In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. R. H. T. and P. J., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0468

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. R. H. T. and P. J., Parents.

Filed October 25, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-JV-20-2929

Anne M. Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant
J.R.H.T.)

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney , Kathleen J. Schur, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Angela Sonsalla, Perham, Minnesota (for intervenor)

Deanne Raitz, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges a district cour t order terminating parental rights to a
minor child. Because the record supports the district court’s determination that a statutory
ground for termination exists and termination is in the child’s best interests, we affirm.
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FACTS
Child in Need of Protection or Services
Appellant J.R.H.T. is the mother of a child (the child) born in December 2014.1 In
early 2020, Otter Tail County Department of Human Services (the county) received reports
that the child was living in an unsafe environment and was exposed to drug use. Following
its investigation, the county filed a petition on February 10, 2020, a lleging that the child
was in need of protection or services (the CHIPS petition), and seeking an order for
immediate custody. The dist rict court held an emergenc y protective care hearing on
February 13 and granted the county’s reques t for immediate custod y of the child. On
March 10, the county filed an out-of-home placement plan. After the district court held a
contested adjudication trial on the CHIPS petition in July and August 2020, it adjudicated
the child in need of protection or services. The district court ordered placement to continue
with the county and formally adopted the co unty’s out-of-home placement plan. A short
time later, the county filed a second out-of-h ome placement plan, which largely matched
the first plan. The district court ordered mother to comply with this plan.2
Petition to Terminate Parental Rights (TPR)
On November 25, 2020, the county file d a petition seeking to involuntarily
terminate mother’s parental rights to the child. The county alleged four statutory grounds

1 The district court also terminated the parent al rights of the child’s father, P.J. Because
father does not challenge the district court’s termination of his parental rights, we limit our
review to the district court’s termination of mother’s parental rights.
2 The county offered mother serv ices right after the removal of the child. But the district
court did not order her to comply with the plan until after adjudication, in August 2020.
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in support of termination: (1) abandoning th e child; (2) substantially, continuously, or
repeatedly refusing or neglecting to comply with the duties imposed by the parent and child
relationship; (3) failing to correct the cond itions that led to th e child’s out-of-home
placement; and (4) neglecting the child in foster care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(1), 1(b)(2), 1(b)(5), and 1(b)(8) (2020).
TPR Trial and District Court Order Terminating Mother’s Parental Rights
The district court held a court trial in March 2021. The district court heard testimony
from the county’s ongoing case manager, the child’s clinical therapist, mother’s treatment
counselors at Teen Challenge and Healing H ouse, the guardian ad litem (the GAL), the
child’s grandmother, and mother. On April 1, the district court issued its written findings,
conclusions and order, terminating mother’s parental rights to the child. The district court
found that the testimony of the county’s witnesses was both credible and supported by the
evidence presented. The district court did not find mother’s testimony credible.
The district court determined that the county satisfied its burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that mother’s parent al rights should be terminated because:
(1) the child was abandoned, 3 (2) mother failed to comply with the parent and child
relationship, (3) mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home
placement, despite reasonable efforts by the coun ty to return the child to mother’s home,
and (4) the child was neglected an d in foster care. The distri ct court also found that the
county made reasonable efforts to return the child to mother’s home and offered services

