In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M. R. K., J. J. A., and Any Unknown Alleged Father, Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0364

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
M. R. K., J. J. A., and Any Unknown Alleged Father, Parents.

Filed August 23, 2021
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-JV-20-7359

David W. Buchin, Buchin Law Office, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant)

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Gayle A. Borchert, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Lisa Gertken, Waite Park, Minnesota (Guardian ad Litem)

Considered and decided by Hooten , Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M. , Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s termination of her parental rights, appellant -
mother argues that the district court should have ruled that (a) she overcame the
presumption that she is a palpably unfit parent; and (b) it was not in the child’s best interests
to terminate mother’s parental rights. We affirm.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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FACTS
In November 2019, the parental rights of appellant mother, M.R.K., were
involuntarily terminated with respect to her two ol dest children, subject to parenting time
agreed to by M.R.K. and the children’s custodian. The county concluded that reasonable
efforts to reunify M.R.K. with her two oldest children had failed and that it was in the best
interests of the children to term inate her parental rights. These involuntary terminations
occurred after Stearns County Human Services (the county) offered services to M.R.K.
through a case plan focused on M.R.K.’s chemical dependency involving the use of
methamphetamine. According to the district court, M.R.K. agreed to transfer custody of
her two oldest children to the custodian “so that she could get her substance abuse under
control,” and nothing in the record shows that M.R.K. ever appealed the termination of her
parental rights with respect to her two oldest children.
In October 2020, M.R.K. gave birth to a third child (the child), who is the subject
of this proceeding. At birth, the child tested positive for methamphetamine. Because
M.R.K.’s parental rights to her other children were previously involuntarily terminated, the
county was required to immediately file a petition to terminate her parental rights to the
child. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.503, subd. 2(a)(4) (2020). The county petitioned the district
court to terminate M.R.K.’s parental rights to the child, alleging that M.R.K. was presumed
palpably unfit to be the child’s parent under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2020).
Also, because of the previous termination of M.R.K.’s parental rights, the district court
relieved the county of its duty to make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the
child under Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(2) (2020).
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In January 2021, M.R.K. was arrested in Wright County and charged with driving
while intoxicated (DWI) with three children in the car. As a result, Wright County placed
M.R.K on pretrial release under the condition that she undergo alcohol monitoring three
times a day, in addition to ongoing sweat patch testing required as part of her probation for
a prior fifth-degree drug possession charge. On the morning of February 3, 2021, M.R.K.
tested positive for alcohol. Later that same day, she again tested positive for alcohol before
her scheduled parenting time with the child. One day later, one of M.R.K.’s sweat patches
tested positive for methamphetamine.
On February 5, 2021, appellant entered a 90 -day residential treatment program
where she was residing when this case went to trial on February 19, 2021. After trial, the
district court terminated M.R.K.’s parental rights to the child, finding that she had “not
rebutted the statutory presumption that she [was] palpably unfit to parent” the child. The
district court determined that there was “no evidence supporting a conclusion that
[M.R.K.’s] drug addiction will not contin ue for a prolonged, indefinite period so as to be
permanently detrimental to the welfare of the child.” (quotation omitted). Additionally,
the district court found “that clear and convincing evidence exists that it is in the best
interests of the child t o involuntarily terminate the parental rights of [M.R.K.]. ” M.R.K.
appeals.
DECISION
“We affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights when at least one
statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and
termination is in the best interests of the child, provided that the county has made
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reasonable efforts to reunite the family.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted). We give “[c]onsiderable deference” to th e
district court’s decision to terminate parental rights “because a district court is in a superior
position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393,
396 (Minn. 1996). However, we must still “closely inquire into the sufficiency of the
evidence to determine whether the evidence was clear and convincing.” In re Welfare of
K.L.W., 924 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Minn. App. 2019), review denied (Minn. Mar. 8, 2019)
(quotation omitted). When reviewing a district court’s decisio n to terminate parental
rights, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error but “review its
determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental
rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805
N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “A finding is
clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750
N.W.2d 656, 660–61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
1. Palpable unfitness

