In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: H.-M. E. R. and R. N. N., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0381

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
H.-M. E. R. and R. N. N., Parents.

Filed October 25, 2021
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-JV-20-4331

David W. VanDerHeyden, VanDerHeyden Law Office, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for
appellant H.-M. E. R.)

Michael D. Schatz, Schatz Law Firm, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent R. N. N.)

Mark A. Ostre m, Olmsted County Attorney, Debra A. Groehler, Sr. Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent Olmsted County Health, Housing, and
Human Services)

Vicki Duncan, Rochester, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
On appeal from an order terminating parental rights to her child, appellant-mother
argues the district court erred by determining (1) the county made reasonable efforts to
reunite the family, (2) statutory grounds supported termination of her parental rights, and
(3) termination is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
2
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s written findings following a three-day
bench trial and is supplemented by the record evidence when helpful to understanding the
issues on appeal. D.N. (son) is the child of appellant H.-M.E.R. (mother) and respondent
R.N.N. (father), born in May 2014.1 Mother and father did not live together, and mother,
who has a history of mental-health issues, lived in Rochester with her parents (maternal
grandparents) and son. In summer 2019, mother married D.E.T. who moved into maternal
grandparents’ home. D.E.T. has a long criminal history and must register as a predatory
offender.
In September 2019, when son was five, respondent Olmsted County Health,
Housing, and Human Services (the county) received a report of “threatened sexual abuse”
involving mother, son, and D.E.T. County social worker, C.P., investigated the report and
learned mother and maternal grandparents knew of D.E.T.’s criminal history and
“accepted, apparently without question, [D.E.T.’s] versions of his past criminal record and
his claims of innocence to the sexual offense of which he had been found guilty.” Maternal
grandparents supported D.E.T.’s relationship with mother and “did not have concerns
regarding domestic violence between” D.E.T. and mother. Finding no maltreatment of son,
C.P. helped the family develop a safety plan, which provided that D.E.T. would not
personally care for son and their time together would be supervised by a family member.

1 During these child-protection proceedings, father voluntarily terminated his parental
rights and did not appeal. As a result, this opinion does not discuss the procedural history
related to father.
3
In November 2019, the state charged D.E.T. with assaulting mother, and the district
court issued a domestic-abuse-no -contact order (DANCO), prohibiting D.E.T. from
contacting mother. The county assessed the safety risk to son by considering that son was
not present for the assault and he resided with maternal grandparents, who “provid[ed]
most of the care.” The county prepared to close the investigation.
In January 2020, before the investigation closed, mother and D.E.T. violated the
DANCO. Law enforcement tried to arrest D.E.T. at maternal grandparents’ home; D.E.T.
fled while police searched the house and mother “drove away and picked up” D.E.T. After
this incident, mother and D.E.T. were together while son continued to live with maternal
grandparents and attend school regularly.
In early February 2020, son stopped attending school, and on February 20, mother
informed the school that son would not return. Law enforcement arrested mother and
D.E.T. in Osceola, Florida on February 21, and took them into custody; police took son
into protective custody and notified the county. Mother was hospitalized on a 72-hour hold
because of “concerns about her mental health.”
The county requested an e mergency-protective-care order and filed a
child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition on February 25, 2020. On
February 28, the district court ordered son taken into emergency protective care . Paternal
grandmother and C.P. traveled to Florida and returned son to Minnesota. The district court
ordered mother, D.E.T., and maternal grandparents to have no contact with son, and
4
approved son to reside with paternal grandparents.2 Mother entered a denial to the CHIPS
petition. The district court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) and granted mother
supervised visitation with son. The county transferred the case to social worker T.S. in
March 2020. Mother regularly attended supervised virtual and in-person visits with son,
which T.S. supervised. T.S. testified about positive and normal interactions between
mother and son during visits.
In early May 2020, D.E.T. was convicted of felony domestic assault for the
November 2019 incident involving mother. The district court sentenced D.E.T. to
30 months in prison, his anticipated release date is in October 2021.
Later in May, mother signed an out-of-home placement plan (case plan) that, as the
district court summarized, “lays out the goals for [son’s] safety, permanency, and
well-being which [mother] needed to work towards and achieve before [son] could be
returned to her care.” The case plan stated mother should (a) provide a safe environment
for son where he is not exposed to domestic violence, and (b) follow mental-health
providers’ recommendations to manage her mental health “in a way that is safe and
predictable” for son. The case plan listed a parenting assessment as one of mother’s
services.
The county retained Deena McMahon, a licensed, independent social worker and
parenting-assessment expert, to complete a parenting assessment of mother and make

