In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: R. R. B., Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0451

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: R. R. B.,
Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

Filed November 8, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-18-3250

D.S., Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant grandmother)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mary Lynch, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Marian E. Saksena, DeWalt, Chawla + Saksena, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent K.O.)

David Yates, Guardian ad Litem Program, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reyes , Presiding Judge; Bratvold , Judge; and Frisch ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
On appeal from an order denying a petition for adoptive placement,
appellant-grandmother argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding
that she failed to prove that respondent-county acted unreasonably in not placing child with
her and by admitting inadmissible evidence. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Out-of-Home Placement Proceedings
Child was born in 2017. In January 2018, respondent Hennepin County Human
Services (the county) filed a petition alleging that child w as a child in need of protection
or services (CHIPS). In May 2018, child was adjudicated to be CHIPS. Two months later,
the county filed a petition to terminate mother and father’s parental rights.
Child has been in court -ordered out -of-home placement since January 13, 2018.
Child was initially placed in a short -term shelter for five days before being placed with
mother’s former foster parent for approximately three months. In early April, child wa s
placed with respondent K.O. (foster mother).
County’s Relative Outreach, Grandmother’s Child -Protection History, Grandmother’s
Foster-License Home Study, County’s Placement Decision, and Grandmother’s Initial
Petition

The cou nty conducted a thorough investigation of child’s relatives, ultimately
concluding that foster mother was best suited to child’s needs. In February and March
2018, in response to child being placed out -of-home, the county mailed
relative-notification letters to a dozen of child’s relatives to assess whether any relative was
interested in becoming a licensed foster parent or possible caregiver for child. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.221(a) (2020) (requiring that the county notify child’s relatives). Of those
relatives, five ex pressed interest in serving as a potential permanency option for child:
mother’s cousin, two of child’s paternal great aunts (great aunt I and great aunt II), child’s
paternal great uncle, and appellant, child’s paternal grandmother.
3
In March 2018, the county received a letter from grandmother expressing interest in
being a caregiver and permanency option for child. At the time, grandmother lived in Ohio.
The county’s kinship worker telephoned grandmother to discuss her day -to-day life, work,
and hous ing, and to determine whether any potential barriers to licensure existed.
Grandmother stated that she was recently unemployed but searching for new work and that
she lived with and had custody of her three grandchildren. 1 Grandmother also stated that
she had a child-protection history, explaining that her daughter entered the foster -care
system at 16 and aged out of foster care without grandmother regaining custody.
Grandmother’s brief description of her child -protection history was concerning to
the kinship worker. The fact that grandmother’s “daughter went into foster care at the age
of 16 and then was still in foster care when [she] turned 18” indicated to the kinship worker
that “it wasn’t a small issue that the [daughter] went into foster care fo r, that it was a rather
serious issue.” 2 The kinship worker was also concerned that “the [daughter’s case] . . .
didn’t resolve by the [daughter] coming back into [grandmother’s] custody.” The kinship
worker relayed this child -protection history to the county’s social worker, who was also
concerned by grandmother’s daughter’s foster placement because such a child -protection

1 As evidence of her suitability for care of child, grandmother repeatedly references the
fact that she gained legal custody of her three grandchildren and that she obtained a
favorable home study to gain their custody. However, the record shows that the relev ant
Ohio child-protection agency stated that it “was not involved or consulted regarding this
decision.” Grandmother never provided the county with documentation showing how she
gained custody of her grandchildren.

2 The facts in this opinion are summ arized from the record of grandmother’s February
2021 evidentiary hearing.
4
history can serve as a barrier to grandmother obtaining a foster -care license and because it
called into question grandmother’s abil ity to be a safe caregiver for child.
The social worker then conducted an internet search of grandmother and discovered
a 2010 kidnapping charge initiated by the State of Ohio against grandmother. The social
worker was very concerned by this “major” cha rge because it called into question
grandmother’s ability to become licensed and to safely care for child. In July 2018, the
social worker contacted grandmother and stated that she had discovered the kidnapping
charge. Grandmother responded that the char ge had been dismissed. 3
Because grandmother lived out -of-state, she needed to receive approval under the
interstate-compact-for-placement-of-children (ICPC) process to gain placement of child.
See Minn. Stat. § 260.851 (2020) (requiring that an out -of-state relative be approved
through ICPC prior to placement of a foster child). The social worked informed
grandmother that her “child protection history and possible criminal history” prevented the
county from conducting the ICPC process with her.
In Au gust 2018, grandmother moved to Minnesota with her three grandchildren,
and therefore she no longer needed to obtain ICPC approval to have child placed with her.4
Once in Minnesota, grandmother only needed to obtain a Minnesota foster -care license to