3 Mother argues that the evidence does not support abandonment. The county agreed that
this statutory ground had not been proven.
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that were timely, available, relevant, and culturally appropriate for the child and the family.
The district court found that these services provided a meaningful opportunity to address
the child’s out-of-home placement. Yet the district court foun d that mother did not fully
engage in these services and substantially failed to comply with the court-ordered
placement plan to demonstrate a commitment to reunification. Lastly, the district court
determined that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
The district court weighed the competing interests of mother and the child and concluded
that the benefits to the child that would result from a termination of parental rights
outweighed the interests in preserving the parent and child relationship.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that at least one
statutory ground existed to support termination of parental rights.
Mother challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights. Parental
rights may only be terminated for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O.,
462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). Whether to terminate parental rights is discretionary
with the district court. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn.
2014). A district court may order the terminati on of parental rights if it (1) finds by clear
and convincing evidence that a statutory condition exists to support termination,
(2) determines that termination is in the child’s best interests, and (3) finds that reasonable
efforts toward reunification were either ma de or were not required. Minn. Stat.
§§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8; .317, subd. 1 (2020); see also In re Welfare of Child. of
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S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “We review the termination of parental rights
to determine whether the district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether
the district court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly
erroneous.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
The existence of a statutory condition perm itting the termination of parental rights
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1; Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a). The county bears the burden of proving the grounds for
termination. See In re Welfare of Child of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 869-70 (Minn. 2021).
“[W]e closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear
and convincing.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. “[W]e w ill review the district court’s
findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its determination of
whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present
for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn.
App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Child of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court determined that th e county proved by clear and convincing
evidence that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-
of-home placement.4 The district court may terminate a parent’s rights on this ground if

4 The district court determined that three other statutory bases also supported termination.
The state concedes that the record did not support termination based on abandonment. But
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“reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions
leading to the child’s placemen t.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). A reviewing
court presumes that reasonable efforts have fa iled if: (1) the “child has resided out of the
parental home under court order for a cumulative period of 12 months,” (2) “the court has
approved the out-of-home placement plan,” (3) the “conditions leading to the out-of-home
placement have not been corrected” as shown by the parent not “substantially [complying]
with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan,” and (4) “reasonable efforts have been
made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id.,
subd. 1(b)(5)(i)-(iv).
Mother does not challenge the first and second elements, which the record supports.
Mother did not correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home placement.
As for the third element, mother argues that she corrected the conditions leading to
the out-of-home placement. We are not pers uaded. The county ope ned an investigation
after it received reports that the child was living in an un safe environment and that adults
used and possessed controlled substances aro und him. The county found several prior
child-protection reports showing “concerns of chemical use by [mother], injuries the child
had suffered, inappropriate supervision of the child, and concerns surrounding the child’s
environment.” The reports revealed that mother and other caregivers passed out from drug
use in front of the child, rendering them unable to provide for the child’s health or safety.

because we determine that moth er failed to correct the cond itions leading to the child’s
out-of-home placement, we do not address the remaining two bases. See In re Welfare of
Child of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 & n.2 (Minn. 2004) (recognizing that only one statutory
ground needs to be proven to support termination of parental rights).
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The county also learned that the child spent as much as one to two weeks each month living
with mother’s cousin in Nort h Dakota because mother was unable to care for him.
Mother’s cousin told the county that mother “had a history of pr ior controlled substance
use” and was using drugs. The child’s maternal grandmother also took care of the child
“for significant periods of time.”
When the county took custody of the child in February 2020 , following the
emergency protective care hearing, the county noticed that th e child’s hair and eyebrows
had been shaved. The county investigator testified that in her 19 years in child protection
she had never encountered a child who had their eyebrows shaved, but she had experienced
situations in which a child’s head had been shaved to avoid a hair follicle test.
At the CHIPS trial, the district court credited testimony from the county’s witnesses
that the child was “without n ecessary food, clothing, shelte r, education or other care
because the child’s parent is un able or unwilling to provide said care.” The district court
noted that the child did not ha ve a “primary or stable residence,” and instead “float[ed]
from house to house” among various relatives. The district court was also “concerned”
that mother only visited the child one time—in June—between his removal and the CHIPS
trial. The district court determined that mo ther failed to show s obriety or “otherwise
cooperate with [the county] in any way, including visitation with the child.”
After the CHIPS trial, the county filed an out-of-home placement plan. The district
court ordered mother to comply with this plan. The placeme nt plan required mother to:
(1) abstain from the use of all non-prescribed mood-altering substances, (2) ensure that the
child was not exposed to drug use or domes tic violence, (3) comp lete a chemical-use
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assessment, (4) comply with random drug screening, (5) en sure that the child was not
exposed to any criminal activity, (6) comple te a parental capacity evaluation with a
diagnostic assessment component, (7) complete parenting education, and (8) remain law
abiding.5
During the termination-of-parental-rights tr ial, the district court heard testimony
from the county case manager about mother’s lack of complia nce with the court-ordered
placement plan. The case manager testified that as of the first day of trial, the child had
been out of mother’s home for 390 days. Th e case manager referred mother for a rule 25
assessment, which she did not complete. Later, in October 2020, mother did complete an
assessment. The assessment recommended th at mother complete inpatient chemical
dependency treatment, random te sting, and mental-health counseling. Mother was
scheduled to start inpatient treatment at Teen Challenge on October 15, 2020, but she failed
to start treatment as schedul ed. Mother entered the prog ram about a month later, in
November 2020. Mother completed three drug tests in September 2020, before entering
Teen Challenge. She tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines on two of
these tests. Mother did not complete any drug tests in October or November. The case
manager testified that mother had shown no periods of sobriety while in the community.
The district court also heard testimony from the Teen Challe nge counselor. The
Teen Challenge counselor testified that mother denied having a drug problem and showed
little insight into her drug use. Mother admi tted that she used me thamphetamine the day

