Nicholas David Wivinus, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0430

Nicholas David Wivinus,
Appellant,

vs.

Nicole Lynette Nelson Anderson,
Respondent.

Filed December 27, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-14-731

Nicholas D. Wivinus, Coon Rapids, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Julie K. Swedback, Swedback Law, PLLC, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presid ing Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this appeal, appellant-father cha llenges the district court’s order granting
respondent-mother’s motion to modify custody and the district court’s order holding him
in constructive civil contempt. Father argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion
by awarding mother sole legal custody of the parties’ children; (2) violated his civil and
constitutional rights by modifying custody; (3) displayed judicial bias; (4) improperly
2
ordered father to pay for part of the costs of a custody evaluation; and (5) erred by finding
him in constructive civil contempt for failing to pay his child-support obligations. We
affirm.
FACTS
This case centers on a custody dispute be tween appellant Nicholas David Wivinus
(father) and respondent Nico le Lynette Nelson Anderson (m other). The parties never
married and are the parents of two minor children, now ages six and seven.
Background
In 2014, shortly after the first child was born, the parties entered into a stipulation
granting the parties joint legal and joint ph ysical custody of the child, with reasonable
parenting time for each parent. In 2016, not long after the second ch ild was born, father
moved to establish custody and parenting time for the second child and to modify custody
of the first child. The district court adjudicated father to be the second child’s father, and
it modified child support. The district court later ordered the existing custody arrangements
to remain in place, with the parties having joint legal and joint physical custody of the first
child and mother having sole legal and sole physical custody of the second child.
In November 2018, the parties signed a s tipulation for custody and parenting time.
Under the terms of the stipulation, the partie s were given joint physical and joint legal
custody of both children. The parties were also given equal parenting time. The stipulation
provided that, “in the even t of a legal custody disput e, [father] has the final
decision[-]making authority with the understa nding that the Parenting Consultant has the
3
authority to overrule a decision made solely by [father].” Th e district court approved the
stipulation on May 22, 2019.
Motion to Modify Custody
On October 21, 2019, mother filed a motion to modify legal custody. Mother sought
to amend custody based on father’s “gross interference with her parenting time and conduct
that has endangered the child ren’s emotional health and well-being.” She filed an
accompanying affidavit, whic h alleged numerous incident s between May and October
2019 in which father had interfered with mother’s parenting time and undermined her
relationship with the children. The district court determined that mother had alleged a
prima facie case for modification of custody and ordered an evidentiary hearing to be held
on the motion.
The district court ordered a custody ev aluation to be completed before the
evidentiary hearing. The district court’s orde r was silent as to how the parties would pay
for the evaluation. Father filed a “supplemental affidavit for proceeding in forma pauperis
for custody evaluation.” He alleged that th e custody evaluation wa s estimated to cost
$4,500. He further alleged that he lacked the resources to pay half of the cost as requested
by mother. For these reasons, he asked the district court to order the county to pay for his
portion of costs under the in forma pauperis statute, Minn. Stat. § 563.01 (2020). The
district court denied father’s request. The di strict court determined that no provision in
Minn. Stat. § 563.01 authorized the district c ourt to order the county to pay father’s costs
for a custody evaluation. The parties mediated the issue and agreed to divide the costs of
4
the custody evaluation, with mother paying 90% and father paying 10%. The district court
ordered the parties to share the fees in accordance with the agreement.
The custody evaluation was completed in December 2020 an d submitted to the
district court. The evaluati on was based on interviews with the parents, information the
parents provided, information provided by thir d parties, and observations of the parents
and children at home and in public. The ev aluation opined that, while mother supported
father’s relationship with the children, father refused to support mother’s relationship with
the children. It commented th at father’s emails to mother were “arrogant, pompous and
belittling,” and that father “appear[ed] energetic ally disposed to sa botage” the children’s
relationship with mother. The evaluation stat ed that father’s “unwillingness to support a
healthy relationship between the children and [mother] pose[d] a real and serious danger
to the children’s health development.” For these reasons, the evaluation recommended that
mother be granted sole legal custody.
The district court held the evidentiary hearing on mother’s custody-modification
motion. Mother testified that the parties’ stipulated custody agre ement gave the parties
joint legal and joint physical custody, but father acted as though he had sole custody over
all physical and legal custody decisions. Mother explained that, even though the stipulated
agreement said that father had “final decision-making authority,” that term was a misnomer
because the stipulation also provided that if the parties had a disagreement, the parenting
consultant would make the fina l decision. In mother’s view, the parties “stood on equal
footing” for making decisions about the childr en. According to mother, the district court
5
had informed father of this fact, but father continued to act as t hough he could make all
decisions without mother’s input.
Mother detailed multiple ways in which father interfered with her parenting time
between May and October 2019. Father enrolled the children in a summer-school program
and a daycare without mother’s knowledge; he picked the children up during mother’s
parenting time and would not retu rn the children to her until la ter in the day; he removed
mother’s name from the children’s medical provider’s records and canceled appointments;
and he refused to allow mother’s husband to pick up or drop off the children at school.
Mother testified that, when she tried to enroll one child in an after-school program on her
parenting-time days only, father contacted th e program organizers and told them that he
had sole legal custody and that mother coul d not make decisions about the children.
Because of father’s actions, the program suspended the child’s enrollment temporarily until
it could clarify the custody situation.
Mother also testified that the childcar e center that the children were attending
decided to unenroll the children because of father’s “intimidation and threats” towards the
staff at the facility. The district court received into evidence the email from the childcare
center to mother explaining th e decision to dismiss the childre n. The email stated that
father had engaged in “repeated threats and harassment” direct ed at staff at the childcare
center through phone calls, ema ils, and attacks on social medi a. Because of father’s
behavior, the email said, the staff at the center felt uncomfortable and unsafe, and the center
was concerned about the staff’s safety and mental health. The email al so said that father
had told “blatant lies” to the district court about the communications between himself and
6
the center. According to the email, the decision to unen roll the children was “solely due
to the harassment, threats and aggressive domineer[ing]” by father.
Mother further testified about father’s c onduct towards her and the effect of father’s
behavior on the children. According to mother, father made numerous condescending
remarks about her in the presence of the child ren. Mother testified that he practically
encouraged the children to make negative comments about her and her husband, and that
she believed father was trying to manipulate the children to dislike her. Mother also sensed
father’s influence on the children when they came back from spending time with him. She
explained that, when the childre n returned to her care, they were “unruly” and “mean,”
calling her names and making ina ppropriate remarks. Mother did not believe that father
was able to support her relationship with the children.
After the evidentiary hearing, the district court granted mother’s motion to modify
custody in a February 25, 2021 order. The district court found that father had “refused to
cooperate with [mother], and instead attempted to undermine, interfe re with, and negate
her role in the children’s lives at every turn.” Because father had shown a pattern of making
false reports, the district court found that he had “no credibility whatsoever,” and it credited
mother’s testimony instead. 1 The district court determin ed that father’s “outrageous
behavior” endangered the children because, “[ b]y interfering with the children’s medical
care, education, and daycare placement, [fa ther] has jeopardized their physical and

