In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: C.M.R., C.L.T., and C.G.M., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0399

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
C.M.R., C.L.T., and C.G.M., Parents.

Filed November 1, 2021
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-JV-20-1878

Joshua E. Haugen, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant -mother C.M.R.)

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Lisa M. Tufts, Assistant County Attorney,
Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent Beck er County Human Services)

Veronica S. Newcomer, White Earth, Minnesota (for respondent White Earth Indian Child
Welfare)

Bobbi Jo Hamilton, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge;
and Halbrooks, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
On appeal from the district court’s termination of parental rights to her three
children, mother argues that the district court erred in concluding that statutory grounds for

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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termination were proven and that the county made active efforts to reunify the family. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant C.M.R. is the mother of three children . C.L.T. is the father of the two
oldest children, who were born in 2011 and 2012 . C.G.M. is the father of the youngest
child, who was born in 2016. C.L.T. is an enrolled member of the White Earth Band of
Ojibwe. The two oldest children are therefore eligible for enrollment as members and they
each qualify as an “Indian child” covered by the protections of the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) and the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA). 25 U.S.C. §
1903(4) (2018); Minn. Stat. § 260.755, subd. 8 (2020).
Mother has a history of substance -abuse problems, which has led to multiple child-
protection proceedings. Her first involvement with child protection occurred in 2011 after
she had a positive drug screen while pregnant with the oldest chi ld. In February 2012,
mother tested positive for methamphetamine and the child was briefly removed from
mother’s care. The child was adjudicated a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS)
in March 2012 . Mother gave birth to her second child during the pendency of the child-
protection matter. This case was closed in September 2013 after mother successfully
completed treatment.
Mother’s second child -protection matter started in October 2014, when social
services in Hubbard County received a child-maltreatment report concerning the two oldest
children. Mother failed to pick up the children from childcare and , when law enforcement
located mother, she was paranoid, rambling, and seemed to be “under the influence.” The
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officers brought mother to the emergency room because she exhibited signs of a psychotic
incident that they thought may have been caused by methamphetamine use. The children
were removed from mother’s care and eventually placed with relatives.
Hubbard County filed a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition. Because the
children are Indian children protected under ICWA and MIFPA, the case was transferred
to White Earth Tribal Court. During the pendency of that case, mother gave birth to th e
youngest child. Hubbard County received a child -maltreatment report shortly after the
birth because the baby was experiencing withdrawal symptoms as a result of mother’s use
of suboxone. Mother went through treatment and regained custody of the childre n in
October 2016. The case was closed in January 2017.
The current child -protection matter was opened after mother’s arrest on June 27,
2020, for driving while impaired. All three children were in the car at the time of the traffic
stop. The arresting officers suspected that mother was under the influence of
methamphetamine. A hypodermic needle and baggie containing what appeared to be
methamphetamine were found in mother’s handbag that was located between mother and
one of the children in the front seat of the car. Law enforcement placed an emergency 72 -
hour hold on the children, and a social worker transported them to a foster home. Mother
admitted to law enforcement that she used methamphetamine earlier that morning and had
methamphetamine in her purse. A social worker collected hair samples from the children,
and the youngest child’s sample tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine.
On June 30, 2020, respondent Becker County Human Services (the county) filed a
CHIPS petition. The district court issued an emergency protective-care order the next day
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continuing the placement of the children in foster care. The district court also determined
that ICWA and MIFPA applied to the proceedings because the two oldest children were
eligible for enrollment as members of the White Earth Nation.
The county social worker, the guardian ad litem (GAL), and a representative from
the White Earth Nation met with mother on July 30 to develop an out -of-home placement
plan. Mother participated in the meeting, but said that she would not sign the plan until
she had the chance to speak with her attorney. The social worker later asked mother several
times if she had reviewed the case plan with her attorney and was ready to sign it, but
mother was “not ever able to give [her] a straight answer.” The county ultimately submitted
the case plan to the district court for approval with out mother’s signature. Mother never
objected to the case plan and the district court approved the plan on August 27, 2020.
The primary goals identified in the case plan were for mother to address her
chemical-dependency and mental -health issues. The p lan required mother to complete a
chemical-use assessment and follow recommendations, comply with testing for substances,
complete a parenting -capacity evaluation, attend scheduled visits with the children,
demonstrate financial and education al support for the children, cooperate with the social
worker, and remain law-abiding.
Mother completed a chemical-use assessment on July 22, 2020, but was dissatisfied
with the recommendation for inpatient treatment and requested the opportunity to seek a
second opinion. The county permitted mother to seek a second opinion, which she did not
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obtain until October 1, 2020. 1 The second assessment similarly recommended inpatient
treatment because mother tested positive for methamphetamine at the assessment. Mother
attended an intake appointment later that month, but the treatment facility determined that
she was not an appro priate candidate for inpatient treatment because she tested negative
for methamphetamine at the intake and self -reported that she last took methamphetamine
in August 2020.2 Mother ultimately started outpatient treatment on December 15, 2020 .
Mother comp leted a parenting -capacity assessment, and the evaluator
recommended against reunification. The evaluation indicates that mother showed an
adequate functioning in just one out of 17 positive parenting factors, and that the evaluator
did not recommend reun ification “due to serious safety concerns.” The evaluation lists
mother’s “drug addiction, lack of functional stability, personality disorder, and mental
health issues” as factors that contributed to her “neglectful parenting.” When the evaluator
met with mother to go over the recommendation, mother became so angry that the evaluator
abruptly ended the meeting. The court record also shows that mother failed to attend four
consecutive visits with the children in November 2020, and one in December.

