State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0460

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kent William Edwards, Sr.,
Appellant.

Filed April 11, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-CR-20-1180

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Alina Schwartz, Campbell Knutson, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction for violating a harassment restraining order
(HRO), appellant challenges the validity of his decision to wa ive his trial rights and the

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
validity of the underlying HRO. We affirm appellant’s conviction because appellant does
not establish that the assert ed error affected his substa ntial rights and because his
challenges to the validity of the HRO are not properly before this court.
FACTS
On January 24, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Kent
William Edwards Sr. with a gr oss misdemeanor for violatin g the terms of a harassment
restraining order in violation of Minnesota Statutes § 609.748, subdivision 6(a), (c) (2020).
According to the complaint, on September 5, 2019, Edwards agreed to the issuance of an
HRO which protected his son and prohibited Edwards from coming within four blocks of
his son’s home and places of employment. On December 25, 2019, around 11:27 p.m.,
Edwards was in his vehicle at a gas station on Kenrick Avenue in Lakeville, Minnesota.
Law enforcement officers ther e checked information regard ing Edwards’s vehicle and
learned that Edwards had an active warrant. While in custody, law enforcement also
learned of the HRO. At the time of his arrest, Edwards was within four blocks of his son’s
place of employment.
On October 24, 2020, Edwards moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the HRO
statute does not authorize geographical restri ctions. Two days later, Edwards appeared
before the district court, waived his trial rights, and stipulated to the state’s evidence. 1

1 Commonly referred to as a Lothenbach plea, this type of plea was incorporated into the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2007. State v. Myhre , 875 N.W.2d 799, 802
(Minn. 2016); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4 (allowing a defendant to stipulate
to the prosecution’s case, avoid a contested tr ial, and preserve appellate review of a
dispositive pretrial ruling).
3
Edwards’s attorney discussed the case with Edwards on th e record, commenting that he
did not have a strong factual defense, but they had identified a potential legal issue:
Counsel: Mr. Edwards, you and I talked that this case turns
on what is, essentially, a legal and not a factual
determination in this matter, correct?
Edwards: Correct.

. . . .

Counsel: We also talked ab out the—more or less, the
futility of trying to contest the facts of this case,
correct?
Edwards: Yes, sir, correct.

Edwards’s attorney then explained Edwards’s options: they could proceed “by essentially
stipulating—that is agreeing—to the truth of the essential facts of the State’s case and
preserving for legal determination the viable legal issue on which [Edwards’s] case turns,”
or they could proceed with a contested jury trial, where the state’s witnesses would testify
that they “found [Edwards] within a certain distance of the place of employment,” and the
state would provide proof that Edwards was se rved with the HRO. Edwards agreed to
proceed with a stipulated trial and waived the following rights: the “right to a trial by jury,”
“the right to have six jurors be able to return a verdict of guilty, only if its unanimous and
it’s proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” “the right to admit evidence of [his] own in this
case,” the right “to not testify and to have no adverse inference drawn from the fact of [his]
silence,” and “the right to have a compulsory process of the court to bring any reluctant
witnesses before it and provide favorable testimony.” Edwards understood that there
would be no factual dispute regarding guilt or innocence:
4
Counsel: So in doing this procedure, you’re giving all of
that up, and the sole issue before the Court is the
legal issue as I’ve raised it. Do you understand
that?
Edwards: Yes, sir.
Counsel: Is that wh at you want to do?
Edwards: Yes, sir.

Edwards then stipulated to the following facts: he had a prev ious conviction for a
violation of an HRO; he was present and se rved in court with the HRO; the HRO was
issued without findings of harassment base d on the parties’ agreement; Edwards knew of
the condition that prohibited hi m from being a certain distance from his son’s place of
employment; and that on December 25, 2019, he was within the distance prohibited by the
HRO.
The district court reiterated the trial right s that Edwards was waiving: the right to
have a trial, the right “to have the prosecution’s witnesses te stify in open court in [his]
presence,” and the right for his counsel “to question the State’s witnesses or cross-examine
them at trial.” The district court explai ned that it would “make a decision on whether
[Edwards was] guilty or not based on the stipulated facts that [he was] admitting to, as well
as the law that [Edwards’s attorney] had argu ed in his motion.” Th e district court also
explained there would be no jury. Edwards agreed that he had enough time to talk with his
attorney, and Edwards and th e prosecutor acknowledged that the pretrial issue was
dispositive. Edwards did not raise any objections to this waiver.
The district court took the matter under advisement and denied Edwards’s motion,
concluding “that the specific ity requirement set forth [in] Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd.
8(a)(1), permitted, if not necessitated, the use of a geographical restriction in this particular
5
HRO.” The order also explained that the case was “proceeding on stipulated facts pursuant
to State v. Lothenbach” and that Edwards “admitted to engaging in conduct on December
25, 2019, that violated an ac tive [HRO].” Based on the adm itted facts, the district court
convicted Edwards of a gross misdemeanor violation of an HRO. Edwards appeals.
DECISION
I. Validity of the Waiver of Trial Rights
Edwards argues that his conviction should be reversed because the waiver did not
strictly satisfy the requirements of Minnes ota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01,
subdivision 4.2 We affirm the conviction because we conclude that the asserted error did
not affect Edwards’s substantial rights.
Rule 26.01, subdivision 4, allows a defendant to stipulate to the prosecution’s case
and avoid a contested trial yet preserve the right to obtain appellate review of a dispositive
pretrial ruling. Among other specified ackn owledgements, the rule includes a provision
regarding the defendant’s acknow ledgement “that appellate review will be of the pretrial
issue, but not of the defendant’s guilt, or of other issues that could arise at a contested trial.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(f).

