Troy Gates, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0368

Troy Gates,
Relator,

vs.

Advanced Web Technologies, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed January 10, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 43568701-3

Steven Anderson, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)

Advanced Web Technologies, Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Relator Troy Gates challenges the decisi on of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ)
that he is ineligible for unemployment benefits because he quit his job and does not meet
a statutory exception to ineligibility based on a quit. Gates argues that (1) there was not
substantial evidence to s upport the ULJ’s finding that Gates did not request an
accommodation before quitting to seek treatment for his chemical dependency and (2) the
ULJ failed to adequately assist Gates in developing the record at the evidentiary hearing.
Because we conclude that Gates was not pr operly assisted in developing the record,
we reverse and remand for an additional hearing.
FACTS
Gates was employed with respondent Adva nced Web Technologies, Inc. (AWT) for
over 20 years until he quit his employment in October 2020. In 2017, Gates took a leave
of absence to complete a 28-day inpatient tr eatment program for alcohol addiction. Gates
returned to work at AWT and remained sober for twenty months, but, due to the pandemic,
Gates’s AA meetings became virtual and he attended with less frequency, leading to a
relapse in July 2020. Although he continued working at AWT, Gates struggled with his
chemical dependency, and, in October 2020, he quit his job to return to an inpatient-
treatment program.
Gates applied for unemployment benefits . In a request for information from
respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED),
Gates was asked whether he had “request[ed] accommodation, such as a leave of absence
3
or a change in job duties or hours of work.” He answered, “No,” and explained that he did
not do so “because non [sic] of those would have helped in [his] situation.” Based on
Gates’s responses to the reque st for information, DEED determined that Gates was
ineligible for unemployment benefits because he did not request an accommodation. Gates
appealed.
A ULJ held a telephonic evid entiary hearing on December 2, 2020. Gates appeared
without legal representation. His significant other was his only witness besides himself. No
one from AWT appeared . The ULJ twice tried to reac h AWT by phone to determine
whether anyone would be attending, but without success.
At the beginning of the he aring, Gates said that he was missing some exhibits and
was unsure if he had received the mailed packet of information from DEED. However, he
did not object to any exhibits being included in the record , including his responses to the
request for information. Unbe knownst to the ULJ and presum ably to Gates, a statement
from AWT was missing from the record. As DEED has since explained to this court,
AWT’s HR representative had sent a stat ement that was received by DEED on
November 24, 2020, but that was not scanned into the sy stem until December 4, 2020—
two days after the hearing. In it, the HR re presentative stated that Gates was a valued
employee, that he quit “for medical reasons,” and that she had called DEED multiple times
attempting to inform DEED of her scheduling conflict with the December 2, 2020 hearing
but that she could not get through on DEED’s phone line.
At the hearing, when the ULJ asked whether he had requested an accommodation
before quitting, Gates testified that he had talked to AWT’s HR representative about taking
4
a leave of absence but that he was told that he could not ta ke a leave because no one else
could do his job. The ULJ questioned Gates about the apparent inconsistency between this
testimony and his response to DE ED’s request for information. Gates became somewhat
flustered, and the ULJ agreed to take a s hort break. When the hearing resumed, the ULJ
asked whether Gates had any information to add, and Gates said, “I, I tried to communicate
to HR that I was not able to continue work ing.” The ULJ responded, “I want to move on
here,” and turned to Gates’s witness for her testimony. At the end of the hearing, the ULJ
asked Gates if there was anything he would like to add, and Gates said there was not.
In a written decision, the ULJ concluded th at Gates was ineligible for employment
benefits, finding that Gates did not request an accommodation because Gates “did not think
anyone else could do his job.” Further, the ULJ found Gates’s testimony not “convincing”
because it was inconsistent with his response to the request for info rmation and because
the ULJ found it unlikely that an HR representative “would te ll Gates he was not able to
take a leave of absence . . . when he had pr eviously been allowed to do so three years
earlier.”
Gates requested reconsideration of the ULJ’s decision and an additional hearing.
The ULJ considering this request affirmed the decision, concluding that the fact that Gates
was unrepresented at the hearing did not change the outcome of the case, that the ULJ did
assist Gates with the presentation of evid ence, and that the statement from AWT’s HR
representative—which had since come to lig ht—would not have changed the outcome of
the case.
Gates appeals by writ of certiorari.
5
DECISION
We “may affirm the decision of the [ULJ] or remand the case for further
proceedings; or [we] may revers e or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the
petitioner may have been pr ejudiced” for multiple reasons, including “unlawful
procedure,” “other error of law,” lack of “substantial evidence,” or arbitrariness or
capriciousness. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).
On a request for reconsideration, a ULJ mu st order an additional hearing “if a party
shows that eviden ce which was not submitted at the he aring” “would likely change the
outcome of the decision and there was good cause for not having previously submitted that
evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(c) (2020). We will “not reverse a ULJ’s decision
to deny an additional eviden tiary hearing unless the decision constitutes an abuse of
discretion.” Kelly v. Ambassador Press, Inc., 792 N.W.2d 103, 104 (Minn. App. 2010).
Generally, an individual is ineligible fo r unemployment benefits if they quit their
employment. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2020). However, an individual who quits
because their “serious illness or injury made it medically necessary” to quit is eligible for
unemployment benefits if the individual “inf orms the employer of the medical problem
and requests accommodation an d no reasonable accommodatio n is made available.” Id.,
subd. 1(7).1 Gates’s eligibility for unemployment benefits turned on whether he requested
an accommodation.

