In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: M. H., Custodial Parent, K. H., Stepparent, and J. B., Mother.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0416

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: M. H., Custodial Parent,
K. H., Stepparent,
and J. B., Mother.

Filed October 18, 2021
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-JV-19-6681

Danielle L. Difiore, Anderson Law Firm, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellants)

Michael D. Schatz, Schatz Law Firm, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s denial of appellants’ private petition to terminate
respondent’s parental rights, appellants argue that ( 1) the record does not support the
district co urt’s determinations that respondent rebutted the presumption that she was a
palpably unfit parent and (2) the district court failed to make adequate findings that denying
appellants’ petition was in the best interests of the child. Because respondent introduced
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether she is palpably unfit and
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because the district court is not required to make best-interests findings absent the existence
of a statutory basis for termination, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellants M.H. and K.H., who are the biological father and stepmother of J.H.H.,
contest the district court’s denial of their private petition to terminate respondent-mother’s
parental rights to J.H.H. Appellants argue that respondent failed to overcome the statutory
presumption of palpable unfitness triggered by the involuntary termination of her parental
rights to her other child and that the district court failed to make findings that denying their
petition was in the child’s best interests.
In July 2019, prior to the commencement of this case, respondent’s parental rights
were involuntarily terminated with respect to her other child because of her mental-health
and chemical-dependency issues. At that time, respondent had the following services in
place: chemical -dependency treatment, Adult Rehabilitative Mental Health Services
(ARMHS) worker, psychiatric treatment and medication management, supervised
parenting time through the Family and Children’s Center, Community of Recovering
Aiding Families in Transition (CRAFT) Program, county-support social worker, probation
officer, mental -health therapist, and alcohol monitoring. Despite participation in these
services, respondent failed to maintain sobriety . Her parental rights were terminated on
the bases that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to out of home
placement and that her other child who was the subject of that petition experienced
egregious harm in respondent’s care.
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In September 2019, appellants petitioned to terminate respondent’s parental rights
to J.H.H. on two statutory grounds: (1) that respondent has “substantially, continuously, or
repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the
parent and child relationship” and (2) that respondent is “palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent and child relationship.” Because respondent’s parental rights to the other child had
been terminated, respondent was p resumed to be a palpably unfit parent to J.H.H. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2020).
The district court held a two-day trial in February 2021. To rebut the presumption
of palpable unfitness, respondent testified and offered the testimony of h er clinical
counselor, ARMHS worker, probation officer, friend and co -sponsor, and her prescribing
nurse practitioner. Collectively, the testimony showed that respondent has made tangible
changes in her life and is in a much better place now than she was at the time of her previous
TPR in 2019.
On March 18, 2021, the district court issued an order denying appellants’ petition
to terminate respondent -mother’s parental rights to J.H.H. The district court found that
respondent’s credible and considerable ev idence rebutted the presumption of palpable
unfitness and that appellants failed to prove by clear-and-convincing evidence the existence
of a statutory ground for termination. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. Respondent overcame the presumption of palpable unfitness.
Appellants argue that respondent failed to overcome the presumption of unfitness
because: (1) she is participating in the same services she participated in during the previous
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TPR; (2) she failed to present objective and verifiable evidence of her sobriety ; and
(3) respondent’s alleged sobriety does not demonstrate that she is capable to be entrusted
with the care of J.H.H. We disagree.
A district court may terminate parental rights if it finds that a parent is “palpably
unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat. §260C.301, subd.
1(b)(4) (2020). A parent is presumed to be palpably unfit if their parental righ ts to a
different child had previously been involuntarily terminated. Id. If the presumption
applies, the presum ptively unfit parent has the burden to produce evidence sufficient “to
support a finding that the parent is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the child[].” In
re Welfare of Child of J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn.
Feb. 26, 2018) (citation omitted). The presumption is “easily rebuttable.” In re Welfare of
Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014). The presumptively unfit parent need
only introduce evidence that creates a genuine issue of fact on the issue of palpable
unfitness. Id. If a parent introduces such evidence, the statutory “presumption is rebutted
and has no further function at the trial.” In re Welfare of J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn.
App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
The petitioning party then bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is , in fact, palpably unfit to parent the child in question . J.A.K.,
907 N.W.2d at 247-48. The district court “shall find the existence or nonexistence of the
alleged palpable unfitness upon all the evidence exactly as if there never had been a
presumption at all.” Id. at 246 (quotation and citation omitted). If the district court finds
the parent to be palpably unfit, it may terminate parental rights only after finding the
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termination to be in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678
N.W.2d 49, 54-55 (Minn. 2004).
This court reviews a district court’s determination as to whether a parent has
rebutted the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness de novo. J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at
246 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the district court’s credibility determinations are due
“considerable deference” as it is in the superior position to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses. In re Welfare of Child of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 733 (Minn. App. 2009).
Appellants argue that respondent’s partici pation in services is insufficient to
overcome the presumptio n because the only services she is currently participating in are
those she participated in when her parental rights to her other child were involuntarily
terminated. Appellants rely on In re Welfare of D.L.D. in support of this argument, where
this court stated, “to rebut a presumption of palpable unfitness, a parent must do more than
engage in services; a parent must demonstrate that his or her parenting abilities have
improved.” 771 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. App. 2009). Appellants claim that respondent’s
failure to participate in services or activities aimed at improving her parenting skills
distinguishes this case from those cited in the district court’s order, where the parent at
issue engaged in supervised parenting time or participated in parenting -skills-focused
programs.
We initially note that D.L.D.’s discussion of the threshold for rebutting the
presumption of palpable unfitness is stale. Specifically, D.L.D., predates the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s statement in R.D.L. that the presumption of palpable unfitness is “easily
rebuttable.” 853 N.W.2d at 134. Since R.D.L., this court has recognized that D.L.D.’s
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discussion of the threshold for rebutting the presumption of palpab le unfitness identifies
an artificially high threshold for doing so. J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 245 n.1. Additionally,
in D.L.D., the presum ptively unfit parents failed to overcome the presumption after they
introduced evidence of their participation in the same services they were engaged in during
their previous TPR. Id. at 544. However, in that case, the parents’ failure to rebut the
presumption was not based solely on the similarity of the services they were engaged in.
Id. Rather, the district court fo und the parents uncooperative because, at the time of the
trial, neither parent had started chemical -dependency treatment, the father had not
completed his court-ordered domestic-abuse counseling, and the parents had not engaged
in couples counseling. Id. at 544-45. Further, the presum ptively unfit mother changed
therapists to present herself in a better light, and the father continued to engage in criminal
behavior. Id. at 543.
The present matter is easily distinguishable from D.L.D. Here, r espondent
completed all recommended chemical-dependency treatment, complied with the conditions
of her probation, and is engaged in individual therapy. Significantly, respondent has
continued to work with the same providers. Her clinical counselor and ARMHS
practitioner testified at both the 2019 TPR and the trial for the current matter. Respondent’s
clinical counselor testified as to the significant improvements respondent has made relative
to her mental -health therapy since the beginning of 2019. Her ARMHS pra ctitioner
testified to noticing a “real shift” in respondent over the past year, noting that respondent
takes the necessary steps for her mental health, is more engaged with her services, and has
developed a healthy support system that she was previously l acking. Respondent
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acknowledged her previous lack of engagement with the services and stated she did not
fully internalize the concepts. Now, respondent testified that she implements the steps of
her 12-step program into her daily life, sponsors three ot her women, and holds AA/NA
meetings at a local church.
Appellants point to the fact that respondent does not participate in any services
aimed at improving her parenting skills and argue that sobriety alone does not demonstrate
she is suitable of being entrusted with the care of J.H.H. However, the services respondent
participates in are directly related to the conditions that made her unfit in the first place —
her chemical -dependency and mental -health issues. Further, the record shows that
respondent was participating in supervised parenting time until appellants discontinued the
visits after the results of the 2019 TPR.
Appellants next challenge respondent’s evidence of sobriety, arguing that
respondent failed to provide any objective and verifiable evidence of sobriety by not
introducing the testimony of her most recent treatment provider. This court defers to the
district court’s determinations of witness credibility and the weight given to the evidence.
S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 733. The district court’s thoughtful order emphasized that much of
respondent’s evidence came from individual providers, professionals, and support persons
in the community. It stated that these witnesses
confirm[ed] [r]espondent’s testimony that she has undergone
significant positive change since the time of the TPR. Each of
them testified in substantially similar terms as to their
independent observations of the manner in which
[r]espondent’s direction in life has altered for the better.

