Charles Earl Strother, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0467

Charles Earl Strother, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 10, 2022
Affirmed; motion denied
Reilly, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-17-616

Christopher X. Nguyen, Julie T. Le, Aberrant Law PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jenna M. Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assi stant County Attorney, William C. Lundy (certified student
attorney), Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district cour t’s summary denial of his petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that he received in effective assistance of appellate counsel
and that the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition without an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm. Based on this ruling, we deny as moot respondent’s
motion to strike portions of appellant’s brief.
FACTS
Appellant Charles Earl Strother was convicted of multiple counts of criminal sexual
conduct, domestic abuse, witness tampering, a nd drug crimes. Appellant filed a direct
appeal challenging his convictions. We affirmed appellant’s convictions in July 2019, and
the Minnesota Supreme Court denied furt her review. The factual background is
summarized in our earlier opinion. State v. Strother, No. A18-1035, 2019 WL 3293459
(Minn. App. July 22, 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2019). Following his direct appeal,
appellant petitioned for postconviction relief. The district court denied the petition without
an evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.
DECISION
A person convicted of a crime may petition the district court for relief based on a
claim that “the conviction obtained . . . violated the person’s rights under the Constitution
or laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2020). We
review the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Gulbertson v. State,
843 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Minn. 2014 ). “A [district] court abuses its discretion when its
3
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We review
issues of law de novo and issues of fact for sufficient evidence. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d
531, 535 (Minn. 2007). A district court may deny a postconviction petition without an
evidentiary hearing if “the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively
show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020).
I. Appellant is not entitled to relief on his ineffective-assi stance-of-appellate-
counsel claim.
Appellant claims that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Unlike
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims , ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel
claims “are not barred by the Knaffla rule[1] in a first postconviction [petition] because
they could not have been brought at any earlier time.” Onyelobi v. State, 932 N.W.2d 272,
280 (Minn. 2019). “To receive an eviden tiary hearing on a postconviction claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a de fendant is required to allege facts that, if
proven by a fair preponderan ce of the evidence, would satisfy the two-prong test
announced in Strickland v. Washington .” Bobo v. State , 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn.
2012) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). To prevail under the
Strickland test, appellant must show that: (1) his counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 688,

1 Under this rule, a postconviction court cannot consider claims that were known or should
have been known at the time of a petitioner’s direct appeal but were not raised in that
appeal. State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976).
4
694. Appellant bears the burden of proving both prongs of this test. Gates v. State, 398
N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987).
Under the first prong, we consider whether counsel’s representation was reasonable.
“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney
exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would
perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 266-67 (Minn.
2014) (quotation omitted). Counsel’s pe rformance is presumed reasonable. Zornes v.
State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Minn. 2016). Appellate counsel “is not ineffective for failing
to raise issues that themselves have no merit.” Evans v. State, 788 N.W.2d 38, 45 (Minn.
2010). An appellate court presumes that counsel’s “judgment about which issues to raise
falls within the wide range of r easonable professional assistance.” Bobo, 820 N.W.2d at
516 (quotation omitted).
Appellant asserted in his petition that a ppellate counsel failed to raise claims on
direct appeal objecting to the testimony of certain trial witnesses, failed to object to aspects
of opposing counsel’s closing argument, and failed to argue that there were cumulative
errors at trial. The district court rejected these arguments, reasoning that it is not ineffective
assistance of counsel to decline to bring arguments that the attorney did not believe would
prevail.
On appeal, appellant focuses mainly on the burdensome workload of the public
defender’s office. Appellant cites a report from the State Board of Public Defense that “the
average full-time public defender has a case load in excess of 500 case units, where a case
unit is approximately equal to a misdem eanor and the American Bar Association
5
recommends a maximum caseload of 400 case un its.” Appellant argues that “[t]his is a
matter of the people of Minnesota not having sufficient resources to allow counsel working
for the public defender offices to take the time they need to be thorough to the detriment
of their clients.” Thus, he contends th at not granting a new trial will “embolden”
prosecutors.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently addressed a similar argument in Odell v.
