A21-0357

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0356
A21-0357

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
C. J. N., D. S. H. (A21-0356),
and E. J. G., II (A21-0357), Parents.

Filed August 23, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Douglas County District Court
File Nos. 21-JV-20-886, 21-JV-20-888

Matthew P. Franzese, Wheaton, Minnesota (for appellant-mother C.J.N.)

Chad Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Daniel Lee, A ssistant County Attorney,
Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent Douglas County)

Thomas J. Nolan, Jr., Nolan Law Offices , Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
guardian ad litem Mary Peterson)

Robert M. Levasseur, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent-child P.C.N.)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from the termination of her pa rental rights (TPR) to her two children,
appellant-mother argues that the record does not support the district court’s determinations
that (1) respondent Douglas County provided reasonable efforts to reunify the family, (2) a
statutory basis exists that warrants TPR, and (3) TPR is in the children’s best interests. We
affirm.
FACTS
This case involves the termin ation of parental rights to mother’s two minor sons.
This child-protection case began in August 2019, when the older son, P.C.N., was 13 years
old and the younger son, P.D.N., was 7 years old. At that time, the children were removed
from mother’s care on an emergency basis. Th e children thereafter were adjudicated in
need of protection or servic es (CHIPS) within the meanin g of Minn. Stat. § 260C.007,
subd. 6(4) (2020), and legal cu stody of the children was tran sferred to Douglas County.
The children have remained together in c ourt-ordered out-of-home placement since their
removal in September 2019. The county petitioned for TPR for both children in June 2020.
In January 2021, the district court held a bench trial on the TPR petitions. At that
time, the children had been in out-of-home placement for 483 days. At the trial, the county
presented testimony from the Douglas County Social Services (DCSS) case manager, the
DCSS child protection supervisor, the family and community services director from the
facility where supervised visits took place, the instructor from the younger son’s cognitive-
therapy program, the psychol ogist who conducted the child ren’s initial therapy, the
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parenting and attachment assessor who conduc ted mother’s assessment, the dialectical
behavior therapy (DBT) therapist who saw mother when she was referred for DBT, one of
the foster parents, and the gu ardian ad litem. The children, their older half-sister, mother,
and mother’s boyfriend also testified at the hearing.
Reason the CHIPS Action Was Initiated
In August 2019, th e county received a welfare report concerning the children’s
supervision as well as physical and verbal abuse that mother committed against the older
son. The report alleged that mother tried to run the older son over with an all-terrain vehicle
(ATV) and that mother often le ft the children home alone for days at a time. The county
met with the children the day after receivi ng the report, and the children confirmed the
allegations that the older son was chased by mother on the ATV and that they were
frequently staying by themselv es at the home without an a dult or supervision. A petition
for emergency protective care (EPC) was file d and granted, and th e county obtained
custody of the children. A CHIPS petition was filed soon thereafter.
Placement Suitability
The case manager created an out-of-home placement plan for mother in August
2019. The out-of-home placement plan recommended that mother accomplish or show five
things for the children to re turn home: (1) “complete a Chemical Use Assessment and
follow any and all recommendations of that assessment”; (2) “cooperate with random drug
testing”; (3) “complete a psychological evaluation/assessment, with an anger management
component”; (4) “cooperate with intensive in home therapy”; and (5) “maintain regular
contact with the children.”
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The county offered mother services, including providing a diagnostic assessment;
scheduling supervised vi sits at a family services facilit y and unsupervised visits in the
community; coordinating home visits; coordinating random drug testing; transporting the
children to dental, medical, vision, and ther apy appointments; scheduling a parenting and
attachment assessment; and attempting to sc hedule family therapy services. Mother
complied with most of her case plan. She completed the random drug testing, the diagnostic
assessment, and the parenting and attachment assessment.
Mother completed the diagnostic assessm ent in November 2 019. However, no
further treatment was reco mmended for mother because the diagnostic assessment
concluded that she “does not meet diagnostic criteria for any mental health diagnosis and
insurance will not pay for the therapy she requests.”
In March 2020, the case manager emailed mother, requesting that mother sign a
release of information to start family ther apy with Lutheran Soci al Service (LSS) and
informing mother that the county was coordinating w ith a parenting and attachment
assessor to schedule an assessment for mother. Mother responded that she did not want to
move forward with LSS because she had a prior bad experience with them. The case
manager researched other family-therapy pr oviders but could not find any without long
waitlists. She reached out again to mother and explained that she thought it was prudent to
start with LSS. The case manager never received a reply or a signed release of information
from mother.
In the meantime, the pare nting and attachment assessment was performed. The
parenting and attachment assessor observed mother with the children for several hours over
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a period of two days. The pa renting and attachment assessor’s report recommended that
reunification efforts cease immediately, conclu ding that mother “does not demonstrate
healthy, safe boundaries or positive attachment formations” with the younger child and that
any further contact with mother would be harmful to the children.
In May 2020, the county moved to cease reunification efforts. The district court
granted the county’s motion. The county then petitioned for TPR, and the trial was held.
The district court granted the TPR petiti ons. It found that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify th e family. It further found th at four statutory bases for
termination existed: that mother failed to satisfy the duties of the parent-child relationship,
that mother is a palpably un fit parent, that reasonable effo rts had failed to correct the
conditions that led to the ch ildren’s out-of-home placement, and that the children are