1 Mother claims that the delay was the county’s fault . She maintains that she objected to
having the county provide collateral input to the evaluator for the second dependency
assessment. She points to the county’s refusal to accede to her objection as the cause of
her delay in scheduling. Mother conceded at trial, however, that “the process requires
collateral input from the agency,” in this case, the county.

2 Mother refused to submit to drug testing by the county between August and November
2020. Mother ’s next drug test was on November 12, 2020 , and was conducted at the
visitation center’s request after mother failed to attend several visits with her children. The
test was positive for methamphetamine.
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The county petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights. The petition alleged
three statutory bases for termination: that mother was palpably unfit to parent, that
reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that led to the children’s out -of-home
placement, and that the children were neglected and in foster care. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), (5), (8) (2020). In January and February 2021, the district court
held a three-day TPR trial. The district court heard testimony from mother, th e social
worker, a qualified -expert witness 3 representing the White Earth Nation, the GAL, the
social worker involved in mother’s 2011-13 child-protection matter, and the evaluator who
completed the parenting -capacity assessment. All the witnesses, except mother, testified
in support of termination of mother’s parental rights.
On March 8, 2021, the district court issued an order terminating mother’s parental
rights.4 The district court determined that the county had made active efforts to reunify the
family, that the county had proven all three alleged statutory grounds for termination
beyond a reasonable doubt , and that termination was in the children’s best interests .
Mother now appeals.

3 A qualified-expert witness is “an individual who (1) has specific knowledge of the Indian
child’s tribe’s culture and customs . . . and (2) provides testimony as required by the Indian
Child Welfare Act . . . regarding out -of-home placement or termination of parental rights
relating to an Indian child.” Minn. Stat. § 260.755, subd. 17a (2020) ; see also 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.122(a) (2020).

4 The district court also terminated the parental rights of both fathers. The fathers did not
respond or participate in the district court proceeding, and their parental rights are not at
issue on appeal.
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DECISION
Mother asserts two arguments in this appeal. First, she argues that the district court
abused its discretion in determining that the county proved a statutory ground for
termination because she maintains that she was making substantial progress on her cas e
plan and that any delays were the fault of the county, not her. Second, she challenges the
district court’s determination that active efforts were made to reunify the family.
On appeal from a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, thi s court
reviews “the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we
review its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily
terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child .
of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of
M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). “The child’s best interests, however, remain
the paramount consideration in every termination case.” Id.
Generally, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that a
statutory ground exists for terminating parental rights. In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d
886, 893 (Minn. 1996). But TPR cases involving Indian children , as defined in ICWA or
MIFPA, involve a heightened evidentiary standard and require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 5 See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2018); Minn. Stat. § 260.771, subd. 6 (2020). In addition,

5 The youngest child is not an Indian child. The district court’s order states that the
determination was made at the Emergency Protective Care hearing that ICWA would apply
to the youngest child, and during trial mother’s attorney suggested that this determination
was made “just due to family dynamics.” Documentation submitted by the White Earth
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petitioners must prove that “active efforts,” not just reasonable efforts, have been made to
reunify the family. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2018); Minn. Stat. § 260.762, subd. 3 (2020).
We address both of mother’s arguments in turn below.
A. Statutory Ground for Termination
On appeal, we will affirm a district court’s termination of parental rights if at least
one statutory ground for termination is supported by the record. In re Welfare of Child. of
R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). Here, the district court determined that the county
proved three statutory grounds for termination beyond a reasonable doubt: mother was
palpably unfit to parent, reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that led to out-
of-home placemen t, and the children were neglected and in foster care. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), (5), (8).
Mother does not separately address each ground, but generally asserts that the
district court erred because it ignored “substantial evidence that [mother] was engaged in
and making significant progress on her case plan.” On appeal, however, we must analyze
mother’s claims in the context of the specific statutory grounds for termination. Because
it appears most closely aligned with mother’s challenge, we will turn first to an analysis of
the second statutory ground found by the district court —that reasonable efforts failed to
correct the conditions that led to out-of-home placement.

