E Xiong, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0414

E Xiong, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 22, 2021

Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Scott County District Court
File Nos. 70-CR-19-2527, 70-CR-19-2898

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, John Patrick M onnens, Assistant County
Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Wo rke, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s order denying in part his petition for
postconviction relief. In his postconviction pe tition, appellant sought to withdraw two
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guilty pleas. The district court granted his petition as to one plea but denied his petition as
to the other plea. On appeal, he argues that the district court abused its discretion because
he entered both pleas as part of a global agreement and therefore must be permitted to
withdraw from the entire agreement. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion,
we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2019, respondent State of Mi nnesota charged appellant E Xiong with
giving a false name to a peace officer in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd. 2 (2018),
a gross-misdemeanor offense, and misdem eanor trespass in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(8) (2018). About a week later, the state charged Xiong in a
separate complaint with fel ony fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2018), and gross-misdemeanor introduction
of contraband into a jail in violation of Minn. Stat § 641.165, subd. 2(a) (2018).
In March 2019, Xiong entered guilty pleas in both cases at an omnibus hearing. The
hearing also served as a probation violation hearing for a previous offense.
At the beginning of the hearing, the distri ct court said, “[W]e’re here for a couple
omnibus hearings and a proba tion violation. What are we doing?” Xiong’s attorney
explained:
Your honor, it’s my understanding that on File 19-2527, the
State’s going to amend the charge to 609.506, subdivision 1, a
misdemeanor false name. Mr. Xiong will plead guilty to that;
he’d also plead guilty [to] Count 1 in the File 2898, which is
fifth drug possession; and he will admit being in violation of
his probation on 19203.

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The district court then questioned Xiong’s attorney about the felony
drug-possession charge, probation violation, and misdemeanor false-name charge, in that
order. The district court first asked, “[W]hat is the agreement on the felony?” In response,
Xiong’s attorney said:
Basically, Your Honor, we have an agreement that probation
would be up to five years; th at he would get a chemical use
assessment and follow the reco mmendations; he would have
no use and be subject to testing; there would be a 90-day cap
on jail, which we will argue; and fine would be left to the
Court.

