Kawaljit S. Bhatia, as Trustee for the next of kin of Ena M. Bhatia, deceased, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0378

Kawaljit S. Bhatia, as Trustee for the
next of kin of Ena M. Bhatia, deceased,
Appellant,

vs.

Owners Insurance Company,
Respondent.

Filed December 6, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CV-19-5092

Paul W. Rogosheske, Rogosh eske, Rogosheske, & Atkins , PLLC, South Saint Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Stuart T. Johnson, Brock P. Alton, Redi ng & Pilney, LLC, Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presid ing Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In this uninsured motorist (UM) be nefits action, appellant Kawaljit Bhatia
challenges the district court’s grant of resp ondent insurer’s summary-judgment motion.
Bhatia argues that there is a genuine fact issue as to whethe r his daughter was a resident
relative under his insurance po licy when she was killed in a fall from a motorcycle.
2
Because the record evidence does not establish a genuine i ssue of material fact regarding
his daughter’s residence, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2016, 21-year-old Ena Bhatia fell off a moving motorcycle that her boyfriend
was driving. She died at the scene.
Alleging that the motorcycle was an uninsured vehicle, Bhatia, who is Ena’s father
and next-of-kin, sought UM benefits from his own insurance company, respondent Owners
Insurance Company (Own ers). Bhatia’s insurance polic y with Owners identifies the
circumstances under which the policyholder may recover damages when the policyholder
or a relative is injured or killed in an uninsured vehicle.
The UM endorsement states, in relevant part:
2. COVERAGE
a. We will pay compensatory da mages, including but not
limited to loss of consortium, any person is legally entitled
to recover from the owne r or operator of an uninsured
automobile because of bodily injury sustained by an
injured person while occupying an automobile that is
covered by SECTION II – LIABILITY COVERAGE of
the policy.
b. This coverage is extended to you, if an individual, as
follows:
(1) We will pay compensatory damage, including but
not limited to loss of consortium, you are legally
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of
any uninsured automobile because of bodily
injury you sustain:
(a) when you are not occupying an automobile
that is covered by SECTION II –
LIABILITY COVERAGE; or
(b) while occupying an automobile you do not
own which is not covered by SECTION II
3
– LIABILITY COVERAGE of the policy,
or
(2) The coverage extended in 2.b.(1) above is also
afforded to a relative who does not own an
automobile.
c. The bodily injury must be accidental and arise out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured
automobile.

The policy defines “relative” as “a person who resides with you and who is related
to you by blood, marriage or adoption.”1
Owners denied Bhatia’s claim. Bhatia filed suit seeking UM benefits under the
policy. Owners moved for summary judgment. Based on the record evidence, the district
court determined that the undisputed facts established that Ena did not reside with Bhatia
and therefore was not a resident relative unde r his policy. The district court granted
Owners’ summary-judgment motion.
Bhatia appeals.
DECISION
Bhatia argues that the district court erred in determining that the undisputed record
evidence established that Ena di d not reside with him and wa s therefore not a “relative”
under his insurance policy. He contends that , because the record evidence establishes a
genuine issue of material fact as to Ena’s residency, summary judgment was inappropriate
and reversal is required.

1 We note that the policy contains a slightly different definition of “relative” in the non-
stacked no-fault insurance endorsement: “any person related to you by blood, marriage or
adoption and who resides in your household.” The parties have consistently relied on the
policy’s general definition of the term, and not the definition in the no-fault endorsement.
Likewise, the district court’s analysis focused on the general definition of “relative.”
4
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows, by citing to specific parts of the
record, including depositions, documents, affidavits, admissions, and interrogatory
answers, that “there is no genu ine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01, 56.03(a ). A genuine issue of
material fact exists “when re asonable persons might draw different conclusions from the
evidence presented.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997). “[O]n a motion
for summary judgment, the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those
facts must be resolved in [the nonmoving party’s] favor.” Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort ,
964 N.W.2d 613, 620 (Minn. 2021). “Any doubt as to whether issues of material fact exist
is resolved in favor of the party against whom summary judgment was granted.” Lubbers
v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 40 1 (Minn. 1995) (citing Rathbun v. W.T. Grant Co. , 219
N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 1974)).
Appellate courts “review the grant of summary judgment de novo to determine
whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its
application of the law.” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). Reviewing courts “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v.
Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002).
The record evidence here is as follows. 2 Bhatia and his former spouse had two
children, Ena and a son. The couple divorced in 2003. After the divorce, Bhatia continued

