under the Minnes ota Sentencing Guidelines. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2 (2020). But the commissioner of corrections still maintains authority to
determine whether an offende r whose offense was committed before May 1, 1980, is
eligible for parole. Minn. Stat. § 244.08, subd. 1 (2020) (stating the commissioner retains
all powers and duties with respect to indivi duals convicted of crimes committed before
3
April 30, 1980). Husten is currently incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at
Moose Lake with a parole hearing scheduled for February 2022.
On a self-represented basis in 2016, Hust en petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
in Washington County District Court, alleging in part th at his indeterminate sentence
violated the ex post facto provisions of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions. The
district court denied Husten’s habeas corpus petition, and this court affirmed. We held that
“[i]t is undisputed that Husten was properly sentenced to a 20-year indeterminate sentence.
This sentence was authorized under the statute that applied to him when he committed the
second-degree murder in 1975.” Husten v. Roy, No. A17-0775, 2017 WL 5661583 (Minn.
App. Nov. 27, 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 24, 2018).
In April 2020, after the World Health Organizatio n declared the COVID-19
outbreak a global pandemic, th e Minnesota Department of Co rrections (the department)
created a temporary process for inmates to apply for COVID-19 conditional medical
release (COVID-19 CMR). The COVID-19 CMR program allows incarcerated individuals
to apply for temporary release from custody, if they have existing medical conditions that
put them at a higher risk of serious illne ss or death from COVID-19. The department
screens COVID-19 CMR applicants and grants release at its discretion. 1 The department
later published an update on COVID-19 CMR, st ating that inmates “subject to the parole
process . . . are not eligible for [the depart ment’s] conditional medical release related to

1 In contrast, inmates need not apply for release under the traditional conditional medical
release program (CMR). Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 8 (2020). Instead, the department
identifies eligible persons and grants CMR on its own initiative. Id.
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COVID-19. This decision is due to the differe nt obligations for notification, publication,
and parole process review.”
Husten suffers from several serious medi cal conditions making him particularly
susceptible to complications and death from COVID-19. Husten applied for COVID-19
CMR and the department grante d his application. But five days later, the department
withdrew its approval and notified Husten that , because he was serving an indeterminate
sentence and subject to the parole process, he was not eligible for the COVID-19 CMR
program.
Husten filed a complaint in district court against Paul Schnell, the Commissioner of
Corrections (the commissioner), asserting tw o claims: (1) that the commissioner denied
him equal protection of the laws by declaring him ineligible for COVID-19 CMR based on
his indeterminate sentence, and (2) that the ca lculation of his sentence violated ex post
facto provisions of the Minneso ta and United States Constitu tions. The district court
dismissed the action with prejudice concluding: (1) that Husten’s section 1983 claims were
precluded because he had not prevailed in a habeas corpus action, and (2) that his ex post
facto claim was also barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because he raised the
same issue in his 2016 habeas corpus action. Husten appeals from the resulting judgment.
ISSUES
1. Did the district court err in concluding that Husten’s section 1983 claims are
precluded by his failure to first bring and prevail in a habeas corpus action?

2. Did the district court err in concluding that Husten’s constitutional challenge to his
indeterminate sentence is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel?

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ANALYSIS
The district court dismissed Husten’s section 1983 claims with prejudice,
concluding that Husten was barred from bringing these claims given the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Preiser and Heck. See Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). We review de novo a district court’s decision on a motion
to dismiss and limit our review to whether the complaint sets forth legally sufficient claims
for relief. Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes , 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (M inn. 2008). We accept
the allegations in the complaint as true and “construe all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party.” Id. (quotation omitted).
I. The district court did not err in conclu ding Husten’s section 1983 claims are
precluded by his failure to prevail in a habeas corpus action.