1 The district court also commented that fath er “seems to be incapable of anything other
than an obnoxious, bullying posture toward” mother, and th at, at the evidentiary hearing,
“his inappropriate, belittling tone required the Court to admonish him on the record.”
7
emotional health and development.” For these reasons, the dist rict court determined that
mother had met her burden to show that a cha nge of circumstances had occurred and that
the children were endangered. The district c ourt considered the statutory best-interests
factors and concluded that the factors weighe d in favor of granting mother’s motion.
Accordingly, the district court granted mother sole legal custody of the children.
Contempt Order
While mother’s custody-modification mo tion was pending, she also filed a motion
to hold father in contempt for failure to obey the district court’s orders to pay child support.
On February 12, 2021, the district court issued a contempt order. In the order, the district
court determined that father failed to pay his child-support obligations and therefore was
in constructive civil contempt of the district court’s orders. The district court ordered father
to be conditionally confined for up to 90 days in the county jail but stayed execution of the
confinement for a period of two years subjec t to certain conditions. Those conditions
included that: father pay his monthly child-su pport obligation of $1 81 and at least $37
toward his child-support arrears in February 2021, and that father continue to make those
payments on time for every month afterwards. The order stated that if father complied
with those conditions for the next 24 months, he would be deemed to have purged himself
of the contempt. The order also provided that if father failed to comply with the conditions,
the stay could be vacated and conditional confinement would be imposed.
Father appeals.
8
DECISION
Father challenges both the order modify ing custody and the co ntempt order. He
makes five arguments on appeal, arguing that the district court (1) erred by awarding
mother sole legal custody of the children; (2) violated father’s civil and constitutional rights
when it modified custody; (3) showed judici al bias; (4) erred by ordering him to pay for
part of the costs of the cu stody evaluation; and (5) erred by finding him in constructive
civil contempt. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discre tion by granting mother’s motion to
modify custody and awarding her sole legal custody.