5 On or about March 26, 2021, the state ch arged mother with a felony fifth-degree
controlled substance crime.
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before she entered Teen Challenge because “[i]t was a free high because she knew she had
to go to treatment.” The Teen Challenge counselor testified that even after mother began
engaging in treatment, she continued to deny that she was responsible for her actions or for
the child’s trauma.
On appeal, mother argues that she corrected the conditions lead ing to the child’s
out-of-home placement because sh e successfully completed i npatient treatment at Teen
Challenge and was engaged in outpatient treatm ent at Healing House. The district court
acknowledged that mother su ccessfully graduated from Teen Challenge and has had no
positive urinalysis tests at Healing House. But the district court also credited the witness’s
testimony that mother’s prognosis was only “fair, if [she] follows all recommendations.”
The district court noted that mother was still in treatment as of the time of trial and had not
shown that she could maintain her sobriety outside of treatment. The district court found
that while mother entered and remained in treatment to address her drug-use issues, “the
testimony indicates that [she] still largely re fuses to accept responsibility for her actions
leading to the out of home pl acement of the child, and her ac tions (or lack thereof) that
caused the child to remain in foster care for over a year.”
The record supports the district court’s findings that mother refuses to accept
responsibility for her actions. Mother was in Teen Challenge from November 13, 2020 to
January 11, 2021. Mother at first denied having a drug problem and claimed she “just
lacked motivation for sobriety and lack of awareness of her drug addiction.” The counselor
characterized mother as being at the highest risk factor fo r continued use and relapse.
Mother was “closed off” in November and December 2020. Eventually, the counselor told
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mother that she would not graduate from Teen Challenge if she did not engage in treatment.
Mother began to complete her homework and participate in treatment at that time, but
continued to deny that she was responsible for her actions and explained that she only sold
drugs but did not take them. Teen Challenge discharged mother in December 2020 and
recommended a transfer to Healing House.
A case coordinator at Healing House has been working with mother since she
transferred to Healing House from Teen Challenge in January 2021. The witness testified
that mother has “done really well” in the program, participates in class, and completes her
assignments. Mother is at phase two of the program, out of f our total phases. Mother is
eligible to remain at Hea ling House until about January 20 23 and has not yet completed
her treatment. Mother was still at Healing Hous e at the time of trial. The district court
acknowledged that at the tim e of the TPR trial mother was addressing her controlled
substance issues. But the district court also found that:
Maybe the single most im portant fact in this case is that for a
large portion of the time that the child was placed out of home,
[mother] did nothing. Based on her testimony, she [now]
understands that her addiction and inability to accept
responsibility made it difficult for her to engage in services and
the Court commends that realiz ation; however, in the months
that it took for her to reach this level of understanding, the child
was left to wonder where his Mother was and when he would
see her again. This caused signi ficant trauma to the child and
the Court does not find it in his best interests to force him to
continue living with this uncertainty, especially when [mother]
is still a significant amount of time away from being able to
independently live with and care for the child.
The record also supports th e district court’s findings th at mother refused to take
responsibility for the child’s trauma. The child’s therapist first met the child in September
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2020. The therapist completed a diagnostic assessment with the child and diagnosed him
with adjustment disorder with mixed disturba nce of emotions and conduct based on
experiencing trauma and neglect. The ther apist described the child as “hyperactive,”
“dysregulated,” and “quite aggr essive in his interactions w ith the toys.” Based on her
observations, the therapist believed that he “had been in a place that was unsafe.”
The GAL also prepared a stat ement to share with the dist rict court about mother’s
response to the child’s trauma. The GAL noted that mother did not comply with the court
order to submit to random testing “for most of the first ten months of this case,” and allowed
the child “to wonder about her whereabouts for months.” Th e GAL stated that the child
“needs to have perman ency established for him now,” a nd “should not be expected to
continue to linger in out of home placemen t, waiting for [mother] to make the necessary
changes.” Ultimately, the GAL supported establishing permanency for the child by
terminating mother’s parental rights.
The district court found th e testimony of the county’s witnesses credible. The
record supports the district court’s findings that mother has not co rrected the conditions
that led to the child’s out-of-home placement under the third element.
The county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
As to the fourth element, the district court found that the county made reasonable
efforts to return the child to mother. We review the district court’s underlying factual
findings for clear error, and its ultimate determination for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare
of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321- 22 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July
20, 2015); see also In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d at 900-01 (stating that
12