This case is about whether an incarcerat ed individual can bring claims under the
federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in state court to challenge the fact or duration
of his incarceration if the individual has not yet succeeded in a habeas corpus action. Both
the writ of habeas corpus and section 1983 provide access to a judicial forum to challenge
alleged unconstitutional treatment by state officials. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2020). But a writ of habeas corpus and section 1983 claims differ in
procedure and scope. We be gin by comparing the nature of habeas corpus relief, under
both state and federal law, with section 1983 claims.
A. Habeas corpus relief versus section 1983
Minnesota prisoners may petition for a writ of habeas corpus either under the
Minnesota habeas corpus statute, Minnesota Statutes chapter 589, or under the federal
6
habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A prisoner may file a writ in Minnesota state
court under chapter 589 to challenge unlawful imprisonment or restra int. Minn. Stat.
§ 589.01; Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1979) (Kelsey II).
Similarly, a federal writ of habeas corpus can be sought in federal court asserting
that an individual is in “custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the federal statute, a prisoner must exhaust all
state remedies unless there are no availabl e or otherwise effective state corrective
processes. Id. (b)(1)(A)-(B). This exhaustion requirement provides the state court with the
first opportunity to correct constitutional errors through alternative remedies. Preiser, 411
U.S. at 492. A writ of habeas corpus is narr ow in scope and “not available when there is
some other regular legal procedur e to remedy the alleged wrong.” State ex rel. Young v.
Schnell, 956 N.W.2d 652, 674 (Minn. 2021).
Section 1983 provides a federal civil action to challenge deprivation of
constitutional rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Unlike the federal habeas
corpus statute, section 1983 does not include an exhaustion-of-remedies requirement. And
the broad language of section 1983 could be interpreted to allow an incarcerated individual
to pursue claims challenging the fact or duration of his confinement without first obtaining
a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser , 411 U.S. at 489 (acknowl edging the breadth of
statutory language). Relief under section 1983 includes monetary damages or injunctive
relief but it does not necessarily mean a shorter duration of confinement. Id.
Because both section 1983 and writs of habeas corpus pr ovide remedies for
constitutional violations, the United States Su preme Court has analy zed whether the two
7
causes are interchangeable. Thus, a review of United States Supreme Court cases guides
our analysis.
B. United States Supreme Court caselaw on habeas corpus relief and section
1983 claims

i. Preiser v. Rodriguez
The United States Supreme Court first a ddressed the interrelationship between
section 1983 claims and the federal habeas corpus statute in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475. In that case, three state prisoners challenged the revocation of good-behavior-time-
credits and sought injunctive relief to restore the credits. Id. at 477. Rather than seeking
relief under the habeas corpus statute, the prisoners sued under section 1983. Id. The Court
addressed whether state prisoners could obta in equitable relief under section 1983 or
whether they must proceed under the federal habeas corpus statute. Id. at 478.
The Court analyzed the language of secti on 1983 and the common-law history of
habeas corpus and held that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration
of his physical imprisonment . . . his sole fe deral remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Id.
at 484, 500. The Court further held that “even if the restoration of the respondents’ credits
would not have resulted in thei r immediate release, but only in shortening the length of
their actual confinement in prison, habeas corpus would have b een their appropriate
remedy.” Id. at 487.
In reaching its holding, the Preiser Court relied in part on federal-state comity
concerns, recognizing the importance of a state’s interest in prison administration: “[i]t is
difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a strong er interest . . . than the
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administration of its prisons.” Id. at 491-92. State courts and administrative bodies are
familiar with the complaints of state prisoners and are “in a better physical and practical
position to deal with those grievances.” Id. at 492. Thus, the Court held that prisoners
should not be allowed to circ umvent state remedies, which are required to be exhausted
before pursuing federal habeas reli ef, by filing suit under section 1983. Id. at 500. The
Court, however, did not decide whether a suit fo r damages, rather than equitable relief in
the form of restoration of good-behavior-time-credits, could be brought under section 1983.
Id. (“But we need not in this case explore the appropriate limits of habeas corpus as an
alternative remedy to a proper action under § 1983. That question is not before us.”)
Whether a state prisoner could challenge confinement by suing for damages under section
1983 was not addressed until the Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, more than 20 years
later.
ii. Heck v. Humphrey—“the Favorable Termination Rule”
In Heck, a state prisoner filed suit in federa l court under section 1983, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages stemming from allegations of wrongful confinement
based on an allegedly unlawful investigation underlying his conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at
478-79. The prisoner did not seek injunctive relief. Id. at 479. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to clarify whether claims for monetary relief are cognizable under section 1983.
Id. at 480.
The Court found that a state prisoner’s claims are not cognizable under
section 1983 when resolution of the claims wo uld “necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487. The Court held:
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[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness wo uld render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Id. at 486-87. The Court’s rule that a prisoner must prevail in a habeas corpus action (or
otherwise obtain relief from a conviction or sentence) before bringing section 1983 claims
has since been term ed the favorable te rmination rule. Id. at 498-99 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
iii. Wilkinson v. Dotson
In 2005, the Supreme Court once again addressed the relationship between section
1983 and the writ of habeas corpus. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, two inmates brought section
1983 claims in federal district court ch allenging the constitutionality of state parole
procedures, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 544 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). The district
court held that the prisoners were restricted to pursuing habeas corpus relief and dismissed
the claims, but the Sixth Circuit reversed , and the Supreme Court granted review. Id. at
77.
The Court analyzed the progression of the favorable termination rulings, beginning
with its decision in Preiser, noting that the primary focus had been on remedies sought by
inmates. Id. at 78-79. The Court held:
These cases, taken together, indicate that a state prisoner’s
§ 1983 action is barred (absen t prior invalidation)—no matter
the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the
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target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction
or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the inva lidity of confinement or its
duration.

