Jose Antonio Martinez-Fuentes, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0455

Jose Antonio Martinez-Fuentes, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed February 7, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-08-954

Kimberley Woods Vanselow, Khanh Nguyen Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Julianna Passe, A ssistant County Attorney,
Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tr acy M., Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s denial of postconviction relief, appellant Jose
Antonio Martinez-Fuentes argues that the dist rict court erred by determining that his
petition was time-barred and abused its discretion by concluding that, in any event, he was
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not entitled to relief on the merits of his pe tition. Because the district court did not err by
concluding that Martinez-Fuentes’s petition is time-barred, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2008 Martinez-Fuentes, who did not and does not have legal status to reside in
the United States, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated forgery in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.625, subd. 1(1) ( 2008). Under federal immigration law, aggravated forgery is
considered a “crime of moral turpitude,” ma king Martinez-Fuentes inadmissible, and a
person who is inadmissible is deportable. See 8 U.S.C. § 11182(a)(2)(a)(1)(I) (2017)
(stating that immigrants who commit crimes involving moral turpitude are inadmissible);
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2 017) (stating that an immi grant “who at the time of
entry . . . was within one or more of the cl asses of aliens inadmissible by the law existing
at such time is deportable”). Martinez-Fuentes’s guilty plea thus makes him deportable.
Martinez-Fuentes was represented by counse l at the time of his plea. At the plea
hearing, the district court asked Martinez-Fue ntes if he understood that there could be
adverse consequences to his guilty plea, incl uding “[his] ability to remain in the United
States.” Martinez-Fuentes responded that he di d. Years after this plea hearing, Martinez-
Fuentes’s plea counsel was pl aced on probation and then suspended indefinitely for
providing incompetent legal advice to clients.
In 2020, pursuant to Mi nn. Stat. § 590.01 (2018), Martinez-Fuentes filed a
postconviction petition for relief, asserting that his constitutional rights were violated when
his plea counsel failed to advise him of the i mmigration consequences of his plea. At an
evidentiary hearing on his petition, Martinez-Fuentes testified that his plea counsel never
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discussed the consequences of the charges on his immigration status, that his counsel
advised Martinez-Fuentes to plead guilty, and that he would not have pleaded guilty if he
had understood that he would be subject to deportation. Martinez-Fuentes also testified that
he was “overcome by nerves” when the district court judge went through a list of his rights
at the plea hearing.
Martinez-Fuentes further testif ied that, in 2010, he met with an attorney at the
Wilson Law Group. This second attorney informed Martin ez-Fuentes that Martinez-
Fuentes did not “have any case” to gain lawful immigration status and that he would need
to “wait until the immigration laws were changed.” Martinez-Fuen tes testified that,
following that meeting, he withheld a $1,000 payment from his plea counsel.
Martinez-Fuentes also testified that, in 2019, he met with a third attorney, who
informed him that his aggravated forgery conviction would make him ineligible to obtain
lawful immigration status.
The district court denied Martinez-Fue ntes’s petition for pos tconviction relief on
the ground that it was time-barr ed. The district court also de termined that, even if the
petition was timely, Martinez-Fuentes’s claim that his guilty plea was not accurately,
knowingly, or intelligently made was not credible.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
A denial of postconviction relief is re viewed for an abuse of discretion. Reed v.
State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010). “Under this standard of review, a matter will
not be reversed unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
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capricious manner, based its ru ling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly
erroneous factual findings.” Id. An appellate court reviews legal issues de novo but reviews
factual issues for “whether there is suffici ent evidence in the re cord to sustain the
postconviction court’s findings.” Pearson v. State , 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted).
A petition for postconviction relief must be filed within two years after the entry of
a judgment of conviction or sentence if, as here, no direct appeal is filed. See Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4. This time bar has exceptions, including when “the petitioner establishes
to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of
justice.” Id., subd. 4(b)(5). An additional time bar applies to the exce ptions. Under the
postconviction statute, “[a]ny petition invoking an exception provided in [subdivision 4(b)]
must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.” Id., subd. 4(c).
It is undisputed that Martinez-Fuentes f iled his petition 12 years after the district
court entered a judgment of conviction a nd imposed his sentence. However, Martinez-
Fuentes argues that his petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice and therefore
meets the time-bar exception described in section 590.01, subdivision 4(b)(5). His
argument fails for two reasons.
First, the district court correctly conclude d that Martinez-Fuentes failed to assert a
claim that triggers the interests-of-justice exception. In Sanchez v. State, the supreme court
explained that “the interests-of-justice exception is triggered by an injustice that caused the
petitioner to miss the primary deadline in subdivision 4(a), and not to the substance of his
petition.” 816 N.W.2d 550, 557 (M inn. 2012). The court clarif ied that the interests of
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justice referred to in subdiv ision 4(b)(5) “relate to the reason the petition was filed after
the 2-year time limit in su bdivision 4(a), not the substantive claims in the petition.” Id.
Therefore, a petitioner attempting to invoke th e interests-of-justice exception must allege
that some injustice occurred that caused the petitioner to miss the filing deadline.
Here, the district court concluded that Martinez-Fuentes failed to allege any
injustice that caused him to miss filing a tim ely petition. The injustice that Martinez-
Fuentes alleged was ineffective assistance of plea counsel in misadvising Martinez-Fuentes
about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Under Sanchez, because the
injustice that Martinez-Fuentes alleged was iden tical to the substance of his petition, that
injustice could not have caused him to miss the primary two-year deadline. See id. The
district court therefore properly concluded th at the interests-of-justice exception to the
primary two-year time bar does not apply.
Second, even if Martinez-Fuentes’s clai m did properly invoke the interests-of-
justice exception, the district court did not clearly err by determining that the claim would
still be untimely under the secondary time bar because it was not filed within two years of
the date that the claim arose. A claim arises for the purposes of th e interests-of-justice
exception “when the petitioner knew or should have known that he had a claim” that could
invoke that exception. Id. at 560.
The district court found that “[a]ll of the facts on which Martinez Fuentes’ claim is
based were known or knowable by him by 2010 , when he met with an attorney at Wilson
Law Group.” Thus, the district court conclude d, any claim under the interests-of-justice
exception arose at that time and he was require d to file a petition with in two years, or by
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2012. Because the present petition was not filed until 2020, the district court concluded, it
is time-barred.
Martinez-Fuentes argues that his claim arose not in 2010, but in 2019, when he met
with his third attorney. He points to the fact that he did not file a claim for a refund of the
$12,000 he had paid to his plea counsel and argues that, had he known he had a claim,
“logically he would have requested a refund or at least filed a complaint.”
The argument is unpersuasive. Martinez-Fuentes’s own testimony provides a basis
for the district court’s factual finding. He testified that he learned from his second attorney
in 2010 that he did not have a case under existing immigration law to seek lawful status in
the United States. Given this testimony, the district court did not clearly err by finding that
Martinez-Fuentes’s claim arose in 2010. In the absence of clear error, we defer to the
district court’s factual findings. See Pearson , 891 N.W.2d at 596. Because Martinez-
Fuentes’s claim arose in 2010, his petition failed to meet the secondary two-year deadline
in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c).
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez-Fuentes’s
petition for postconviction relief on the ground that it is time-barred and does not meet the
interests-of-justice exception to the statutory deadline. We do not address the district
court’s determination that the petition also fails on the merits of Martinez-Fuentes’s claim.
Affirmed.