Clayton Douglas Groves, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0474

Clayton Douglas Groves, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded
Cleary, Judge*

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-17-2369

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joseph Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Appellant Clayton Douglas Groves challenges the district court’s denial of his
petition for postconviction relief, arguing that: (1) his convictions for criminal sexual
conduct should be vacated because his right to a speedy trial was violated, and (2) the
postconviction court abused its discretion by rejecting his request for in-camera review of
the victim’s counseling and social services records. We conclude that appellant’s speedy-
trial right was not violated, but we agree that the postconviction court abused its discretion
by denying appellant’s motion for in-camera review of the victim’s records. We therefore
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
Appellant was charged with various counts of criminal sexual conduct against M.S.,
the eight-year-old daughter of appellant’s ex-girlfriend. M.S. told a police investigator that
appellant touched her on her leg, stomach, and private parts with his hand but not with any
other part of his body. Appellant denied the allegations. The state charged appellant with
three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct against M.S.
Before trial, appellant moved the court for in-camera review of M.S.’s social service
and counseling records. Appellant’s motion was submitted with an affidavit in which
appellant stated that he had learned from M.S.’s mother that M.S. had previously made
sexual assault allegations against her biological father to a representative at her school.
Appellant identified M.S.’s elementary school and stated that the report had been made in
2014 or 2015. Appellant’s affidavit asserted that, because the school was a mandated
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reporter, the allegations had been investigated by social services and the allegations had
not been substantiated. Appellant stated in his affidavit that he had been told by M.S.’s
mother that, because of the allegations, M.S. was seeking ongoing counseling at the school.
Appellant stated that any unsubstantiated or false allegations were relevant to his defense
as evidence of fabrication or truth conflation by M.S. Appellant asked the district court to
review M.S.’s social service and counseling records and to disclose to the defense any
relevant information. The district court found that appellant had not made a plausible
showing that the information he sought would be material and favorable to his defense and
denied the motion.
On June 28, 2018, appellant demanded a speedy trial. His trial date was set for
August 28, 2018. On August 7, M.S. spoke with the police investigator and described new
incidents, including an incident where appellant penetrated M.S.’s vagina with his penis.
On August 10, the state filed an amended complaint which added a charge of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct based on M.S.’s second statement. The state also moved for a
continuance of the trial date on the grounds that appellant needed time to review the new
charge and receive the video and transcript evidence supporting it. Appellant objected to
the continuance. The district court allowed the state to amend the charges and issued an
order continuing the trial.
Appellant’s trial began September 24, 2018. The jury found appellant guilty of one
count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and three counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct. Appellant petitioned for postconviction relief. Appellant argued: (1) the
postconviction court should vacate appellant’s convictions because his Sixth Amendment
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right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) the postconviction court should vacate appellant’s
convictions and order a new trial because the district court improperly allowed the state to
impeach appellant with four felony convictions; (3) the postconviction court should review
in camera the records regarding M.S.’s prior allegations of abuse that appellant had sought
before trial and consider whether the failure to disclose the records entitled appellant to a
new trial; and (4) the postconviction court should vacate appellant’s conviction and
sentence on count 4 because it was committed during the same behavioral incident as count
1 and amend appellant’s conditional-release term on count 1 to ten years.
The postconviction court agreed that counts 1 and 4 arose from the same behavioral
incident and granted that part of the petition. The postconviction court denied appellant’s
other claims. Appellant now appeals, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated
and that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his motion for in-camera
review of M.S.’s counseling and social services records.
DECISION
I. Appellant was not denied his right to a speedy trial.
Appellant first argues that the district court violated his right to a speedy trial when
it continued his trial 284 days after he was charged and 88 days after he demanded a speedy
trial. The United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution guarantee criminal
defendants the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6.
Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a constitutional question that we
review de novo. State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017). To determine
whether a speedy-trial violation occurred, we apply the four-factor balancing test
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established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33
(1972). In applying the Barker test, we consider: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason
for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether
the delay prejudiced the defendant. Id. None of the Barker factors is a necessary or
sufficient condition to finding the deprivation of the speedy-trial right; instead, they are
related factors and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances. State v.
Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 245 (Minn. 2021) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).
A. Length of the delay
The first factor is the length of the delay. The length of the delay functions as a
