State of Minnesota, Respondent,

1
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0469

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Karl Alfredo Rosillo,
Appellant.

Filed March 28, 2022
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-19-3781

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Patrick McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
On direct appeal from his convictions of first-degree sale and third-degree
possession of a controlled substance, appellant argues that (1) the state presented
insufficient evidence to prove that appellant possessed the methamphetamine found in his
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vehicle and (2) the district court plainly erred by admitting two officers’ testimonies
because their testimonies constituted inadmissible drug-dealer profile evidence. Appellant
also asserts additional claims in a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 4, 2019, law-enforcement officers were attempting to find appellant
Karl Alfredo Rosillo, who had an outstanding warrant. Offi cers stopped T.C., a known
acquaintance of appellant, and, during that stop, an officer asked T.C. if they knew where
to find appellant. T.C. told the officer a bout a vehicle appellant drove and a farmhouse
appellant frequented. The officer went to the farmhouse and saw the vehicle T.C. described
parked outside. Officers began monitoring the area.
Shortly thereafter, the vehicle left the fa rmhouse, with M.R. driving and appellant
in the front passenger seat. Officers attempte d to pull the vehicle ove r, but it sped away
and did not stop until it eventu ally collided with an appr oaching police car. Officers
ordered appellant and M.R. to get out of the vehicle. M.R. got out immediately. Appellant
sat with his hands up in the passenger seat until an officer pulled him out from the driver’s
side. Appellant briefly struggled while an officer handcuffed him.
Officers searched the vehicle. On the floor of the driver’s side, officers found a
black bag containing a wallet holding $4,270 in cash. On the passe nger side, they found
seven “gem baggies” 1 containing a crystal substance, a glass pipe, a spoon, an empty but
possibly used “gem baggie,” and a black drawstring bag.

1 Officers testified that “gem baggie” refers to a type of Ziploc bag.
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Testing by the Minnesota Bureau of Cr iminal Apprehension (BCA) confirmed that
the substance in the baggies was methamphetamine weighing 19.097 grams. The baggies
were submitted for DNA testing, but the results were inconclusive.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with the kidnapping of M.R.,
fleeing a police officer, first-degree controlled-substance sale, and third-degree controlled-
substance possession. At appellant’s jury tria l, officers testified about their arrest of
appellant and the items they found in the vehi cle. Two officers testified generally about
their experience with drug sales.
Appellant presented defense witnesses T.A., M.F., and D.S. M.F. and D.S. testified
that, around September 4, 2019, T.C. worked on appellant’s vehicle and that they had seen
T.C. with a black bag. T.A., M.F., and D.S. were all held in the same county jail building
as appellant at some point after his arrest.
The district court entered a judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping and fleeing
charges. The jury found a ppellant guilty of first-degree controlled-substance sale in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd . 1(1) (2018), and third-degree controlled-
substance possession in viola tion of Minn. Stat. § 152.023 , subd. 2(a)(1) (2018). The
district court sentenced appellant to 256 months’ imprisonment for the first-degree
controlled-substance-sale conviction. This appeal follows.
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DECISION
I. The state presented suffi cient evidence to prove that appellant possessed the
methamphetamine found in the vehicle.

Appellant first argues that the state presen ted insufficient evidence to prove that he
possessed the methamphetamine found in his vehicle. We disagree.
The parties agree that the state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove appellant’s
controlled-substance offenses. When a verdict is based on circumstantial evidence, we use
a two-step analysis. State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Mi nn. 2013). First, we
identify the circumstances proved and assume th at the jury believed the state’s witnesses
and disbelieved the defense’s witnesses. Id. at 598-99. Second, we “determine whether
the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). We examine independently
the “reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn,” giving no deference to the jury’s
choice between reasonable inferences. Id. (quotation omitted).
The jury found appellant guilty of fi rst-degree controlled-substance sale. 2 To
convict, the state had to prove that appe llant knowingly possessed the methamphetamine
found in the vehicle. The parties agree th at the state had to prove that appellant