2 The facts are derived from the summary-judgme nt record and are presented in the light
most favorable to Bhatia. See STAR Ctrs., Inc., 644 N.W.2d at 76-77.
5
to live in the marital home in Burnsville. As a teenager, Ena maintained a bedroom in the
Burnsville home, and she would often stay there, alternating between her father’s house
and her mother’s residence. Following her graduation from high school and emancipation,
Ena remained close with her father. They saw each other every day. But Ena moved to an
apartment.
Bhatia owns multiple businesses. One of these businesses is a retail store in St. Paul
that sells gifts and other items. Bhatia owns the building that houses the St. Paul store. On
the upper level of the building, there are four apartment units. At the time of Ena’s death,
Bhatia occasionally stayed in one of these units although he continued to live in the
Burnsville home. Bhatia’s son lived in a second unit. And, after graduating from high
school, Ena lived separately in a third unit. The fourth un it was vacant and used by the
family as needed.
Ena kept her bedroom in her father’s Burnsville home, and she occasionally stayed
there as an adult. But Ena lived in the unit above the store. Her boyfriend also lived with
her there on and off.
Although Bhatia spent time in his apartment above the st ore, he resided in the
Burnsville home. He received mail at both the Burnsville home and the St. Paul building.
Ena did not pay rent for her apartment in the St. Paul building. Bhatia also covered
all of her other expenses, including her car insurance and health insurance.
At the time of her death, Ena was in the process of moving from Bhatia’s building
to a new apartment with her boyfriend. Bh atia last saw her on November 16, 2016—two
days before the motorcycle accident—and they discussed her move at that time. According
6
to Bhatia, she was ecstatic to be moving. She told him that she had written a check on the
business account to cover rent for her new apartment. Ena told Bhatia that she was moving
some of her belongings into the new apartment that night, including a television that she
had taken from the store. Bhatia did not know whether she had actually moved anything
into the new residence or spent any time there before she died. But Bhatia “hoped” that
Ena had spent the night of November 16 there because she had not stayed in her apartment
in his building.
Having identified the record evidence regarding Ena’s residency, we next consider
the applicable legal principles. A party claiming insurance coverage bears the preliminary
burden of proof to show a prim a facie case of coverage. Boedigheimer v. Taylor , 178
N.W.2d 610, 614 (Minn. 1970). Once the party claiming coverage meets this burden, the
party “is entitled to go to the jury and the burden of proof then shifts to the insurer to prove
facts establishing avoi dance of liability under the insu rance policy as an affirmative
defense.” Id. Whether the insured has demonstrated a prima facie case of coverage
depends on the language of the insurance policy at issue. See id.
“Generally, the extent of an insurer’s liability is determined by its insurance contract
with its insured.” Hanbury v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 865 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn. App.
2015), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 2015). Insurance policy language “must be construed
as a whole, and unambiguous la nguage must be given its pl ain and ordinary meaning.”
Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co. , 383 N.W.2d 645, 652
(Minn. 1986) (citing Bobich v. Oja , 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Minn. 1960)). If a contract is
“clear and unambiguous,” a court “should not rewrite, modify, or limit its effect by a
7
strained construction.” Valspar Refinish, Inc., v. Gaylord’s, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359, 364-65
(Minn. 2009). “Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law,” which an appellate
court reviews de novo. Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. 2008).
Under Bhatia’s policy, a “relative” is “a person who resides with you and who is
related to you by blood, marriage or adoption.” The parties agree that Ena was related to
Bhatia by blood. Thus, the so le question before the district court, and now before us, is
whether there is a genuine fact issue regarding Ena’s residence—specifically, whether she
resided with Bhatia.3
The district court concluded that th e undisputed facts demonstrate that
“Ena . . . does not qualify as a ‘resident relative’ under the terms of the policy to allow UM
coverage.” In support of this determination, the district court noted that Ena “maintained
her own residence separate and apart from [Bhatia],” she did not “regularly sleep under the
same roof as [Bhatia],” and she had no intention of returning to Bhatia’s Burnsville home
because she “was in the proc ess of moving to a new resi dence that was not owned by
[Bhatia].”
On appeal, neither party contends that the policy’s definition of a relative is
ambiguous. Instead, Bhatia argues that the dist rict court erred in concluding that Ena did
not reside with him. He maintains that the record evidence establishes a factual dispute as
to whether Bhatia and Ena were “living under the same roof.” On the other hand, Owners

3 The district court observed that Owners “does not concede that the vehicle in the accident
qualifies as an uninsured vehicle pursuant to th e policy.” But the district court noted that
it was not “asked to determine whether the motorcycle is an ‘uninsured vehicle’ under the
policy.”
8
argues that there is no factual dispute. Acco rding to Owners, there is no record evidence
that Ena was residing with Bhatia in his home, the Burnsville residence.
To assist us in considering this issue, the parties refer us to a body of Minnesota
caselaw addressing resident relatives. Both parties cite Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J.
v. Viktora, a homeowners-insurance case, which the district court used as a foundation for
its analysis. 318 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 19 82). There, the Minnesota Supreme Court
identified several factors bearing on whether an adult son resided “in the named insured’s
household”:
a. [l]iving under the same roof;
b. in a close, intimate and informal relationship;
and
c. where the intended duration is likely to be
substantial, where it is consiste nt with the informality of the
relationship, and from which it is reasonable to conclude that
the parties would consider the relationship in contracting about
such matters as insurance or in their conduct in reliance
thereon.

