In re the Matter of: Jill Moore, et al., Respondents,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0482

In re the Matter of: Jill Moore, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Commissioner of Morrison County Board of Adjustment,
Appellant.

Filed December 13, 2021
Reversed
Bryan, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CV-20-807

Kristine M. Erickson, Rosenmeier Law Office, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondents)

Jason J. Kuboushek, Andrew A. Wolf, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presid ing Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
In 2011, the legislature am ended the state’s zoning statutes, adding a list of
mandatory factors for zoning authorities to consider when applying the practical difficulties
standard. 2011 Minn. Laws. ch. 19, § 1, at 1; Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 7 (2020). This
amendment partially superseded the holdings in In re Kenney, 374 N.W.2d 271, 275 (Minn.
1985), and In re Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 332 (Minn. 2008), which listed discretionary
factors for zoning authorities to consider in the absence of a specific statutory definition of
the practical difficulties standard.
2
OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
After Morrison County Board of Adjustment (the board) denied respondents’
variance request, respondents appealed to the district court, which reversed the denial.1 On
appeal to this court, respondents argue that appellant acted unreasonably for two reasons.
First, respondents contend that the denial of their variance request was not based on legally
sufficient criteria because the board failed to apply each of the Kenney/Stadsvold factors.
Contrary to this argument, we conclude that the board relied on legally sufficient criteria
when it applied the statutory definition of the practical difficulties standard, and it did not
err as a matter of law. Second, respondents contend that the denial of the variance request
was not sufficiently supported as a factual matter. We also disagree with this argument
and conclude that the board’s decision had an adequate factual basis in the record. We
reverse the district court and reinstate appellant’s denial of the variance request.
FACTS
On March 13, 2020, respondents and landowners Jill and James Moore (the Moores)
requested that the board grant an after-the-f act variance. The variance would allow the

1 On appeal from the district court’s order, this court independently reviews the zoning
authority’s decision, not the decision of the district court, and we review the zoning
authority’s decision without any defe rence to the district court. Town of Grant v.
Washington County, 319 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn. 1982); see also Kismet Invs., Inc. v.
County of Benton , 617 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15,
2000) (“[A]ppellate review is based on the record of the board’s proceedings, not the
district court’s findings or conclusions.”). In addition, the party seeking review of the
decision bears the burden of showing that the zoning authority acted unreasonably.
Schwardt v. County of Watonwan , 656 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 2003). For this reason,
we address respondents’ arguments challenging the zoning authority’s decision.
3
Moores to maintain the size and configuration of a new deck that they built to replace a
previous deck on their lakeshore property. After a hearing, the board denied the Moores’
variance request. The Moores challenged the denial in district court, and the district court
reversed the board’s denial. Appellant Co mmissioner of the Morrison County Board of
Adjustment appeals.
The evidence presented at the hearing be fore the board established the following
undisputed facts. In 2015, th e Moores bought a parcel of la nd on the shore of Fish Trap
Lake, in Morrison County, Minnesota. At the time of the purchase, the parcel contained
an original structure (built in 1935), a deck along the south side of the original structure, a
large patio along the north side of the original structure, an addition on the west side of the
original structure, and a deck along the east, or lakeside, of the original structure. There is
no record that the lakeside deck was ever previously permitted or that a variance was ever
requested, and the parties acknowledge the nonconforming nature of the lakeside deck and
other structures at the time the Moores purchased the property. 2 The parties refer to the
original structure and the addition as “the cabin.”
At the time that the Moores purchased the property, the lakeside deck extended from
the cabin towards the lake by 7.3 feet, within the shore impact zone. In addition, the
lakeside deck was connected by stairs descending toward the lake. The Moores calculated
the square footage of the existing lakeside deck, including the stairs, to be 212 square feet
in size. In 2016, the Moores applied for and were granted a land use permit to replace the