State, 931 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 544 (2019). The defendant
based his ineffective-assistance claim, in part, on the workload of public defenders. Id. at
106. Relying on a law review article, th e defendant argued that trial counsel was
unconstitutionally ineffective “b ecause, according to the ar ticle, public defenders are
overworked and delegate too many responsibilities to their law clerks.” Id. at 106-07. The
supreme court rejected this argument, stating that the defendant “[did] not provide any facts
that would show that his public defenders were so overworked that they were
unconstitutionally ineffective in this case.” Id.
Similarly, appellant has not established that his counsel was so overworked that the
attorney provided ineffective assistance in his individual case. Yet appellant wants a new
trial where his “counsel will not have the burden of being task ed with impossible
caseloads.” But this is not the standard for an ineffective-assistance claim. Appellate
counsel’s decisions related to which claims to bring on direct appeal were matters of
strategy, which generally are not subject to review. Nunn v. State, 753 N.W.2d 657, 661
(Minn. 2008). Appellant does not explain how counsel’s decisions we re unreasonable.
And caselaw explicitly permits counsel to raise only those claims the attorney believes will
6
be most meritorious. Id. (noting that appellate counse l may only argue “the most
meritorious claims” (quotation omitted)); see also Morrow v. State, 886 N.W.2d 204, 206
(Minn. 2016) (noting that appellate counsel “does not have a duty to raise all possible
issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims on appeal”).
Appellant has not shown that his coun sel was so overworked that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Because appellant failed
to carry his burden of proof with respect to the first Strickland prong, we do not address
the second prong. See Nissalke v. State , 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (M inn. 2015) (“We may
dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other.”). Thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s post conviction petitio n without an
evidentiary hearing on this claim.
II. Appellant’s remaining claims are Knaffla-barred.
Together with his ineffective-assistance claim, appellant argues that: (1) the district
court erred by admitting testimonial evidence from the state’s expert witness, (2) the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for tampering with a witness, (3) his
sentence was cruel or unusual because it diffe red from the state’s plea deal, which he
rejected, and (4) the cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial.
Appellant’s claims are Knaffla-barred. A petition filed “aft er a direct appeal has
been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal
of the conviction or sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2020); see also Knaffla, 243
N.W.2d at 741 (recognizing that “where dire ct appeal has once been taken, all matters
raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a
7
subsequent petition for postconviction relief”). Claims are also Knaffla-barred when the
claim was raised in an earlier proceeding, but on slightly different grounds. Cooper v.
State, 745 N.W.2d 188, 193 (M inn. 2008) (applying Knaffla rule to claims presented in a
different way than in first proceeding). We review the district court’s Knaffla decision for
an abuse of discretion. Quick v. State, 692 N.W.2d 438, 439 (Minn. 2005).
Here, the district court determined that appellant’s “claims were either addressed on
appeal or known at the time of appeal.” The district court stated:
[Appellant’s] claims of error related to the admissibility
of expert testimony, whether th ere is sufficient evidence to
convict [appellant] of [w]itne ss [t]ampering, and whether the
difference between the State’s plea offer and the Court’s
sentence following gu ilty verdicts constitutes cruel [or]
unusual punishment were known but not raised during [his]
direct appeal, and are therefore barred from consideration[.]
In its memorandum accompanying the po stconviction order, the district court
analyzed each of appellant’s claims under the Knaffla doctrine. We briefly address each
in turn.
A. Challenge to admissibility of testimony of state’s expert witness
First, the district court found that appe llant’s challenge to the admissibility of
testimony from the state’s expert witness was barred because “the district court considered
and evaluated those issues,” and “[t]he topic was very much known at the time of appeal.”
In fact, appellant challenged the testimony of the state’s expert witness in his direct appeal.