triggering mechanism: there must be some presumptively prejudicial delay before further
review is necessary. State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999). In Minnesota,
delays more than 60 days after a defendant’s speedy-trial demand raise a presumption that
a violation has occurred. Id. at 315- 16; see Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). Appellant’s
September 24 trial occurred 88 days after his June 28 speedy-trial demand. That delay is
presumptively prejudicial so we must consider the three remaining Barker factors.
B. Reason for the delay
The essential question under the second Barker factor is whether the government or
the defendant is more to blame for the delay. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628. After
determining which party is responsible for the delay, courts consider the specific reason
for the delay. Id. Deliberate attempts to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
weigh heavily against the government, neutral reasons such as negligence or overcrowded
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courts weigh less heavily, and a good reason, such as a missing witness, will justify an
appropriate delay. Id.; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
The state was responsible for delaying appellant’s trial. The trial was continued on
the state’s motion and over appellant’s objection. The state originally provided four
reasons for the delay, but before the postconviction court, the state only asserted that the
continuance was necessary to allow appellant and his attorney to review M.S.’s August 7
interview and the new first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charge that resulted from it.
Appellant argues that this factor weighs in his favor because he did not want or need extra
time to review the new charge. The state argues that this factor weighs against appellant
because the brief continuance was necessary to ensure that appellant was competently
represented by counsel who had an adequate opportunity to review the evidence and
present an effective defense.
We agree with appellant that this factor weighs in his favor and against the state,
but its weight is minimal. While the state insisted on the continuance over appellant’s
objection, there is no indication that the state deliberately sought to delay the trial in order
to hamper appellant’s defense. Instead, it appears the state wanted to ensure that appellant
had time to prepare for the more severe first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charge, and it
sought a relatively short delay of approximately one month. Additionally, the added charge
underlying the continuance did not result from the state’s lack of diligence in investigating
and charging appellant, but rather from unexpected new details revealed by the eight-year-
old victim. Because the state was responsible for the delay, but because the delay was
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relatively short and not for an improper reason, this factor weighs only slightly in
appellant’s favor.
C. Assertion of the speedy-trial right
A defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial is “entitled to strong evidentiary
weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.” Barker, 407
U.S. at 531 -32; see also Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 629. Appellant asserted his right to a
speedy trial on June 28, 2018. This factor therefore weighs in appellant’s favor.
D. Prejudice to appellant
The final prong of the speedy-trial analysis is whether appellant suffered prejudice
because of the delay. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 631. There are three types of prejudice which
may result from unreasonable delay: (1) oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety and
concern of the accused, and (3) the possibility that the defense will be impaired by
diminishing memories and the loss of exculpatory evidence. Id. (citing Doggett v. United
States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992)).
Appellant argues that the 28-day delay beyond the 60-day speedy-trial period was
excessive, which raises a presumption of prejudice. But although exceeding the 60-day
period is “presumptively prejudicial” for the purpose of triggering analysis of the last three
Barker factors, a delay must actually be “excessive” before we presume that the delay
prejudiced the defense. State v. Strobel, 921 N.W.2d 563, 571 (Minn. App. 2018)
(“Presumptive prejudice does not require any particular showing of harm but results only
from excessive delay.” (quotation omitted)), aff’d 932 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2019). We have
generally not considered a 28-day delay to be excessive. See State v. Jefferson, No. A18-
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0122, 2019 WL 908269, at *4-5 (Minn. App. Feb. 25, 2019) (holding that 59-day delay
beyond 60-day period was not excessive), rev. denied (Minn. May 14, 2019); State v.
Davis, No. A13-0267, 2014 WL 502849, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 10, 2014) (holding that
22-day delay beyond 60-day period was not excessive).1 Appellant is therefore not entitled
to the presumption that he was prejudiced by the delay.
Appellant also has not shown that the delay caused any of the three types of
prejudice. Appellant argues that because he was in custody from the time of his arrest in
December 2017 until his trial in September 2018, he was subjected to oppressive pretrial
incarceration. But the rules of criminal procedure do not require a defendant’s release from
custody for failure to comply with a speedy-trial demand until 120 days from the date of
the demand. Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b); see also Strobel, 921 N.W.2d at 573. Appellant
was tried within this 120-day period. And pretrial incarceration by itself does not constitute
a serious allegation of prejudice. State v. Stroud, 459 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Minn. App. 1990).
Appellant also did not assert that he experienced any exceptional anxiety or concern
while awaiting trial as a consequence of the delay. Appellant only argues that the record
has not shown that appellant did not experience the anxiety and concern that a person in
appellant’s position would presumptively suffer while awaiting trial. That is not enough.
The expected stress and anxiety experienced by anyone who is involved in a trial is
insufficient, by itself, to demonstrate prejudice. Strobel, 921 N.W.2d at 571.