neglected and in foster care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4)-(5), (8) (2020).
The district court also determin ed that termination of mothe r’s parental rights was in the
best interests of the children.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
On appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we consider whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory termination criteria and have substantial evidentiary
support. See In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). We
give considerable deference to a district court’s TPR decision. Id. We review findings of
“underlying or basic facts” for clear error. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d
895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012). In doing so, we defer to
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the district court’s credibility determinations. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d
76, 90 (Minn. App. 2012). But we will not disturb a district court’s decision whether clear
and convincing evidence supports a particular gr ound for termination, absent an abuse of
discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 899, 901. We will affirm the decision to terminate
parental rights when at least one statutory termination ground is supported by clear and
convincing evidence, the county made reasonable effort s to reunite the family, and
termination is in the child’s best interests. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
I. The county made reasonable efforts to reunite mother with the children.
Mother challenges the district court’ s determination that the county made
reasonable efforts toward reunification of the family. She contends that the county failed
to offer her services that wo uld help her accept responsib ility for her children’s removal
from the home and that that failure renders the overall efforts unreasonable.
Termination of parental rights require s clear and convinci ng evidence that
“reasonable efforts were made to reunite the parent with the child.” In re Welfare of A.M.C.,
920 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. App. 2018). Whether the responsible social services agency
made reasonable efforts turns on “the length of the time the [agency] was involved and the
quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K. , 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990),
review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). In evaluating whether the efforts were reasonable, a
district court must consider whether servi ces were: “(1) relevant to the safety and
protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally
appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under
the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h ) (2020). The district court must make
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“individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the
social services agency to re habilitate the parent and reun ite the family.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2020). Whether the county made reas onable efforts is a factual
finding that we review for clear error. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 387.
Mother argues that the county failed to ma ke reasonable efforts toward reunification
because it did not provide her with the services necessary for her to accept her role in the
children’s removal from the home. Althou gh accepting her own responsibility in the
children’s removal from the home was not a component of her case plan, mother argues
that the county and the guardian ad litem “acted as though it were the most important part
of it.” She argues that, if that were the case and accepting responsibility was a component
of her case plan, then the coun ty was required “to offer all necessary services to [mother]
in order to allow [her] to complete the case plan” and that the county failed to do so.
Mother compares this case to In re Welfare of M.D.O. , 462 N.W.2d 370 (Minn.
1990). In M.D.O., the county concluded that the moth er, who had been convicted of the
second-degree murder of her adopted daughter, could not be sufficiently rehabilitated to
care for a second child, born after the adopted daughter’s d eath, because she refused to
admit guilt in the daughter’s death. 462 N.W. 2d at 371, 377. The supreme court reversed
the termination of the mother’s parental rights, concluding that the county failed to provide
reasonable services to help the mother admit her guilt. Id. at 371. In doing so, the supreme
court determined that “[t]he county’s expect ations seem especially daunting considering
the county’s admitted failure to provide services, counseling or assistance to aid [the
mother] in coming to gr ips with her conduct.” Id. at 377. For example, the county never
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told the mother what programs would be appropriate for her, it never contacted the leaders
of the therapy programs she joined, and the social worker only observed one visit between
the mother and the second child. Id. Mother argues that her situation “is exactly the same
as the mother in M.D.O.” because she refuses to admit that she attempted to run the older
son over with an ATV and the county failed to provide he r with services, counseling, or
assistance to help her “come to grips with her alleged conduct.”
But, here, the county did provide mother with services, counseling, and assistance
to help her recognize her role in the children’s removal. The county provided mother with
a diagnostic assessment, a family therapy optio n, and a DBT therapy referral. As to the
diagnostic assessment and the DBT therapy, further services were not provided to mother
because she did not report any mental health concerns and so the assessors were unable to
recommend further services. Still, mother argues that if the county had concerns about the
validity of mother’s diagnostic assessment, it should have recomme nded that mother
undergo a full psychological evaluation. While a full psychological evaluation certainly
could be a reasonable service to provide, it is not the only reasonable service available.
Instead of a full psychological evaluation, the case manager requested that a parenting and
attachment assessment take place in orde r “to get a professional opinion, get the
professional’s perspective and insight, and to see if there were any other services that might
be beneficial to support reunification.” The district court granted the county’s request that
a parenting and attachment assessment take place so that the county could “better identify
the source of the problem and to better understand how to improve [mother’s] parenting.”
The fact that mother may not agree with the parenting and attachment assessor’s ultimate
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recommendation does not render the service itself unreasonable. The record thus supports