Nation and testimony from the qualified-expert witness indicate that ICWA does not apply
to the youngest child, but neither party challenged the district court’s determination . The
district court’s application of ICWA to the youngest child thus appears to be in error, but
the error appears to be harmless because ICWA requires a heightened standard of proof for
termination of parental rights.
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A district court may terminate parental rights if “following the child ’s placement
out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct
the conditions leading to the child ’s placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
Mother argues that the district court “did not properly terminate” her parental rights
because she “actively participated in and substantially complied with the court ordered case
plan.” We are not persuaded .
The children were placed out of home following mother’s arrest for driving while
impaired and the resulting concerns over her methamphetamine use. The primary goal of
the case plan was for mother to address her methamphetamine addiction. To facilitate this
goal, the plan required mother to obtain a chemical -use assessment and follow all
recommendations, submit to drug testing, and cooperate with the county social worker .
The evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that mother failed to satisfy th ese
basic plan requirements in a ti mely manner and thus failed to correct the conditions that
caused the children to be placed out of home.
Mother completed a chemical -use assessment in July 2020 , but objected to the
recommendation that she attend inpatient treatment. Despite her long history of
methamphetamine addiction, treatment and relapses, she wanted outpatient treatment. The
county permitted her to get a second opinion, but she waited over two months to sc hedule
it. She seeks to explain this delay by arguing that she was at a “stalemate” with the county
because she did not wish to use the social worker as the source of collateral in put for the
assessment. Mother acknowledged at the TPR trial, however, that “the process requires
collateral input from the agency.”
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After the second chemical -use assessment similarly recommended inpatient
treatment, mother finally attended an intake meeting on October 27, 2020 , three months
after her children were first remov ed from her care . The treatment center determined that
mother was not a candidate for inpatient treatment based on mother’s self -report that she
last used methamphetamine in August 2020 and the fact that the drug test administered on
the date of the intak e meeting was negative. But mother’s allegation that she last used
methamphetamine in August 2020 ignores a positive test for methamphetamine from
earlier in October. Mother claimed that the positive result was caused by a medication she
was taking, but the toxicology lab informed the social worker that the result was not due to
medication. At the TPR trial mother again claimed that the positive result was caused by
medication, but the district court found that mother’s testimony was not credible .
Moreover, despite testing negative at the October 27 intake meeting, mother tested positive
for methamphetamine on November 12 when the visitation center required mother to
submit to a drug test after mother missed four consecutive visits with her children with out
providing notice.
Mother did not begin outpatient treatment until December 15, 2020, almost six
months after her children were removed. Mother lays the blame for her late start in
treatment on the county’s actions in declining her initial request for outpatient treatment.
The court -approved case plan, however, required mother to complete a chemical -use
assessment and “follow all recommendations.” Mother had not one, but two assessments
and both recommended inpatient treatment. Moreover, the district court specifically noted
in its order that mother had been employed as a child -protection social worker with
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Hubbard County for ten years and was familiar with how to access treatment. Mother thus
could have started outpatient treatment on her own if she thought this was the best option
for her, particularly when getting her addiction under control was the single most
significant part of her case plan. I nstead, mother delayed the start of any treatment for
months. The court commented that mo ther
has special knowledge and insight into services available to
parents in child protection matters and how to access those
services that other parents in child protection matters do not
have. . . . Despite this awareness [mother] has failed to use her
knowledge to better herself and has continued to suffer from
chronic chemical dependency and neglect her mental health
which negatively impacts the Children and their safety.