M.R.K. contends that she successfully rebutted the presumption of palpable
unfitness to parent because “the steps she has taken are sufficient to overcome the
presumption created by the prior involuntary transfers of custody” and that “[i]t is
reasonable to expect that with success in [the residential treatment] program, [she] would
be able to be in a position to successfully parent [the] child within a few months.”
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A natural parent is typically presumed fit to care for his or her child. In re Welfare
of D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App. 2003). However, “upon a showing that
the parent’s parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily terminated,”
we presume that a parent is palpably unfit to parent. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4).
In cases involving prior involuntary terminations of parental rights, the parent has the
burden of rebutting the presumption of palpable unfitness. See In re Welfare of J.A.K., 907
N.W.2d 241, 245 –46 (Minn. App. 2018). This burden is not high; in fact, it “is easily
rebuttable.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014).
“[W]hether the evidence satisfies the burden of production is determined on a case-
by-case basis.” Id. at 137. When reviewing the parent’s evidence, a district court must
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to “justify a finding of fact that [the parent] is
not palpably unfit.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). If the presumption is
not rebutted, the statutory ground of palpable unfitness is established. See In re Welfare of
J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
However, if a parent introduces such evidence, the statutory “presumption is rebutted and
has no further function at the trial.” Id. The county then bears the burden to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the parent is palpably unfit to be a parent. J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d
at 247–48. We apply a de novo standard of review to a district court’s determination as to
whether a parent has rebutted the statutory presumption. J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 446.
Because M.R.K.’s parental rights to her two oldest children were previously
involuntarily terminated, due to her chemical dependency involving the use of
methamphetamine, she is presumed to be palpably unfit to parent, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
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subd. 1(b)(4), and she had the burden of rebutting that presumption . J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d
at 245–46. M.R.K. argues that she rebutted the statutory presumption of unfitness because,
“[t]hrough the programming that she is attending, [she] has demonstrated that she can be
in a position to have the child placed back with her in the near future.” Specifically,
appellant contends that she would “be in a position to successfully parent [the] child within
a few months.” In her attempt to rebut the statutory presumption of unfitness at trial,
M.R.K. testified that: (1) she did not miss any supervised parenting time throughout the
course of this proceeding; (2) she entered a 90-day inpatient residential treatment program
on February 5, 2021; (3) she was taking classes through Love and Logic to improve her
parenting skills; (4) there was a parenting component once a week as part of her residential
treatment; (5) her current residential treatment program was more thorough than other
programs she had been involved with; and (6) she would “be doing outpatient aftercare”
following her current inpatient treatment program. M.R.K. also testified that she had
received treatment several times before attending her current residential treatment program,
that she had used methamphetamines during her pregnancy with the child, and that she had
relapsed several times after the child’s birth before entering treatment. M.R.K. stated that
she had completed a drug and alcohol test when she was admitted to her current residential
treatment program and tested positive for both methamphetamine and alcohol. M.R.K.
admitted that the past month or two had not been great for her, but stated that she hoped
that the district court “would take into consideration all that [she was] trying to do.”
M.R.K. testified
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I love my children very much and I know I’ve made a lot of
bad choices but I am trying to get my life back on track and I
hope that [the district court] can see that . . . I know that, the
things that I’ve done [are] wrong, but when it comes down to
taking care of my children, I love them and I would do anything
for them. Even though I’ve made the mistakes and the bad
choices that I’ve made over the past couple months.