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The district court gave greater weight to these testimonies because the witnesses are
professionals trained to recognize dishonesty and deception and have no reason to lie for
respondent. It further found it unlikely that respon dent “managed to mislead so many
objective professionals as to her trajectory in life” and more likely that “the changes they
see in [r]espondent are, and have been, real.” Additionally, the record shows that
respondent completed all recommended chemical -dependency treatment, is engaged in
aftercare, is dedicated to her recovery and sobriety, and is active in the recovery
community. Further, respondent complied with her probationary conditions, passed all
eight of her UAs, and has abstained from all subst ances since June 2020 and from illegal
drugs since November 2019.
Based on our de novo review, t he evidence presented was sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of fact as to whether respondent is palpably unfit. Because we agree with
the district court’s conclusion that respondent overcame the presumption of palpable
unfitness, the presumption had “no further function at the trial.” J.W., 807 N.W2d at 445.
It then became appellants’ burden to prove by clear -and-convincing evidence that
respondent either “substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to
comply with the duties imposed” by the parent and child relationship or that respondent is
“palpably unfit to be a parent.” Minn. Stat. §260C.301; see J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 247-48.
However, the district court found that appellants failed to meet their burden, and appellants
do not challenge the district court’s conclusion on appeal.

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II. The district court was not required to find that denying appellant’s petition to
terminate respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child.

Appellants argue that the district court erred by failing to make specific findings
that denying their petition is in the child’s best interests.
The “involuntary termination of parental rights is proper only when at least one
statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and the
termination is in the child’s b est interests.” R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137 (citing R.W., 678
N.W.2d at 54-55). While the child’s best interests is a significant factor for consideration,
“it cannot be the sole justification for the termination of parental rights.” In re Welfare of
R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. App. 1992).
Because the district court found that appellants failed to present clear and
convincing evidence of the existence of at least one statutory ground for termination, and
because the termination of parental rights can not be based solely on the best interests of
the child, the district court did not need to find that denying appellants’ petition was in the
best interest of the child. Therefore, the district court did not err by failing to make these
findings.
Affirmed.