2 Paternal grandparents moved to intervene in the protective proceedings, and the district
court granted them party status in April 2020. Son remained in paternal grandparents’ care
after returning from Florida and throughout these proceedings.
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recommendations. McMahon observed mother and son on June 9, 2020, and interviewed
mother, son, and maternal grandparents. McMahon described mother as “minimally
responsive” when she interacted with son.
McMahon’s report observed mother was “preoccupied” with “unresolved trauma”
and “so focused on her own internal challenges she is unable to focus on” son’s challenges.
Mother “has been repeatedly involved with partners who have abused and exploited her”
and is “emotionally unavailable to her son because she is overwhelmed with her own needs
and feelings.” McMahon’s report also concluded mother is a vulnerable adult and lacked
capacity to parent. McMahon recommended mother “remain in therapy, attend a women’s
group for domestic violence,” attend anger management, and have her medications checked
to ensure they are the “right dosage” and she takes them “reliably.” In McMahon’s opinion,
mother needed “at least 12-18 months” of therapy before she “might be able to parent” son.
On June 16, 2020, T.S. supervised mother’s in-person visitation with son. Mother
was, at first, not responsive to son, but then “walked out, slamming the door as she left.”
Mother damaged furniture in the lobby and tore up plants outside the building.3 Police took
mother to Mayo Clinic for mental-health services. After the June 16 visit, T.S. consulted
the child-protection team and the GAL and decided “there would be no further in person
visits.” The county offered mother virtual visits with son “but she declined them.” Mother
did not visit with son after the June 16 visit.