“we will review the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error,
but we review its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily
terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion”).
Counties are required to make reasonable ef forts at reunification before a district
court may terminate a parent’s rights. In re Welfare of Child of T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664;
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2020). Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere
matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W.,
727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2007). To determine whether efforts were reasonable, the district court considers whether
the services offered were: (1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate
to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) cultura lly appropriate; (4) available and
accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h) (2020). Finally, th e district court must consider “the length of the time the
county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d
529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).
The district court made thor ough findings of fact related to the county’s efforts to
alleviate the conditions that gave rise to the need for out-of-home placement. The district
court found that the county “exercised due diligence and offered services that were timely,
available, relevant, and culturally appropri ate for the child and family to remedy the
circumstances requiring the foster care placement.” These services included: (1) chemical
health services; (2) parenting-skills services , including a parental ca pacity evaluation, a
family resource worker, skills during visitation, and parenting classes; (3) mental health
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services, including diagnostic assessments; (4) services aimed at addressing the family’s
basic needs, such as assisting with housing, providing direction to financial resources and
housing, and assisting with ob taining a driver’s license; (5) transportation services; and
(6) visitation with the child. Despite these o fferings, the district court found that mother
failed to “fully engage” with the county’s services, and thus “substantially failed to comply
with the court ordered case plans to de monstrate a commitment to reunification and
remediation of the issues that necessitated removal of the child.”
Extensive evidence in the record supports the district court’s findings that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The county offered transportation services
to facilitate visitation with the child, but mother did not request or engage in this service.
Following the November 2020 vi sit, the county “had to canc el every other visit” after
November 2020, “due to [mother] not complying” with drug testing. Mother only had two
visits with the child in 390 days, despite th e county’s efforts. The county case manager
testified that mother also failed to complete the parental capacity evaluation required by
her case plan. The case manager testified that mother had only “minimal visitation” with
the child “throughout the entire case.” The case manager noted that these visits were
supervised because mother was not “able to show that she [was] sober.” The case manager
noted that mother did not establish any periods of sobriety in the community. Additionally,
the case manager testified that mother did no t have stable employment, failed to remain
law abiding, and did not find stable housing.
Based on this testimonial evidence—which the district court found credible—the
district court determined that the county’s efforts were “reasonable efforts to reunify [the
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child] with [mother].” Despite these reasonable efforts, the district court found that “the
conditions that made out-of-home placement ne cessary continue to exist.” The record
supports the district court’s findings that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify
mother and the child under the fourth element.
Clear and convincing evidence in the record supports the district court’s underlying
factual findings identifying the services offe red by the county. And we discern no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s ultimate determination that the county’s efforts were
reasonable.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that reasonable
efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), and by terminating mother’s parental rights on this
basis.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
of mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
Even if a statutory basis for termination is present, the child’s best interests are the
