In re the Matter of the Child of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0488

In re the Matter of the Child of:

S. S. N., k/n/a S. S. T. and P. J. H., Parents.

Filed October 25, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-JV-20-510

Bill L. Thompson, Law Office of Bill L. Th ompson, Duluth, Minneso ta (for appellant
S.S.T.)

Matthew Miller, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent P.J.H.)

Rhoda Nagorski, Superior, Wisconsin (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Wo rke, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
This case involves a petition by appellant-m other to terminate respondent-father’s
parental rights to the parties’ minor child. Father moved to dismiss mother’s petition, and
the district court granted father’s motion. On appeal, mother argues that the district court
improperly granted father’s motion to dismiss because the motion was untimely. We
affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant S.S.T. (mother) and respondent P.J.H. (fath er) were married and had a
child together in 2012. The parties divorced in March 2014. Pursuant to the judgment and
decree dissolving the marriage, mother was granted sole physical custody of the child, and
father was given “reasonable an d liberal parenting time.” Th e parties share joint legal
custody. Between May 2014 and November 2020, neither mother nor father sought to
amend father’s custody or parenting time in the marital-dissolution case.
In November 2020, mother filed a petition to terminate fa ther’s parental rights to
the child. The petition identified three statutory grounds to support termination of father’s
parental rights, including that: (1) father had abandoned the child; (2) father had refused to
comply with the duties imposed by the parent-child relationship; and (3) father was unable
or unwilling to provide the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other
care. The petition alleged the following facts to support the statutory grounds: father had
not provided financial support for the child; father had “chemical dependency issues with
both alcohol and drugs”; and fa ther could not care for the child because the child had
“special needs.” The petition also alleged that, during discussions with the child’s
therapist, the child showed “extremely negative feelings towards his father, and no longer
want[ed] to be associated with, or to see hi s father in the future.” The petition further
alleged that mother believed that mental he alth professionals who had worked with the
child would conclude that term ination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interests.
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The district court held an admit/deny hear ing in December 2020. Father appeared
pro se at that hearing and requested that the court appoint an attorney for him. The district
court entered a denial on father’s behalf. The district court subsequently appointed counsel
to represent father.
At a February 10, 2021 pretri al hearing, father’s attorney requested a motion hearing
to challenge the sufficiency of the petition. Shortly thereafter, father filed a motion to
dismiss the petition. Father’s memorandum of law in support of the motion raised two
independent grounds for dismissal. First, he argued that the petition failed to make a prima
facie case for termination of his parental rights because the petition did not plead facts that,
if proved, would support termination of his parental rights. Thus, father argued the petition
should be dismissed under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 14.04(c). Second, father argued that the
district court should dismiss th e petition because it failed to include information required
by Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 54 and Minn. Stat. § 260C.141, subd. 1(b) (2020), which govern
a petition to terminate parental rights. The district court held a hearing on father’s motion
in March 2021. At the hearing, mother’s attorney told the district court that father’s
prima-facie-case argument “should have been made well prior to a pretrial” hearing and
that “[i]t’s not definitely something we bring up at a pretrial hearing.”
After the motion hearing, th e district court granted fath er’s motion to dismiss the
petition. The district court granted the motio n on two bases. First, the district court
determined that dismissal was appropriate unde r Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 14.04(c) because
the petition did not make a prim a facie case because it failed to allege facts which, if
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proven, would allow the district court to te rminate father’s parental rights under the
statutory grounds set forth in the petition.1
Second, the district court determined th at the petition faile d to comply with
rule 54.03, subd. 2, and Minn. Stat. § 260C.141 , subd. 1(b). The district court explained
that Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 54.03, subd. 2, requires that a petition filed by an individual
to terminate another person’s parental ri ghts must meet the requirements of Minn.
Stat. § 260C.141, subd. 1(b). That statute in turn provides that such a petition must include
certain information, which the district court found to be lacking in this case. Specifically,
the district court found that the petition failed to include a statement by mother that she had
reported the circumstances underlying the petition to the county social services agency as
required by the statute. The district court also found that the petition failed to disclose the
existing custody order between the parties from the marital-dissolution case—another
requirement of the statute. The district court further commented that mother’s allegations
regarding financial support were more appropriately addressed in the dissolution case, and
that father’s alleged chemical-dependency i ssues could be addressed by the county in a
proceeding for a child in need of protection or services, if properly brought to the county’s

1 The district court’s order says that father brought the motion under rule 15.04(c), rather
than rule 14.04(c). The district court appears to have been looking at a previous version of
the rule. In 2019, the supreme court promul gated amendments to th e rules of juvenile
protection procedure, and rule 15.04 was renumbered as rule 14.04. Order Promulgating
Amendments to the Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure & the Rules of Adoption
Procedure, No. ADM10-8041 (Minn. May 13, 2019) ; Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 14.07 2019
advisory comm. cmt. (noting that rule 14 was previously numbered as rule 15).
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attention, as required by the statute. Accord ingly, the district court dismissed mother’s
petition.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother challenges the district court’s or der granting father’s motion to dismiss her
petition to terminate parental rights. We revi ew a district court’s decision on a motion to
dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare
of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 318 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20,
2015). The interpretation of the rules of juvenile protection procedure is a legal question,
which we review de novo. In re Welfare of Child of R.K. , 901 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn.
2017).
On appeal, mother does not challenge the s ubstance of the district court’s decision.
Instead, mother argues only that the district court should have denied father’s motion
because it was untimely. Ru le 14.04 of the Minn esota Rules of Juvenile Protection
Procedure governs a motion to dismiss a petition to terminate parental rights. The rule
provides that a party or co unty attorney may bring a mo tion to dismiss the petition upon
any of the following grounds:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) lack of jurisdiction over the child;
(c) at or prior to the admit/deny hearing, failure of the petition
to state facts which, if proven, establish a prima facie case to
support the statutory grounds set forth in the petition; or
(d) any other ground supported by law.

