In the Matter of: Katrina Lynn Deantoni, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0365

In the Matter of:
Katrina Lynn Deantoni,
Respondent,

vs.

Donnetto Antonio Deantoni,
Appellant.

Filed November 1, 2021
Affirmed; motion granted
Worke, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-FA-20-5480

Tifanne E. E. Wolter, Henningson & Snoxe ll, Ltd., Maple Grove, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Jill A. Brisbois, The JAB Firm, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-husband challenges the district court’s issuance of an order for protection
(OFP), arguing that the district court err oneously excluded eviden ce, erroneously found
that husband committed acts of domestic abuse, and abused its discretion by imposing a
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four-mile restriction around respondent-wife’ s home. Husband also moves us to strike
portions of wife’s brief and addendum. We affirm, and we grant husband’s motion to
strike.
FACTS
Appellant-husband Donnetto Antonio Deantoni and respondent-wife Katrina Lynn
Deantoni married in 2013 and, as of the filing of this ma tter, were proceeding with a
dissolution. Wife petitioned for an OFP in November 2020. Th e district court issued an
ex parte OFP and set the matter for a hearing.
At the hearing, wife testified to the fo llowing events. At some point before wife
petitioned for an OFP, husband threw his keys across the room in anger, breaking a plant
next to her. Another time, husband was slici ng an apple and was upset. He put the knife
to his throat and threatened to harm himsel f. Wife felt “immense, enormous” fear and
urinated, thinking that husband might commit a murder-suicide. She had recently come to
understand, through therapy, th at husband had been “gasligh ting” her, or telling her that
she is mentally ill.
After the ex parte OFP was served on husb and, wife, while driving in St. Michael,
Minnesota, saw husband pass her quickly in his vehicle. She sped up to confirm that it was
indeed him. She continued to her destina tion, a sandwich shop, at which point husband
drove through the parking lot and parked seve n spaces from her. On another day, wife
again went to the sandwich shop. Husband again pulled into the parking lot and sat in his
car.
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Husband disputed wife’s vers ion of these events. He testified that he threw the keys
underhand toward the counter and that wife was not in the room at the time. He stated that
wife sent him a text message the next day as king why the plant was broken. He asserted
that the knife incident arose out of a “more lighthearted” situation in which he joked, “You
make me want to cut my head off,” and claimed that he did not believe that he was holding
a knife at the time. He also testified about travel documents that provided an alibi for the
date on which wife alleged the knife incident occurred.
The district court found wife’s testimon y credible and found that wife proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that husband committed acts of domestic abuse. The district
court issued a two-year OFP that required hus band to stay four miles away from wife’s
home in St. Michael. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Exclusion of evidence

Husband first argues that the district court erred by prohibiting him from introducing
(1) a text message purportedly from wife asking what happened to the plant and (2) travel
documents showing that husband wa s out of town on the date that wife alleged that the
knife incident took place. We disagree.
To prevail on this issue, husband must demonstrate that an evidentiary error
prejudiced him. See Olson ex rel. A.C.O. v. Olson , 892 N.W.2d 837, 842 (Minn. App.
2017). “An evidentiary error is prejudicial if it might reasonably have influenced the fact-
finder and changed the result of the proceeding.” Id.
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Here, the district court was aware of th e contents of husband’s exhibits and
husband’s purposes in offering them. And although the district court excluded the exhibits,
it allowed husband to testify and cross-examin e wife about them. The district court,
however, found husband’s testimony regarding th e exhibits to be ne ither credible nor
persuasive. It is not reasonably likely that admission of the exhibits would have influenced
the district court, the fact-finder here, a nd changed the result of the proceeding. See id.
The district court’s exclusion of husband’s evidence is therefore not reversible error.
OFP