2 Given the issue on appeal, we need not addr ess the conformity or nonconformity of the
original structure or other features of the property.
4
lakeside deck. The Moores specifically requested permission to replace the lakeside deck
with a new deck that would be “the same si ze” as the old, unpermitted deck. Despite a
requirement that the variance application include a sketch of the proposed deck, the Moores
did not include one. The board granted the permit with out reviewing any proposed
configuration of the deck.
The Moores thereafter made several improvements to the property. In relevant part,
they constructed a new lakeside deck that wa s configured differently than the previous
lakeside deck. Instead of having a deck th at extended 7.3 feet toward the lake with
descending stairs, the Moores removed the stairs and constructed a deck that extended 10
feet toward the lake, farther into the shore impact zone than the previous deck. The Moores
also replaced the southside de ck with a patio. In Novemb er 2019, after receiving a
complaint regarding unpermitted work on the property, a site investigator identified several
potential zoning violations. The Moores corrected many of these violations, and in March
2020, the Moores requested th e following after-the-fact variances to allow the remaining
zoning violations: (1) a variance to continue the patio on the south side of the cabin, within
the shore impact zone; and (2) a variance to continue the lakeside deck, within the shore
impact zone.3 In their application, the Moores e xplained that they “were unaware that
[they] needed a permit to relocate the [deck] from one side of the cabin to the other,” that

3 The board denied both requests, and the Moores appealed only the denial of the variance
request related to the lakeside deck to the district court. We need not address the decision
to deny the variance request relating to the lo cation of the southside patio or any dispute
relating to the surfaces of the new decks and patios. We only address the board’s decision
relating to the location of the lakeside deck inside the shore impact zone in violation of the
setback requirements of the zoning ordinance.
5
they had a permit to rebuild the deck on the lakeside of the cabin, and that “because [they]
were relocating the stairs to the lake, [they] felt it reasonable to si mply make the deck a
rectangle inside the space [they] had from the trees.”
At the hearing before the board, the board received statements and comments from
the Moores, other property owners on Fish Trap Lake, the Morrison County Land Services
Director, and the Morrison County Soil and Wa ter Conservation District Director. The
Land Services Director discussed the permitting and violation history of the property, the
applicable goals of the Morrison County Comprehensive Land Use Plan, and the goals of
the Morrison County Comprehensive Water Plan. The comments from the Soil and Water
Conservation District Director noted the detrim ental effect that the lakeside deck would
have on water quality and argued against the new deck’s additional encroachment into the
shore impact zone. Other public comments al so criticized the new lakeside deck for
negatively impacting the health of Fish Trap Lake. The Moores argued that while the
permit did not expr essly authorize additiona l extension into the sh ore impact zone, they
characterized the descending stairs as part of the old deck, so the new deck fell “within the
spirit of the permit.”
The zoning ordinance mandates that the board consider six mandatory conditions
when deciding if enforcement of the ordinance would cause a practical difficulty to the
landowner. Morrison County, Minn., Land Use Control Ordinance § 505.2 (a)-(f) (2021).4

4 At the time of the board’s decision, these factors were listed at 506.2(a)-(f) (2020). Since
that time, a subsection was removed, and these factors are now numbered at section
505.2(a)-(f). We refer to the current ordinance section number for these factors because
the amendments did not include substantive changes to the language applied in this case.
6
The parties agree that these six factors in corporate the language of the legislative
amendment regarding the mandatory conditions a zoning authority must consider when
deciding whether a practical difficulty exists. See Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 7. Section
505.2 expressly makes consideration of these six factors mandatory and allows a variance
only if all six are established:
The Board of Adjustment shall not grant an application for a
variance unless it determines that the strict enforcement of this
ordinance would cause a practical difficulty, as defined herein,
because of circumstances uni que to the indi vidual property
under consideration and that th e granting of such variance(s)
will be in keeping with the spirit and intent of this ordinance.
Specifically, the Board of Adjustment must find that each of
the following conditions are met:

a. Is the request in harmony with the general
purpose of the Morrison County Land Use
Ordinance and Comprehensive Plan; and
b. Is the applicant proposing to use the property in
a reasonable manner not permitted by the Land
Use Ordinance; and
c. Will the issuance of the variance maintain the
essential character of the locality; and
d. Is the alleged practical difficulty due to
circumstances unique to the property; and
e. Is the need for the vari ance created by actions
other than the landowne r or prior landowners;
and
f. Does the alleged practic al difficulty involve
more than just economic considerations.

