In re the Marriage of: Bobbi Jean Suhonen, n/k/a Bobbi Jean Lindsay, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0435

In re the Marriage of:
Bobbi Jean Suhonen, n/k/a Bobbi Jean Lindsay, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Robert Thomas Suhonen,
Respondent.

Filed November 8, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-FA-19-252

Misty K. Myers, Groshek Law, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Robert Suhonen, Hibbing, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-wife challenges the district court’s reopening of the stipulated judgment
dissolving the parties’ marriage to address a property-division dispute. We reverse and
remand.

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FACTS
In October 2019, appellant-wife Bobbi J ean Suhonen, n/k/a Bobbi Jean Lindsay,
petitioned to dissolve her marriage to respondent-husband Robert Thomas Suhonen. The
parties reached agreement on all matters, a nd the stipulated judgment was entered on
November 1, 2019. The stip ulated judgment included th e following provisions. “The
parties agree that they will divide their personal property by mutual agreement and [wife]
will be awarded her animals.” “If the parties are unable to divide the property by mutual
agreement, then the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration.”
Following the dissolution, the parties di scussed arrangements for a pet, a dog named
Gus. While the stipulated judgment awarde d wife “her animals,” it did not specifically
address any animal, including Gus. The parties dispute the arrangement regarding Gus.
According to wife, Gus was one of “her animals” awarded to her, and she verbally
agreed to allow husband to “tak e Gus for a temporary trial vi sitation with the thought of
possibly some type of shared arrangement/visitation with Gus.” She claimed that she “set
forth strict guidelines that [husband] would have to follow such as first right of refusal . . .
and that this was a trial period.”
According to husband, he was to be awarded Gus in the dissolution and wife
proposed a “transition period.” He claimed that he picked up Gus in December 2019, and
that all subsequent communications with wife show that Gus is his dog. Husband claimed
that it was not until late August 2020 that wife stated her intention of pi cking up Gus
because he was her dog and husband failed to follow through with the guidelines of the
verbal agreement.
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On September 9, 2020, Gus was returned to wife. On October 9, 2020, husband
moved the district court for an order that wife return Gus. During a hearing, husband
testified that wife adopted Gus before the marri age, but they were in a relationship at the
time, and he reimbursed wife for Gus’s adoption fee. Wife testified that husband paid her
for half of Gus’s adoption fee and agreed th at husband was Gus’s ha lf-owner. But wife
testified that her adoption contract for Gus requires her to relinquish ownership to the
rescue organization if she is unable to care for Gus and prohibits her from transferring
ownership to anyone.
The district court ordered wife to re turn Gus to husband but granted wife
“visitation.” The district court concluded that the evidence showed that “Gus was jointly
owned by the parties” and that “Gus was a family pet, not just the pet of one person or the
other.” Alternatively, the district court concluded that if wife was Gus’s sole owner after
the dissolution, the evidence showed that she gifted Gus to husband and “her ownership of
Gus ended” at that point.
Wife moved for amended findings and a ne w trial, claiming that there was no legal
basis to reopen the stipulated judgment and th at the district court erred by modifying the
property award. Husband requested that the di strict court deny wife’s motion and vacate
the visitation provision. Foll owing a hearing, the district court denied wife’s motion and
granted husband’s motion to vacate the visita tion provision, concluding that “visitation”
was not in Gus’s “best interest” and caused pr oblems between the parties. This appeal
followed.

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DECISION
Wife challenges the district court’s reopeni ng of the stipulated judgment, its failure
to abide by the provisions of the stipulated judgment, and its classification of property.
This court reviews the district court’s ruling on a request to reopen a judgment and decree
for an abuse of discretion. Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1996). A
district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the
evidence, misapplying the law, or rendering a decision that is “against logic and the facts
on record.” Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
Wife first argues that the district cour t reopened the stipulated judgment without
husband satisfying a statutory basis for reopenin g it. “Subject to the right of appeal, a
dissolution judgment and decree is final when entered, unle ss in a timely motion a party
establishes a statutory basis for reope ning the judgment and decree.” Thompson v.
Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. App. 2007).
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2020), prov ides the statutory bases for reopening,
and granting relief from, a judg ment entered under chapter 518. A district court may
reopen a judgment for the following reasons: “( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . . ; (3) fraud . . . misrepresentation, or
other misconduct . . . ; (4) the judgment and decree or order is void; or (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged.” Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. “The sole
relief from the judgment and decree lies in meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat.
§ 518.145, subd. 2.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997) (footnote omitted).
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Wife is correct. The district court did not require husband to establish a basis for
reopening the stipulated judgment. See Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Minn.
App. 2001) (“For the purposes of reopening a dissolution judgment, the moving party bears
the burden of proof.”), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001); see also Knapp v. Knapp , 883
N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn. App. 2016) (stating that moving party must prove statutory basis
by a preponderance of the evidence).
Husband asserted in district court that he did not need to establish a basis for
reopening the stipulated judgment because he did not move to reopen the stipulated
judgment. Rather, husband cl aimed that the stipulated ju dgment awarded wife “her
animals,” and Gus, being his an imal, was not addressed in th e stipulated judgment; thus,
according to husband, the distri ct court did not reopen the s tipulated judgment when it
ordered wife to return Gus. However, the district court ruled that Gus was “jointly owned
by the parties.” As such, the district court determined that Gus was marital property. The
district court reopened the stipulated judgment without considering the statutory bases for
doing so when it made a ruling on the division of property. By doing so, the district court
abused its discretion by misapplying the law. See Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d at 202.
Wife next argues that the district cour t failed to abide by the provisions of the
stipulated judgment. The stipulated judgment addresses the division of personal property
and provides that if the par ties have a property dispute, th e dispute must be submitted to
binding arbitration. The parties have a dis pute regarding the division of property. This
dispute was to be submitted to binding arbitration. Thus, the district court improperly held
a hearing on the disputed issu e. Based on the stipulated judgment and the parties’ post-
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dissolution dispute regarding personal prop erty, the district court erroneously
circumvented the arbitration provision in the stipulated judgment.
Finally, wife argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion by misclassifying
Gus as a gift. The legal elements of a gift are delivery, absolute disposition, and, most
importantly, donative intent. Olsen v. Olsen , 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). The
district court concluded:
[I]f [wife] was the sole owner of Gus after the dissolution, the
evidence demonstrates that she gifted Gus to [husband]. The
evidence also established that the gift was conditioned on
[husband] allowing [wife] to have visitation with Gus. When
[husband] did not provide visita tion with Gus, [wife] decided
to reclaim ownership . . . .

It is not clear from the district cour t’s order under what authority it acted in
determining that wife gifted Gus, nor did it conduct a legal analysis in doing so. Moreover,
the record fails to esta blish that wife intended to relinqui sh ownership of Gus absolutely.
The district court therefore abused its discre tion by determining that wife gifted husband
Gus after the dissolution because this determination does not align with the legal elements
of a gift.
We reverse and remand. On remand, the di strict court must abide by the stipulated
judgment, and the parties, if their dispute persists, must adhere to the arbitration provision.
Reversed and remanded.