State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0371

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Vanessa Lynn Page,
Appellant.

Filed October 18, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Jackson County District Court
File No. 32-CR-20-129

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Thomas J. Prochazka, Jackson County Attorney, Jackson, Minnesota (for respondent)

Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Vanessa Lynn Page1 challenges the district court’s denial of her motion
to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop that she contends violated her
constitutional rights. Because the arresting officer observed Page commit a traffic offense
when she drove on the fog line at the edge of the road, we conclude that the stop was lawful
and affirm.
FACTS
In August 2020, the state ch arged Page with two counts of driving while impaired
following a traffic stop. At an omnibus he aring, Page moved to suppress the evidence
obtained through the traffic stop, arguing that the stop was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. But Page’s attorney neither filed a written motion to suppress nor requested
an evidentiary hearing. Instead, he requested that the par ties brief the issue. The district
court granted the request. The prosecutor attached a copy of the arresting deputy’s police
report to his subsequent brief. The following facts come from the deputy’s report.
Early one morning in August 2020, a deput y on patrol observed a car touch the fog
line2 of a highway. The deputy began to follow the car. Soon after, th e car turned into a

1 Appellant’s legal name is now Vanessa Talk s, but because her driver’s license bore the
name “Vanessa Page,” the parties used that name below and continue to use that name on
appeal.
2 We follow the parties in referring to the white line on the far-right side of the roadway as
the “fog line.”
3
parking lot, crossed it, and took a left turn ou t of the lot without usi ng a turn signal. The
deputy then stopped the car and spoke with Page, the driver.
While speaking with Page, the deputy observ ed that her eyes were bloodshot, and
he detected an odor of marijuana coming from the car. The deputy asked Page to exit the
car, and he noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from her when she did so.
Page underwent field sobriety tests that i ndicated signs of impairment. She failed a
preliminary breath test. The deputy arrested Page, and a breath test administered at the law
enforcement center showed an alcohol concentration of 0.100.
In November 2020, the district court i ssued an order denying Page’s motion to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. The district court concluded that
the deputy reasonably suspected Page of a la ne violation when he observed her car touch
the fog line.3
In January 2021, the partie s agreed to stipulate to the prosecution’s case under
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4, so Page could have the denial
of her suppression motion reviewed by this cour t. In February 2021, the district court
adjudicated Page guilty of driving while impaired with an alcohol concentration over 0.08
within two hours of driving. This appeal follows.

3 While the district court reasoned that Page was not required to use a turn signal when
turning out of the parking lot, it concluded that Page’s use of the parking lot to bypass the
main roadway further supported the traffic stop.
4
DECISION
Page argues that her conviction must be reversed because the record does not
support the district court’s conclusion th at the deputy reasonably suspected her of
committing a traffic violation by touching th e fog line. If the de puty did not have a
reasonable basis to suspect Page of criminal activity, the stop would violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. United States v. Cortez ,
449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). When reviewing the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress,
we defer to the district court’s findings of fact and independently review its legal
conclusions. State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. 2018).
We begin our analysis w ith the constitutional framework . The United States and
Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A police officer may stop a driver within
constitutional parameters if the officer can artic ulate specific facts th at led the officer to
reasonably suspect the driver of criminal activity. State v. Anderson , 683 N.W.2d 818,
822-23 (Minn. 2004). A mere hunch is not re asonable suspicion. State v. George ,
557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). But when an officer witnesses a driver violate even a
minor traffic law, that obs ervation may justify a traffic stop of the driver. Anderson,
683 N.W.2d at 823.
One such traffic law requires drivers who ar e traveling on any road divided into two
or more clearly marked lanes to stay within a single lane as nearly as practicable. Minn.
Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1) (2020). The driver must remain within a single lane until the
driver has determined that movement to another lane is safe. Id. The lane that drivers are
5
required to stay within is the area of the road between the marked boundary lines, but
the lane does not include the lines themselves. Kruse v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety ,
906 N.W.2d 554, 559-60 (Minn. App. 2018). 4 A driver who moves onto, but does not
cross, the fog line violates section 169.18, subdivision (7)(1). Id. at 560.5
Here, the deputy stated in his report that he observed Page’s car touch the fog line.
When the deputy observed Page’s car touch the fog line, he observed her move outside of
the designated lane because the la ne ends before that line. Kruse, 906 N.W.2d at 560.
Based on this observation, the deputy reasonably suspected Page of violating
section 169.18, subdivision (7)(1). Soucie, 957 N.W.2d at 465. Because the deputy
reasonably suspected Page of committing a traffic violation, the traffic stop was
permissible under the United States and Minnesota constitutions. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d
at 823.
To persuade us otherw ise, Page argues that Kruse does not support the district
court’s conclusion that the deputy reasonably suspected her of a traffic violation. She
argues that Kruse is distinguishable because the driver in Kruse drove on both the fog line

4 The Kruse court cited Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a) (2016). Id. at 557. In 2019, the
legislature renumbered subdivision 7(a) to subdivision 7(1). 2019 Minn. Laws 1st Spec.
Sess. ch. 3, art. 3, § 37, at 751.
5 Correspondingly, an officer reasonably suspects a driver of violating section 169.18,
subdivision (7)(1), if the officer observes the driver’s tires graze the edge of the fog line.
Soucie v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 957 N.W.2d 461, 465 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied
(Minn. June 29, 2021). Page argues that the officer did not reasonably suspect her of a
traffic violation because there is no evidence showing how long she was on the fog line or
how much of her tire touched the line. Bu t because a driver violates the statutory
requirement to maintain a single lane when “even a fraction” of the car extends outside the
lane, this argument is not persuasive. Id. at 464.
6
and the center line. But the Kruse court concluded that the officer reasonably suspected
Kruse of committing a traffic violation on the sole basis of Kruse driving on the fog line,
and not the combination of driving on the center and fog lines as Page suggests. Kruse,
906 N.W.2d at 560-61. Under Kruse and Soucie, the state just had to show that Page’s car
touched the fog line for the deputy to reasonab ly suspect her of a traffic violation. The
state did so here.
Page further contends that the record contained no basis from which the district
court could uphold the stop of her car because the parties did not stipulate to the admission
of the police reports and becau se no testimony was taken at the omnibus hearing. But
because Page raised her suppression motion orally at the omnibus hearing, the state did not
have the opportunity to present testimony. And the prosecutor attached the deputy’s report
as an addendum to his brief submitted in op position to Page’s suppression motion. The
district court may receive evidence offered by the prosecutor or the defendant on any
omnibus issue. Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.03(a). In the police report, the deputy stated that he
saw Page’s car touch the fog line. Accordingly, Page has not shown that the district court
erred by denying her motion to suppress.6
Affirmed.

6 Page raises two more arguments. She argues that she was not weaving, but the district
court did not consider whether Page weaved in her lane. And she argues that her failure to
signal her turn did not justify the traffic stop, but the district court did not rely on her failure
to signal in concluding that the stop was reasonable.