Joseph Lee Selisker, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0367

Joseph Lee Selisker,
Respondent,

vs.

William Paul Kiley, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed December 20, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-21-97

Joseph Lee Selisker, St. Cloud, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

John A. Abress, Franz Hultgren Evenson, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from the district court’ s grant of a harassment restraining order
(HRO), appellant William Paul K iley, Jr., argues that the dist rict court erred because it
made no findings of harassment and because Kiley did not agree to issuance of the HRO.
Because the district court’s order did not refl ect an agreement of th e parties, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
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FACTS
Respondent Joseph Lee Seliske r, the boyfriend of Kiley’s ex-wife, petitioned for an
HRO, alleging that Kiley was harassing him. Th e district court granted an ex parte HRO,
and Kiley requested a hearing. At the hearing, Kiley and Selisker appeared, and both were
unrepresented by counsel.
At the start of the hearing, the district c ourt put the parties under oath but, before
taking testimony or admitting any evidence, proposed that the parties agree to a “joint,” or
two-way, HRO. While addressing Selisker, the district court explained:
So my thought would be rather than before it escalates anymore
that we have that joint order basically saying that nobody is
going to harass anybody and go your separate ways. So if
Mr. Kiley were to come to your house again, call you up, send
you a disappointing email, a harassing email, or vice versa . . . .

(Emphasis added.) Selisker indicated that he agreed with the proposal, although Kiley had
not petitioned for an HRO agains t Selisker. The district court then asked Kiley if he was
“okay” with the proposed resolution, and Kiley said, “Yes.” The district court said that it
would not “find harassment at this time” but would issue an HRO.
Following the hearing, th e court granted an HRO that restricted Kiley but not
Selisker. In the order, the district court wrote, “[Kiley] denies the allegations of the Petition
but has no objection to the issuance of a Re straining Order. The court makes no findings
of harassment.”
Kiley appeals.
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DECISION
Kiley argues that the district court abus ed its discretion when it issued an HRO
against him without making a finding of harassment and that the district court’s order did
not reflect an agreement between Kiley and Selisker.
Individuals may petition fo r an HRO under Minn. Stat . § 609.748 (2020). If the
respondent requests a hearing, the district court may issue an HRO provided that the district
court finds “that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged
in harassment.” Id., subd. 5(b). We review the issuance of an HRO for abuse of discretion.
Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008).
Kiley first argues that the district court l acks authority under the statute to grant an
HRO without a finding of harassment. We note that, in other contexts, stipulations or
agreements of the parties have formed the basis for judgments or orders. See, e.g., Anderson
v. Anderson, 225 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Minn. 1975) (a ffirming marital-dissolution judgment
incorporating parties’ stipulation); State ex rel. Bassin v. Dist. Ct. of Hennepin Cnty., 259
N.W. 542, 543-44 (Minn. 1935) (affirming or der of district court extending redemption
period in foreclosure action ba sed on the parties’ agreement). But we need not determine
whether for some reason the district court’s authority under the HRO statute is different
because, even assuming that the district cour t is authorized to issue an HRO without
findings based on a stipulation or agreement, the HRO issued here did not accurately reflect
an agreement of the parties.
Generally, when an order or judgment is based solely on the agreement of the
parties, “it is the duty of th e court to enter judgment in acc ordance with the agreement of
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the parties and the court’s authority is limited by the consent or stipulation.” Hentschel v.
Smith, 153 N.W.2d 199, 206 (Minn. 1967). The court cannot, “by judicial fiat, impose
conditions on the parties to which they did not stipulate and thereby deprive the parties of
their ‘day in court.’” Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 638 n. 1 (Minn. App. 2000);
see also Mechtel v. Mechtel, 528 N.W.2d 916, 919-20 (Minn. App. 1995) (reversing mutual
restraining order in an orde r-for-protection proceeding when the appellant-petitioner did
not clearly agree to a restraining order agains t her, noting that, “[s]ince appellant was pro
se, the district court should have been very careful to make sure that she was agreeing to a
mutual restraining order”).
Here, it is unclear from the record of the hearing exactly what the parties agreed to,
but the record does not show that Kiley agreed to a one-way HRO that restricted only him
and not Selisker. At the hearing, the district court described a “joint order” that “nobody is
going to harass anybody” and said that the or der would go “both ways.” Therefore, the
HRO that was issued—restricting only Kiley—did not reflec t the discussion between the
district court and the unrepresented parties at the HRO hearing. The district court thus
abused its discretion, and we reverse the HRO and remand the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.