In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. S. S. and D. M. P., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0412

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
J. S. S. and D. M. P., Parents.

Filed October 25, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-JV-20-1820

Anne M. Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant-
father D.M.P.)

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Kathleen Schur, Assistant County Attorney,
Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Otter Tail County Department of Human Services)

Janice Amundson, Dalton, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presid ing Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
On appeal from an order terminating pare ntal rights to his child, appellant-father
D.M.P. argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by de termining that three
statutory grounds to terminate parental rights existed, that reasonable efforts had been made
to reunite him and child, and that termination was in child’s best interests. We affirm.
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FACTS
Father and mother, J.S.S., are the parents of A.S.B., a child born in 2014. Following
a multi-day court trial in 2021, the district court terminated both parents’ parental rights to
child. Mother, who failed to ap pear at the trial and was fou nd to be in default, does not
participate in this appeal.
In 2017, Swift County Hu man Services filed a petition alleging that child was in
need of protection or services. The petition noted that mother had “an extensive child
protection history regarding drug use and abandonment issues,” that mother had her rights
to three previous children involuntarily terminated, and that intrauterine drug exposure had
been a “significant condition” involved in the death of one of her children. While father’s
own history of illegal drug use was noted by the district court throughout the Swift County
proceedings, the court ultimat ely concluded that father could provide a “stable and
satisfactory environment” for child, and sole legal and physical custody of child was
transferred to father on January 12, 2018, af ter 170 days of out-of-home placement. The
district court’s order transferring custody to father explicitly prohibited him from returning
child to mother’s care without court approval.
Child protection again became involved with child after the evening of February 16,
2020, when Pelican Rapids police responded to a report that two small children were
outside, alone, and inappropriately dressed for the cold winter weather. One of the children
was later identified as child; the second child was a cousin. Both children were without
coats, and the cousin was wearing ill-fitting adult male shoes. Further investigation
revealed that the children had been at mother’s apartment in Pelican Rapids and that they
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left the apartment unattended. The officers re turned the children to the residence, where
they found mother and mother’s sister. One officer desc ribed the apartment as dirty and
unkempt. And child informed the officer that she slept on the wooden slats of a bed, with
no mattress. Mother’s sister was later iden tified as a convicted predatory offender who
was not to have contact with children; she wa s later arrested for fa iling to comply with
predatory-offender registration requirements. Although mother told the officers that father
did not live in the apartment, officers observed signs that a male was staying there,
including a man’s clothing.
Respondent Otter Tail County Human Services (the county) began its involvement
in this matter shortly after this incident. A child-protection investigator visited mother’s
apartment on February 19, 2020. Child was no longer there, however. The only person at
the residence—child’s uncle—told the investigat or that child had been taken to the Twin
Cities.
1 The investigator could not find child until the following day, at which point child
was removed from the parents’ custody and placed in the em ergency care of the county
pending location of an appropriate foster-care placement. After child was removed, a hair
follicle test showed that she had been exposed to cocaine.
An Emergency Protective Care (EPC) hear ing was held on February 21, 2020, at
which father admitted that he and mother had gotten married in 2019—after sole custody
of child had been transferred to father. Fath er stated that he was not living with mother,
but he was unable to provide an independ ent address. Mother, who attended the EPC

1 Child protection was also seeking to remove child’s cousin from his mother’s custody,
although this was done in a separate child-protection matter unrelated to this one.
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hearing, provided an address that was later found to “not exist.” The district court granted
the county’s requests to place child in protective care and to temporarily transfer custody
to the county.
The county provided father with a reunification case plan requiring him to, among
other things, “submit to random and ongoing drug tests,” remain in contact with the child-
protection agency, and undergo a parent al capacity evaluation and follow the
recommendations of that evaluation. Father showed some initial compliance with his case
plan, including attending parenting classes and a drug treatment program, as well as
maintaining some contact with his caseworke r. However, child-prot ection workers were
concerned about father’s marginal parenting abilities, failure to complete a requested hair
follicle test, failure to obtai n stable housing or employme nt, and failure to maintain
consistent contact with the ag ency. They were most concer ned about father’s refusal to
discuss his relationship with mother and in ability to commit to ke eping child safe from
mother, whose myriad problems endangered child’s welfare.
The county moved to termin ate father’s parental right s to child based on these
concerns. When the termination petition was f iled, then five-year-o ld child had already
been in out-of-home placement for over 330 days in the Swift County and Otter Tail
County matters. 2 Ultimately, and after a cumulative total of 499 days of out-of-home
placement, a three-day court trial was held on the county’s petition. The district court heard

