John Steven Martin,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-0386

Carlton County Chutich, J.

John Steven Martin,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: January 19, 2022
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________
John Steven Martin, Rush City, Minnesota, pro se.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Lauri A. Ketola, Carlton County Attorney, Alexander W. Saumer, Assistant Carlton
County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. Appellant’s claim concerning subjec t matter jurisdiction fails on the merits.
2. Appellant’s claim concerning newly discovered evidence is time-barred.
3. Appellant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of
counsel are time-barred.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
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O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
Following a jury trial, appe llant John Steven Martin was convicted of first-degree
premeditated murder for the A ugust 28, 1996 killing of Paul Antonich. We affirmed his
conviction on direct appeal. State v. Martin (Martin I), 614 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 2000).
In 2008, we affirmed the district court’s su mmary denial of Martin ’s first postconviction
petition. Martin v. State (Martin II), 748 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Minn. 2008). This year, Martin
filed a second postconviction pe tition, alleging that: (1) Minnesota lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to prosecute him, (2) newly di scovered evidence entitles him to relief, and
(3) prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel entitle him to relief. The
district court summarily denied the second pe tition as time-barred. Because we conclude
that even if the facts alleged in Martin’s second postconviction petition were proven at an
evidentiary hearing he would not be entitled to relief, we affirm.
FACTS
Our opinion in Martin I fully sets forth the facts of the murder of Paul Antonich.
614 N.W.2d at 218–21. We recite only the pertinent facts here. Before trial, Martin moved
to change his plea to not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency because of an
alcohol-induced blackout. To that end, he moved in limine to admit testimony that he “was
highly intoxicated to the point where he blac ked out and had lost c ontrol of his mental
faculties to the point wh ere he was incapable of musteri ng any criminal intent,” but the
district court ultimately exclud ed that evidence. After his conviction, Martin pursued a
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direct appeal based on the di strict court’s denial of a Schwartz hearing,1 as well as the
district court’s exclusion of the witness testimony about intoxication and the State’s
peremptory strike of the only African Amer ican in the jury pool . We affirmed his
conviction on direct appeal. Id. at 227. In Martin’s first postconviction petition, he alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, ineffe ctive assistance of counsel, and bias. We affirmed the
denial of his first pos tconviction petition. Martin II, 748 N.W.2d at 296. In this second
postconviction petition, Martin claims that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to convict him and argues that he has newly disc overed evidence. He also
alleges prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.
ANALYSIS
We review the summary denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of
discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). A district court abuses
its discretion when “it has exercised its disc retion in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
based its ruling on an erroneous view of th e law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We review legal issues de novo, but will
not reverse a district court’s fact findings unless they are “clearly erroneous.” Id. A district
court does not abuse its discretion when it summarily denies a postconviction petition that
is time-barred. Fort v. State, 861 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Minn. 2015).

1 A Schwartz hearing is a procedure in which a trial court may investigate alleged
juror misconduct by summoning a juror for questioning ab out the alleged misconduct in
the presence of counsel for both parties. See Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co.,
104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960).
4
Minnesota law permits persons convicted of a crime to seek postconviction relief
when they claim the conviction violates their rights under “the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of the state,” or when they claim that scientific ev idence unavailable at
trial establishes the person’s actual innocence . Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2020).
Petitioners may not request postconviction relie f based on “grounds that could have been
raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.” Id. Petitioners must file
postconviction petitions within tw o years of their conviction or sentence, or their direct
appeal’s final disposition, whichever is later. Id., subd. 4(a). The law, when enacted in
2005, also provided: “Any person whose conviction became final before August 1, 2005,
shall have two years after [August 1, 2005] to file a petition for pos tconviction relief.”
Miles v. State, 800 N.W.2d 778, 781 (quoting Act of Ju ne 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13,
2005 Minn. Laws 1080, 1097–98) (alteration in original). For defendants like Martin,
whose conviction was final before August 1, 2005, subdivision 4(a)’s two-year statute of
limitations expired on July 31, 2007. Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. 2012).
Petitioners may request postconviction relief after the two-year limitation period has
expired if they satisfy one of several statutory exceptions. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b).
The exceptions potentially applicable to this case are as follows:
(2) the petitioner alleges the existe nce of newly disc overed evidence,
including scientific evid ence, that could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within the
two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition, and the evidence is
not cumulative to evidence presented at trial, is not for impeachment
purposes, and establishes by a clear and convincing standard that the
petitioner is innocent of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner was
convicted;