3 Grandmother later submitted a one -page document to the county showing that her
kidnapping charge had been dismissed.

4 Grandmother testified that she believed that she needed t o move to Minnesota to gain
placement of child. The county’s kinship worker testified that she never told grandmother
that she should move to Minnesota to obtain placement of child.
5
become eligible to have child placed with her. Grandmother began working with a private
agency to obtain the license, completing a series of foster -parent trainings in early 2019.
From January 2018 through April 2019, the county continued to work on reunifying
child with mother.5 In April 2019, however, a district court held a trial regarding whether
to terminate parents’ parental rights. Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights and
the district court involuntarily terminated father’s parental rights.
Around that same time, in April 2019, the county requested grandmother’s
child-protection records from Ohio. Two weeks later, the county received a summary of
grandmother’s child-protection history from Ohio. 6 The summary “outlined ongoing child
protection history which alleged that . . . [grandmother] physically abused her children,
that there was emotional abuse . . . that she wasn’t ensuring that their mental health needs
were addressed or followed through, and at times that she abandoned h er children.” The
social worker testified that she did not feel comfortable placing child with grandmother
after reviewing these records because she “did not believe that [grandmother] could
provide a safe home for [child].”

5 Father was incarcerated at the time and would continue to be incarce rated for the
foreseeable future.

6 The county did not receive the full set of grandmother’s Ohio child -protection reports—
more than 500 pages —until October 2020. The county’s adoption -resource worker and
the guardian ad litem testified that the Ohio ch ild-protection summary was consistent with
grandmother’s full child -protection history. The district court agreed, finding that the full
child-protection record “further corroborate[d the summary that] was previously received.”
6
Also in April 2019, the coun ty contacted great aunt I to inquire whether she was
willing to adopt child “if necessary.” Great aunt I indicated that she was interested in child
being placed with her and authorized the county to conduct a background check.
In May 2019, the county hel d a family group conference, gathering all interested
family members together to discuss which relative should become licensed as a foster
parent to obtain placement of child. Seven or eight relatives attended this conference,
including mother and grandmo ther, as well as the county’s case workers for child.
Grandmother informed the group that she had cleared her background check and would be
licensed shortly. The family decided that great aunt I should also become licensed in the
event that grandmother w as not able to take child into her care. 7
On June 14, 2019, the county requested that the district court rule out grandmother
as a suitable permanency-placement option for child because of its concerns regarding her
“lengthy child protection history” a nd its belief “that [grandmother] was [not] an
appropriate or safe caregiver for [child].” The district court denied the county’s motion
without reaching the merits. Despite requesting to rule out grandmother, the county
continued to consider her as a pl acement option for child.
In July 2019, grandmother received an approved home study from the private
foster-licensing agency and was approved for a foster -care license. The county received
the records from grandmother’s home -study application and became concerned “because

7 The county repeatedly a ttempted to contact great aunt I to complete the licensing
paperwork over the following nine months. Great aunt I did “not seem motivated to get
her license” and eventually removed herself from consideration.
7
a lot of the things that [it] had been informed of were not included in the home study.”
Specifically, the materials did not include grandmother’s prior kidnapping charge, only
included an interview of one of grandmother’s four childre n and neither of grandmother’s
children who had been placed in foster care, lacked “a lot of child protection history,” and
“there was just not a lot of detail” in the report.
In September 2019, the county contacted child’s other relatives who had initial ly
expressed interest in being caregivers for child.8 The county telephoned mother’s cousin
twice in September to see if she would be a placement option for child and “asked that she
follow up . . . if she wanted to proceed with the licensing process.” Mother’s cousin never
followed up with the county. Th e county telephoned great aunt II to see if she was still
interested in being a placement resource. Great aunt II stated that she was still interested,
and the county initiated the ICPC process that would be required to place child out-of-state.
Great au nt II’s ICPC application was denied three months’ later. The county also
telephoned great uncle to see if he was interested in serving as a placement resource. Great
uncle affirmed his interest in being an adoptive resource for child and the county initi ated
the ICPC process for him. Great uncle later “withdrew his interest in being studied for
placement” and his ICPC application was denied.
In October 2019, the county conducted a home -study follow -up meeting at
grandmother’s house “to more thoroughly review that child protection history that wasn’t
discussed in the home study.” At this meeting, the county’s adoption -resource worker