Id. at 706 (quotation omitted).
In support of its position, Owners relies on two additional supreme court decisions.
In Fruchtman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., a mother was a passenger in her 27-year-
old son’s vehicle when there was an acciden t; the coverage question was whether the son
was a member of his mother’s household. 142 N.W.2d 299, 300-01 (Minn. 1966). The
son, who was on leave between military assignments, had moved out of his mother’s home
more than two years earlier, had not visited the home for more than two weeks at a time,
and did not intend to return to the home, altho ugh he stored most of his belongings there.
Id. at 301. The supreme court concluded that th e mother and her son di d not reside in the
9
same household. Id. at 301-02. And in Van Overbeke v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. ,
the injured relative was 19 years old, em ployed and self-supporting, attending post-
secondary school in Mankato, and intending to reside there. 227 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Minn.
1975). The supreme court concluded that he was not a resident relative of his brother’s
household in Marshall. Id.
Owners draws a contrast between these two decisions and Viktora , where the
supreme court ultimately determined that the adult son was a resident relative of his
parents’ household. 318 N.W.2d at 707. There, the 23-year-old son moved to his parents’
home from another city after losing his job a nd lived there for nearly four months before
the accident occurred. Id. at 705. He did not pay room or board, a nd his mother usually
did his laundry. Id. In concluding that the son was a resident relative, the supreme court
pointed out that he lived with his parents, that he “was not self-supporting,” and that the
family “enjoyed the intimate, informal family relationship indicative of a legal residency.”
Id. at 707.
Bhatia directs us to our decision in Skarsten v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 381 N.W.2d 16
(Minn. App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 1986). In Skarsten, a 24-year-old daughter
was the policyholder and her father was injured in a car accident. Id. at 17. Years before
the accident, the daughter had moved away from her parents’ home in Benson to attend
school and lived in California and Minneapolis. Id. at 17-18. She was unemployed,
however, and returned to her parents’ house once or twice per month and on holidays. Id.
at 18. Although she received most of her mail at her own Minnea polis address and was
registered to vote in Californi a, she had her own room at her parents’ house and kept
10
belongings there. Id. We concluded that the daughter was a resident relative and noted
that a policy’s use of the term “resident or member of the same household” is intended to
protect “‘those whom, because of close relationship, a person obtaining a liability insurance
policy would ordinarily want it to protect.’” Id. at 18-19 (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union
Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Maca, 132 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Wis. 1965)).
Although the cited cases are helpful in illustrating factual scenarios involving
resident-relative provisions, our first and pr imary consideration must be the terms of
Bhatia’s policy. See Hanbury, 865 N.W.2d at 86. That polic y language is different than
the language at issue in Skarsten, the case that Bhatia urges us to follow. Bhatia’s policy
defines a resident relative as one w ho “resides with” the insured. In Skarsten, however,
the provision was not limited to a resident. Rather, the policy covered a “resident or
member of the same household,” which is a broader definition. See Skarsten, 381 N.W.2d
at 18.
Because the policy here requires a resident-relative to reside with the insured, we
agree with the district court’s decision to focus on whether Bhatia and Ena lived under the
same roof. Our independent review of the record evidence certainly establishes that father
and daughter had a close relationship. But there are no facts that would allow a reasonable
fact finder to conclude th at they lived together. See DLH, Inc, 566 N.W.2d at 69. Thus,
we also agree with the district court’s conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Ena resided with her father.
Citing Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thiem, Bhatia points out that a relative can reside
in more than one place. 503 N.W.2d 789, 790 (M inn. 1993). He argues that a fact finder
11
could conclude that Ena lived in both the Burnsville home and the St. Paul apartment. We
agree that in some circumstances—such as those in Thiem, where a minor child spent time
in the homes of both of his divorced parents, see id. at 790-91—an individual may have
more than one residence. But the record evid ence shows no such circumstances here.
Although Ena maintained her childhood bedroom in Bhatia’s Burnsville home, had a key
to the home, and would occasionally spend th e night, she did not reside there. The
undisputed evidence is that En a resided in the St. Paul apar tment. Moreover, there is no
evidence that Ena ever planned to reside in the Burnsville home again. At the time of her
death, she was in the process of moving to another apartment.
Bhatia also directs us to the evidence that Ena remained de pendent on him in
adulthood, relying on him to pay for her housing and all other expenses. He argues that he
“certainly considered her a part of his househ old and intended to have her covered for all
aspects of life, including his insurance contracts.” But again, our analysis is guided by the
policy language, which defines a relative as a person who re sides with the policyholder.
Although Ena was largely dependent on her father, there is no record evidence suggesting
that she resided with him at the time of her death.
The record evidence leaves no doubt that Bhatia loved his daughter and that he
remained close and connected with her until she passed away. But because there is no
genuine factual dispute as to whether Ena resided with Bhatia, the district court did not err
in determining that she did not qualify as a resident relative under Bhatia’s insurance policy
and in granting Owners’ motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.