2 The district court, in its order terminating parental rights, took judicial notice of the Swift
County case involving parents and child, during which child was in out-of-home placement
for a total of 170 days.
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testimony from multiple witnesses, including father. After the trial, the district court issued
a written order granting the county’s petition an d terminating father’s parental rights to
child. According to the order, father, who indicated for the first time at trial that he would
not allow mother to have contact with child, was not a credible witness. The district court
concluded that termination was justified under three separate statutory bases, that the
county had made reasonable effo rts at reunification, and that termination was in the best
interests of child.
Father appeals.
DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s order terminating his parental rights. Parental
rights should only be terminated “for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of H.G.B.,
306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981). Here, the district court concluded that three statutory
bases supported termination of fa ther’s parental rights: (1) that father had “refused or
neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon [him] by the parent and child
relationship,” (2) that “reasonable efforts” had “failed to correct the conditions leading to
the child’s placement,” and (3) that child was “n eglected and in foster care.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (5), (8) (2020).
Generally, an appellate court will affirm th e district court’s termination of parental
rights when (1) “at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and
convincing evidence,” (2) “the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family,”
and (3) “termination is in the best interests of the child.” In re Welfare of Children of
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008); see Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (listing
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statutory grounds for the involuntary termina tion of parental rights); .317, subd. 1 (2020)
(requiring clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground to terminate parental rights);
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a) (stating that the st andard of proof in juvenile
protection proceedings not involving an Indian child is clear and convincing evidence). On
appeal from a district court’s termination of parental rights, appellate courts “closely
inquire into the suffi ciency of the evidence to de termine whether it was clear and
convincing,” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385, and “[c]onsiderable deference is due to the district
court’s decision because a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of
witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Mi nn. 1996). Additionally,
appellate courts review the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear
error but review for an abuse of discretion th e district court’s determination of whether
those underlying or basic facts show the ex istence of a particular statutory basis to
terminate parental rights. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 899-901
(Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in concludi ng that clear and
convincing evidence established at le ast one statutory basis to terminate
father’s parental rights.

Father argues that the reco rd does not support the factual findings underlying the
district court’s determinations that father fa iled to satisfy the duties of the parent-child
relationship, that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to child’s out-
of-home placement, and that child is neglected and in foster care. Thus, father contends,
the district court abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights on these grounds.
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The supreme court recently di scussed the clear-error standard that appellate courts
use to review a district court’s findings of fact:
In applying the clear-error standard, [appellate courts] view the
evidence in a light favorable to the findings. [Appellate courts]
will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the
entire evidence, [they] are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.

In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations and citations
omitted).3 An appellate court must “fully and fairly consider the evidence, but so far only
as is necessary to determin e [whether that evidence] reasonably tends to support the
findings of the factfinder.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). And “[w]hen the record
reasonably supports the findings at issue on appe al, it is immaterial th at the record might
also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Under Minnesota law, a statutory basis to terminate parental rights exists when
“reasonable efforts . . . have failed to corr ect the conditions leading to the child’s
placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). Here, the condition that led to child’s
out-of-home placement was father’s decision to allow child to live w ith mother despite a
court order prohibiting him from returning child to mother’s permanent care without court
approval. The district court concluded that despite the county’s efforts, there remained

3 In Kenney, which is a civil-commitment case, the supreme court prefaced its discussion
with the observation that “[t]he clear-error standard of review is familiar because it applies
across many contexts.” 963 N.W.2d at 221. We therefore presume that Kenney’s
discussion of the clear-error standard of review is not limited to the commitment context.
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substantial concern that father would return child to mother’s care. Specifically, the district
court stated,
[Father] was given opportunities to comply with the case plan
and to demonstrate that he coul d keep [child] safe. However,
at this point in the proceedings , the Court still has significant
concerns that [father] would al low [mother] contact with the
child. The Court also finds concerning that [father] was never
able to provide his current address or living situation and could
not offer a solid plan or explanation for where the child would
be living if returned to his care.