Husband next argues that the district c ourt’s findings that he committed acts of
domestic abuse are not supported by the record. We disagree.
We review a district court’s decision to gr ant an OFP for an abuse of discretion.
Chosa ex rel. Chosa v. Tagliente, 693 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Minn. App. 2005). In doing so,
we give great deference to the district court’s credibility determinations. Gada v. Dedefo,
684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004) (citing Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210
(Minn. 1988)). And we review the district c ourt’s findings of fact for clear error. Id.
Noting that the clear-error standard applies across many contexts, the Minnesota Supreme
Court recently clarified: “In applying the clea r-error standard, [appellate courts] view the
evidence in a light favorable to the findings. [Appellate cour ts] will not conclude that a
factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evid ence, we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistak e has been committed.” In re Civil Commitment of Kenney , 963
N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations a nd citations omitted). Further, we may not
reweigh the evidence, engage in fact-fi nding, or reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at
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221-22 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we need not go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the co rrectness” of the district court’s findings. Id.
Instead, we must consider a ll the evidence and de termine whether it reasonably tends to
support the district court’s findings. Id. at 223. And when the record reasonably supports
the district court’s findings, “it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable
basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. (quotation omitted).
A person commits domestic abuse by, am ong other things, inflicting “fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” against a family or household member.
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(2) (2020). The abuser’s present intent to inflict such fear
may be inferred from the totality of the circum stances, including past abusive behavior.
Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009). A single act of domestic
abuse can sustain an OFP. See, e.g., Aljubailah ex rel. A.M.J. v. James, 903 N.W.2d 638,
644 (Minn. App. 2017) (upholding OFP based on single incident).
The district court found that husband committed the following acts of domestic
abuse: he threw keys at wife, damaging a plant near her; he held a knife to his neck and
threatened to hurt himself, causing wife to fear that he might harm her next; and he twice
parked his vehicle near wife’s vehicle at a sandwich shop, causing wife to feel intimidated
and fear for her safety. We address each incident in turn.
Plant and knife incidents
As an initial matter, husband does not challenge whether the plant and knife
incidents constitute domestic abuse. Because we do not presume error on appeal and
husband failed to carry his burden to show that the plant and knife incidents do not
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constitute domestic abuse, husband forfeited any additional arguments that these incidents
do not support the OFP. See Loth v. Loth , 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949). We
nevertheless address the merits in the interest of completeness. See In re Welfare of
Children of M.L.S., ___ N.W.2d. ___, ___, 2021 WL 2640559, at *9 (Minn. App. June 28,
2021) (addressing question in interests of completeness); see generally Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 103.04 (allowing appellate court to address questions in interest of justice).
As to the plant incident, husband admitted throwing his keys forcefully enough to
break a plant and provided no viable reason for doing so. The district court’s order shows
that it believed wife’s testimony that wife wa s next to the plant when this occurred, and
disbelieved husband’s testimony that she was not in the room. We defer to this implicit
credibility determination. See Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 99 (deferring to district court’s
implicit credibility determination). Wife urinat ed because of this in cident, showing that
she feared imminent physical harm. The record therefore supports the district court’s
determination that this incident constitutes domestic abuse.
As to the knife incident, each party test ified to their versi on of what allegedly
happened. The district court found wife’s testimony credible and found husband’s
testimony not credible. Again, we defer to these credibility determinations. Wife again
urinated and testified that she feared that husband would commit a murder-suicide. The
record therefore supports the district cour t’s determination that the knife incident
constitutes domestic abuse.

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Sandwich shop incidents
Both sandwich shop incidents occurred after husband was served with the ex parte
OFP. It is undisputed that husband does not live in St. Michael. He did not assert a viable
reason for being at the sandwich shop that the di strict court believed. Wife testified that
she felt “shocked,” “scared,” and “fearful” by his presence at the shop, and she later
testified generally that she believed that she was “in danger of physi cal violence to the
point of murder.” Thus, the record also supports the district court’s determination that the
sandwich shop incidents constitute domestic abuse.
Husband asserts that the district court found that the sandwich shop incidents
occurred on December 1, 2020, and that this finding is not supported by the record.
Husband misreads the OFP, which states that wife served the ex parte OFP on husband on
December 1, 2020, and that the sandwich shop incidents occurred sometime after that date.
Husband also asserts that the district court found that husband intended the
sandwich shop incidents to cause wife to fear for her safety and to intimidate her, which he
argues does not constitute domestic abuse because there is no implication of physical harm.
Even if we agree that finding that husband ca used wife to fear fo r her safety and feel
intimidated does not rise to the level of domestic abuse, husband again misreads the OFP.
There, the district court stat ed that the “above-noted incide nts,” including the sandwich
shop incidents, “involve [husband] inflicting in [wife] the fear of imminent physical harm.”
That finding fulfills the statutory requirement that the abuser inflict fear of imminent
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physical harm. Because the district court’s findings regarding these incidents of domestic
abuse are supported by the record, it did not abuse its discretion by issuing the OFP.1
Geographic restriction

Husband argues that the four-mile geographic restriction is unreasonable. On this
record, we disagree.
The district court may exclude an abus er from “a reasonable area surrounding the
[petitioner’s] dwelling or residence.” Minn. St at. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(3) (2020). The
statute imposes no further requirements regarding the district court’s decision to impose a
geographical restriction. See id.
Here, the record indicates that husband lives and work s around Minneapolis. His
nonjoint child attends school in Elk River. Although husband has “lifelong friends” in
St. Michael, husband points to no evidence that the four-mile restriction impedes his daily
activities. Additionally, husban d encountered wife within th e city of St. Michael after
being served with the OFP and knowing that he was to have no contact with wife,
whereupon wife felt threatened. The four-mile restriction prov ides protection to wife so
that she can go about her da ily activities in the city where she lives without fear of
encountering husband. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by imposing
a four-mile restriction around wife’s home.

1 Because only one act of domestic abuse is necessary to sustain an OFP, we need not
consider husband’s argument that the distri ct court erred by find ing that he committed
domestic abuse by interfering with a 911 call. See Aljubailah, 903 N.W.2d at 644 (Minn.
App. 2017).
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Motion to strike
Finally, husband moves us to strike copi es of emails between husband’s former
counsel and the district court’s clerk found in wife’s addendum and reference to these
emails in her brief.
The record on appeal is the papers filed in district court, the exhibits, and any
transcripts of the proceedings. Minn. R. Ci v. App. P. 110.01. Generally, we do not
consider matters outside the record on appeal and will strike any reference to such matters.
Stageberg v. Stageberg , 695 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn.
July 19, 2005); see Plowman v. Copeland, Buhl & Co., 261 N.W.2d 581, 583, 584 (Minn.
1977) (stating that “[i]t is well settled that an appellate court may not base its decision on
matters outside the record on appeal, and that matters not produced and received in
evidence below may not be considered”). Here, the emails are not part of the district court
record. We therefore grant husband’s motion to strike.
Affirmed; motion granted.