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(3) the petitioner asserts a new interpretation of federal or state constitutional
or statutory law by either the United States Supreme Court or a Minnesota
appellate court and the petitioner estab lishes that this interpretation is
retroactively applicable to the petitioner’s case;

. . .

(5) the petitioner establishes to the sati sfaction of the court that the petition
is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.

Id. Although we need not address these exceptions if petitioners do not expressly invoke
them, Clifton v. State , 830 N.W.2d 434, 437–38 n.2 (M inn. 2013), the postconviction
statute requires us to “liberally constr ue” postconviction petitions and “look to the
substance thereof and waive any irregularities or defects in form.” Minn. Stat. § 590.03
(2020). A petition that invokes one of the exceptions must be brought within two years of
when the petitioner knew or should have known of the basis for the exception. Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(c).
I.
Martin asserts that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he is
an enrolled member of the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa and because he
murdered Antonich on the Fond du Lac Reservation. Citing McGirt v. Oklahoma, ___ U.S.
___, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), he contends that, as a member of that tribe, and in keeping
with the 1854 Treaty of La Pointe, only the United States Government can prosecute him
for his crimes. The State asserts that Mart in’s claim is time-barred under Minnesota
Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a), and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla,
243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976). The State furt her observes that, even if not time-barred,
Martin’s claim fails on the merits. The distri ct court found that Martin’s subject matter
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jurisdiction claim is time-ba rred under subdivision 4(a) beca use the claim was known to
him at the time of his trial and direct appeal.
Although Martin’s subject matter jurisdiction claim would otherwise be time-barred
by subdivision 4(a), we libera lly construe his petition as a sserting two exceptions to the
time bar: the exception for a “new interpretation of federa l or state constitutional or
statutory law” under Minnesota Statutes se ction 590.01, subdivision 4(b)(3), and the
exception for petitions that are “not frivolous” and are “in the interests of justice” under
Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(b)(5). Jackson v. State, 919 N.W.2d 470,
472–73 (Minn. 2018). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Martin’s subject
matter jurisdiction claim fails on the merits.
Having reviewed the relevant law and facts, we conclude that Martin’s reliance on
McGirt is misplaced. In McGirt, the United States Supreme Court held that much of
Oklahoma was Native American reservation land where the State of Oklahoma lacked
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute Native Americans. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2478. In that
case, Oklahoma generally had “no jurisdiction to try Indi ans for conduct committed in
Indian Country” because Congress never gran ted Oklahoma criminal jurisdiction over
Native Americans committing crimes on Native lands. Id. at 2459. Generally, “state law
is not applicable to Indians within Indian Country without the consent of Congress.” State
v. Robinson, 572 N.W.2d 720, 72 2 (Minn. 1997) (citing California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987)).
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Unlike Oklahoma, Congress endowed Minnesot a with “jurisdiction over offenses
committed by or against Indians in . . . [a]ll Indian country within the state”2 when it passed
Public Law 280. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2020). See also State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725,
728 (Minn. 1997) (“In Public Law 280, Congress granted Mi nnesota broad criminal . . .
jurisdiction over all Indian c ountry within the st ate, with the exce ption of Red Lake
Reservation.”). We have consequently held that Minnesota has the power to “enforce the
same criminal laws within tribal boundaries as would be enforced elsewhere in the state.”
State v. Manypenny, 682 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Minn. 2004). Because the rule announced in
McGirt is not applicable to Martin’s case, his subject matter jurisdiction claim fails on the
merits.
II.
Martin’s second argument invokes the ne wly discovered evidence exception and
claims that an examination by a neuropsychologist would lead to evidence showing that he
was incapable of premeditation at the time of the murder because of past head trauma and
an alcohol-induced blackout. The State argues that Martin was aware of the potential effect
of alcohol intoxication at the time of his direct appeal and urges us to affirm the district
court’s determination that Martin’s newly discovered evidence claim is time-barred. The
district court found that, because the defense of intoxication was “known to [Martin] . . . at