Father first challenges the district cour t’s decision to award mother sole legal
custody of the children. We review a district court’s custody-modification decision for an
abuse of discretion. Sharp v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 26, 2000). Our review is limited to whether the district court made factual
findings not supported by the record or misapplied the law. Pikula v. Pikula ,
374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 19 85). We will sustain the district court’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Factual findings “are cl early erroneous when they
are manifestly contrary to the weight of th e evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted). In reviewing whether a factual finding is clearly erroneous, it is not
our role to reweigh the evidence; rather our role is to review “the record to confirm that
evidence exists to support the decision.” Id. at 222. We also defer to the district court’s
opportunity to assess w itnesses’ credibility. Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210
9
(Minn. 1988). Accordingly, we will not conclude that the di strict court clearly erred in
making a factual finding unless, “on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mist ake has been committed.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221
(quotation omitted).
To modify custody on the basis of child endangerment under Minn.
Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) (2020), the district court must find that four elements are met: “(1) the
circumstances of the children or custodian have changed; (2) modification would serve the
children’s best interests; (3) the children’s present environm ent endangers their physical
health, emotional health, or emotional development; and (4) the benefits of the change
outweigh its detriments with respect to the children.” Crowley v. Meyer, 897 N.W.2d 288,
293 (Minn. 2017) (listing elements for ma king a prima facie case for modification
of custody based on endangerment); see also State ex rel. Gunderson v. Preuss ,
336 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Minn. 1983) (explaining that district court must address all four
factors to modify custody). The party seeki ng modification of custody has the burden to
show that all elements are met. Crowley, 897 N.W.2d at 293. We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discre tion by concluding that mother met her burden on all four
elements.
First, the record supports that the ci rcumstances of the children and parents had
changed since the district court’s May 22, 2019 custody order a pproving the parties’
stipulation.
2 To warrant a modificati on of custody, the change in circumstances must be

2 Father measures the change of circumstances from the district court’s order on August 12,
2019. In that order, the district court denied an earlier motion by mother to modify custody,
10
significant. Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. App. 1997). Mother presented
evidence that father repeated ly interfered with her paren ting time, which impacted the
children’s school and daycare placements. Fa ther changed the children’s summer-school
program and a daycare placement without mother’s knowledge. The children’s
after-school program suspended the children’s enrollment after father told the program that
mother could not make decisions for the ch ildren. And the children’s childcare center
unenrolled the children because father was harassing and threatening the staff. Father’s
hindrance of mother’s parenting time, coupled with the disruption to the children’s school
and daycare, is sufficient to show a significant change in circumstances.
Father nonetheless asserts that mother failed to show a significant change of
circumstances because she merely raised ongoing issues that the district court had already
addressed in previous orders. We disagree. Although the district court’s previous orders
show that the parties faced similar disputes over parenting time in th e past, the evidence
introduced at the hear ing focused on specific incidents that occurred after the district
court’s May 22, 2019 order. Even when parties have faced ongoing conflicts over
parenting time, the district court may find a change of circumstances based on new attempts