3 Two county employees testified about mother’s behavior—mother yelled, screamed,
cried, knocked things over in the lobby, threw a trash can, threw papers around, pulled
mulch out of the planters and threw it around, and tried to get behind the receptionist’s
glass-encased desk in the lobby.
6
In July 2020, the county petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights. Trial
started on November 23, 2020. The county offered testimony by father, C.P., McMahon,
county employees, and T.S.; mother testified and offered testimony by T.S., mother’s
therapist, mother’s friend, mother’s counselor from Nystrom and Associates, and maternal
grandparents. The district court also received the GAL’s testimony.
On top of testimony establishing the facts already summarized, mother’s therapist
(therapist) testified about services she provided to mother from March 2020 until
August 2020, when mother terminated services. Therapist testified mother needed therapy
and other services to manage her mental health and it would take “a significant amount of
time” for mother to progress. Therapist concluded if mother worked at therapy, she “could
show some progress in six months and significant progress in a year.”
Mother testified she “feels victimized by the CHIPS process” and believes nothing
prevents her from parenting son. Mother “believes [son] is strong enough for her behaviors
not to ‘rub off on him.’” Mother also testified “her depression is still significant” and she
continues to have a plan to kill herself “dependent on the outcome of this case.” Mother
acknowledged she discussed this plan with a Nystrom and Associates counselor on
November 9, shortly before trial. When questioned about her relationship with D.E.T. at
trial, mother agreed she had “regular communication” with D.E.T., he is a “support” for
her, and she intended to reunite with him upon his release from prison.
On January 19, 2021, the district court issued written findings of fact and
conclusions of law and ordered mother’s parental rights be terminated. The district court
made detailed factual findings. Starting with mother’s mental health, the district court
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found mother “has not been stable throughout this case” and “has struggled with mental
health issues since her teen years.” The district court added, “[h]aving mental health issues
does not equate to an inability to parent”; however, mother’s ongoing thoughts of and plans
to kill herself combined with “multiple hospitalizations have made [mother] unavailable
and unable to care for [son].”
The district court rejected mother’s testimony that she is son’s primary caregiver
because mother “has never resided with and consistently care d for [son] on her own. ”
Rather, maternal grandparents and other family members assisted mother and “provided a
safety net” for son when mother could not parent. The district court stated that D.E.T.’s
“violent past is very concerning” and mother and maternal grandparents “placed [son] in
danger by permitting [D.E.T.] to reside in their home.” The district court determined
mother “lack[ed] consistency and follow through” on permanency goals because she did
not stabilize her me ntal health, communicated inconsistently with the county, and thus
“shows she cannot provide a stable environment for [son].”
In its conclusions of law, the district court determined the county had proven by
clear and convincing evidence that mother had neglected to comply with the duties of the
parent-child relationship under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2020). Although
mother and maternal grandparents provided for son’s “basic needs in the past, this does not
equate to safety.” Mother “repeatedly demonstrated a lack of insight into how her behavior,
and [D.E.T.’s] behavior, have harmed [son].” Mother’s “unstable mental health negatively
impacts [son’s] mental health, emotional well-being, and development.” The district court
concluded, for similar reasons, the county had proven by clear and convincing evidence
8
that son was neglected and in foster care under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8)
(2020).
The district court examined the services provided by the county to mother and found
the county made “reasonable efforts to reunify” mother and son, in part, by scheduling
parenting time, which continued until moth er declined virtual visits after the June 16
incident. Services mother received included a transitions program through Mayo Clinic and
mental-health therapy. The county’s other reasonable efforts included “case management,
foster care, supervised parenting time, . . . referrals for mental health and other services,
and a parenting capacity assessment.” The district court found, d espite these services,
mother “continues to deny responsibility for her own behavior,” often changed
mental-health providers, and “obstructed” the county’s ability to monitor her progress by
revoking consent for them to obtain information. The district court determined further
services toward rehabilitation and reunification would be “futile and therefore
unreasonable under the circumstances.” Finally, the district court determined the county
proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of mother’s parental rights is in
son’s best interests.
Mother moved for a new trial or for amended findings. After a hearing, the district
court denied mother’s motion for a new trial and modified some of its factual findings. For
example, the district court’s posttrial order stated son “cannot return to his mother’s care
in a reasonable amount of time.” This opinion incorporates the modified findings as
appropriate to the issues on appeal.
This appeal follows.
9
DECISION
Parental rights should be terminated only “for grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981). Here, the district court determined
two statutory bases supported termination of mother’s parental rights: (1) mother had
“refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and
child relationship,” and (2) son was “neglected and in foster care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2), (8). Generally, appellate courts will affirm the district court’s decision to
terminate parental rights when (1) “at least one statutory ground for termination is
supported by clear and convincing evidence,” (2) “the county has made reasonable efforts
to reunite the family,” and (3) “termination is in the best interests of the child.” In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
On appeal from a district court’s order terminating parental rights, appellate courts
“closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and
convincing,” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385, and “[c]onsiderable deference is due to the district
court’s decision because a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of
witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). Appellate courts
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
Recently, the Minnesota S upreme Court discussed the clear-error standard that
appellate courts use to review a district court’s factual findings: “[i]n applying the
clear-error standard, [appellate courts] view the evidence in a light favorable to the
findings. [Appellate courts] will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the
10
entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.”4 In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations
and citations omitted). Clear-error review does not permit a n appellate court to weigh the
evidence, nor does it allow an appellate court “to engage in fact-finding
anew. . . . Consequently, an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of the
evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the trial court.” Id. at
221–22 (quotations and citations omitted). An appellate court fulfills its duty by “fairly
considering all of the evidence” and determining whether the evidence “reasonably
supports the decision.” Id. at 223. And “[w]hen the record reasonably supports the findings
at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for
inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. (quotation omitted).
I. The district court did not err by determining the county made reasonable
efforts to reunite mother and son.

“Whether the county has met its duty of reasonable efforts requires consideration of
the length of time the county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare
of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). For a
county’s efforts to reunify a family to be reasonable, the services offered must be:
(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the
child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and