the district court’s determination that the parenting and attachment assessment was a
reasonable service to offer mother.
As to family therapy, the record also supports the finding that the county made
reasonable efforts. The case manager testified that, while the older son was uncomfortable
with beginning family thera py, one of the son’s individua l therapy goals was to work
toward initiating family therapy. To that end, the case manager investigated possible family
therapy providers and ultimately determined that LSS was the best fit because it provided
the services mother and the children needed and it could take place in a reasonable
timeframe. The case manager emailed mothe r, requesting that she sign a release of
information so that th e family could start therapy at L SS. Mother responded that she did
not want to move forward wi th LSS because she had a prio r bad experience with them.
Although the case manager res earched other providers, sh e could not fi nd any family-
therapy providers that provided the services the family would need without long waitlists.
She reached out again to moth er and explained that she th ought LSS was the best option
and asked mother to sign the release of info rmation. The case manager never received a
reply or a signed release of information from mother.
On appeal, mother argues that the cas e manager’s family therapy option was
unreasonable because, based on th e psychologist that mother chose to provide therapy to
the children, family therapy could have begun as early as January 2020. This psychologist
testified at trial, and mother cites his testimony that, if reunification was the county’s goal,
there was no reason to delay family therapy. The psychologist testified that he “couldn’t
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see any downfalls” to the olde r son engaging in family th erapy because the older son
already talked with mother when he was in the therapy waiting room every week. Although
the district court found the psychologist’s testimony credible, it disagreed with his opinions
and conclusions. Instead, the district court relied on the parenting and attachment assessor’s
testimony that attempting family therapy would harm the olde r son. On appeal, we defer
to the district court’s determination of the weight to be given to the evidence. In re Welfare
of Child of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. July 17,
2007).
The parenting and attachment assessor te stified that she woul d “strongly disagree
with [the psychologist’s] recommendation” th at mother and the children were ready for
family therapy. She explained that, when a child refuses to engage in family therapy and
remains adamant in their refusal, there is “tremendous pain behind that statement” and that
“pain probably needs to be respected” for a 14-year-old. She testified that “forcing them to
[engage in family therapy] in spite of what their statement is, causes more harm than good.”
The case manager corroborated the parenting and attachment assessor’s concerns. She
testified that, based on her conversations with the older son, he was uncomfortable moving
forward with family therapy and that he did not trust the psychologist to keep his individual
therapy sessions confidential. Becaus e we will not reweigh the evidence, id., the district
court’s determination that attempting family therapy too soon would harm the older son is
supported by the record.
The record contains evidence of other services offered by the county, in addition to
the assessments and efforts to arrange family therapy. These services included a chemical-
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use assessment and random testing, visitation with the children, and a DBT therapy referral
for mother. The district court found that the services offered to mother were adequate and
appropriate to facilitate reunification with the children and that there were no other services
that could be provided to mother that would allow the children to return to mother’s care.
The district court found that mother had tried; it observed that mother complied with many
components of the case pl an including completing dia gnostic and chemical-use
assessments and attending regular visitation. But it also noted th at mother “actively
sabotaged” the county’s efforts to assist her family a nd reunite them. This finding is
supported by the record.
The record reflects that mother bloc ked the guardian ad litem from attending
individualized-education-plan meetings for the children and the guardian ad litem’s access
to the school. She cancelled medical appointments that the foster parents scheduled for the
children. She failed to respond to requests by the case manager or the guardian ad litem—
for example, a request to give the older son’ s glasses to him or the request to release
information to LSS for family therapy.
On this record, we discern no clear error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determination that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
II. Reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-
of-home placement.
A district court may terminate parental ri ghts when clear and c onvincing evidence
shows “that following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the
direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditio ns leading to the child’s
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placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1( b)(5). As explained above, the record
supports the district court’s finding that the county made reasonable efforts to address the
conditions leading to the child ren’s out-of-home placement. Th e record establishes that,
despite the county’s efforts, the conditions persisted.
The conditions that led to th e children’s out of home placement were physical and
verbal abuse against the older son and neglecting both children by frequently leaving them
without adult supervision or adequate food. Despite reasonable efforts to address these
conditions, mother did not demonstrate any insight to her mistreatment and neglectful care
of her children. Mother regularly made commen ts and acted in a manner that disregarded
the children’s physical and emotional bound aries, causing the children discomfort and
distress. Mother consistently stated that he r children were lying about any physical abuse
and denied that she neglected or harmed them. The older son testified that he waited for
mother to change durin g these proceedings and show him that “she’s actually sorry” but
that she never took responsib ility for her actions. The district court found that mother’s
lack of progress toward respecting her chil dren’s boundaries and understanding how her
behavior made her children feel underscored that she does not possess the parenting skills
to safely assume the responsibilities of caring for her children.