determining that mother had not made a prima facie case to modify custody. Mother filed
that modification motion on May 17, 2019, five days before the district court approved the
parties’ stipulation. In its August 12, 2019 order denying the motion, the district court
reasoned that mother failed to demonstrate a change of circumstances since May 22, 2019,
because all her evidence related to circumstances that existed before May 22. For this
reason, we conclude that the district court, when considering mother’s present motion,
properly considered circumstances dating ba ck to May 22, 2019. And, based on the
evidence presented, we believe that mother still would have met her burden if the change
of circumstances were measured from the August 12, 2019 order denying her
custody-modification motion.
11
to interfere with parenting time. This court has “decline[d] to endorse a position that would
encourage custodial parents to in terfere or to continue to in terfere with visitation in an
attempt to prevail in a later custody dispute.” Sharp, 614 N.W.2d at 263. Based on the
substantial evidence showing father’s interference with mother’s parenting time since the
May 22, 2019 order, the district court did not err by determining that mother had shown a
significant change of circumstances.
Second, the record supports that the children’s environment endangered their
physical health, emotional health, or emo tional development. A party must show
“a significant degree of danger” to satisfy the endanger ment element.
Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2 008) (quotation omitted). “The
existence of endangerment must be determined on the particular facts of each case.” Sharp,
614 N.W.2d at 263 (quotation omitted). Bu t the danger may affect only the children’s
emotional development. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d at 778. This court has recognized that “a
sustained course of conduct by one parent designed to diminish a child’s relationship with
the other parent” may c onstitute endangerment. Amarreh v. Amarreh, 918 N.W.2d 228,
231-32 (Minn. App. 2018). In Amarreh, this court held that the father had shown a prima
facie case for endangerment based on allega tions that the mother had substantially
interfered with the father’s relationship with the children. Id. at 232.
Here, the district court heard ample eviden ce showing that father was substantially
interfering with mother’s relati onship with the children. Fa ther repeatedly disregarded
mother’s right to co-parent the children and acted as thoug h he had sole control over
decisions about the children. He interfered with mother’s parenting time and disrupted the
12
children’s school and daycare placements. Fa ther also refused to support the children’s
relationship with mother. He made pejora tive remarks about mother in front of the
children, and he encouraged th e children to make negative statements about her and her
husband. The custody evaluation opined that father’s unwillingness to support the
children’s relationship with mother posed a “real and serious danger” to the children’s
development. This evidence showing father’s attempts to undermine mother’s relationship
with the children adequately supports the dist rict court’s determination that father’s
conduct endangered the children’s emotional health and development.
Additionally, the record supports the di strict court’s determinations on the
remaining two elements to modify custody: that modification serves the children’s best
interests and the benefits of the change in custody outweigh the detriments. Crowley,
897 N.W.2d at 293. The district court made specific findings evaluating the best-interests
factors set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2020), as the district court was required
to do. See Abbott v. Abbott, 481 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Minn. App. 1992) (noting that specific
findings on the best-interests factors are “ab solutely required”). The district court
determined that most factors weighed strongl y in favor of granting mother sole legal
custody. The district court reasoned that father’s interference with the children’s medical
care, education, and daycare, as well as hi s threatening and abusive behavior, negatively
affected the children’s emoti onal health and development. The district court also
determined that mother generally supported the children’s relationship with father, while
father attempted to undermine mother’s role in the children’ s lives, and that the parties’
inability to cooperate with each other was primarily attributab le to father. The record
13
supports the district court’s analysis on th e best-interests factors. And this court
defers heavily to the district c ourt’s weighing of the factors. Maxfield v. Maxfield ,
452 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1990). Given the evidence of father’s sustained interference
with the children’s relationshi p with mother, thes e considerations likewise support the
determination that the benefits to the change in custody outweigh the detriments.
We add that, while joint legal custody is rebuttably presumed to be in the best
interests of a child if it is requested by a party, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9) (2020),
we have previously recognized that joint legal custody is not a preferred arrangement when
the parties are unable to cooperate an d communicate about parenting decisions,
Wopata v. Wopata, 498 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. App. 1993). Given the record developed
at the evidentiary hearing, it would not have been appropriate for the district court to
continue the existing joint-legal-custody arrangement. Based on the evidence, the district
court acted within its discretion in determining that the children’s best interests were better
served by granting sole legal custody to mother. Thus, we conclude that the record supports
the district court’s determination that mother satisfied all four elements to modify custody.
For these same reasons, we reject father’s related argument that the district court
erred by ordering an evidentiary hearing on mother’s custody-modification motion. The
district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a party’s motion to modify custody if the
party makes a prima facie case for modification. Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284. In
determining whether a party has made a prima facie case, the district court looks to the
moving party’s affidavits setting forth facts to support modification, and the district court
must accept the facts in those affidavits as true. Boland v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 182-83
14
(Minn. App. 2011). Here, mother’s affidavit accompanying her modification motion listed
numerous specific allegations of the ways in which father had interfered with mother’s
parenting time and undermined her relationship w ith the children. The allegations in the
affidavit parallel the evidence that mother later presented at the evidentiary hearing. Thus,
we conclude that the allegations in mother’s affidavit were sufficient to establish a prima
facie case. The district court did not err by ordering an evidentiary hearing on mother’s
motion or by awarding mother sole legal cu stody of the children after the evidentiary
hearing.
II. The district court did not violate father’s civil and constitutional rights.