Morrison County, Minn., Land Use Control Ordinance § 505.2.
The zoning ordinance also includes eight a dditional, discretionary factors that the
board may consider when deciding after-the -fact variance requests. Morrison County,
7
Minn., Land Use Control Ordinance § 505.3 (a)-(h) (2021).5 The parties agree that section
505.3 incorporates the Kenney/Stadsvold factors. Section 50 5.3 expressly makes
consideration of these eight factors discreti onary and applicable only if the board first
determines that all six of the factors listed in section 505.2 weigh in favor of a variance:
[A]dditional criteria may, in th e discretion of [the board], be
considered in determining whether to grant or deny the
variance request. If [the board] finds that all of the criteria set
forth in section 5065.2 a through f, are met, then the following
additional criteria may be cons idered and weighed by [the
board] in determining whether to grant or deny the request . . . .

Id. (strikethrough in original).
The board orally considered each of the six mandatory factors listed in section
505.2. The board discussed and then voted regarding whether each factor weighed in favor
of granting or denying the requested variance.
The board also determined that the size and layout of the new lakeside deck differed
from the previous lakeside deck. Instead of repairing or replacing the previous lakeside
deck, the Moores expanded the lakeside deck further into the shore impact zone, which is
“something that we hold very dear to our considerations in these variance requests.” In its
discussion, the board declined to accept the Moores’ argument that the original descending
stairs were properly characterized as part of the original deck. Accordingly, the board
concluded that the first, second, and third factors favored denial. By expanding the lakeside