2 A defendant is guilty of first-degree cont rolled-substance sale if “on one or more
occasions within a 90-day period the person unlawfully sells one or more mixtures of a
total weight of 17 grams or more contai ning . . . methamphetamine.” Minn. Stat.
§ 152.021, subd. 1(1). To “se ll” means “(1) to sell, give away, barter, deliver, exchange,
distribute or dispose of to another, or to manufacture” or “to possess with intent to perform
an act listed in clause (1).” Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a(1), (3) (2018). The state
charged appellant with first-degree controlled- substance sale on the th eory that appellant
possessed with intent to sell the methamphetamine found in the vehicle.
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constructively possessed the methamphetamine. The state proves constructive possession
when (1) the item was found “in a place under defendant’s exclusive control to which other
people normally did not have access” or (2) if the item was found in a place to which others
had access, “there is a strong probability (inf erable from other eviden ce) that at the time
the defendant was consciously or knowingly ex ercising dominion and control over it.”
State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017 ). A defendant may possess an item
jointly with another person. Id. But the defendant must have exercised dominion and
control over the item itself and not merely the place where it was found. State v. Hunter,
857 N.W.2d 537, 542-43 (Minn. App. 2014). “Proximity is an important factor in
establishing constructive possession.” State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. App.
2013) (quotation omitted).
The state proved the following circumstances at trial:
 Officers received information from T.C. that appellant
may be at a particular farmhouse with a particular
vehicle.

 Officers located the described vehicle at the farmhouse.

 The vehicle belonged to appellant.

 During the officers’ observation, pursuit, and stop of the
vehicle, M.R. drove and appellant sat in the front
passenger seat.

 The vehicle did not stop when officers attempted to pull
it over.

 Pursuing officers saw appe llant slouching low in his
seat, looking around frantica lly, removing his seatbelt,
and reaching for the steering wheel.
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 The vehicle sped away fr om the officers, moved
erratically, and did not st op until it crashed into an
oncoming police car.

 M.R. immediately got out of the car and surrendered,
but the officers had to remove appellant from the
vehicle, and appellant briefly resisted an officer’s
attempt to handcuff him.

 Officers searched the vehicl e and found seven baggies
containing a crystal substance. The officers found five
baggies protruding from underneath the passenger-side
glovebox area, one baggie between the front passenger
seat and the passenger door, and one baggie on or near
the front passenger seat.

 Officers found a wallet with $4,270 under the driver’s
seat.

 Five of the baggies contained a total of 19.097 grams of
methamphetamine.

 No usable DNA was found on the baggies.
First, the circumstances prove d are consistent with appe llant’s guilt. The vehicle
belonged to appellant. Appellant sat closest to the methamphetamine, which officers found
on the passenger side within appellant’s reach. Appellant’s flight from the officers, his
furtive movements during pursuit, and his resistance to arrest further support an inference
of guilt. See State v. Caine , 746 N.W.2d 339, 356 (Minn. 2008) (noting that flight is
evidence of consciousness of guilt); State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 746 (Minn. 2010)
(noting that resisting arrest is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt).
Appellant argues that the circumstances proved are consistent with the rational
hypothesis that someone else, such as T.C. or M.R., possessed the methamphetamine. This
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alternative hypothesis that T. C. possessed the drugs and hid them in appellant’s vehicle
rests entirely on the testimony of defense witnesses T.A., M.F ., and D.S. On appeal, we
defer to the jury’s rejec tion of those witnesses. See Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598-99.
Appellant’s alternative hypothesis that M.R. alone possessed the methamphetamine is also
not a rational inference from the circumstances proved. Although M.R. drove the vehicle,
the vehicle belonged to appellant, officers found the methamphetamine on the passenger
side where he sat, appellant resisted arrest , and none of the other circumstances proved
suggest that M.R. alone possessed the meth amphetamine. At most, the circumstances
proved are consistent with the hypothesis th at M.R. and appellant jointly possessed the
methamphetamine. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601 (“A defendant may possess an item
jointly with another person.”).
Appellant argues that his case is like State v. Sam , 859 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. App.
2015), and State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 2017). The facts in Sam are
distinguishable. The appellant-driver in Sam had borrowed the ve hicle from another
person, officers found the methamphetamine in the glove compartm ent in front of a
passenger who had methamphetamine in his walle t, and no drugs or paraphernalia were
found on the appellant’s person. 859 N.W.2d at 834-36. This court accordingly concluded
that a reasonable inference existed that e ither the owner of the car or the passenger
possessed the methamphetamine and put it in the glove compartment. Id. at 835.
Harris is similarly distinguishable. In Harris, the appellant drove a car he did not
own, a firearm not immediately visible to th e searching officer in the dark was stuck
between the headliner and the roof of the car, and two other occupants of the vehicle could
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not be excluded as contributors to DNA found on the firearm. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 602-
03. Based on those circumstances, the supreme court concluded that a reasonable inference
existed that the defendant did not know the firearm was in the car. Id. at 603. As noted
above, the circumstances here are different. Because the circumstances proved here are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis, we conclude that
the state presented sufficient evidence to support appellant’s convictions.
II. The district court did not plainly err by admitting two officers’ testimonies.
Appellant next argues that the district court plainly erred by admitting two officers’
testimonies because they constituted improper drug-dealer profile ev idence. We are not
persuaded.
Because appellant failed to object to th e officers’ testimonies on these grounds at
trial, we may review the admission for plain error. 3 See State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177,
182 (Minn. 2002). Plain error exists when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that
affects the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn.
2006). If those three prongs ar e met, we assess whether the e rror should be addressed to
ensure the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. Id. An error is “plain” if it is
clear or obvious by contravening caselaw, a rule, or a standard of conduct. Id.
Testimony regarding quantities of drugs ty pically possessed for sale compared to
personal use or explaining how certain items indicate drug sales is generally admissible
when it is relevant to show that a defendant intended to sell drugs. See State v. Barajas ,