“paramount consideration” in a termination pr oceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7
(2020); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2 020). The district court balances
three factors when considering the child’s best interests: (1) the child’s interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) th e parent’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; and (3) any competing intere sts of the child. Minn . R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii); see also In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (“Competing
interests [of the child] in clude such things as a stable e nvironment, health considerations
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and the child’s preferences.” (quotation omitte d)). We review a district court’s best-
interests determination for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
The district court weighed the competing interests of mother and the child and
concluded that mother “failed to place the needs of the child” ab ove her own needs and
desires. The district court noted that fro m the outset, mother sh owed an inability to
“differentiate what is best for her and what is best for the child.” The district court
determined that the child w ould “benefit[] from stability,” a nd that he was “unsafe and
unhealthy” in mother’s care. The district c ourt found that the chil d had an interest in
achieving a safe and stable permanent home, which mother could not provide. The district
court balanced the competing interests of th e child for a safe, sober, and stable living
environment against mother’s interests in maintaining a relationship with the child. Upon
weighing the factors, the district court found that the interests favored terminating mother’s
parental rights.
The district court’s best-int erest findings are amply sup ported by the record. The
child did not have a permanen t residence and was regularly “shuffled” between relatives
in Minnesota and North Dakota. The child’s th erapist testified that in therapy the child
exhibited signs consistent with a child raised in an “unsafe” environment. The therapist
diagnosed the child with an ad justment disorder with mixed emotions and conduct based
on the trauma and neglect he experienced.
Further, both the therapist and the child’s grandmother testified that the child
exhibited concerning behaviors following an in-person visit with mother. Grandmother
has been the child’s primary caregiver since Fe bruary 2020. Grandmother stated that the
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child had “terrible fits” when he first came to live with her, but has since “gotten better.”
Grandmother agreed that the ch ild “feels very much a part of [the] household,” and is
integrated into her home and the community. Th e child attends school, Cub Scouts and
church, and has made friends at school. Yet following the February 2020 visit with mother,
grandmother noticed that the child “wouldn’ t eat at all” for nearly two weeks.
Grandmother also observed some remote visits between mother and the child and described
them as “not well.” The therapist was also troubled by the child’s behavior following the
November 2020 visit with moth er. The therapist noticed “a serious regression going on
following the visit,” and note d that the child had more problems in school, increased
hyperactivity, and additional di sciplinary problems at school. The therapist had three
conversations with mother, during which mother blamed grandmother for the child’s
problems and refused to take responsibility for the child’s trauma. Th e therapist did not
believe that face-to-face contact with mother was in the child’s best interests.
The GAL testified that although mother loved the child, she “[has] not put his needs
above her own.” The GAL stat ed that the child had been in out-of-home placement for
more than 390 days, which was “a significant amount of time in a six-year-old’s life.” The
GAL stated that the child “needs to have permanency established for him now.” The GAL
believed that terminating mother’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interests.
We determine that there are sufficient fact s in the record to support the district
court’s determination that termination of moth er’s parental rights is in the child’s best
interests. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion on this issue.
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In sum, because a statutory ground for termination of parental rights is supported by
clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the child’s best interests, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by terminating mother’s parental rights to the child.
Affirmed.