Xiong’s attorney then explained that “on the . . . probation violation, Probation is asking
for that to be changed to a stay of execution, which would be a year and a day, and they’re
asking for 60 days.” Then the district court asked, “And the sentence on the misdemeanor
false info?” Xiong’s attorney responded, “Your Honor, I assume it would be whatever jail
time concurrent.”
Xiong then signed a written plea petition that included both file numbers. On the
line of the petition stating the agreement betw een the parties, only the agreement on the
felony drug-possession charge appeared written out. Xiong then pr ovided a factual basis
for his guilty pleas, and the district court co nvicted him of both offenses and imposed
separate sentences.
In October 2020, Xiong filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw
both guilty pleas. In his pos tconviction petition, Xiong ar gued that his misdemeanor
false-name plea was inaccurate because the reco rd did not show a sufficient factual basis
to support his plea. As a result, he maintain ed that withdrawal of the plea was necessary
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to correct a manifest injustice. With regard to his plea to felo ny drug possession, Xiong
made a different argument. Xiong did not argue the plea was inaccurate, but instead argued
that he should be permitted to withdraw his drug-possession plea because it was part of a
global plea agreement with th e false-name charge, and ther efore the invalidation of the
false-name plea entitled him to withdraw from the entire plea agreement.
Xiong did not file a ny affidavits or other evidence to support his postconviction
petition, nor did he request an evidentiary hearing. Instead, he relied solely on the record
from the plea hearing.
The district court granted in part and denied in part Xiong’s postconviction petition.
Based on the record from the plea hearing, the court determined that Xiong’s misdemeanor
false-name plea was not supported by a suffici ent factual basis and granted his request to
withdraw that plea on the basis that it was inaccurate. But the district court denied Xiong’s
request to withdraw his felony drug-possession plea, concluding that the two pleas were
not part of a global plea deal under which both pleas must either stand or fall together. The
district court found that there was no evidence to suggest that Xiong or the state “entered
[into] their agreements on each file in consider ation of the agreement on the other file.”
Rather, the court found that the “evidence overwhelmingly suggests the agreements were
made independently.” The district court also determined that the pleas were not part of a
global agreement because allowing Xiong to withdraw the misdemeanor false-name plea
would not alter the parties’ bargained-for exchange on the felony drug-possession plea.
Xiong appeals.
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DECISION
Xiong argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied in part his
postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty pl eas after determining that they were not
entered as part of a global plea agreement. We disagree.
We review a district court’s denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of
discretion. Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 671 (Minn. 2020). A district court
does not abuse its discretion when it denies a petition for postconviction relief unless it has
“exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Henderson v. State,
906 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Minn. 2018) (quoting Brown v. State , 863 N.W.2d 781, 786
(Minn. 2015)). When reviewing a denial of a postconviction petiti on, we review legal
issues de novo. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). We limit our review
of factual issues to determining whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support
the postconviction court’s findings. Id.
Xiong contends that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that
his plea agreements were made independently and denied his request to withdraw his
felony drug-possession plea on that ground. He argues that his two pleas were made as
part of a global plea deal and are not severable. As a result, Xiong maintains that the district
court’s decision to invalidate his misdemeanor false-name plea required the district court
to grant his request to withdraw his felony drug-possession plea as well.
Plea agreements represent bargained-for understandings between the state and
defendants in which the parties give up rights and assume risks in exchange for certainty
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about the outcome of criminal proceedings. State v. Meredyk, 754 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn.
App. 2008). When the state and a defendant reach a global plea agreement across several
court files, it may be inappropriate for a court to change only one part of the agreement.
State v. Misquadace , 629 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Minn. App. 2001), aff’d , 644 N.W.2d 65
(Minn. 2002). That is because altering only one portion of a global plea agreement may
allow one party to retain all the benefits of the bargain but avoid some or all of the
consequences that they had agreed to. See id. (remanding for resentencing after sentencing
error on “intricate plea agreement involving many crimes” because “[e]verything was
interrelated” to such an extent that “it w ould be inappropriate . . . to make piecemeal
corrections without regard to the effect of the corrections on the plea bargain”). In
determining whether multiple plea s are interrelated, district courts typically examine the
parties’ intent and whether the o ffenses themselves are related. See Misquadace ,
629 N.W.2d at 491 (considering the par ties’ respective objectives to determine
interrelatedness); State v. Montermini , 819 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Minn. App. 2012)
(concluding that the district court did not err in granting the state’s motion to vacate other
convictions implicated by the plea agreement in a case in volving “several interrelated
alleged offenses”).
As a preliminary matter, the parties disagr ee as to whether the district court’s
determination that the pleas were made inde pendently (and not as part of a global plea
agreement) involves a question of law or fact. We begin our an alysis with that question.
The question is important because it affects the legal standard that we apply to review the
district court’s determination.
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In the context of plea agreements, what the parties agreed to is a factual
determination made by th e district court. State v. Brown , 606 N.W.2d 670, 674
(Minn. 2000). We review factual determinations for clear error. Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at
596. “Issues involving the interpretation a nd enforcement of plea agreements, however,
are issues of law that we review de novo.” Brown, 606 N.W.2d at 674.
Xiong argues that determining whether his pleas were entered independently or as
part of a global agreement is a question of legal interpretation because “what the parties
agreed to is memorialized in the transcript and the plea pe tition, and the facts themselves