Father also argues that the district cour t’s decision to modify custody violated his
civil and constitutional rights. He maintains that the dist rict court violated both his
due-process rights and his right to parent his children. Neither argument is persuasive.
Father first argues that he was denied hi s due-process rights because he was unable
to confront his accusers. He notes that th e custody evaluators did not appear at the
evidentiary hearing to support the recommendations in the custody evaluation, which the
district court relied on when granting mother’s motion. Father maintains that he was denied
his right “to confront [the custody eval uators’] accusations and cross examine the
testimony they provided as ‘witnesses.’” He appears to refer to the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment of th e United States Constitution. This clause applies only to
criminal prosecutions. Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 42 (20 04). To the extent
that father’s argument is based on some other provision of the Constitution, the argument
is not adequately briefed and is therefore forfeited. See Brodsky v. Brodsky ,
15
733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (providing that this court does not consider issues
that are inadequately briefed).
Father also argues that the district c ourt’s custody-modification decision impinged
on his constitutional right to parent his children. Parents have a fundamental constitutional
right to make decisions abou t the care, custody, and control of their children.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000); SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 820
(Minn. 2007). But this right is not absolute , and the state may intr ude on parental rights
when necessary to protect children’s well-being. SooHoo, 731 N.W.2d at 822 (citing
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
Here, the district court modified legal custody only after it determined that the
endangerment standard was met under Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). Father does not appear to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute, and he argues merely that the district court’s
decision was unconstitutional. Th e district court complied with Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d),
determining that father’s conduct endangered the children and jeopardized their emotional
health and development. The district court adequately ensured that father’s constitutional
right to parent his children was protected by carefully considering the statutory factors and
modifying custody only after concluding that the childre n were endangered under the
existing legal-custody arrangement. The district court did not infringe on father’s parental
rights by awarding sole legal custody to mother.
III. Father’s judicial-bias claim is without merit.

