Mower County Health and Human Services, Petitioner,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0465

Mower County Health and Human Services,
Petitioner,

April Ann Rowe,
Appellant,

vs.

Michael Paul Osborn,
Respondent.

Filed December 13, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-FA-18-1107

April A. Rowe, Albert Lea, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Danielle L. DiFiore, Anderson Law Firm, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal of an award of conduct-based attorney fees under Minnesota Statutes
section 518.14, subdivision 1 (2020), appellant challenges the district court’s decision for

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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the following two reasons: (1) the district court failed to satisfy statutory requirements by
not considering respondent’s ability to pay; and (2) the district court abused its discretion
in awarding the fees. First, we conclude th at the district court correctly applied the law
because a court need not cons ider a party’s ability to pay when awarding conduct-based
fees. Second, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the
district court made specific findings regarding Rowe’s impact on the cost of litigation.
FACTS
In June 2017, appellant April Ann Ro we and respondent Michael Paul Osborn
became the parents of a minor child. The parties never married and ended their relationship
prior to the child’s birth. On April 16, 2020, following a bench tria l, the district court
awarded permanent sole legal and permanent sole physical custody of the child to Osborn.
Within a week of the permanent custody order, the district court granted Osborn’s ex parte
motions, ordered supervised exchanges, and prohibited Rowe’s out-of-state travel with the
child. Since the April 2020 permanent custody order, Rowe has filed motions for a new
trial, to change venue after the district court denied the new trial motion, and to remove the
assigned judge.
In December 2020, Osborn move d for an award of attorney fees based on Rowe’s
litigation conduct. Osborn incurred attorney fees from September 2020 to December 2020,
totaling $5,653.40. On April 2, 2021, the district court awarded Osborn $1,000, concluding
that Rowe’s actions unreasonably contributed to the length and expense of the related
proceedings for the fo llowing reasons: several hearings were based on Rowe’s false
allegations or baseless requests; Rowe cha llenged virtually every decision made by the
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district court; Rowe filed pleadings in anot her county in an atte mpt to undermine the
district court’s decision; Rowe used the legal system to interfere with Osborn’s parenting
time and custodial rights; Osborn had to file numerous ex parte motions due to Rowe’s
conduct; and Rowe’s requests for hearings were “relentless.” Rowe appeals.
DECISION
Rowe first argues that the district court e rred as a matter of law when it failed to
consider her ability to pay the $1,000 award. In addition, Rowe argues that the district
court abused its discretion beca use the conduct at issue did no t sufficiently contribute to
the length and expense of the proceedings. We affirm the district court’s decision because
the district court properly applied the law and did not abuse its discretion.
Minnesota Statutes section 518.14, subd ivision 1, addresses two grounds upon
which a district court may award attorney fees: need-based and conduct-based. To award
need-based fees, the district court must cons ider a party’s ability to pay. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.14, subd. 1. However, to award conduct-based fees, as in this case, the district court
need not consider a party’s ab ility to pay: “[A]n award of c onduct-based fees . . . may be
made regardless of the recipient’s need for fees and regardless of the payor’s ability to
contribute to a fee award.” Geske v. Marcolina , 624 N.W.2d 813, 818-19 (Minn. App.
2001); see also Dabrowski v. Dabrowski, 477 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Minn. App. 1991) (noting
that conduct-based attorney fees may be “based on the impact a party’s behavior has had
on the costs of the litigation regardless of the re lative financial resources of the parties”).
Instead, an award of conduct-b ased fees requires a finding that the nonmoving party’s
conduct unreasonably contributed to the length or expense of the proceeding. Minn. Stat.
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§ 518.14, subd. 1. The moving party bears the burden of establishing the unreasonableness
of the other party’s behavior, Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 818, and the district court must support
the award with specific findings regardin g the behavior justifying the award, Kronick v.
Kronick, 482 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Minn. App. 1992).
We apply a de novo standard of review to questions of law, such as the construction
and application of the statute governing attorney fee awards. Sanvick v. Sanvick , 850
N.W.2d 732, 737 (Minn. App. 2014) (citing In re Estate of Holmberg , 823 N.W.2d 875,
876 (Minn. App. 2012). We review for abus e of discretion the district court’s ultimate
decision to grant or deny a request for attorney fees. Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 825
(Minn. 1999). A district court abuses its discretion if it acts against logic or the undisputed
facts in the record. Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 2002).
We are not convinced by Rowe’s first argument because the argument contravenes
well-established law. Contrary to Rowe’s argument, the dist rict court is not required to
consider a party’s ability to pay when deciding a motion for conduct-based attorney fees.
Rowe’s second argument is also unavailing. Although Rowe argues that her conduct was
reasonable, Rowe does not di spute any of the following fa ctual determinations made by
the district court: several hearings were ba sed on Rowe’s false a llegations or baseless
requests; Rowe challenged virtually every decision made by the district court; Rowe filed
pleadings in another county in an attempt to undermine the district court’s decision; Rowe
used the legal system to interfere with Osborn’s parenting time and custodial rights; Osborn
had to file numerous ex parte motions due to Rowe’s conduct; a nd Rowe’s requests for
hearings were “relentless.” Based on those uncontested determinations, we conclude that
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the district court did not abuse its discretion because an award of $1,000 in conduct-based
attorney fees is not against logic or the record.
Affirmed.