3 Appellant objected to the officers’ testimonies at trial but on the grounds that the officers’
testimonies amounted to improper expert-opinion testimony by a lay witness.
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817 N.W.2d 204, 222-23 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012). In
contrast, testimony that goes “well beyond” t hose subjects and instead suggests that a
defendant is a drug dealer because he shares traits of other drug dealers amounts to drug-
dealer profile evidence and is plainly inadmissible. See Litzau, 650 N.W.2d at 185. This
may include officer testimony about the typical behavior of drug couriers, including that
they typically bought tickets with cash, came from a “source” city like Detroit, and usually
used the club car on the train. State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 548 (Minn. 1994). The
supreme court likened this type of tes timony to inadmissible character evidence. Id.
Inadmissible drug-dealer profile testimony ma y also include that drug dealers often buy
vehicles without transferring title to their ow n names, sometimes use an older vehicle to
transport drugs to avoid forfeiture of newer vehicles, and often hi de drugs in obscure
places, such as the air cleaner. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d at 185.
Here, as in Litzau, the district court determined that the state’s witnesses could
testify about quantities of drugs and items commonly found in a suspect’s possession that
indicate drug sales. At trial, one officer stated that, in his experience, someone involved in
methamphetamine sale has more than a small amount or has the methamphetamine divided
into several bags and that se llers will have a scale, clean bags, and U.S. currency. He
explained that sellers are typically found with U.S. currency because the cash is either
profits from sale or used to buy more drugs to sell, since “drug sales is a cash business”;
that people in drug sales have clean baggies so they can bag smaller amounts for sale; that
people who sell drugs often have drugs divided into baggies to facilitate a quicker sale; and
that a drug seller may have a scale on hand to weigh particular amounts for buyers. He
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also explained that possession of those items differs from someone engaged in personal
use because “Typically, someone would not have several bags. They’d have one bag of
their own drugs that they use and not have a scale with them, in my experience.”
Another officer testified that, in his experience, someone looking to buy for personal
use would buy small amounts of “a gram or two” while a seller would buy enough “to also
sell to make money” and “usually 7 grams is what they’ll purchase.” He also testified that
if someone is selling, “sometimes people will have individual bags already set up so it’s
easier for them to sell in the specific weights” or “sometimes they’ll just have one lump
sum and they’ll scoop it out of whatever they have and weigh it out.”
Appellant compares this testimony to that in Haaland v. State, No. A10-1124, 2011
WL 781229 (Minn. App. Mar. 8, 2011). First, Haaland is a nonprecedential and
nonbinding opinion. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136. 01, subd. 1(c) (stating that
nonprecedential opinions are no t binding authority but may be cited as persuasive
authority). Second, it is unpersuasive. In Haaland, an officer testified that he suspected
the defendant was a drug trafficker because the defendant drove a vehicle not registered to
him, there were air fresheners and energy drinks in the ve hicle, and the vehicle’s body
panels appeared to have been previously removed. Haaland, 2011 WL 781229, at *4. This
court concluded that was inadmissible drug- trafficker profile evidence because the
testimony went beyond the officers’ observations to their conclusion that, consistent with
typical drug dealers, the appellant was using the vehicle to transport drugs. Id.
Here, the officers’ testimonies informed the jurors about how the quantity of drugs,
their packaging, and the items found nearby potentially related to appellant’s intent to sell
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methamphetamine. This is permissible testimony regarding quantities of drugs and items
indicating drug sales which did not go “well beyond” those subjects. As a result, the district
court did not plainly err by admitting it.
We also note that, in his closing argument at trial, appellant specifically highlighted
parts of the officers’ testimonies he now cl aims were plainly inadmissible. Appellant
reminded the jury that the offi cers had testified that drug dealers have clean baggies and
scales, noted that officers found no clean bagg ies or scales in appellant’s vehicle, and
argued that the lack of such items weighed against appellant’s guilt. Appellant also pointed
out the lack of scales and baggies while cr oss-examining the officers. Appellant cannot
now claim on appeal that thes e testimonies are inadmissible after failing to object and
relying on them. See State v. Helenbolt, 334 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 1983) (stating that
appellant could not complain about inadmissible evidence on appeal when appellant failed
to object to state eliciting challenged evidence and, as part of trial strategy, re-elicited the
same evidence and used it in his final argument).
III. None of appellant’s claims in his pro se brief merit relief.
Appellant raises several additional claims in a supplemental pro se brief. Appellant
argues that: (1) he received ineffective a ssistance of counsel; (2 ) the state improperly
charged him; (3) the district court should not have allowed certain evidence and statements;
(4) the jurors were biased; and (5) the distri ct court ordered excessi ve restitution. We