4 We recognize Kenney discussed the standard of review in a civil commitment case. In
doing so, th e supreme court observed “[t]he clear-error standard of review is familiar
because it applies across so many contexts.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221. This observation
suggests Kenney’s discussion of the clear -error standard of review is not limited to the
civil-commitment context.
11
timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). As
discussed above, appellate courts review the district court’s underlying factual findings for
clear error and its ultimate determination about whether reasonable efforts were met for
abuse of discretion. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 387; In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D.,
865 N.W.2d 315, 322–23 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015) (applying
an abuse of discretion standard of review).
Mother challenges the district court’s findings on the county’s reasonable efforts for
three reasons, which we discuss in turn.
A. Case plan
Mother argues the case plan lacked sufficient clarity in the “parent detail” and
“permanency” sections because the case plan “does not articulate any specific, concrete,
and quantifiable changes [mother] must make.” Our review of the record does not confirm
that mother raised this issue during district court proceedings, and we seldom review
arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988); In re Welfare of Children of A.I., 779 N.W.2d 886, 894 (Minn. App. 2010)
(applying Thiele on appeal from a termination of parental rights). But even if we assume
mother raised this issue below, we are not persuaded.
The district court found the case plan provided safety and permanency goals mother
needed to work toward before she could regain custody of son. The district court pointed
out the safety goal required mother to show son would reside in a home “free
from . . . domestic violence.” To achieve this goal, mother had to “demonstrate an
understanding of how [D.E.T.’s] assaultive behaviors and criminal history pose safety
12
concerns for [son].” The case plan’s permanency goal required mother to show son’s
caregiver provides a “safe, consistent, and stable home environment where his needs are
met.” To achieve this goal, mother need ed to follow treatment recommendations for her
mental health, participate actively in services to manage her mental health in a safe and
predictable manner, sign releases of information so the county could monitor her
mental-health progress, prevent son from being exposed to physical fighting, report all
contact with D.E.T to the county, and attend all court hearings.
Mother also argues the county failed to explain the case plan to her, but the district
court relied on mother’s testimony and found the case plan was “created during a family
group conference [mother] and [D.E.T.] attended.” The record shows mother signed the
case plan. It is true mother checked a box on the signature page indicating the plan had not
been explained to her. But T.S. testified she and mother created the case plan together and
she explained the case plan to mother on telephone calls and by video conference. The
GAL also testified she was present when T.S. discussed the case plan with mother.
In short, mother’s case-plan argument fails because record evidence supports the
district court’s findings that mother worked with the county to prepare a case plan that was
sufficiently detailed, and the county explained the case plan to mother. Based on this
record, we conclude the district court did not err in its findings related to the case plan and
did not abuse its discretion by determining the county provided reasonable efforts in
preparing the case plan.
13
B. Domestic-violence services
Mother argues the county did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with son
because it did not provide or compel mother to participate in domestic-violence services.
The district court found mother would have benefitted from domestic-violence therapy
groups, the county can refer clients to domestic-violence services, and “[mother] was
offered [domestic-abuse treatment], but denied being a victim of domestic abuse, and thus,
refused the services.” The record supports the district court’s findings.
Even after D.E.T. assaulted mother, she maintained contact with him in violation of
the DANCO, permitted son to be around him, removed son from school, left the state with
son and D.E.T., and continued her relationship with D.E.T. while he was in prison for
assaulting her. Mother admitted to McMahon that D.E.T. was violent with her but did not
“acknowledge that she’s in a domestically violent relationship or that she is unsafe” and
refused to change her relationship with D.E.T. As already mentioned, mother identifies
D.E.T. as her “support” and intends to resume her relationship with D.E.T. upon his release
from prison.
McMahon recommended mother attend a women’s group for domestic violence and
T.S. testified domestic-violence services may help mother. But domestic-violence services
were not included on the case plan. T.S. testified the county “wouldn’t typically refer
someone to domestic violence services if they weren’t acknowledging that they needed
those services.” The district court found the county explained “it was not appropriate to
refer Mother for domestic violence services because Mother denied that she was a victim
or had any concerns about her husband’s violence against her.”
14
Thus, the district court did not err in its underlying factual findings and did not abuse
its discretion by determining the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother
despite the lack of domestic-violence services.
C. Mental-health services
Mother argues the county failed to offer mental-health services. The district court
found when the case plan was created, mother “had attended the Transitions program
through Mayo Clinic and was attending therapy at Zumbro Valley Health Services [with
therapist]. Since [mother] was currently in therapy, [the county] did not recommend
additional therapy services.” The district court’s finding is supported by the record.
T.S. testified that, when assigned mother’s case in March 2020, “[mother] had
reported she was going to therapy and was involved in the transitions program” at Mayo
Clinic. The record reflects mother received mental-health treatment from at least three
providers during these proceedings—the transitions program at Mayo Clinic, Nystrom and
Associates, and mother’s therapist at Zumbro Valley Health Services. T.S. also testified
the county offered to make additional referrals for mother, but mother told T.S. that “she
already had the services that she felt she needed.” T.S. testified the county could not
monitor mother’s progress in mental-health treatment because mother revoked the release
of information.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining the county provided reasonable reunification efforts, including not
recommending additional mental-health services because mother was currently in therapy.
15
II. The district court did not err by determining mother neglected her parental
duties to son.