Mother argues that clear and convinci ng evidence does not exist to support
termination because she subs tantially complied with the case plan. But there is no
presumption that completion of a case plan necessarily equates with a correction of the
conditions that led to th e out-of-home placement. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 89. Rather, the
issue is “whether the parent is presently able to assume the responsibilities of caring for
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the child.” Id. As discussed above, although mother may have completed the case plan to
the best of her ability, the record clearly and convincingly shows that mother did not
improve her parenting skills to a degree that corrected the conditions that led to the
children’s removal from the home. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that mother’s failu re to meaningfully engage w ith the diagnostic assessment,
family therapy, and DBT therapy prevented her from addressing the underlying conditions
that led to the children’s out-of-home placement.
In sum, the district court did not abus e its discretion by ruling that clear and
convincing evidence established that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that
led to the children’s out-of-hom e placement. We need not address mother’s arguments
regarding the other statutory bases the district court relied on because only one statutory
basis is necessary to terminate parental rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)
(2020) (allowing termination of parental rights upon satisfaction of “one or more” statutory
conditions).
III. Termination of mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.
Even when the district court finds that a statutory ground for termination is met,
“the district court must separately find that termination is in the ch ild’s best interests.”
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92. When, under Minn. St at. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b), a statutory
basis for terminating a parent’s rights to a child exists, “the best interests of the child must
be the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020).
“In analyzing the best interests of the ch ild, the court must balance three factors:
(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
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in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any compe ting interests of the child.”
In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (M inn. App. 1992); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests include such things as a stable environment, health
considerations, and the child’s preferences.” R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4. “Where the interests
of parent and child conflict, the interest s of the child are paramount.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 7. We review “a district court’s ultimate determination that termination
is in a child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
In determining that TPR was in the children’s best interests, the district court
explained:
[Mother’s] interactions with the children is unhealthy,
including creating tension be tween the two brothers and
overruling the boundaries of th e children. [Mother] puts her
own needs before her children’s safety and secu rity, leaving
them alone and unsupervised in a home that was not fit to live
in, was isolated from everyone else, had inadequate food, and
was sometimes too cold. She sh owed little to no concern for
their education. She physically harmed and threatened [the
older son]. Then, when conf ronted by DCSS about her
children’s suffering, she accused her children of lying about
her behavior, rather than tryi ng to honestly assess how she
might do better as a parent. As [the parenting and attachment
assessor] concluded, [mother] has expressed no remorse about
any of her past actions, and she is not receptive to any
suggestions that she needs to modify her parenting.
Regarding the older son, the district cour t determined that mother “mostly ignores
him or violates his emotional, physical and sexual boundaries, leaving him uncomfortable.”
It found that mother has physically harmed and threatened the older son and that he has no
interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship. The district court found that the older
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son feels safer and more supported in his fost er care placement and that he wants to stay
with his foster family.
Regarding the younger son, the district court also found that, while he is conflicted
about his relationship with mother and he misse s her, he has not asked to return to his
mother’s care. When asked by the district court to rank where he wants to live, the younger
son ranked the foster care placement first, his half-sister second, and mother’s boyfriend
third. The district court found that the younger son is thriving in his foster home and is
well-adjusted to his life there. His grades ar e better, his relationship with his brother has
improved, and he gets along well with his fo ster family. Because both children are doing
well in their foster care placement and they need permanency and stability, the district court
determined that clear and conv incing evidence exists that te rminating mother’s parental
rights is in the children’s best interests.
Mother contends that “to find that termina tion is in a child’s best interests without
attempting family therapy is contrary to Minnesota law and the whole intent behind child
protection cases to reunify a broken/wounded family.” But mother cites no caselaw to
support her argument. Instead, she again challenges the district court’s credibility
determinations. She argues that the parenting and attachment assessor’s testimony is not
credible and that the district court erred by relying on it. We defer to a district court’s
credibility determinations, T.D., 731 N.W.2d at 555, and mo ther has not shown those
determinations are clearly erroneous. Here, th e district court found that family therapy
would not only not lead to reuni fication, but that it would be harmful to attempt it before
the older son is ready. As discussed above, this finding is supported by the record.
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Overall, the record reflects that the children have done well in their foster care
placement, that they have both made progress since they were placed there, and that, if they
were removed or separated from each other they might regress or deteriorate.
The district court analyzed the three fact ors outlined above and concluded that the
children’s best interests are se rved by terminating mother’s parental rights. The district
court did not abuse its discreti on by finding that it is in the ch ildren’s best interests that
mother’s parental rights be terminated.
Affirmed.