briefly address each argument below and conclude that none merit relief.
To establish that he is entitled to relief b ecause he received ineffective assistance of
counsel, appellant must demonstrate that (1 ) his counsel’s representation fell below an
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objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Anderson v. State, 830 N.W.2d
1, 10 (Minn. 2013). Trial counsel is afforded wide latitude to determine trial strategy, and
we generally will not review atta cks on counsel’s trial strategy. See Opsahl v. State, 677
N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004). We review de novo whether a defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Dereje v. State, 837 N.W.2d 714, 721 (Minn. 2013).
Appellant first makes general assertions that his trial counsel was unprepared and
failed to investigate. These are conclusory a ssertions without adequate factual support.
See State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2007) (noting that appellant asserting
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must “do more than offer conclusory
argumentative assertions, without factual suppor t”). Appellant also argues that his trial
counsel failed to object to the disclosure of M.R.’s name and age at trial and to the state
playing video of the police pursuit of appellant’s vehicle. But “[d]ecisions about objections
at trial are matters of trial strategy, wh ich [appellate courts] will not review.” State v.
Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 592 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Appellant also argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because
his counsel failed to call L.B., a crucial witness to appellant’s alternative-perpetrator theory
regarding T.C., to testify. Which witnesses to call at trial is also a matter of trial strategy
that we do not review. See State v. Bobo , 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009).
Additionally, three other defense witnesses tes tified in support of appellant’s alternative-
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perpetrator theory. The jury rejected that theory, and appellant has not shown that L.B.’s
additional testimony would have led to a different result.
Finally, appellant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
because he did not move for a judgment of acquittal. Appellant challenged the sufficiency
of the evidence on appeal. A motion for judgment of acquittal would have tested the same
evidence according to the same legal analysis as his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. See
State v. McCormick, 835 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15,
2013). Because we conclude that the stat e presented sufficient evidence to support
appellant’s controlled-substance conviction, he cannot establish that the trial result would
have been different had his counsel sought a judgment of acquittal on that charge.
Appellant argues that the state improp erly charged him because 50 grams of
methamphetamine were required to convict him of first-degree possession of a controlled
substance. Appellant appears to have mistaken the first-degree possession statute, which
requires that a defendant unlawfully possess 50 or more grams of a mixture containing
methamphetamine, see Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1), with the first-degree sale
statute. The state charged appellant with first-degree sale of a controlled substance in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd.1(1), which only requires that a defendant possess
with intent to sell one or more mixtures weighing 17 or more grams of a mixture containing
methamphetamine. Appellant’s claim fails.
Appellant argues that statements made at trial giving M.R.’s name and age were
“Crawford violations.” At the start of trial, appellant objected to any identification of M.R.,
including passing references to her name and age, arguing the information came from
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testimonial hearsay statements, and, becaus e M.R. did not testify, admission of such
testimony violated appellant’s confrontation rights under Crawford v. Washington , 541
U.S. 36 (2004). But even if we were to as sume that references to M.R.’s name and age
were inadmissible under Crawford, reversal is not required if the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Swaney, 787 N.W.2d 541, 555 (Minn. 2010). An
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the guilty verdict is surely unattributable to
the error. Id. Appellant does not explain how brie f references to M.R.’s name and age
affected the jury’s controlled-substance verdic t. Accordingly, even if the admission of
such references was error, it was harmless error.
Appellant claims jury bias. Appellant’s jury-bias claims are unsupported by citation
to relevant legal authority and are therefore waived. See State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713,
719 (Minn. 2002). Further, the record reflects that the prospective jurors appellant claims
were biased were not ultimately selected to sit on his jury.
Finally, appellant challenges the district court’s restitution order. The district court
ordered appellant to pay $16,072.25 in restitution requested by the state. A restitution order
must be challenged within 30 days of receipt of written notice of the amount of restitution
or within 30 days of sentencing. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2020). Appellant did
neither. Because appellant did not challeng e restitution within th e 30-day statutory
timeframe, he cannot challenge it now. See State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn.
2011) (concluding that statutory deadline a pplies to preclude review on appeal when
offender disputes amount or type of restitution).
Affirmed.