State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0396

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bao Thao,
Defendant,

Midwest Bonding, LLC,
Appellant.

Filed December 6, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-9043

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Je ffrey A. Wald, Assistan t County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

James McGeeney, Doda McGeeney, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Midwest Bonding, LLC (Midwest) appeals from the district court’s order
denying its petition to reinstate and discharg e two forfeited bail bonds it posted on behalf
of defendant Bao Thao. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2017, respondent State of Minnesot a charged Thao with first-degree drug
possession. See Minn. Stat. § 152.021, su bd. 2(a)(1) (2014). Ov er the course of the
proceedings in Thao’s case, Midwest posted three bail bonds on her behalf. Two of those
bail bonds are at issue in this appeal.
Midwest posted the first of these bail bon ds, in the amount of $20,000, in January
2018. Thao then failed to appear for two hearings in February 2018. The district court left
the $20,000 bond in place, issued a bench warrant, and set an additional bail of $10,000.
In July 2018, Midwest posted the second bail bond on Thao’s behalf. It posted
$10,000, on top of the $20,000 previously posted, so that Thao could be released from jail.
Thao failed to appear for he r jury trial on January 14, 2019. The district court
ordered both bail bonds, totaling $30,000, forfeited.
On April 14, 2019, while Thao was still at large, Midwest filed a petition requesting
reinstatement of the two forfeited bail bonds or more time to locate Thao. Midwest detailed
its efforts to locate Thao, which consisted of calling he r, electronically searching all
Minnesota jails, and hiring a “professional Fu gitive Recovery Agency ” (the agency).
According to Midwest’s petition, the agency attempted contact with Thao at nine
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addresses, contacted Thao’s “relatives and associates,” conducted “skip tracing and social
media searches,” and performed “rotating surv eillance” that was accessible to and shared
with law enforcement. Midw est’s petition stated that the agency determined Thao was
“staying with [her] family, more specifically [her] mother,” and her family was helping her
evade arrest. The district court denied Midwest’s April 2019 petition.
On May 13, 2019, the Cottage Grove po lice arrested Thao for committing a new
offense. When Thao appeared on the outstanding bench warrant for her first-degree drug
possession case, the district court set a new $20,000 bail. Midwest then posted a third bail
bond of $20,000 on Thao’s beha lf, which is not part of this appeal. It also submitted a
second petition to reinstate and discharge th e first two bail bonds that it had posted on
Thao’s behalf.
Thao continued to miss court appearances. Eventually, the district court also
forfeited Midwest’s third bail bond.
In January 2020, Midwest f iled a third petition, this tim e requesting reinstatement
and discharge of the third bond. The district court issued an order in February 2020
denying Midwest’s petitions to reinstate and discharge the three bonds.
Following the district court’s order, Midw est requested a hearing to address its
requests for reinstatement and discharge, and a hearing was held in December 2020. In
March 2021, the district court summarily denied Midwest’s petition for reinstatement and
discharge of the bonds.
Midwest now appeals the district court’s denial of its request to reinstate and
discharge the first and second of the bail bonds that it posted on Thao’s behalf.
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DECISION
We review a district court’s decision concerning the reinstatement and discharge of
a forfeited bail bond for an abuse of discretion. State v. Askland, 784 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Minn.
2010). “A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its conclusions on an erroneous
view of the law.” Id. Here, where there were multiple petitions and several orders, we
consider both the district court’s initial decisions and its decisions on reconsideration. See
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (“On appeal from or review of an order the appellate courts
may review any order affecting the order fro m which the appeal is taken and on appeal
from a judgment may review any order involvi ng the merits or affe cting the judgment.
They may review any other matter as the interest of justice may require.”).
When a bail bond is forfeited, the district court “may forgive or reduce the penalty
according to the circumstances of the case and the situation of the party on any terms and
conditions it considers just and reasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 629.59 (2020); see also Minn.
R. Gen. Prac. 702(f) (specify ing procedure for petitioning fo r reinstatement of forfeited
bail bond). But in considering a petition for reinstatement and discharge of bail, the district
court must consider the four factors identified in In re Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn.
1953). Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. The first factor is “the purpose of bail, the civil nature
of the proceedings, and the cause, purpose and length of a defendant’s absence.” Id. Bail
serves several purposes, including minimizi ng pretrial incarcerati on, ensuring penalty
payment, and encouraging sureti es “to locate, arrest, and return defaulting defendants to
the authorities.” Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 46; State v. Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d 539, 541-42
(Minn. 2003). The second factor is “the goo d faith of the bond company as measured by
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the fault or willfulness of the defendant.” Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. This factor imputes
the “[d]efendant’s willfulness or ba d faith . . . to the surety.” State v. Vang, 763 N.W.2d
354, 358 (Minn. App. 2009). Third, the district court must consider “the good-faith efforts
of the bond company to apprehend and produce the defendant.” Askland, 784 N.W.2d at
62. The final factor is “any prejudice to th e State in its administration of justice.” Id.
(citing Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 46).
The surety bears the burden of showing that the first three factors weigh in its favor.
Id. And the respondent bears the burden of proving prejudice. Id.
Here, the district court addressed each of these factors. To determine whether the
district court abused its discretion, we examine its assessment of each factor in turn.
1. The purpose of bail, the civil nature of the proceedings, and the cause,
purpose, and length of defendant’s absence