Father first argues that the county never cl early communicated to him that contact
between mother and child was not allowed. He notes that the case plan did not explicitly
ban contact. Thus, father contends, he was never given the opportun ity to correct this
condition, and the district court clearly erred in concluding otherwise.
We initially observe that the case plan is not the sole source of a parent’s obligations
during a permanency proceeding. “The critical issue is not whether the parent formally
complied with the case plan, but rather whether the parent is presently able to assume the
responsibilities of caring for the child.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76,
89 (Minn. App. 2012)
We also reject father’s assertion that he was never told about restrictions on contact
between child and mother. There is no ambiguity in the record about the issue of contact
with mother. The case plan expressly prohi bited mother from having any contact with
child outside of a supervised setting: “all visits must be supervised by the agency, parenting
time center or an individual or agency deemed appropriate by [the county].” Beyond the
case plan, the trial record reflects that father was repeatedly counseled that allowing child
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to have contact with mother was detrimental to child. Father’s caseworker tried to impress
upon him the importance of keeping child safe from mother, but father became emotional
and refused to discuss the issue. More over, the parenting assessment recommended
reunification only if father a ccepted that contact with mother was not in child’s best
interests. Indeed, the major recommendation of the parenting assessment was that father
“commit to no contact between [child] and . . . mother.” And the case plan specifically
ordered father to comply with the recommenda tions of the parenting assessment. Given
these facts in the record, the district court did not clearly err in finding that contact between
child and mother remained a significant concern, and that the county’s efforts did not
mitigate this concern.
Father also argues that the record does not support the di strict court’s finding that
the county “attempted to remedy the issues the court finds uncorrected.” We again disagree
with father.
The first item in father’s case plan was that father “need[s] to ensure that he is not
residing with [mother].” To that end, father was offered assistance in locating independent
housing and employment. As noted, the record also shows that father was given a parenting
assessment that directly addressed the importance of keeping child safe from mother. And
father was provided with multip le ancillary services that complemented the efforts
specifically targeted at keeping child safe from mother. Those services included chemical-
dependency services, a family resource work er, parental education, and supervised
visitation. The district cour t therefore did not clearly err in finding that the county made
reasonable efforts to correct the condition leading to child’s placement.
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Father further contends that the district court failed to consider and credit his trial
testimony acknowledging the importance of ke eping child safe from mother. At trial,
father testified that he unders tood that having no contact with mother was in child’s best
interests. He also testified that he would not allow mother to have contact with child going
forward. However, the district court found father’s testimony to be not credible. And the
district court found the testimony of father’s caseworker, the guardian ad litem (GAL), and
the parenting assessor—all of whom expr essed concern about father’s ability and
willingness to prevent contac t between child and mother and avoid othe r behaviors
dangerous to child—to be credib le. We must defer to a dist rict court’s determination of
credibility, L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d at 396, and do so here.
Finally, father argues that the record fails to support the district court’s finding that
he “substantially failed to comply” with his case plan. We again note that the salient issue
is not compliance with a case pl an but whether a parent is “p resently able to assume the
responsibilities of caring for the child.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 89. But we also disagree
with father’s contention that the record do es not support the district court’s finding
regarding his compliance with th e case plan. The record reve als that father did comply
with some aspects of his case plan and made some efforts to address the county’s concerns.
He took and completed parenting classes, attended chemical-dependency treatment in the
Twin Cities, and maintained contact (albeit sporadic) with his caseworker. Child’s GAL
testified that the supervised visits that di d occur went well, and that father and child
appeared to have a loving relationship.
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But the record also shows that father did not address the primary concern in his case
plan—keeping child safe from mother—which supports the district court’s conclusion that
there were “significant concerns that [father] would allow [mother] contact with the child.”
Father’s caseworker stated that the threat of contact between father, mother, and child was
“one of the biggest issues” in this case. The caseworker test ified that when he attempted
to discuss the importance of avoiding contact between child and mother, father was unable
to have productive conversations on this topic. When the caseworker raised the subject of
mother, father would become emotional and “heated.” The parenting assessor made a
similar observation, stating that father’s “commitment to prohib iting contact between
[child] and . . . mother appears low and this increases risk to the child.” And the GAL
testified about similar concerns. According to the GAL, father consistently stated that he
wanted mother to be part of the family. The GAL testified that she did not know whether
father knew contact with mother was bad for child.
Additionally, the record supports the dist rict court’s findings regarding father’s
general resistance to the county’s efforts to assist the family . Father did maintain some
contact with the county, but this contact was inconsistent. Given father’s own history of
drug use, one requirement of father’s case plan was that he “submit to random and ongoing
drug testing.” As part of this requirement , the county asked father to complete a hair
follicle test, which would more accurately de tect controlled-substa nce use. However,
father never completed the required hair follic le test, and he was unable to provide any
explanation for this failure. Father’s resistance to the hair follicle test led the caseworker
to believe that father’s drug use—another basis for child’s out- of-home placement—had
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not been adequately addressed. Finally, while father did complete the parenting
assessment, as required, he refused to allow his caseworker to attend and participate in the
last session of the assessment, which is a customary component of the assessment.
The record before the district court am ply supports the findi ng that father was
substantially noncompliant with his case plan. Thus, this finding is not clearly erroneous.4
The district court’s findings of fact s upporting its determination that reasonable
efforts had failed to correct the conditions le ading to child’s out-o f-home placement are
not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the dist rict court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that this statutory basis for term ination—that “reasonable efforts” had “failed
to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement,” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(5)—existed in this case. Because we conc lude that termination was justified on this
basis, we do not address the district court’s conclusions regarding the two alternative bases.
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1( b) (requiring only “one or more” statutory basis for
termination to justify termination of parental rights).
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in determining that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.

Before terminating parental rights, a distri ct court must also find that there were
reasonable efforts made to reunify the child and the parent. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.