Id. at 81-82. The decision hinged on whether the prisoners’ section 1983 claims implicated
the validity of confinement. Id. at 82. In other words, if relief meant immediate release
from prison or the shortening of the term of confinement, the prisoner must proceed by
petition for habeas corpus, unless the prisoner had obtained a favorable termination in other
proceedings. Id. at 79.
In Wilkinson, because the prisoners’ requested relief was a new parole proceeding,
the Court held it did not fall within the realm of the writ’s common law purpose, and section
1983 claims were viable. Id. at 82. Specifically, a fa vorable judgment would not
necessarily mean a shorter stay in prison, but instead would cure a procedural defect and
shorten the time before a new parole hearing. Id. Although the outcome of the future
parole hearing could mean immediate release from confinement, the Court held that such
relief was too attenuated from the prisoners’ claims for relief. Id.
C. The application of habeas corpus and section 198 3 to Husten’s
claims

In this case, the district court, relying on the Supreme Court’s favorable termination
rule, concluded that Husten could not brin g his section 1983 acti on because he had not
prevailed in a habeas corpus action. Husten argues that his section 1983 claims are not
barred because he brought his claims in Minnesota state court and the Supreme Court cases
restricting section 1983 claims apply only in federal court. He also argues that the
favorable termination rule does not apply because he is not seeking immediate release from
11
prison but is instead asking to be declared eligible for early release through COVID-19
CMR. The State argues that the favorable term ination rule applies in state court and that
Husten’s request for relief falls within it.
i. The Supreme Court’s favorable termination rule applies in
Minnesota state courts.

Husten first argues that the district c ourt erred in relying on the favorable
termination rule because the Supreme Court’s holdings only limit federal court jurisdiction
and do not apply in state court actions. He argues that the rule of exhaustion from Preiser
and Heck cannot apply to his claims because he is pursuing his section 1983 claims in state
court. We disagree.
Federal and state courts ha ve concurrent jurisdiction over section 1983 claims.
Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn. , 763 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. App. 2009).
While Husten filed his claims in state court, his claims are based on the federal civil rights
statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Husten cites no authority, and this cour t can find none, that
holds that the favorable termination rule does not apply to section 1983 actions in state
courts. While the Preiser decision focused mainly on federal-state comity concerns, it was
only a part of the Court’s reasoning, and la ter cases more explicitly apply the favorable
termination rule as a predicate to a section 1983 claim. Moreover, although the Minnesota
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue raised here, its decisions are consistent
with the favorable termination rule. See Kelsey II , 283 N.W.2d at 893 (holding that
allegations that parole authorities unconstituti onally denied parole may be addressed in
habeas corpus proceedings); Kelsey v. State ex rel. McManus , 244 N.W.2d 53, 53 (Minn.
12
1976) (Kelsey I) (stating that “habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy if the relief to which
the petitioner may be entitled is immediate release”).
In sum, the district court did not err in concluding that the favorable termination rule
applies to section 1983 claims brought in state court.
ii. Husten must succeed in a habeas co rpus action before bringing his
section 1983 claims because his request for relief challenges the
duration of his confinement.