Father also appears to raise a claim of judicial bias. He argues that the district court
“repeatedly displayed bias in its [o]rders and [r]ulings favoring [mother], ignoring the best
16
interest of the children and subjecting [father] to barriers that [mother] was never subjected
to.”
We reject father’s judicial-b ias argument for two reasons. First, father fails to point
to any specific facts in the record showing how the district court was unfairly biased against
him. “An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument
or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be consid ered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith &
Sons Carpet Co. , 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971); see also Braith v. Fischer ,
632 N.W.2d 716, 725 (Minn. App. 2001) (applying Schoepke in a family-law appeal), rev.
denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001). Because it is not apparent on mere inspection how the
district court judge may have been biased against father, this is not a basis for reversal.
Second, to the extent that we can comp rehend father’s argument, he primarily
appears to be dissatisfied with the outcome of the proceedings. Appellate courts presume
that district court judges have di scharged their duties properly. Hannon v. State ,
752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). Adverse rulings by a judge do not, by themselves,
constitute judicial bias. State v. Sailee, 792 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). The fact that the dist rict court rejected father’s arguments and
granted mother sole legal custody of the children does not show that the judge was unfairly
biased against him. The record does not support father’s judicial-bias claim.
17
IV. The district court did not err by ordering father to pay for part of the costs of
the custody evaluation.

Father argues that the district court erre d when it “ordered” him to pay for a portion
of the costs of the custody evaluation. We are not persuaded.
Father’s argument relates to the distri ct court’s order denying his supplemental
application “for proceeding in forma pauperis for custody evaluation.” In that filing, father
requested that the district court order the co unty to pay for his portion of the costs of the
evaluation. The district court denied the request. But, in the challenged order, the district
court did not actually “order” fath er to pay for any portion of the costs of the evaluation.
Instead, the district court determined that there is no provision within the in forma pauperis
statute, Minn. Stat. § 563.01, th at would authorize the district court to require the county
to pay for a custody evaluation. On that basis, the district court denied father’s
supplemental application to proceed in forma pauperis.
We agree with the district court’s legal conclusion. While the in forma pauperis
statute does authorize the payment of cert ain expenses for qualifying low-income
individuals such as witness fees and deposition expenses, the statute does not extend to the
payment of custody evaluation fees. Minn. Stat. § 563.01. The district court therefore did
not err in denying father’s re quest for the county to pay hi s portion of the costs of the
custody evaluation.
V. Father’s challenge to the contempt orde r is not properly before this court
because the contempt order is not a final, appealable order.

Finally, father challenges the district c ourt’s order finding him in constructive civil
contempt. The purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is to secure compliance with an
18
order of the district court. Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn. 1968). Here, the
district court’s contempt order was meant to secure father’s compliance with the district
court’s orders directing him to pay child support.
Mother contends that father’s contempt argument is not properly before this
court because the contempt order is not appe alable. We agree. A contempt order is
nonappealable if it is not a final order, but instead “is a conditional order directing
punishment only if [the] defendant fails to purge himself of his contempt.”
Becker v. Becker, 217 N.W.2d 849, 850 (Minn. 1 974). This court has recognized
this principle on multiple occasions. See, e.g., Rohrman v. Moore, 423 N.W.2d 717, 721
(Minn. App. 1988) (determining that father could not appeal conditional order finding him
in civil contempt for failure to pay his child-support obligations); Time-Share Sys.,
Inc. v. Schmidt, 397 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Minn. App. 1986) (“A contempt order is not
appealable if it is an order which directs consequences only if the defendant fails to purge
himself of his contempt.”).
Father’s appeal is taken from the district court’s February 12, 2021 order. In that
order, the district court found father in co nstructive civil contempt, ordered him to be
conditionally confined, and st ayed execution of the conf inement on the condition that
father purge himself of the contempt by paying his monthly child-support obligations and
arrears each and every month for two years be ginning in February 2021. Because the
district court’s order was conditional and impose d punishment on father only if he failed
19
to purge himself of the contempt, it is a nonappealable order.3 We therefore do not reach
father’s argument challenging the contempt order.
Affirmed.

3 We assume that, if father fa ils to comply with the conditi ons of the contempt order, the
district court will hold a hearing at which it will decide whether to confine father. See
Mahady v. Mahady, 448 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. App. 1989) (explaining that, after district
court has issued contempt order with purge conditions, at a later st age, the obligor is
entitled to a hearing to determine whether he should be confined for failure to comply with
purge conditions).