4 Among father’s challenges to the district c ourt’s factual findings, he argues that the
district court clearly erred in finding that services offered in Swift County failed to correct
“ongoing chemical dependency issues, neglect of the child(ren) and abandonment.” He
agrees that this finding may be accurate as to mother. But because he was granted physical
and legal custody in the Swif t County proceedings, he argues that the district court’s
finding is clearly erroneous as to him. We conclude that the challenged finding concerned
mother and not father, and therefore it is not clearly erroneous.
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8 (2020). In determining wh ether reasonable efforts were made, the district court was
required to consider whether the efforts were “(1) relevant to the safety and protection of
the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). “Reasonable efforts” must “go beyond
mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children
of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 28, 2007). However, “the nature of the services which constitute reasonable efforts
depends on the problem presented.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656,
664 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitte d). We review a district court’s determination that a
county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family for an abuse of discretion. In re
Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d 315, 3 23 (Minn. App. 2015) rev. denied (Minn.
July 20, 2015).
As noted, the county made numerous effo rts to facilitate reunification here. The
county developed a case plan designed to help father understand the steps that he needed
to take to be reunited with ch ild. To assist father in comp lying with the case plan, the
county provided him w ith a resource worker, facilitated chemical-dependency treatment
and parental education, and made available other servic es related to housing and
employment. Father’s caseworker made referra ls in Otter Tail County for other services
such as drug testing, mental-health services, anger management, and supervised visitation.
The county expended significant efforts in identifying an appropriate location for visitation
between father and child.
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Father argues that none of the county’s efforts were directed at addressing the
relationship between father and mother. Th e record does not suppo rt this argument,
however. In fact, the county tailored its e fforts to address the most significant concern
about father’s parenting—his failure to address the serious safety issue presented by
mother. Again, the parenti ng assessment, which was orde red in the case plan and
facilitated by the county, stressed to father the importance of avoiding contact with mother.
Father’s caseworker repeatedly and unambiguously attempted to impress upon father the
gravity of the safety concerns about mother. And father’s caseworker repeatedly and
unsuccessfully attempted to open a dialogue w ith father about moth er’s involvement.
Moreover, the county offered father assistance with housing and employment to help father
find independence from mother.
In its order, the district court identifie d the correct legal standard and noted the
county’s efforts to reunify child and father. Additionally, the district court determined that
the “services provided a meaningful opportunity to address the issues relevant to the foster
care placement.” Given the record and the di strict court’s findings, we see no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s conclusion that the county made reasonable efforts to
reunify child and father.
III. Although the district court did not ex plicitly scrutinize the three statutory
factors for considering child ’s best interests, its findings clearly demonstrate
that it performed the necessary analysis.

A district court may only terminate parental rights if it is in the best interests of the
child. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. In evaluating the best interests of a child, a district court
must consider (1) “the child’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship,” (2) “the
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parent’s interests in preserving the parent -child relationship,” and (3) “any competing
interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). “[D]etermination of a child’s
best interests is generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of a record,
and . . . an appellate court’s combing through the record to determin e best interests is
inappropriate because it involves credibility determinations.” In re Welfare of Child of
D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). We review a district
court’s best-interests determination for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of
J.R.R., 943 N.W.2d 661, 669 (Minn. App. 2020).
Father argues that because the district court failed to expressly address the interests
of child and father in maintaining the parent-child relationship, the district court’s findings
were inadequate requiring reversal of the termination decision. The county agrees that the
district court’s findings are technically defi cient but asks us to remand the case for
additional findings rather than reverse the termination.
Although the district court’s order does not explicitly delineate the interests of child
and father in maintaining a relationship, we disagree that the district court failed to consider
these issues. The district court’s order made clear that both child and father had an interest
in maintaining a relationship. Specifically, the district court found credible the GAL’s
testimony that child and father had a loving re lationship. The district court observed that
visits between child and father had gone well. And the district court noted the testimony
of father’s mother—child’s gr andparent and foster parent—t hat father regularly visited
with child in her home and participated in child’s bedtime routine. Given these factual
findings, the district court implicitly recognized that both child and fa ther had an interest
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in maintaining a relationship. See D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d at 545 (reviewing a district court’s
implicit findings of fact). Nonetheless, the district court determined that “[t]he benefits to
the child that will result by a termination of pa rental rights . . . outweigh the interests of
preserving the parent-child re lationship.” Moreover, the dist rict court found that “the
competing interest of the ch ild’s need for a safe, sober, and stable living environment
supports the termination of parental rights.”
Considering the district court’s order in its entirety, we conclude that the district
court adequately addressed all the factors be aring on whether the termination served the
best interests of child. We therefore see no abuse of discretion.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that clear and
convincing evidence supported at least one statutory basis for termination, that reasonable
efforts were made to reunify father and chil d, and that terminati on was in child’s best
interests.
Affirmed.