A parent’s rights may be terminated if the parent has “substantially, continuously,
or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed . . . by the parent and
child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Those duties include providing
“food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the child’s
physical, mental, or emotional health and development.” Id. Parental duties also include a
duty to “protect and care for the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902 (quotation omitted).
To terminate parental rights for neglect of parental duties, the district court must
find the parent is currently unable and willing to assume their responsibilities and that the
parent’s neglect of these duties will likely continue. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. ,
814 N.W.2d 76, 90 (Minn. App. 2012). The district court’s evidence must address
conditions existing at the time of the termination trial. In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d
886, 893 (Minn. 1996). Thus, the district court should not rely “primarily on past history,”
but consider the “projected permanency of the parent’s inability to care for his or her child.”
Id. (quotation omitted) . As discussed above, appellate courts review the district court’ s
factual findings for clear error and review its determination of whether a particular statutory
basis supports termination for abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 899–901.
Mother challenges three of the district court’s determinations, which we discuss in
turn.
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A. Mother’s lack of insight
The district court determined mother neglected her parental duties by “repeatedly
demonstrat[ing] a lack of insight into how her behavior, and [D.E.T .’s] behavior,” harm
son, and how her “unstable mental health negatively impacts” son. Mother argues she
demonstrated insight into the effect of her mental health and her relationship with D.E.T.
on son’s well-being. She points to her own testimony that she understood taking son to
Florida with D.E.T. was an error and her actions at the June 16 supervised visit were
inappropriate. The district court, however, credited other evidence and found mother did
not take responsibility for fleeing to Florida with son, she minimized or completely
disregarded D.E.T.’s violent criminal history, and mother downplayed any effect on or
damage to son.
Evidence in the record supports these findings and, as already noted, this court will
not weigh the evidence. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221. McMahon testified mother took
“no responsibility for why [son] was removed from her custody” and “didn't really believe
she had deficits . . . . She doesn't know why the police arrested her in Florida. She doesn't
know what she could have done differently to have prevented that.” Mother denied D.E.T.
posed any danger to herself or son, denied she knew of D.E.T.’s criminal history, and
“accepted, apparently without question, [D.E.T.’s] versions of his past criminal record and
his claims of innocence to the sexual offense of which he had been found guilty.” As
discussed, mother identifies D.E.T. as her “support” and plans to reconcile with him upon
his release from prison. After mother’s violent outburst at the June 16 visitation, T.S.
testified mother did not recognize the effect of her behavior on son by pointing to mother’s
17
statement that she has “raised [son] to understand her and her behaviors.” We conclude the
district court did not err by determining mother neglected her parental duties because she
lacked insight into how her behavior, D.E.T. ’s behavior, and her unstable mental health
harmed son.
B. Mother’s failure to provide a safe home
The district court determined mother cannot provide a safe and stable home, in part,
because of her relationship with D.E.T. Mother argues she can provide a safe home for
son because the county’s September 2019 report found maternal grandparent’s home to be
safe. It is true that C.P.’s investigation concluded son was safe in 2019; still, the record
supports the district court’s determinations as of the time of the termination trial. First, as
discussed, mother does not acknowledge the danger D.E.T. poses to her or son and she
plans to reunite with D.E.T. upon his release from prison. Mother’s brief to this court does
not discuss this evidence.
Second, maternal grandparents support mother’s relationship with D.E.T., and they
refuse to recognize the danger D.E.T. poses to mother and son. 5 The district court found
maternal grandfather aided mother and D.E.T. in their flight to Florida with son. Maternal
grandfather testified he did not assist mother intentionally and he did not know mother and
D.E.T. went to Florida until after their arrest. The district court, however, found his
testimony not credible and determined maternal grandfather contributed to mother and