1 If the individual’s serious illness is chemical dependency, this exception does not apply
if the individual was previously diagnosed or treated for chemical dependency and “since
that diagnosis or treatment has failed to make consistent efforts to control the chemical
dependency.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(7). In the deci sion denying reconsideration,
6
The ULJ denied Gates’s request for rec onsideration and a new hearing, concluding
that the statement by AWT that was received by DEED but omitted from the record would
not have changed the outcome of the decision because “[w]hether the employer feels an
applicant should receive unemployment benefits is not relevant.”
It is true that the statement—in whic h AWT notified DEED th at it had a conflict
with the scheduled date for the evidentiary hearing—does not specify what the HR
representative intended to testify to at the hearing. Thus, we cannot conclude that the ULJ’s
determination regarding the impact of that statement itself on the outcome was erroneous.
But the statement indicated that the em ployer had tried multiple times to reach
DEED because of a scheduling conflict for the evidentiary hearing but DEED’s phone line
was never available. And DEED had received the statement, but, because it did not scan
the statement into the electronic record for ten days, the statement did not make it into the
record at the hearing. The employer’s statement indicated a need to reschedule the hearing
due to a scheduling conflict. By Minnesota rule, the hearing should have been rescheduled.
See Minn. R. 3310.2908, subp. 1 (2019) (“A hearing must be rescheduled based on a party’s
need for additional time to obtain necessary evidence or to obtai n representation or
adequately prepare, inability to participate due to illness, or other compelling reasons
beyond the control of the party that prevent participation at the originally scheduled time.”).

the ULJ found for the first time that Gates was “not making consistent efforts to control his
chemical dependency after he relapsed in July 2020.” On appeal, DEED concedes that this
finding was not supported by subs tantial evidence, and we agr ee. Therefore, we focus on
the issue of a request for accommodation.

7
And, also by Minnesota rule , the ULJ “must assist all pa rties in the presentation of
evidence” and “must ensure that all relevant facts are clearly and fully developed.” Minn.
R. 3310.2921 (2019); see also Thompson v. County of Hennepin , 660 N.W.2d 157, 161
(Minn. App. 2003) (stating that, under the previous version of the rule, ULJs “have a duty
to reasonably assist pro se parties with th e presentation of the evidence and the proper
development of the record”). Because these rules were not met, the ULJ’s decision was
made based upon an unlawful procedure. The ULJ therefor e abused his discretion by
failing to grant Gates a new hearing.
DEED argues that Gates could have broug ht the HR representative as a witness,
subpoenaed her, or objected to continuing the hearing without AWT. But Gates was an
unrepresented party, and the ULJ was under a duty to assist him with the full development
of the record. In the particular circumstances of this case, we conclude that that duty was
not met. We therefore reverse and remand for a new hearing.2
Reversed and remanded.

2 Because it is unnecessary to do so, we do no t reach Gates’s argument that the record as
presently constituted does not substantially support the ULJ’s factual findings or his other
arguments of procedural error.