1 Although unpublished opinions are not precedential, they may have persuasive value.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c); Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796,
800-01 (Minn. App. 1993).
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Finally, appellant has not argued that the delay impaired his defense. Specific
prejudice involves an affirmative showing that the delay impeded the defendant’s ability
to raise specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or produce specific evidence. Id.
Appellant does not claim that the delay impeded his defense in any specific way. He only
claims presumptive prejudice, which “does not require any particular showing of harm but
results only from excessive delay.” Id. (quotation omitted). But we have already
concluded that the delay was not excessive and does not support a claim of presumptive
prejudice. Appellant therefore was not prejudiced b y the delay of his trial, and this factor
weighs against him and in favor of the state.
Although the first three factors weigh in appellant’s favor, the reason for the delay
weighs only slightly in appellant’s favor and appellant was not prejudiced by the delay.
We therefore conclude that appellant was not denied his right to a speedy trial.2
II. The postconviction court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
for in-camera review of privileged social service and counseling records.

Appellant argues that both the district court and postconviction court abused their
discretion by refusing to conduct an in-camera review of M.S.’s counseling and social
services records for substantive evidence of appellant’s innocence. We review a
postconviction court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d
340, 357 (Minn. 2012). Criminal defendants are afforded a broad right of discovery, but

2 Minnesota courts have previously held that although the first three Barker factors weighed
in a defendant’s favor, the defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated because the
defendant did not suffer prejudice from the delay. See Strobel, 921 N.W.2d at 573; State
v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 234-36 (Minn. 1986). We reach the same conclusion here.
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that right is not unlimited. Id. at 349. When a defendant seeks privileged records, as
appellant does here, the court may screen the records in camera to balance the defendant’s
right to prepare a defense against a victim’s right to privacy. Id. (citing State v. Paradee,
403 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn. 1987)). In-camera review is not a right but rather a discovery
option, and the defendant must first make a plausible showing that the information sought
would be both material and favorable to his defense. State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72
(Minn. 1992). The request must be reasonably specific, State v. Lynch, 443 N.W.2d 848,
852 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 15, 1989), and the defendant’s argument
that the records are material and favorable to the defense must go beyond mere conjecture,
State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 873 (Minn. 2008).
Appellant moved for in-camera review of M.S.’s school counseling and social
services records relating to criminal-sexual- conduct allegations M.S. made against her
father. Appellant provided an affidavit stating that appellant learned from M.S.’s mother
that M.S. had made sexual assault allegations against her father to a school representative
and that the allegations were reported to and investigated by social services. Appellant
stated that he was told that the allegations were not substantiated and, as a result of the
allegations, M.S. was seeking ongoing counseling at the school.
The district court denied appellant’s motion for in-camera review of the records
because it found that appellant had not made a plausible showing that the information
sought would be material and favorable to appellant’s defense. The postconviction court
affirmed the district court’s denial.
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Evidence of prior false accusations is admissible to attack the credibility of a victim
and as substantive evidence tending to prove that an alleged criminal-sexual-conduct
offense did not occur. See State v. Goldstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. App. 1993).
Evidence of a prior false allegation by M.S. would therefore be material and favorable to
appellant’s defense. Appellant’s affidavit relaying the information he learned from M.S.’s
mother about the prior allegations provided enough information to make a plausible
showing that the records he sought could contain material and favorable evidence. See
State v. Eubanks, No. A19-2042, 2021 WL 318260, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2021)
(reiterating that the standard for in-camera review is only a “plausible showing,” which
does not require absolute certainty as to the contents of the privileged information sought);
see also State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 605 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that, in a close
case, the district court should have conducted an in-camera review of privileged records
even though defendant could be engaging in a “fishing expedition” and the records sought
may not contain useful evidence).
The postconviction court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for in-
camera review. We reverse and remand to the postconviction court for in-camera review
of M.S.’s counseling and social services records to determine whether they contain
evidence that would have been material and favorable to appellant’s defense. If, after a
review is conducted, the postconviction court concludes that some records should have
been provided to appellant, the postconviction court can then evaluate whether a new trial
must be granted.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.