Strother, 2019 WL 3293459, at *10. Appellant argued that the witness “assigned a
statistical probability to the likelihood” that the victim lied during her testimony. Id. We
determined that the witness acknowledged that false accusations do occur but did not opine
8
about whether the victim was truthful. Id. Appellant raises different objections to the
witness’s testimony in his current postco nviction petition. But the bases for these
objections were known at the time of his direct appeal. Thus, the district court properly
determined that appellant’s claim related to the expert’s testimony was Knaffla-barred.
B. Sufficiency of the evidence for witness tampering conviction
As for appellant’s sufficiency challenge , the district court found that “[a]
‘sufficiency of the evidence’ issue, following any jury or court trial, is always available for
review on appeal, and was certainly known to [appellant] and appellate counsel in this
matter.” The district court also recognized that this court even “touched upon” this issue
on direct appeal. We agree that appellant’s challenge to the witness-tampering conviction
was known to appellant at the time of his appeal. See Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440,
449 (Minn. 2006) (instructing th at procedural bar applies to claims that could have been
raised in previous appeal). In his direct appeal, while addressing a different issue, we also
considered the strength of the evidence of his guilt. Strother, 2019 WL 3293459, at *7.
We noted that together with the victim’s tes timony, the state also “p resented very strong
evidence corroborating [the victim’s] testimony and proving [appellant’s] guilt.” Id. The
state presented evidence from the victim’s olde st child and the victim’s mother, “both of
whom corroborated [her] testimony.” Id. Police officers and me dical witnesses testified
about their observations of the victim. Id. Lastly, we noted that the state “also introduced
corroborating physical evidence.” Id. Given the strength of this evidence, we determined
that there was “very strong eviden ce” to support the convictions. Id. Appellant’s
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is therefore Knaffla-barred.
9
C. Cruel or unusual sentence
Appellant argues that his sentence was “c ruel or unusual” under the Minnesota
Constitution. See Minn. Const. art. I, § 5 (prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment).
Appellant concedes that his sentence is in line with the sentencing guidelines. But
appellant argues that his sentence is cruel or unusual because it did not adopt the state’s
suggested plea agreement. Du ring plea negotiations before tr ial, the prosecutor offered
appellant a stay of execution. Appellant rejected the proposed plea agreement. Appellant
entered a plea of not guilty to ea ch of the charged offenses a nd the matter went to trial.
After the jury returned its ve rdict, the district court impos ed a 48-month sentence for the
criminal-sexual-conduct crime, and an 86-month sentence for the witness-tampering crime.
The prosecutor’s offer during plea negotiations—which appellant rejected—has no binding
effect now after the jury verdict. Further, appellant cites no authority suggesting either that
the guidelines sentence imposed here was cruel or unusual, or that a district court should
ignore the sentencing guidelines in favor of a rejected plea offer.
D. Cumulative effect of errors
Lastly, the district court rejected appellant’s claim that the cumulative effect of the
errors deprived him of a fair trial. Because appellant faile d to establish that an error
occurred, this claim also fails.
E. No Knaffla-bar exception applies
Minnesota recognizes two exceptions to the Knaffla bar and permits further review
when: (1) the petitioner presents a novel legal issue, or (2) th e interests of justice require
review. Zumberge v. State , 937 N.W.2d 406, 411-12 (Min n. 2019). Appellant has not
10
articulated why either exception should apply, “and we have previously declined to apply
the exceptions in the absence of such reasons.” Lee v. State, 717 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn.
2006); see also Buckingham v. State, 799 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Minn. 2011) (placing burden
of proof on petitioner). And an independent review of the record does not persuade us that
either exception applies.
In sum, we determine that appella nt’s arguments are barred under the Knaffla rule
because they were raised or could have been ra ised on direct appeal and no exception
applies. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily dismissing
appellant’s postconviction petition.
III. The state’s motion to strike is moot.
The state moved to strike the statement of facts in appellant’s brief because appellant
failed to include citations to the record and did not comply with the rules of civil appellate
procedure. Because we affirm the district court’s order, we deny the state’s motion to strike
as moot.
Affirmed; motion denied.