The district court found that this fact or weighed against Midwest because “the
purpose of bail, assuring the reappearance of a defendant, was not achieved.” It noted that
Thao missed multiple court appearances while she was released on Midwest’s bail bonds.
And the district court concluded that the cause of Thao’s absence was her “bad-faith willful
behavior in avoiding court,” which is imputed to Midwest under the caselaw. See Vang,
763 N.W.2d at 358.
A district court’s findings on “the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence as to
the cause of the defendant’s flight from the ju risdiction and of his s ubsequent failure to
appear . . . is to be decided by the trial court in light of all the surrounding facts and
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circumstances.” Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 46-47. Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not
disturb the district court’s consideration of these issues. Id.
Midwest argues that the first factor actually weighs in its favor. It contends that the
district court erred in attribu ting all of Thao’s missed court appearances to Midwest. It
points out that, on a few occasions, Thao was technically released on different bail bonds
than the two at issue here. Midwest also ma intains that some courts have concluded the
purpose of bail was satisfied when defendants were ultimately apprehended after failing to
appear. In support of this proposition, Midwest cites Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62, Farsdale
v. Martinez, 586 N.W.2d 423, 424-25 (Minn. App. 1998), and a nonprecedential decision.1
We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evaluation of the first factor.
Although the district court referenced some failed appearances that did not involve the two
bails bonds at issue in this appeal, the most significant missed court appearance
identified—Thao’s failure to appear at her jury trial in January 2019, which resulted in her
four-month absence—is attributable to Midwest. Moreove r, unlike the circumstances in
Askland and Farsdale, Midwest did not ultimately secu re Thao’s presence. Thao was
brought back to court because she was arrested for committing a new offense. Finally, the
fact that a defendant was ultimat ely returned to court after fa iling to appear is not alone
dispositive. While bail is intended to ensure that a defendant appears for trial, it also seeks
to avoid “delaying, impairing, or unduly burdening the administration of justice.” Shetsky,
60 N.W.2d at 46. As the distri ct court observed, sureties ar e tasked with facilitating the

1 We are not bound by nonprecedential opinions. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d
796, 800 (Minn. App. 1993).
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timely administration of justice. Here, where Thao failed to appear for a jury trial and was
then missing for four months, this purpose was not achieved.
2. The good faith of the bond compan y as measured by the fault or
willfulness of the defendant

The district court found that Thao’s misse d court appearances, which included her
jury trial, were willful acts committed in bad faith. It accordingly concluded that the second
factor weighed against Midwest’s petition for reinstatement and discharge.
Midwest argues that the district court erre d in addressing only Thao’s fault. It
contends that, in considering this factor, th e district court must balance the defendant’s
fault against the good-faith efforts made by the bonding company to secure the defendant’s
presence. If the district court had assessed th e second factor in this fashion, Midwest
argues, it would have weighed in Midwest’s favor.
Midwest’s argument is contrary to the law, however. The third Shetsky factor
accounts for the bondin g company’s efforts to locate and produce the defendant. See
Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62 (expl aining that third Shetsky factor requires consideration of
the bonding company’s efforts to produce the defendant). But the second factor only
concerns the defendant’s intent, which is then imputed to th e bonding company. Vang,
763 N.W.2d at 358. Because th e district court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that Thao’s failures to appear were willful an d in bad faith, it did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that this factor weighed against Midwest.
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3. Good-faith efforts of the bond co mpany to apprehend and produce the
defendant

The district court concluded that Midwes t’s investigative efforts were minimal,
primarily consisting of telephone calls and computer searches. Although Midwest hired a
“Fugitive Recovery Agen t,” the district court observe d that it did not provide any
supporting documentation with its petition, such as an invoice detailing its expenditures.
And, the district court stated, none of Midwest’s efforts ultimately produced Thao.
Midwest argues that the district court’s analysis was flawed. It argues that it acted
in good faith because it made efforts to locate Thao. In turn, Midwest contends, the district
court should have concluded that the third factor weighed in its favor.
As noted, the district court has wide discretion in considering the four Shetsky
factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Midwest failed to
sustain its burden of showing that the third factor weighed in its favor.
4. Prejudice to the state in its administration of justice
Finally, the district court determined that Thao’s significant absences prejudiced the
administration of justice. The court observed that she missed a jury trial date, her absences
unnecessarily prolonged resolution of her case, and the state expended significant resources
returning Thao to jail after her missed court appearances.
Midwest argues that the state bears the burde n of establishing prejudice and that it
failed to do so. Indeed, according to Midwest, the state did not even participate in the
district court proceedings involving Midwest’s petitions.
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But the district court reasonably inferred from court records, including Midwest’s
filings, that Thao’s absences delayed the di sposition of the case. Moreover, Midwest’s
own motion papers established that the state apprehended Thao after she failed to appear
for her trial. Based on these facts, which are apparent in the district court’s records and
Midwest’s filings, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
prejudice factor weighed against Midwest.
In sum, the district court did not a buse its discretion in considering the Shetsky
factors and determining that they weighed against reinstatement and discharge. Thus, the
district court did not err in denying Midwest’s petition.
Affirmed.