2 Edwards also argues that his waiver was invalid because he was uninformed that the
offense was a gross misdemeanor as opposed to a misdemeanor. We disagree and conclude
that the record is clear: Edwards knew the correct offense level. State v. Raleigh , 778
N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (stating that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
invalidity of a guilty plea). The complaint cl assifies the offense as a gross misdemeanor,
the statement of rights Edwards signed is titled “Felony-Gross Misdemeanor First
Appearance Statement of Rights,” and Edward s acknowledged that he had discussed the
charges with his attorney.
6
We review unobjected-to violations of Ru le 26.01, subdivision 4, under the plain-
error standard. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d at 804. To meet the plain-error standard, an appellant
must establish the following three factors: (1) there was an error; (2 ) the error was plain;
and (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d
736, 740 (Minn. 1998); Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02 (p roviding for plain-error review). An
error affects substantial rights if “the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the
case.” Id. at 741. “An error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error
had a significant effect on the proceeding.” State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 884 (Minn.
2014). In the context of a waiver of trial and Lothenbach plea, an error is prejudicial if
there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant would have proceeded to a jury trial had
he been informed that he could not appeal the determination of guilt. See Myhre, 875
N.W.2d 799, 808-09 (concluding that “[b] ecause he cannot show prejudice to his
substantial rights, Myhre is not entitled to relie f based on this error”). If the first three
prongs are satisfied, appellate courts must c onsider “whether [to] address the error to
ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740.
In this case, we agree with Edwards that the waiver made no acknowledgement of
the limited appellate review, as stated in subdivision 4(f). Assuming without deciding that
the first two factors have been met, see State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006)
(an error is plain when it “contravenes case la w, a rule, or a standard of conduct”), we
conclude that the third factor has not been sa tisfied for two reasons. First, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has “never required strict comp liance with the provisi ons of either Rule
26.01, subdivision 4, or Lothenbach.” Myhre, 875 N.W.2d at 804. Instead, appellate courts
7
have “tolerated a substantial amount of procedural error when the record shows that the
parties clearly intended to ac hieve the outcome contemplated by either Rule 26.01,
subdivision 4, or Lothenbach.” Id. Here, the parties did not intend to preserve any factual
determinations regarding guilt or innocence for appeal, and the facts admitted by Edwards
were sufficient to support the finding of guilt.
Second, Edwards does not explain what fa ctual issue regarding guilt or innocence
he hoped to preserve for appeal. In fact, during the plea colloquy, Edwards and his counsel
expressed a belief that there was no strong fa ctual defense and that disputing the facts
would be “more or less” futile. Absent any effort to make an explanation on appeal
regarding what factual dispute Edwards had hoped to preserve, we conclude that the failure
to address Edwards’s appellate rights did not prejudice him.
II. Validity of the Underlying HRO
Edwards argues that the relevant statute does not authorize geographical restrictions
in HROs, and thus the underlying HRO is invalid. 3 In addition, Edwards argues that the
HRO is invalid because it did not contain any finding of harassment.
We decline to address these argument s because Edwards is not permitted to
challenge the validity or constitutionality of the underlying HRO in a subsequent, criminal
proceeding. See State v. Romine, 757 N.W.2d 884, 889-90 (Minn. App. 2008) (declining
to review the constitutionality of an order for protection, stating, “a party’s failure to appeal

3 Edwards initially argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
charged offense because the HRO statute did not authorize a geographical restriction. On
appeal, however, Edwards frames the issue not as one regarding the district court’s
jurisdiction, but rather as a challenge to the validity of the underlying HRO.
8
the issuance of a court order precludes a colla teral attack on that or der in a subsequent
proceeding”); State v. Harrington, 504 N.W.2d 500, 502-03 (Min n. App. 1993) (refusing
to consider collateral attack on HRO in reviewing an appeal taken from appellant’s criminal
conviction for violating the HRO), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1993). Following the
issuance of the HRO, Edwards could have appealed the order within 60 days, challenging
the geographical restriction or its validity in the absence of a finding of harassment. Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 104.01. We affirm the de nial of the motion to dismiss because Edwards
did not appeal the issuance of the HRO within the applicable timeframe, and pursuant to
Romine and Harrington, Edwards was precluded from ch allenging the validity of the
underlying HRO in his criminal proceeding.
Affirmed.