State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0448

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jaren Joseph Dodds,
Appellant.

Filed January 18, 2022
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-20-950

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Kevin A. Hill, Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jaren Joseph Dodds, Chaska, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After approaching appellant Jaren Dodds in an empty parking lot and learning that
his license was revoked, a Carver County Sher iff’s deputy spotted Dodds running a stop
sign later that same night. The deputy cited Dodds with several violations. But the deputy
then told Dodds he wa s free to go if he could obtain a ride from someone else due to his
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revoked license. After the deputy returned to his squad car, Dodds started to yell. When
the deputy reapproached, the deputy noticed Dodds’s speech was slurred and that he
smelled of alcohol. Based on this, the deputy suspected that Dodds was intoxicated.
The state charged Dodds with felony te st refusal and felony driving while
intoxicated. Dodds moved to suppress the ev idence, but the district court denied the
motion, determining that the stop was supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Dodds appeals. Because the deputy permissibly reapproached Dodds after the citation was
completed, we affirm.
FACTS
Shortly before midnight on an early Oc tober evening, a deputy and his partner
observed a vehicle parked in the Domino’s parking lot in Waconia. They approached the
car in their squad car without activating their emergency lights. The deputy spoke with the
occupants in the car, one of whom was later identified as Dodds. The deputy checked
Dodds’s registration and discovered that his driving privileges had been revoked. But
because Dodds was in a nonmov ing vehicle in a private park ing lot, the deputy believed
that no law had been broken.
An hour later, the deputy observed the same car roll th rough a stop sign. The car
also crossed the center line by roughly two feet. The deputy pulled the car over and noticed
the occupants attempt to conceal something within the car. After he identified Dodds (who
had been driving) and his passenger, the de puty noted a strong odor of alcohol. The
passenger appeared to be “extremely intoxica ted” and during the conversation produced
two open containers of alcohol. The depu ty asked Dodds and the passenger to exit the
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vehicle and conducted a search for additional contraband. Dodds warned the deputy that
there were approximately three grams of mar ijuana inside the vehicle, which the deputy
eventually located. The deputy issued Dodds a citation for possession of marijuana, failure
to provide insurance, and driving after revoca tion. The deputy then told Dodds he was
released from the traffic stop and warned him to keep his voice down because they were in
a residential area in the middle of the night.
The deputy returned to his squad car to take pictures of the open containers found
in Dodds’s vehicle when Dodds started to yell to the deputy. The deputy again cautioned
Dodds about yelling in the neig hborhood. But Dodds conti nued to yell. The deputy
reapproached Dodds and this time noticed that Dodds’s speech was slurred, his eyes were
watery and glassy, and his breath smelled of alcohol, which the deputy had not noticed in
the previous encounters that night. The deputy then administered field sobriety testing and
eventually arrested Dodds for suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI).
The state charged Dodds with felo ny test refusal and felony DWI. 1 Dodds filed a
motion to suppress the evidence from the stop and to di smiss, in part, due to an
impermissible expansion of the scope of the stop.
The district court denied the motion to suppress. The court explained that the stop
of Dodds’s car was supported by reasonable suspicion because the deputy observed Dodds
fail to stop at a stop sign and knew Dodds’s lic ense was revoked. And the district court

1 Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subds. 1(1), 2(1) (2020). Dodds wa s initially also charged with
possession of over 1.4 grams of marijuana in a motor vehicle and driving after revocation,
but those counts were dropped. Minn. Stat. §§ 152.027, subd. 3, 171.24, subd. 2 (2020).
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concluded the deputy did not impermissibly expand the scope of the stop because Dodds
reinitiated contact with the deputy when yelling from his car.
Dodds stipulated to the state’s case and th e district court fou nd him guilty of test
refusal and DWI—both felonies. Dodds th en moved for a durational departure and a
dispositional departure. Because Dodds had a criminal history score of three, the
presumptive sentencing rage was between 46 and 64 months for a severity-level-seven
offense.
At the sentencing hearing, the state asked for the “low end of the box” sentence of
46 months. And the state asserted that since the DWI occurred within two weeks of Dodds
being released from jail after three separate felony convictions, he would not be amenable
to probation. Nor had Dodds participated in the jail’s tr eatment program. Still Dodds
argued that because he volunta rily applied to and was accept ed into Teen Challenge, a
faith-based treatment program, he is amenable to probation. He also noted the support
from his family and that all his criminal history involved alcohol, not violence.
The district court denied the durational departure, noting that there was nothing “less
serious or less onerous” than either the typical test refusal or DWI case. The court then
denied the dispositional departure, stating that despite his “good attitude,” family support,
and young age, his criminal history made whether he is amenable to probation “not a close
call.” The district court sentenced Dodds to 46 months in pris on on the test-refusal
conviction with a five-year term of conditional release an d credit of 154 days toward the
sentence.
Dodds appeals.
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DECISION
I. The deputy had reasonable suspicio n to suspect Dodds was driving while
intoxicated.