Husten next argues that the favorable term ination rule does not apply in his case
because he is not seeking immediate release fro m prison. Instead, he argues that he is
simply asking to be declared eligible for pote ntial release. Husten ’s request for relief
includes: (1) a declaratory ju dgment declaring that the co mmissioner violated Husten’s
constitutional rights; (2) an order requiring the commissioner to declare Husten eligible for
CMR; (3) an order requiring the commissioner to set a target releas e date for Husten;
(4) an order and judgment awar ding litigation costs, attorney s’ fees, and other litigation
expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); and (5) any other relief the court deems appropriate
and just.
Husten argues that, like the prisoners in Wilkinson, his request for relief is not a
collateral attack on the fact or duration of hi s confinement but is instead an attack on the
procedures used to de cide his eligibility for his release. But in Wilkinson, the prisoners
challenged the constitutio nality of state procedures used to deny their parole eligibility.
544 U.S. at 74. Success on thei r claims meant that, at most , the inmates would receive a
new parole eligibility hearing. Id. at 82. While a new parole eligibility hearing could mean
early release from prison, early release was not assured. Id.
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In contrast, Husten is seeking an orde r requiring the commissioner to declare him
eligible for COVID-19 CMR and to set a targ et release date. Because the commissioner
previously granted Husten’s application for COVID-19 CMR and then rescinded that
decision because Husten is serv ing an indeterminate sentence, being declared eligible for
COVID-19 CMR would effectively grant Husten immediate release. We discern no
difference on these facts between asking to be declared eligible for release and actually
being released.
Husten is challenging the duration of his confinement and seeking immediate
release. But he brings these challenges using the wrong procedural vehicle. Thus, we hold
that when a state prisoner is challenging the fact or duration of confinement, the inmate
must first prevail on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before bringing section 1983
claims in state court. In sum, the district court did not err in dism issing Husten’s section
1983 claims as barred by the favorable termination rule.
II. The district court did not err by determ ining Husten’s ex post facto claim is
barred by collateral estoppel.

Husten also challenges the district court’s determination that his ex post facto claim
is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine
and is not rigidly applied. Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn.
1996). Instead, applying the doctrine depends on whether it would “work an injustice on
the party against whom estoppel is urged.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Consol. Freightways,
Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn. 1988)). “Whether collateral estoppel precludes litigation
14
of an issue is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.” Hauschildt v.
Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004).
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, ba rs relitigation of an issue when: (1) the
issue is identical to one in a prior adjudication, (2) the adjudication was final on the merits,
(3) the party to be estopped was a party to or in privity with a party in the prior adjudication,
and (4) the party to be estoppe d was given a full and fair opp ortunity to be heard on the
issue. Id. at 840. Two claims involve the same set of factual circumstances when the same
evidence will sustain both actions. McMenomy v. Ryden , 148 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Minn.
1967).
The district court determined that collate ral estoppel applies to Husten’s ex post
facto claim, and we agree. First, Husten’s current ex post facto claim alleges that his term
of imprisonment was improperly calculated in vi olation of the ex post facto doctrine, and
his prior claim alleged the same violation based on the same factual allegations. See
Husten, 2017 WL 5661583, at *1. Thus, the claim asserted in his co mplaint arises from
the same action and involves the same set of factual circumstances as his ex post facto
claim in 2016. Second, the district court issued a judgment on the merits determining that
the commissioner did not violate the ex post facto provisions of the Minnesota and United
States Constitutions and we affirm ed that decision on appeal. See id. There has been a
final adjudication on the merits of this dispute, and the questions of fact related to Husten’s
sentence have been resolved. See id. Third, the action involves the same parties or their
privies. And lastly, Husten had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the matter.
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Husten argues that, while the doctrine of collateral estoppel could apply, it should
not apply because the di strict court and this court wron gly decided the issue in 2016.
Husten represented himself in 2016. He now has counsel. However, his ex post facto
claim remains the same. While courts may allow some leeway in the procedures afforded
to self-represented litigants, Husten cites no authority, and this court finds none, that self-
represented litigants can relitigate the same issue after obtaining counsel.
For a court to determine that collateral estoppel applies, all elements must be met.
Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840. Here, we agree with the district court that all the elements
of collateral estoppel ha ve been satisfied. Id. at 837 (stating that fundamental to the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, any “question or fact distinc tly put in issue and directly
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit
between the same parties or their privies” (quotations omitted)).
Because the elements of collateral estoppel have been satisfied, the district court did
not err in concluding the doctrine bars further litigation of Husten’s ex post facto claim.
DECISION
For the reasons set forth abov e, Husten’s section 1983 claims are precluded under
the favorable termination rule of Preiser and Heck because his claims challenge the
duration or fact of his confinement. Additi onally, Husten’s ex post facto claim is barred
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Affirmed.