M.R.K.’s sister and mother also testified as M.R.K.’s witnesses at trial. M.R.K.’s
sister testified that M.R.K. “was a very good mother,” and that she seemed “very attentive
to [M.R.K.’s oldest child’s] needs” and “very willing and wanting to do fun activ ities and
take [the oldest child] places and teach [the oldest child] new things.” However, M.R.K.’s
sister also testified that she had concerns about M.R.K.’s ability to take care of children “in
the last month or so,” specifically M.R.K.’s “addictions s eeming more on the forefront”
and her “[DWI] and drinking coming up.” M.R.K.’s sister further testified, that “[M.R.K.]
was an excellent mother. Obviously hasn’t been topnotch lately, but I know that if she
wasn’t under the influence of anything she is a very good mother.”
M.R.K.’s mother described the relationship between M.R.K. and her children as
“very good,” but also testified that she has seen M.R.K.’s drug and alcohol use
“progressively increasing” over the years. M.R.K.’s mother further testifie d that M.R.K.
is “very orientated to get better” and to be “drug free” through her current residential
treatment, which M.R.K.’s mother described as a “big change” from M.R.K.’s prior
attempts at treatment. M.R.K.’s mother stated that she had no concerns about M.R.K.’s
ability to parent, assuming that she was sober.
Despite the evidence that M.R.K. presented, t he district court determined that
M.R.K. failed to meet her burden of presenting sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory
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presumption of unfitness. The district court concluded that, although M.R.K. presented
evidence showing her “short -term success by entering treatment,” the evidence she
presented could not affirmatively support a finding “that her parenting abilities have
improved and that she has the ability to successfully parent a child.”
We agree. M.R.K.’s assertions that her parenting abilities are likely to improve in
the reasonably foreseeable future are merely speculative. Although M.R.K.’s decision to
enter residential treatment is commendable, two weeks in residential treatment is not a
significant enough period of sobriety to demonstrate that her parenting abilities have
improved to the point where she is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the child or that
she is likely to become sober in the reasonably foreseeable future. See In re Welfare of
J.D.L., 522 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Minn. App. 1994) (affirming termination of a father’s
parental rights where father’s contention that he “might develop appropriate parenting
skills within a few years” was “speculative at best”).
M.R.K. did not produce enough evidence to support a finding that “her parenting
abilities have improved” to the point where she is suitable to be entrusted with the care of
the child, J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 446 (quotation omitted), and her assertions that her parenting
abilities are likely to improve in the reasonably foreseeable future are merely speculative.
See J.D.L., 522 N.W.2d at 369. She, therefore, failed to rebut the statutory presumption of
palpable unfitness to parent, see J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 445–46, and the district court did not
err in determining that the statutory ground of M.R.K.’s palpable unfitness to parent was
established.

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2. Best interests of the child