5 After D.E.T. assaulted mother, maternal grandfather said he believed “[D.E.T.] is a fine
man and [son] loves him.” McMahon testified maternal grandparents reported “they were
fully in support of [D.E.T.] being the stepfather to [son] . . . . They did not believe he had
actually committed a sex offense.”
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D.E.T.’s flight. Thus, the record supports the district court’s determination that mother
neglected her parental duties because she cannot provide a safe home for son.
C. Mother’s mental health and her ability to care for son
Mental illness alone is insufficient to terminate parental rights; instead, the county
must prove a parent’s mental illness is directly connected to her inability to parent and will
be “permanently detrimental to the welfare of the child.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R.,
750 N.W.2d 656, 662 (Minn. 2008). The district court found mother provided for son’s
basic needs with assistance from maternal grandparents, but the district court also found
mother’s “unstable mental health negatively impacts [son’s] mental health, emotional
well-being, and development.” Mother concedes her mental health has been a lifelong
battle, but claims her mental health stabilized just before trial, pointing to therapist’s
testimony. Mother’s claim is unsupported by the record.
Therapist testified she treated mother regularly from March to August 2020, and
during that entire period, mother was “in crisis mode and her mental health did not
stabilize.” The district court found mother ceased mental-health treatment at the time of
trial because she fired therapist in August. Mother returned to therapist for one visit before
trial. Therapist completed an assessment of mother on November 18, 2020, and testified
mother’s diagnoses include major depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
borderline personality disorder. Therapist added that borderline personality disorder “is not
something that can be treated with medication.”
In October 2020, T.S. received screenshots of mother’s Facebook posts suggesting
she felt like killing herself. In November 2020, Nystrom and Associates provided records
19
referring to mother ha ving a plan to kill herself that she intended to act on in December.
Mother testified “her depression is still significant” and she continues to have a plan to kill
herself “dependent on the outcome of this case.” Mother acknowledged she discussed this
plan with a Nystrom and Associates therapist on November 9, shortly before trial. The
record therefore supports the district court’s finding that mother’s mental health had not
stabilized at the time of trial and negatively affected her ability to parent.
In conclusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining statutory
grounds supported termination of mother’s parental rights because record evidence
supported the district court’s factual findings along with its ultimate determination that
mother neglected her parental duties. As a result, this court need not consider the district
court’s determination that son was neglected and in foster care under section 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(8). See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385 (“We affirm the district court’s termination
of parental rights when at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear
and convincing evidence and termination is in the best interests of the child.”).
III. The district court did not err by determining termination of parental rights is
in son’s best interests.

A district court “must consider the child’s best interests and explain why termination
is in the best interests of the child.” D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d at 545; see Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7 (2020). The district court must consider (1) the child’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship, (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the
relationship, and (3) “any competing interests of the child.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92.
Competing interests include “health considerations, a stable environment, and the child’s
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preference.” Id.; see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (listing factors a district court
must consider when addressing the best interests of a child who is the subject of a petition
to terminate parental rights). “[T]he best interests of the child must be the paramount
consideration.” Minn. Stat § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020).
Appellate courts “apply an abuse -of-discretion standard of review to a district
court’s conclusion that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests.” In re
Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. App. 2018). “Because the
best-interests analysis involves credibility determinations and is generally not susceptible
to an appellate court’s global review of a record, we give considerable deference to the
district court’s findings.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (quotation omitted).
The district court first considered son’s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship, finding son “is too young to express his wishes.” Still, the district court found
son expressed “he feels safe where he is currently residing” and D.E.T. “is not safe.” In
considering son’s interest, the district court found mother and maternal grandparents
“dismiss” the danger D.E.T. poses “despite knowledge of his criminal record.” Mother
argues this finding is unsupported by the record, but her argument fails given the record
evidence detailed above. Mother also argues the district court ignored son’s attachment to
mother, but this is not correct. The district court found, relying on McMahon’s testimony,
that son “is not securely attached to [mother].”
The district court next considered mother’s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship, finding mother loves son “very much” and wants him “return[ed] to her care.”
But the district court also found mother “has not made enough of an effort to complete the
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steps toward the goal of reunification,” son cannot be returned to mother’s care in a
reasonable time, and mother continues to “actively engage” in thoughts of killing herself.
Mother argues these findings are unsupported by the record. We disagree based on the
record already discussed. Moreover, McMahon testified mother needs 12-18 months of
therapy before she “might” be able to parent. Thus, the record supports the district court’s
findings that mother did not make “enough of an effort” to complete the reunification goals
and son cannot return to mother’s care within a reasonable time.
Finally, the district court considered son’s competing interests, finding son “needs
and deserves a safe, stable home where all of his physical, emotional, and developmental
needs are met,” and, after almost a year in foster care, “he needs and deserves permanency.”
The court found mother cannot fulfill son’s needs “due to her mental health which causes
a lack of insight into how her behaviors affect [son]; her delayed efforts in seeking
assistance in stabilizing her mental health; and her continued relationship with [D.E.T.]”
As detailed above, the record supports these findings. Given the record evidence, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by determining termination is in son’s best
interests.
In conclusion, the district court did not err in its underlying factual findings and did
not abuse its discretion when it determined the county made reasonable efforts to reunite
mother and son by providing appropriate services, a statutory ground supports termination
because mother neglected her parental duties, and termination of mother’s parental rights
is in son’s best interests.
Affirmed.