are undisputed.” The state argues that determining whether two pleas are part of a global
agreement is a question of fact and that the district court’s finding that there was no global
agreement “cannot be said to be against logic and the facts in the record.”
We conclude that the district court’s determination as to whether the two pleas were
entered as part of a global plea agreement decided a question of fact. Making that
determination required analyzing th e interrelatedness of the pleas. See Misquadace ,
629 N.W.2d at 491. That determination was made by the district court based on the
evidence in the record of the parties’ intent. Although the terms of the individual pleas for
each offense are not disputed, whether the parties intended to enter into a global plea
agreement or not is a separate determination that depends on what the parties agreed to, as
evidenced by the record. And what the parties agreed to is a factual determination. Brown,
606 N.W.2d at 674. Therefore, the district court’s determination th at Xiong entered his
pleas independently is a factual finding , which we review for clear error. Pearson,
891 N.W.2d at 596.
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We next turn to whether the district cour t’s finding is clearly erroneous. Findings
of fact are clearly erroneous when they are “manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supporte d by the evidence as a whole.” In re Commitment of
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 22 1 (Minn. 2021) (quoting Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima ,
372 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn. 1985)). When a pplying the clear error standard, we “view
the evidence in a light favorable to the findings.” Id.
The district court found no evidence to suggest that Xiong or the state entered each
plea agreement “in consideration of the agreement on the other file, or that the agreements
can be considered one ‘interrelated’ agreem ent such that relieving the parties of their
obligations in one has any impact on their expe ctations in the other.” Specifically, the
district court found that the parties treated th e agreements separately. The district court
also noted that the fact that the court heard the cases together and accepted a single plea
petition showed only the parties’ interest in efficiency rather than any expectations
regarding the plea agreements themselves. Th e district court therefore denied Xiong’s
request to withdraw his drug-possession plea even though it concluded that Xiong could
withdraw his false-name plea because “allowing withdrawal of the false-information plea
would not alter the parties ‘bargained-for exchange’ in the possession plea.”
Viewed in a light favorable to the district court’s findings, the evidence as a whole
reasonably supports the district court’s dete rmination that Xiong’s pleas were made
independently. Xiong’s counsel explained the agreements separately at the plea hearing,
addressing the felony plea, pr obation violation, and misdemea nor plea in turn. Xiong’s
pleas were entered separately, and the dist rict court imposed sentences on each file
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separately. While Xiong’s defense counsel referred to “the plea agreement” and “this plea
agreement” when going through Xiong’s waiver of his tr ial rights, neither party said
anything at the plea hearing to expressly indi cate or even suggest that the two pleas were
interrelated or dependent on each other. As Xiong concedes, “there is no explicit language
linking the files.”
The record further shows that the false-name and drug-possession offenses
themselves were not related, and the state had no interest in having the offenses considered
and sentenced “together as part of one ‘packa ge’” out of concern th at invalidating one of
the pleas would fragment the prosecution. See Montermini, 819 N.W.2d at 455. Xiong
similarly would not be denied the benefit of any part of the plea bargain in the felony
drug-possession case if the misdemeanor fals e-name case were reprosecuted. Though
Xiong’s plea agreements included a decision by the state not to charge certain conduct, the
charges that the state agr eed to drop—misdemeanor tr espass and introduction of
contraband into a jail—were no t connected to or dependent on each other. The record
evidence supports the district court’s determina tion that the two pleas were not part of a
global plea deal.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Xiong’ s argument that certain evidence could
support a finding that the parties entered into a global plea agreement. Xiong notes that
the parties discussed both pleas at the sa me hearing and Xiong signed a single plea
agreement. Further, Xiong emphasizes that th e parties did not have a specific agreement
as to his sentence on the misdemeanor false-name offense at the time of the plea hearing.
It was assumed that the senten ce would be concurrent jail time. Xiong maintains these
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facts support his view that the pleas were pa rt of a global plea de al. Xiong’s argument,
however, fails to consider the record as a whol e. In reviewing a finding of fact, we will
not conclude that a district court clearly erred unless “ on the entire evidence , we are left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 221 (emphasis added) (quota tion omitted). As disc ussed above, record
evidence supports the district court’s determin ation that the parties did not enter into a
global plea agreement. And when the reco rd reasonably supports the finding at issue on
appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for a finding
to the contrary. Id. at 222. Accordingly, this argument does not prevail.
Finally, Xiong argues that the question of whether the pleas were part of a global
plea deal is a close one and, on that basis, he contends that the dist rict court should have
construed the plea agreements in his favor. He relies on In re Ashman, 608 N.W.2d 853
(Minn. 2000), to support his argument. In Ashman, the supreme court interpreted the
meaning of a phrase used in a plea agreement. Id. at 858. The supreme court noted that
“plea agreements have been analogized to c ontracts and principles of contract law are
applied to determine their terms.” Id. But the court then went on to state that “in close
cases, plea agreements should be construed to favor [the defendant]” when the terms of the
agreement are ambiguous. Id. Here, the parties do not dispute the terms of a plea
agreement. Rather, they disagr ee as to whether the record factually supports the district
court’s determination that there were mu ltiple independent agreements and not one
interrelated global agreement. As a result, Xiong’s reliance on Ashman is misplaced and
his argument misses the mark.
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In sum, the district court’s finding that Xiong’s pleas were entered independently is
not clearly erroneous. And, because the district court did not clearly err when it found that
Xiong’s pleas were not part of a global plea agreement, the di strict court acted within its
discretion when it denied in part Xiong’s petition for postconviction relief on that basis.
Affirmed.