8 Around this time, grandmother submitted a m otion to obtain visitation rights with child.
The district court granted grandmother one supervised visit per week.
8
“asked [grandmother] about specific incidents” described in the Ohio child -protection
summary report. “[M]ost of [grandm other’s] answers were either she didn’t recall any of
that [child-protection information] or . . . that wouldn’t be in her nature to do the things
that were alleged.” The adoption -resource worker testified that grandmother did not
“accept responsibility” for any of the child -protection history that she did recall, instead
blaming her daughter’s “behavioral issues” for grandmother’s child -protection record.
In February 2020, after all of child’s relatives other than grandmother had removed
themselves from consideration or were denied ICPC approval, the county met to determine
what placement was in child’s best interests. The county determined that permanent
placement with foster mother was in child’s best interests. The county believed that it “had
thoroughly explored [grandmother] at that point.” In March 2020, the county signed an
adoption-placement agreement (APA) with foster mother. 9
On May 6, 2020, the county mailed notice of the completed APA with foster mother
to grandmother. Three weeks later, grandmother filed a motion with the district court for
adoptive placement. Two weeks after grandmother’s motion, the district court conduc ted
a preliminary hearing. The district court found, accepting grandmother’s alleged facts as
true for purposes of her motion, that the county “took little to no action to investigate or
consider Paternal Grandmother as a placement resource for the child” and that grandmother

9 Even after signing the APA with foster mother, the county continued to evaluate
grandmother for suitability. If the county later chang ed its mind about foster mother, it
could have canceled the APA.

9
“can provide a safe environment for the child to live.” 10 The district court granted
grandmother an evidentiary hearing.
In July 2020, after the private agency received grandmother’s additional Ohio
child-protection history, it published a favorable home -study update. Even with this
update, the county was still concerned with grandmother’s home study, and it determined
that the study did not fully or accurately explain her history. “[S]ome of the language that
[the agency] had used . . . was inaccurate [as] far as stating that the [county] had ruled out
[grandmother] . . . [and] was missing some of the pertinent information, but had alleged
some other information that was . . . incorrect.” Despite its concerns about the home-study
update, the county continued to evaluate grandmother for placement.
District Court Evidentiary Hearing
In February 2021, the district court held a virtual six -day evidentiary hearing on
grandmother’s motion for adoptive placement. The district court re ceived extensive
evidence from the county’s adoption workers affiliated with child’s case about their
concerns with placing child in grandmother’s care and their doubts about grandmother’s
ability to get licensed, a prerequisite to child being permanently placed in her care.
The county’s adoption workers testified that the summary of grandmother’s Ohio
child-protection history raised serious concerns about grandmother’s ability to care for
child and obtain a license. The county’s kinship worker testified :

10 The district court did not consider “the alleged facts about Paternal Grandmother’s Ohio
child protection history” in its decision.
10
Child protection history is—is very important in the process of
foster care licensing. . . . [T]hat there were maltreatment
determinations, that [grandmother] lost custody of her
daughter, and that she had at least two children that spent time
in foster care would all be issues that would make it a barrier
to becoming licensed as a foster parent.

Similarly, the county’s adoption -resource worker expressed significant concern over
grandmother’s patterns of “stopping or not engaging in necessary menta l health treatment
for her children,” “threats or allegations of physical abuse towards her children,” and being
“not cooperative with child protective services.” The county’s adoption workers testified
that they relied on the summary of grandmother’s Ohi o child-protection history in making
decisions about child’s case.
Multiple witnesses also testified that foster mother is a “fantastic provider” to child
who “go[es] above and beyond in meeting [child’s] needs.” The county and the guardian
ad litem both testified that foster mother was best suited to be child’s provider based on the
best-interests factors.
The trial testimony specifically highlighted foster mother’s praiseworthy effort to
become a culturally competent foster parent to a Black child . Trial testimony showed that
foster mother worked diligently to introduce child to people that look ed like child, for
example, placing child in a diverse daycare, bringing child to a Black barber, enrolling
child in an afro -centric music class, and provi ding child with “books, dolls, and toys that
reflect [child].” Foster mother also demonstrated a commitment to engage with child’s
culture of origin and to reinforce his cultural identity as something positive and beautiful.
Foster mother also expressed her assurance that she would maintain connections to
11
important people in child’s life , including child’s biological family. Moreover, trial
testimony showed that foster mother has worked hard to understand the challenges of
parenting a Black child, underg oing transracial foster -care training, educating herself on
child’s culture, and reaching out to friends and family who identify as Black, several of
whom agreed to serve as “cultural mentors” for foster mother.
District Court Order
The district court iss ued a thorough, detailed, and comprehensive 29 -page order,
holding that grandmother had “not proven by a preponderance of evidence that the [county]
was unreasonable in failing to place the child with [grandmother] for adoption” and that
“[e]ven if [grandmother] had proven unreasonableness, [grandmother] has not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that her home is the most suitable adoptive home to meet
the child’s needs.” The district court found the county’s adoption workers, foster mother,
and guardian ad litem to be credible. In contrast, the district court found the home -study
agency official and grandmother’s testimony about her child -protection history to be not
credible. The district court also found that the county reasonably relied on gran dmother’s
Ohio child -protection records in concluding that foster mother was the preferable
placement option for child.
Grandmother appeals.
DECISION
Grandmother argues that the district court abused its discretion by unreasonably
refusing to place child with her, admitting inadmissible evidence, and violating several of
12
grandmother’s constitutional rights as well as conducting a biased trial. We addre ss each
argument in turn.
I. The district court acted within its discretion by determining that the county
did not unreasonably fail to place child with grandmother.