First, Dodds challenges the district court’ s legal conclusion that the deputy had
adequate reasonable suspicion.2
When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we independently
review the facts and determine whether the district court erred in not suppressing the
evidence as a matter of law. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). We review
the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.
State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Accordingly, evidence
obtained pursuant to an unconstitutional se arch or seizure must be suppressed.
State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011). Warrantless searches and seizures are
generally unreasonable. State v. Othoudt , 482 N.W.2d 218, 221-22 (Minn. 1992). But
police may conduct “[a] limited investigative st op . . . if there is a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Wiegand,
645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002). The reas onable-suspicion standard is met when a
deputy observes condu ct that leads the deputy to reasonably conclude that “criminal

2 Unlike at the district court level, Dodds is not challenging the initial contact, the deputy’s
request for Dodds to exit the vehicle, or the first investigatory stop as violating the Fourth
Amendment.
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activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake , 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation
omitted). The standard is not high, but it requires more than an unparticularized hunch.
Id. When determining whether a deputy reas onably suspected crimin al activity, courts
consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Martinson , 581 N.W.2d 846, 852
(Minn. 1998).
Here, while the deputy and Dodds had multiple contacts throughout the night, we
narrowly focus on whether the deputy improperly seized Dodds when he reapproached him
following the written citation. After Dodds got the deputy’s attention by yelling, the deputy
reapproached and noticed that Dodds’s breath smelled of alcohol. The smell of alcohol is
all that is required for reasonable suspicion to suspect that Dodds ha d been driving while
intoxicated and to justify a seizure. See Hager v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 382 N.W.2d 907,
911 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that a driv er’s odor of alcohol provided reasonable
suspicion of driving while impaired and a legal basis for a preliminary breath test).
In sum, because the deputy had reasonabl e suspicion to seize Dodds after smelling
alcohol on his breath, the district court did not err when denying Dodds’s motion to
suppress.
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II. The district court properly determin ed that Dodds was not particularly
amenable to probation.

Next, Dodds argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that
he is not particularly amenable to proba tion and therefore denying his motion for a
dispositional departure.3
District courts have broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
307-08 (Minn. 2014). And this court revi ews a sentencing decision for an abuse of
discretion. Id. A district court abuses its discre tion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is agains t logic and the facts in the record. Riley v. State ,
792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
And, a district court’s sentencing discretion is limited by the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines, which prescribe a sentence that is “presumed to be appropriate.” Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020); see also Soto , 855 N.W.2d at 308 (citing this provision of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines). A distri ct court may depart from the presumptive
sentence only if “identifiable, substan tial, and compelling circumstances” warrant
departure. State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Min n. 2016) (quoting Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.1). The guidelines provide a nonexclusive list of factors that may be used
to support a departure, including whether th e defendant is particularly amenable to
probation. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(7) (2020). There are several factors, known as
the Trog factors, that are weighed to determine whether someone is particularly amenable

3 Dodds does not challenge the district cour t’s denial of his motion for a downward
durational departure.
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to probation. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (stating that, in determining
whether to grant a dispositional departure, a di strict court may consider age, prior record,
remorse, cooperation, attitude in court, and support of family and friends). We will reverse
a district court’s refusal to depart only in a “rare” case. State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463,
468 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court weighed the Trog factors of age, family support, attitude in
court, and criminal history. While the district court noted that Dodds’s young age, support
from his family, and overall demeanor were in his favor, Dodds’s criminal history was too
severe—and too recent—to show that he was particularly amenable to probation. The
record supports the district court’s decisi on. Not only does Dodds have several prior
felonies, but he had just been released from jail roughly two weeks be fore this incident.
Thus, the district court’s finding that Dodds is not amenable to probation is supported by
the record. And even if the dist rict court were to find that he is particularly amenable to
probation, the district court would still not be required to depart from the presumptive
sentence. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Minn. App. 2011).
To convince us otherwise, Dodds argues that the district court appeared to downplay
the concept of a faith-based treatment center. The argument is not developed beyond this
contention. Nor does the record suggest that the district court based its conclusion on the
availability or rigor of Teen Challenge. Instead, it was sway ed due to Dodd s’s criminal
history and very recent release from jail.
In sum, because the deputy had reasonabl e suspicion to suspec t Dodds of driving
while intoxicated, the district court did not err by denying Dodds’s motion to suppress.
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And because the record suppor ts the district court’s conclusion that Dodds was not
particularly amenable to probation, it did not abuse its discretion when denying his motion
for a dispositional departure.
Affirmed.