5 At the time of the board’s decision, these factors were listed at 506.3(a)-(h) (2020). They
were also included verbatim in the second half of section 506.2, after the heading
“Additional Considerations for After the Fact Applications ” and using the letters (g)
through (n). We refer to the current ordinance section number for these factors.
8
deck, the board concluded that the Moores pr oposed a variance that was not in harmony
with the general purposes and intent of the Morrison County Comprehensive Land Use
Plan or consistent with the goals of th e Morrison County Compre hensive Water Plan.
Likewise, the board concluded that the Moor es proposed to use the property in an
unreasonable manner, not authorized by the ordi nance. The board also concluded that
based on the size and layout of the new lakeside deck, the Moores’ request conflicted with
the essential character of the locality.
The board further determin ed that the Moores’ practical difficulties were not
because of circumstances unique to the property. The Moores “chose to replace the deck”
and “had full control” of the repairs. Because the unique circumstances of the property did
not require the Moores to have configured the new deck in such a way as to expand further
into the shore impact zone, and because the need for the variance was created by the
Moores’ actions, the fourth and fifth factors also favored denial of the request.
Sixth and finally, the board concluded that the Moores’ practical difficulties
involved more than just economi c considerations and that this factor weighed in favor of
granting the requested variance.
After considering these factors, the board denied the variance request. Because the
Moores had not established that each of the six factors favored their request, the board did
not expressly discuss or vote on the additional eight, discreti onary factors enumerated in
the zoning ordinance.
9
ISSUE
Did the board act arbitrarily, oppressively , or unreasonably when it denied the
Moores’ variance request?
ANALYSIS
A county board of adjustment has “the exclusive power to order the issuance of
variances from the requirements of any official control including restrictions placed on
nonconformities.” Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 7. The decision of the board is final, subject
to an appeal to the district court, which reviews the decision “to determine whether it was
reasonable.” Kismet Invs., 617 N.W.2d at 90; see also Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9 (2020)
(permitting appeal to district court); Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d at 332 (noting that in reviewing
a zoning authority’s decision, a court “deter mine[s] [whether] the zoning authority was
within its jurisdiction, was not mistaken as to the applicable law, and did not act arbitrarily,
oppressively, or unreasonably, and . . . [whether] the evidence could reasonably support or
justify the determination”). As noted above, as the appealing party, the Moores bear the
burden to show unreasonableness, Schwardt, 656 N.W.2d at 387, and this court
independently reviews the board’s decision without deference to the district court, Town of
Grant, 319 N.W.2d at 717; Kismet Invs., 617 N.W.2d at 90.
To determine whether the board acted reasonably, we consider whether the board’s
stated reasons were legally valid and whether the decision had a factual basis in the record.
See RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington , 861 N.W.2d 71, 75-76 (M inn. 2015). If there is
evidence in the record supporting the decision, a court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the zoning authority, even if it w ould have reached a di fferent conclusion.
10
VanLandschoot v. City of Mendota Heights , 336 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Minn. 1983). We
address the Moores’ challenge to the legal and factual basis for the board’s decision below.
I. Validity of the Legal Basis for the Board’s Decision
The Moores first assert that the denial of their request was unreasonable as a matter
of law. Specifically, they argue that the board’s decision was not legally valid because the
board declined to expressl y consider each of the Kenney/Stadsvold factors. We do not
agree with the Moores and discern no legal error in the board’s decision.
In Kenney and Stadsvold, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered statutory
language that allowed zoning authoritie s to grant variances when, among other
circumstances, “there are practical di fficulties or particular hardship.” Stadsvold, 754
N.W.2d at 327-28 (quoting Minn. St at. § 394.27, subd. 7 (2006)); see also Kenney , 374
N.W.2d at 275 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 7 (1984)). In the absence of legislative
provisions defining the practical difficu lties standard, the supreme court listed
discretionary factors for zoning authorities to consider under the practical difficulties
standard. Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d at 331, 333; Kenney, 374 N.W.2d at 275. Subsequently,
the legislature amended subdivision 7 to incl ude a specific list of factors for zoning
authorities to consider when applying the practical difficulties standard. 2011 Minn. Laws.
ch. 19, § 1, at 1; Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 7 (2020).
We first discuss Kenney and Stadsvold before considering the impact that the
subsequent amendment had on the holdings in these two cases. Because the legislative
11
amendment partially superseded the holdings in Kenney and Stadsvold,6 and because the
opinions in these two cases offer suggestive, not mandatory, factors for consideration, the
board’s decision was legally valid.
In Kenney, a landowner requested a variance regarding the renovation of an existing,
nonconforming boathouse. 374 N.W.2d at 272. The county board of adjustment concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the request. Id. at 273. The landowner initially appealed
the denial to the district court, which affirmed the denial. Id. The landowner then appealed
to this court. Id. at 272-73. We agreed with the landowner, reversed the district court,
concluded that the board of adjustment had jurisdiction over the variance request, and listed
equities in the landowner’s favor for the board to consider on remand:
We believe in this case that substantial equities exist in
favor of the landowner, and while we acknowledge that the
discretion to grant a variance rests with the Board of
Adjustment, we urge consideration of the following factors on
remand: (1) appellant acted in good faith, (2) he attempted to
comply with the law by obtaining a build ing permit, (3) the
township’s building permit viol ated Minn. Stat. § 394.33
(1978), (4) appellant has made a substantial investment in the
property, (5) the repairs were completed before appellant was
informed of their impropriety, (6) the nature of the property is
residential/recreational and not commercial, (7) there are other
similar structures on the lake, and (8) the minimum benefits to
the county appear to be far outweighed by the detriment
appellant would suffer if forced to remove his boathouse.