2 The law excepts the Red Lake Reservation. Further, Minnesota retroceded criminal
jurisdiction for the Bois Forte Indian Reservation accordi ng to the authority contained in
25 U.S.C. § 1323. See Act of May 23, 1973, ch. 625, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 1500, 1501.
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the time of his direct appeal,” it is not ne wly discovered evidence and is therefore time-
barred by Minnesota Statutes section § 590.01, subdivision 4(a).3
Because Martin’s newly discovered evidence claim is based on evidence that is not
actually newly discovered, the claim is time-barred. Martin has repeatedly argued that he
was too intoxicated to form the necessary criminal intent for his crimes. He sought to make
that argument at trial, successfully secured state funding for one of two desired expert
witnesses, and even secured a medical opinion explicitly saying that his intoxication
precluded criminal intent. The evidence that he offers as “newly discovered” has been in
his possession for over two decades. A lthough he now labels the evidence as
neuropsychological, its substance has not ch anged. When a defendant knows of the
expected testimony at the time of trial, th e testimony fails the legal test for newly
discovered evidence. State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 675–76 (M inn. 2011). Martin’s
proffered evidence, therefore, does not fall under the newly discovered evidence exception
to the two-year limitation. Because Martin brings this petition afte r July 31, 2007, and
because his reliance on the newly discovered evidence exception is misplaced, the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied his second postconviction
petition.4

3 Even if Martin had fulfilled a 4(b) exception to the two-year limitation in
subdivision 4(a), the postconviction statute would still require him to request relief under
an exception within two years of the date upon which the claimed exception arose. See
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). The distri ct court, however, did not rely upon this
provision of the statute, and therefore we do not address it here.

4 Martin also requests an ev identiary hearing on this claim. We have held, however,
that a district court need not grant an evidentiary hearing if “the petition and the files and
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III.
Finally, Martin raises claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance
of counsel. According to Martin, the prosecutors committed misconduct by sparking racist
bias against him during trial, forcing him to wear chains and a shock belt at trial, permitting
an accomplice to be sent out of state, seeking a conviction from jurors who had read news
coverage of the underlying murder, and inte rfering with his counsel’s ability to mount a
defense. He also claims that his counsel failed to exhaust all avenues of relief, conceded
his guilt against his wishes, and failed to inve stigate claims of pr osecutorial and juror
misconduct. The State asserts that, because Martin knew of these arguments at the time of
trial, his direct appeal, and his first postconviction relief petition, this claim is time-barred.
The district court found that, because all of the issues Martin cites were “known at the time
of Petitioner’s direct appeal,” they are time-barred.
We conclude that Martin’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective
assistance of counsel are time-barred. He kn ew of all the facts comprising the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct at the time of his tria l and discretionary appeal. In fact, in his
first petition for postconviction relief, he as serted prosecutorial misconduct and many of
the same arguments alleging ineffective assist ance of counsel that he advances now.
Because Martin filed this appeal more than two years after July 31, 2007, and he knew or
should have known of the cond uct of the prosecutor and his own counsel more than two

records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”
Wayne v. State, 866 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Minn. 2015). Because this claim is time-barred, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martin an evidentiary hearing.
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years ago, his argument is time-barred under subsection 4(a). See Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at
555–63; Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.