We review a district court’s decision of whether a county agency unreasonably
failed to make an adoptive placement for an abuse of discretion. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 6(e) (2020) (stating that district court “may” order relative adoptive
placement if the agency unreasonably fails to make requested placement); see also In re
Welfare of L.L.P. , 836 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013) (reviewing for abuse of
discretion a district court’s decision that movants had not met their burden to obtain an
evidentiary hearing on their motion for adoptive placement). A district court “abuse[s] its
discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the
law.” Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996).
The party moving for adoptive placement bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted unreasonably by failing to make the
adoptive placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(d) (2020). We review whether an
agency’s action was reasonable according to two factors: (1) whether the agency’s
rationale for its action was legally sufficient, and (2) whether that legally sufficient
rationale has a factual basis in the record. RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d
71, 75-76 (Minn. 2015) ; see Hagen v. Schirmers , 783 N.W.2d 212, 217 -18 (Minn. App.
2010) (noting, in the context of reviewing a district court’s discretionary, custody -related
13
decision, that “the district court must identify both its decision . . . as well as the underlying
reason(s) for that decision”).
Minnesota law requires the county to first consider a child’s relatives for adoptive
placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020). And, contrary to grandmother’s
assertions, the county did consider child’s relatives, and grandmother specifically, as
placement options for child. The district cou rt concluded that the county “immediately
began its kinship search once the child was placed in foster care” and that the county
“considered [grandmother] and made placement decisions with court oversight.” The
record supports the district court’s conclus ion. The county notified a dozen relatives of
child’s out-of-home placement, identified five relatives who wished to be considered for
placement, contacted those relatives numerous times, organized a meeting to ensure that
the family decided which relatives should become licensed and made certain that the family
had a back-up plan, and conducted additional outreach to other relatives when it appeared
that the initially chosen relatives would not be suitable.
With respect to grandmother, in addition to th e county’s actions described herein,
the county contacted her multiple times to discuss its concerns regarding her
child-protection history, allowed grandmother opportunities to explain this history,
conducted a private meeting at grandmother’s house, sugg ested that grandmother obtain a
foster-parent license to be eligible for placement, followed up with grandmother’s
home-study agency to ensure that the agency accessed and properly considered all of
grandmother’s history, and provided grandmother with acce ss to supervised visits with
child. The record shows that the county continued to consider grandmother as a placement
14
option throughout the entire adoption -placement process with child. Grandmother’s
contention that “[the county] had no intention of ever placing [child] with [her]” is not
supported by the record.
Moreover, the county had a proper basis for its concern over child’s safety if child
was placed in grandmother’s care. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b) (2020)
(describing best -interests factors, of which child safety is an underlying central
component). The district court found that “there are legitimate safety concerns for children
in [grandmother’s] care” and that these safety concerns also “called into question
[grandmother’s] ability to be licensed.” The district court noted that “the [county] gave
[grandmother] the opportunity to explain her side of the story and instead she continued to
deflect and deny [that] anything took place.”
The county’s safety concerns are support ed by the record. The record shows
numerous serious allegations from 2001 through 2016 of physical and mental abuse by
grandmother against her four children. These allegations include not engaging in necessary
mental-health treatment, physical abuse, aba ndonment, threats to kick children out of her
home, neglect, and maltreatment. Two of grandmother’s children were removed from
grandmother’s care and placed in the foster -care system. The district court did not abuse
15
its discretion in determining that th e county’s concerns regarding grandmother’s ability to
safely care for child were legally sufficient and supported by the record. 11
We therefore discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its well-supported
findings and conclusions that grandmother failed to meet her burden to prove that the
county acted unreasonably.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ad mitting certain of
grandmother’s Ohio child-protection records into evidence.