6 The Moores make no argument that the board failed to follow its own zoning ordinance,
that the zoning ordinance required the board to consider the additional discretionary factors
in section 505.3, even when section 505.2 was not met, or that the board abused its
discretion by not addressing section 505.3. We deem any such arguments forfeited. State
Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to address issue not adequately briefed); Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20
(Minn. 1982) (same).
12
In re Kenney, 358 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), aff’d, 374 N.W.2d at 275. The
Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and, in its opinion, quoted the above paragraph,
emphasizing the list of “equities in favor of the landowner set out by the court of appeals”
for the county board of adjustment to consider on remand. Kenney, 374 N.W.2d at 275.
(“We concur with the court of appeals’ deci sion in its entirety, in cluding the equities in
favor of the landowner set out by the court of appeals.”).
In Stadsvold, two landowners requested an area variance regarding the construction
of a home on their nonconforming lot. 754 N.W.2d at 325. The county board of adjustment
denied the request because the landowners failed to establish “adequate hardship unique to
the property.” Id. at 326. The landowners appealed to the district court, which agreed with
the county board of adjustment and granted summary judgment in the county’s favor. Id.
at 327. The landowners appealed to this court, which affirmed the district court, concluding
that the board of adjustment used the proper standard: particular hardship. Id.; see also In
re Stadsvold, No. A06-1696, 2007 WL 1898565, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 3, 2007), rev'd
754 N.W.2d 323 (Minn. 2008) (“The board finding that appellants failed to show an
adequate hardship meets the sta ndard set forth in the ordinanc e. . . . The board used the
correct standard in consider ing appellants’ variance reque st.”). The landowners again
appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted review.
The supreme court first determined that the statutory provisions were ambiguous
because they did not include a definition of “practical di fficulties,” and only defined
“particular hardship.” Id. at 328. The supreme court then concluded that based on
legislative history, the practical difficulties standard applied to area variances and the more
13
stringent “particular hardship” standard applied to use variances. Id. at 329-31. Thus, the
supreme court concluded that th e county board of adjustment erred as a matter of law
because it should have applied the practical difficulties standard rather than the particular
hardship standard. Id. In the absence of a statutory definition, the Minnesota Supreme
Court then restated the list of equities from Kenney:
We further hold that the factors for consideration under the
“practical difficulties” standard include: (1) how substantial
the variation is in relation to the requirement; (2) the effect the
variance would have on government services; (3) whether the
variance will effect a substantial change in the character of the
neighborhood or will be a substantial detriment to neighboring
properties; (4) whether the practical difficulty can be alleviated
by a feasible method other than a variance; (5) how the
practical difficulty occurred, including whether the landowner
created the need for the variance; and (6) whether, in light of
all the above factors, allowing the variance will serve the
interest of justice.
Id. at 331. The supreme court referenced th ese factors a second time and characterized
them as suggestions for remand:
In In re Appeal of Kenney, a case involving a county board of
adjustment’s authority to gr ant the variance sought, we
suggested that the board, on remand, consider certain after-the-
fact elements, incl uding whether the applicant acted in good
faith, attempted to co mply with the ordinance, and made a
substantial investment. 374 N.W.2d at 275. We also “urged”
the board to consider whet her (1) the construction was
completed, (2) there were simila r structures in the area, and
(3) the county’s benefits were outweighed by the applicant’s
burden if the applicant were required to comp ly with the
ordinance. Id. . . .
To the extent that the County is concerned about
variance applications arising out of purposeful violations of its
ordinance, such concerns should be alleviated by considering
whether the applicant acted in good faith and attempted to
14
comply with the ordi nance, and whether, in light of all the
factors, the interests of justic e will be served by granting the
variance.
Id. at 333.7 The supreme court, in its final sent ence, again suggested that on remand, the
county board of adjustment “consider the e quitable factors we set out in Kenney.” Id. at
334.
In the years following the Stadsvold opinion, the legislature amended the zoning
statutes to define the practical difficulties standard as follows:
Subd. 7. Variances; practical difficulties. The board of
adjustment shall have the exclusive power to order the issuance
of variances from the requirements of any official control
including restrictions placed on nonconformities. Variances
shall only be permitted when th ey are in harmony with the
general purposes and intent of the official control and when the
variances are consistent with the comprehensive plan.
Variances may be granted when the applicant for the variance
establishes that there are pract ical difficulties in complying
with the official control. “Pra ctical difficulties,” as used in
connection with the granting of a variance, means that the
property owner proposes to use the property in a reasonable
manner not permitted by an offici al control; the plight of the
landowner is due to circumstances unique to the property not
created by the landowner; and the variance, if granted, will not
alter the essential character of the locality. Economic
considerations alone do not c onstitute practical difficulties.
Practical difficulties include, but are not limited to, inadequate
access to direct sunlight for so lar energy systems. Variances