M.R.K. also argues that termination of her parental rights is not in the best interests
of the child because the “decision to terminate the parental rights of [the] child will
potentially have long te rm impacts on [the] child’s relationship with [the child’s] older
siblings.” To determine the best interests of a child in a termination of parental rights case,
the court must consider: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship;
(2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing
interest of the child,” such as a stable environment, and health concerns . In re Welfare of
R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii).
When, as here, a statutory basis to terminate parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1 (2020), exists, and “the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the
child are paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, su bd. 7 (2020). We review the district
court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child under
an abuse of discretion standard. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
At trial, M.R.K.’s Wright County probation agent, Stearns County probation agent,
chemical dependency counselor, Stearns County social worker, and parenting time
supervisor testified on behalf of the county. The county also called M.R.K. and the child’s
guardian ad litem to testify. M.R.K.’s sister, mother, and fr iend testified on behalf of
M.R.K., and M.R.K. also testified in her own defense.
The social worker testified that she was the current case manager assigned to the
child. The social worker acknowledged that M.R.K. has remained in contact with her
“more than just one time a month.” She testified that M.R.K. had “talked several times
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about getting into treatment” since October 2020, but M.R.K. had not followed through
“until recently.” The social worker also testified that although M.R.K. had told her “o n a
couple occasions that she’[d] done online parenting classes and that she [had] sent [the
social worker] the certificates,” the social worker had “never received certificates of
completion of any parenting classes.” The social worker opined that termin ation of
M.R.K.’s parental rights to the child would be in the child’s best interests because the social
worker had not received verification as to whether or not M.R.K. was completing drug or
alcohol testing or whether or not any tests she had taken were clean. The social worker
stated that termination would be in the child’s best interest “just due to the fact that the
conditions [hadn’t] changed.”
M.R.K.’s Stearns County probation agent testified that M.R.K. had been on
supervised probation with him since “October or November of 2019.” The probation agent
testified that M.R.K. was required to “abstain from mood-altering chemicals and submit to
random testing” as conditions of her probation, in addition to undergoing “chemical
dependency evaluation.” He testified that although M.R.K.’s required urinalysis testing
had been suspended in March 2020, due to the COVID -19 pandemic, M.R.K. was once
again required to complete required urinalysis testing in August 2020. The probation agent
testified that M.R.K. was unable to take a test on August 11, 2020, because she “did not
have payment,” she “did not show up” for scheduled tests on September 24, 2020 and
September 29, 2020, and she “was unable to provide a sample” for a test scheduled for
November 18, 2020. The probation agent testified that he switched M.R.K. to sweat patch
testing in December 2020, her first sweat patch tested positive for methamphetamine, the
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second sweat patch was unable to be tested because she failed to attend the appointment to
remove the patch, and the third patch also tested positive for methamphetamine.
The probation agent stated that he had filed a probation violation against M.R.K.
during the week of trial for her “failure to remain law abiding related to [her] new DWI
arrest, failure to abstain from mood-altering chemicals due to [her] positive alcohol reading
[on February 3, 2021], [her] presumed alcohol use during [her] DWI arrest, . . . [her]
positive sweat patch tests,” and her failure to complete her required urinalysis tests earlier
in 2020. Although the probation agent stated that M.R.K. “had cooperated in certain
aspects, like communicating with [him] and staying in contact with [him],” he also testified
that M.R.K.’s drug testing had been a “constant issue.”
The child’s guardian ad litem testified that she had been assigned to the child in
October 2020 and that M.R.K. had been available to working with her “[u]p until the time
she went into treatment.” She testified that she was not aware of any period of sobriety
M.R.K. had since the child’s birth except for her two weeks in residential treatment
immediately prior to trial. The guardian ad litem opined that M.R.K. was palpably unfit to
be a parent to the child. She also stated that she supported the termination of M. R.K.’s
parental rights to the child and that the termination was in the child’s best interests because
M.R.K. “still ha[d] not corrected her circumstances.” Specifically, the guardian ad litem
noted M.R.K.’s “very, very recent [substance] use,” her DWI ar rest, and her attempt to
attend parenting time while intoxicated.
Based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the district court concluded
that involuntary termination of M.R.K.’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
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In making this determination, the district court noted that M.R.K. has had “frequent contact
and assistance” from Stearns County in the past to “assist her in overcoming her chemical
addictions and maintaining her relationship with her children,” but that those services “did
not succeed in removing [M.R.K.] from her chemical dependency.” The district court also
explained that while M.R.K. had “received treatment several times” before beginning her
current residential treatment, “she continued to have chemical dependency issues and ha[d]
relapsed several times in the previous year alone.” Specifically, the district court noted
that “[d]espite [M.R.K.’s] limited contact with the child,” she “still let her chemical
dependency concerns impact her time with the child” wh en she showed up intoxicated to
her parenting time with the child. Although the district court acknowledged that M.R.K.’s
“current treatment facility may have a stronger focus on mental health than previous
programs she attended” and that she “has shown p rogress by entering [her current]
treatment,” the district court nonetheless found that M.R.K. had “not shown evidence of a
sustained change in chemical dependency.” Without evidence of such a change, the district
court concluded that it was “unable to . . . risk [the child’s] continued presence or return to
such an environment” because “[t]he child needs a drug free home and a drug free mother.”
The district court’s findings are supported by extensive evidence in the record.
Between December 2020 and the trial on February 19, 2021, M.R.K. had two sweat patches
test positive for methamphetamine, and she tested positive for alcohol on February 3, 2021,
before and at her scheduled parenting time with the child. In January 2021, less than two
months before trial, M.R.K. was arrested in Wright County and charged with driving while
intoxicated with three children in the car.
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M.R.K.’s social worker opined that termination of M.R.K.’s parental rights to the
child would be in the child’s best interests “just due to the fact that the conditions ha[d]n’t
changed” and because the social worker had not received verification as to whether or not
M.R.K. was completing drug or alcohol testing during her inpatient treatment program or
whether any tests she had taken we re clean. The child’s guardian ad litem also testified
that she supported the termination of M.R.K.’s parental rights to the child and that the
termination was in the child’s best interests because M.R.K. “still ha[d] not corrected her
circumstances,” noting M.R.K.’s “very, very recent use,” her DWI arrest, and her attempt
to attend parenting time while intoxicated. Additionally, M.R.K.’s probation agent
testified that M.R.K.’s drug testing had been a “constant issue.”
These facts in the record are suff icient to support the district court’s determination
that termination of M.R.K.’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests due to
M.R.K.’s ongoing chemical dependency, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion on this issue or in terminating her parental rights to the child.
Affirmed.