The district court must generally follow the rules of evidence in juvenile -protection
trials. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 3.02, subd. 1. “We afford the district court broad discret ion
when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an
abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch , 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015). A
district court “abuses its discretion if it improperly applies the law.” In re Welfare of Child
of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 93 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn. July 17, 2012).
Grandmother argues that the district court erred in admitting her Ohio
child-protection documents into evidence because those documents were hearsay or, i n the
alternative, unfairly prejudicial.

11 Even if the county’s refusal to place child with gra ndmother was unreasonable, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that foster mother is best suited to care
for child. The record shows that foster mother is an excellent caregiver to child and that
there are legitimate safety concerns regarding grandmother as a caretaker.
Grandmother’s primary objection to the district court’s best-interests analysis is that
it failed to properly consider cultural factors because she, like child, is Black, and should
therefore be allowed to adopt child over a White foster parent. Our caselaw does not
compel such a conclusion. In re S.G., 828 N.W.2d 118, 126-27 (Minn. 2013) (finding that
the district court’s “detailed findings and analysis demonstrat[ed] . . . . that it was in the
[children’s] best interests to be adopted by the foster parents,” even though the Black
children would be raised in a White household).
16
A. The child-protection records are admissible under the business -records
exception or are otherwise non -hearsay.

Evidence offered for the truth of the matter asserted is hearsay when it includes an
out-of-court statement made by someone other than the testifying declarant. Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Evidence is not hearsay if it is not used to prove the truth of the ma tter
asserted, but rather to explain a party’s rationale for its actions. Id.; e.g., Butler v. Leadens
Investigations & Sec., Inc. , 503 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Minn. App. 1993). Hearsay is
inadmissible unless an exception applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802. One such exception is the
business-records exception, which allows admission of an otherwise -hearsay report if ,
among other things, that report was made “in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity.” Minn. R. Evid. 803(6).
Here, the district court pr operly admitted grandmother’s full Ohio child -protection
records into evidence under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule. At trial, an
Ohio records custodian authenticated these documents as records kept in the ordinary
course of business. Each record contained verifying and authenticating information,
including its date and author, and the district court found the custodian credible. The
district court did not misapply the law or abuse its discretion in admitting these documents
into evidence under the business-records exception.
The county also requested to admit the summary of grandmother’s Ohio child -
protection records into evidence. The district court repeatedly rejected the county’s request
and expressly found that the summary did not qualify as a business record because it was
not produced contemporaneously with the events described in the summary as required by
17
the business-records exception and that the summary could not be properly authenticated.
However, the district court did admit the county’s testimony regarding this summary to the
extent that the county relied upon the information in the summary in its decision -making.
In other words, the district court properly considered non -hearsay evidence regarding the
county’s reliance on the information in the summary to explain “what the basis of [the
county’s] decision was,” but the district court did not consider or receive into evidence the
summary itself. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary ruling.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
grandmother’s child-protection history was not unfairly prejudicial.

Grandmother argues that the district court’s consideration of her Ohio
child-protection history was unfairly prej udicial and that it should have been excluded.
Rule 403 provides that “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. This rule is necessarily
discretionary—a district court “may” exclude certain evidence if it determines that the
probative value is “substantially outweighed” by a qualifying concern. See, e.g., State v.
Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 299 (Minn. 2019).
The district court did not abuse its discretion. While g randmother’s Ohio child -
protection records are certainly prejudicial, they are not unfairly prejudicial. The probative
value of these records in determining whether the county acted reasonably in refusing to
place child with grandmother is high. And gran dmother was not unfairly prejudiced
because she had a full and fair opportunity to address the evidence. We see no abuse of
discretion by the district court.
18
III. We do not consider grandmother’s constitutional and judicial -bias arguments
because she did not raise them to the district court.

Grandmother raises several arguments on appeal which she did not raise before the
district court. She summarily asserts four new legal theories: that “[t]he district court
violated [her] Constitutional right to due pro cess, equal protection[,] and right to face her
accuser,” and that the district court was biased against her.
“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows
were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele
v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Thayer v. Am. Fin. Advisers, Inc. ,
322 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Minn. 1982)). This bar on raising new issues at the appellate level
applies to constitutional questions as well. In re Welfare of C.L.L. , 310 N.W.2d 555, 557
(Minn. 1981). Grandmother did not raise these arguments at the district court and we
therefore do not consider them for the first time on appeal.
Affirmed.