7 The Moores make no argument that these tw o lists are substantively different from one
another, that each applies to different types of area variances, or that the two lists in
Stadsvold might differ from the list in Kenney. Instead, the Moores group the lists and the
two cases together, referring to a single group of factors. Similarly, the Moores provide no
legal argument that the language of the prac tical difficulties standard in the statute is
ambiguous or that it is unambiguously applicable only to before-the-fact area variances. In
the absence of adequate briefing, the Moores have forfeited any such statutory or doctrinal
interpretation arguments. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d at 480; Melina, 327
N.W.2d at 20.
15
shall be granted for earth shelte red construction as defined in
section 216C.06, subdivision 14 , when in harmony with the
official controls. No variance may be granted that would allow
any use that is not allowed in the zoning district in which the
subject property is located. The board of adjustment may
impose conditions in the gran ting of variances. A condition
must be directly related to and must bear a rough
proportionality to the impact created by the variance.
2011 Minn. Laws. ch. 19, § 1, at 1; Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 7.
We note that this statutor y definition enumerates seve ral factors and effectively
incorporates many, but not all, of the equitable factors listed in Kenney and Stadsvold. For
example, the statutory definition does not in clude consideration of the degree of the
requested variation, the impact on government services, or the interests of justice. In
addition, the legislature specified that econom ic impacts alone do not constitute practical
difficulties. The statute also establishes a requirement that zoning authorities consider the
enumerated factors . In these respec ts, we observe differences between Kenney and
Stadsvold on one hand and the amended statute on the other hand. To this extent, we hold
that the statutory amendment superseded the holdings in Kenney and Stadsvold. Given this
holding, we do not agree with the Moores that the board erred when it applied the factors
enumerated in the subdivision 7 as opposed to the factors listed in Kenney and Stadsvold.
In addition, even absent th is amendment, we disagree with the Moores’ argument
that Kenney and Stadsvold compel consideration of mandatory factors. The consideration
of the equitable factors listed in Kenney and Stadsvold was always a matter of discretion
for the zoning authority on remand. See Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d at 333-34; Kenney, 374
N.W.2d at 275. Neither opinion reversed a zoning authority’s decision for failure to
16
consider these equitable factors. Instead, th e supreme court reversed the county board of
adjustment’s decision in Kenney on jurisdictional grounds, and it reversed the county board
of adjustment’s decision in Stadsvold because the county board of adjustment applied the
particular hardship standard. Likewise, the characterization of the factors in Kenney shows
their discretionary nature. The Kenney/Stadsvold factors were something that the supreme
court “suggested that the board, on remand, consider.” Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d at 333. This
characterization of the factors as a suggestion conflicts with the Moores’ argument that the
consideration of the Kenney/Stadsvold factors is mandatory, and failure to do so constitutes
reversible error.
For these reasons, we conclude that the board did not act unreasonably when it
applied the statutory definition of the practical difficulties standard. The board’s decision
rested on a legally sufficient basis because the board applied the proper legal standard.
II. Sufficiency of the Factual Basis for the Board’s Decision
Next, the Moores generally argue that th e decision must be reversed because the
factual record does not support the findings underlying the board’s decision. Again, we do
not agree.
The record includes the comments of the Morrison County Land Services Director,
the Morrison County Soil and Water Conservation District Director, and at least one other
property owner on Fish Trap Lake. These statements support the board’s factual findings
that the lakeside deck would negatively impact water quality and the health of Fish Trap
Lake. The statements also su pport the finding that the variance was not in harmony with
the general purposes and intent of th e Morrison County Land Use Ordinance and
17
Comprehensive Plan. The reco rd also supports the factual findings that the descending
stairs were not part of the original deck and that the Moores chose to reconfigure the new
lakeside deck in a way that extended the struct ure further into the shore impact zone than
the previous deck. Therefore, we conclude that the board’s decision had an adequate
factual basis in the record, RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 75-76, and will not substitute our
judgment for that of the zoning authority, VanLandschoot, 336 N.W.2d at 509.
DECISION
Because the stated reasons provided by the board were legally valid and had a
factual basis in the record, the board acted reasonably when it denied respondents’ variance
request.
Reversed.