Mother claims that, despite the late start, she was complying with the case pla n
because she had “ substantially completed” treatment by the time of trial. This assertion,
however, is not supported by the record. A letter from a counselor at the outpatient
treatment center states that mother had attended only seven of 27 sessions as of January
26, 2021, the day before the start of the trial . Mother missed some treatment sessions due
to medical issues, which absences were excused. Nevertheless, completing fewer than a
third of the required number of sessions over a seven-month period cannot be characterized
as “substantial completion.”
Mother’s argument that she substantially complied with her case plan also ignores
the fact that she refused to participate in random drug testing by the county for nearly four
months and only resumed drug testing in December 2020 . H er refusal to cooperate with
drug testing prevented the county from monitoring mother’s methamphetamine use —the
primary reason the children were removed from her care.
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Mother’s excuse for her refusal to submit to county drug testing is that she believed
the county was tampering with or influencing her drug test results. She had had a number
of positive tests before she stopped submitting to the drug tests . The district court noted
that mother presented no evidence to support her claims of tampering and interference and
discounted them as not credible.
Finally, mother’s claim that she fully complied with the case plan for visitation with
her children is also contrary to the record. M other missed four s traight visitations in
November 2020 and one in December without notifying the visitation center. And while
mother did complete a parenting -capacity assessment, she became so angry and hostile
when the evaluator tried to go over the evaluation that the me eting had to end.
In sum, mother fails to show that the district court clearly erred in finding that
mother had not substantially complied with her case plan. Mother, in fact, had not fully
satisfied any of the treatment and programming requirements in the case plan by the time
of trial. And the very same concerns about the children’s safety and well-being that existed
at the start of the current case were still present at the time of trial. Indeed, except for
mother, everyone who testified at the trial —the social worker s, the GAL, the parent
capacity evaluator, and the qualified-expert witness for the White Earth Nation—agreed
that mother’s parental rights should be terminated.
On this record, we conclud e that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that led to out -of-home
placement. Because the record supports this statutory ground for termination, we need not
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address the district court’s determinations that mother was palpably unfit to parent and that
the children are neglected and in foster care.
B. Active Efforts
Mother’s second argument is that the record fails to support the district court’s
conclusion that the county engaged in “active efforts” to reunify the family. In support of
her argument, m other c laims that the county unilaterally imposed the case plan on her
without her engagement, “demanded inpatient treatment when [she] felt it was
unnecessary,” did not provide her with the opportunity to wear a drug patch to monitor her
sobriety rather than require drug testing, and did not provide her adequate time to complete
the recommendations of the parenting -capacity assessment because the evaluator did not
go over the requirements of the assessment until three weeks before trial.
The district court m ay not make a permanent -placement decision about the child
“unless the court finds that the local social services agency made active effor ts . . . for
purposes of . . . permanency,” including “findings regarding whether . . . the local social
services agency made appropriate and meaningful services available to the family based
upon that family’s specific needs.” Minn. Stat. § 260.762, subd. 3 (2020); see 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(d). Under Minnesota law, “active efforts” means
a rigorous and concerted level of effort that is ongoing
throughout the involvement of the local social services agency
to continuously involve the Indian child’s tribe and that uses
the prevailing social and cultural values, conditions, and way
of life of the Indian child’s tribe to preserve the Indian child’s
family and prevent placement of an Indian child and, if
placement occurs, to return the Indian child to the child’s
family at the earliest possible time. Active efforts sets a higher
standard than reasonable efforts to preserve the family, prevent
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breakup of the family, and reunify the family, according to
section 260.762.

Minn. Stat. § 260.755, subd. 1a; see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2020) (defining “active efforts”
under ICWA).
As to mother’s argument about the development of the case plan, the record supports
that mother was in fact present and participated in the meeting with the social worker and
a representative of the White Earth Nation when the plan was developed. At the end of
that meeting, mother requested time to speak with her attorney before signing the plan ,
which request was granted. The county then followed up with her several times to see if
she had consulted with her attorney and was ready to sign the plan , but mother avoided a
clear answer. The plan was eventually approved by the court with no objections to the plan
ever being made by mother. Thus, mother participated in the development of the proposed
case plan, was given the opportunity to consult her attorney, and could have raised
objections to the plan when the plan was pending before the court for approval, but chose
not to do that.
Mother’s contention that the county fai led to make “active efforts” by demanding
inpatient treatment also conflicts with the record. As noted above, t he case plan did not
state that mother was required to attend inpatient treatment , it stated only that mother was
to complete a chemical -use ass essment and follow all recommendations. Mother has a
long and documented history of methamphetamine addiction, including relapse s following
treatment. It was not unreasonable for the county to require her to complete a chemical -
use assessment, rather tha n abiding by mother’s own assessment of her treatment needs .
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Moreover, the recommendation for i npatient treatment was not an arbitrary dictate of the
county, but the recommendation of two independent assessors.
Concerning mother’s argument that she was being denied the opportunity to wear a
drug patch instead of drug testing, the social worker testified at the TPR trial that the county
did not currently have the ability to offer that service. It was therefore not unreason able
for the county to instead require mother to submit to drug testing , despite mother’s
preference for wearing a drug patch to monitor her sobriety .
Finally, the record shows that the short time mother had between receipt of the
recommendations from th e parenting-capacity assessment and the TPR trial was the result
of mother’s failure to timely obtain the assessment. Mother did not complete the clinical
interviews for the parenting-capacity assessment until October and , when the evaluator met
with mother to go over the evaluation , mother became so angry that the evaluator had to
end the meeting early. This court has held that if a parent “has refused to participate in the
proceeding in a timely fashion and has placed unreasonable restrictions on [her] receipt of
appropriate services offered by the petitioner, the parent cannot successfully assert that the
petitioner has failed to make . . . active efforts ” to reunify the family. In re Welfare of
Child. of J.B., 698 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Minn. App. 2005).
The county made appropriate and meaningful services available to mother , but she
failed to timely access those services and cooperate with the county and other providers to
achieve the goals of the case plan. On this record, we discern no abuse o f discretion in the
district court’s determination that the county made active efforts to reunify the family.
Affirmed.