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Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 14.04. Only the third ground—failure of the petition to establish a
prima facie case—is subject to a time limit. Id. There is no time limit specified in the rule
for bringing a motion based on any of the other listed grounds. Id.
Mother’s argument on appeal focuses on rule 14.04(c). Mother argues father’s
motion to dismiss was untimely because father brought his motion after the
admit/deny hearing occurred. Mother notes that the admit/den y hearing here was held in
December 2020, but father did no t file the motion, or even mention bringing the motion,
until February 2021. Accordi ngly, mother argues that the district court erred by not
dismissing the motion as untimely under rule 14.04(c).
Father responds that this court should not consider mother’s timeliness argument
because mother did not raise an objection based on rule 14.04(c) with the district court.
Alternatively, father contends that the motion was properly considered by the district court
pursuant to rule 14.04(d) because the motion set forth other legal grounds to support
dismissal besides the failure to establish a prima facie case. For the reasons set forth below,
we agree with father that mother has not demonstrated a basis for reversal.
First, mother’s timeliness argument is not properly before this court. We generally
consider only issues that we re presented to and consider ed by the district court.
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); see also In re Welfare of Children
of M.L.S., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2021 WL 2640559, at *7 n.5 (Minn. App. June 28, 2021)
(applying Thiele in juvenile-protection proceeding). Mother maintains that she argued the
timing issue to the district court because, at the motion hearing, her attorney told the district
court that father’s motion “should have been made well prior to a pretrial” hearing and that
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“[i]t’s not definitely something we bring up at a pretrial hearing.” But the attorney merely
made a generalized assertion that father s hould have brought the ar gument at an earlier
time. Mother did not raise the particular argument that she raises on appeal—that father’s
motion was untimely under rule 14.04(c). Mother did not cite the rule or otherwise argue
that father’s motion failed to comply with the rules of juve nile protection procedure.
Absent some sort of argument from mother that father’s motion was brought outside the
time allowed under the applicable rules, the di strict court did not ha ve the opportunity to
address whether it should deny father’s moti on as untimely. Because mother failed to
present her timeliness argument to the district court and the district court did not consider
it, mother has forfeited the argument. Cf. Antonson v. Ekvall, 186 N.W.2d 187, 189 (Minn.
1971) (holding that a claim was not before district court when “the pleadings were general
enough to have possibly made out a claim on th at theory, [but] there was no language in
the complaint that would alert anyone to a claim” based on that theory).
Second, even assuming mother’s generaliz ed assertion to the district court was
sufficient to preserve her time liness issue for appeal, we conclude that the district court
was not required to deny fathe r’s motion to dismiss. Under rule 14.04, only a motion to
dismiss based on failure to establish a prima faci e case must be brough t at or prior to the
admit/deny hearing. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 14.04. A motion to dism iss based on lack of
jurisdiction or on “any other ground supported by law” is not subject to that same time
limitation. Id. Here, father’s motion to dismiss raised, and the district court found, another
legal ground to support dismissal of moth er’s petition—namely, failure to meet the
requirements of Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 54 .03, subd. 2, and Minn. Stat. § 260C.141,
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subd. 1(b). Although neither father’s motion to dismiss nor the district court’s order
specifically cited rule 14.04(d), the district court’s dismissal of the petition on the basis of
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 54.03 and Minn. St at. § 260C.141 falls within the scope of
rule 14.04(d), as the dismissal was base d on “any other ground supported by law.”
Accordingly, the district court properly c onsidered this altern ative legal ground in
determining whether to grant father’s motion to dismiss.
We further conclude that the district court did not err by granting father’s motion to
dismiss on the alternate basis of rule 54.03 a nd Minn. Stat. § 260C.141. As the district
court correctly noted, rule 54.03, subd. 2, provides that a petition filed by an individual to
terminate another person’s parental right s must meet the requirements in Minn.
Stat. § 260C.141, subd. 1(b). That statute requires that the petition include, among other
things, “a statement that petitioner has repor ted the circumstances underlying the petition
to the responsible social services agency, and protection or se rvices were not provided to
the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.141, subd. 1(b)(2). The petition must also include “a
statement whether there are exis ting juvenile or family cour t custody orders or pending
proceedings in juvenile or family court concerning the child.” Id., subd. 1(b)(3). The
district court correctly noted that mother’s petition did not comply with these requirements.
The petition did not allege that mother had reported the circumstances to a social services
agency, nor did it disclose the existing custody order in the marital-dissolution case. The
district court ultimately dismissed the petition both because of these defects in the petition
and because the facts alleged failed to estab lish a prima facie case. We see no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s determination that the petition’s failure to comply with the
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applicable requirements of rule 54.03, subd. 2, and Minn. Stat. § 260C.141, subd. 1(b), was
an appropriate ground to dismiss the petition.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing mother’s petition to terminate father’s parental rights.
Affirmed.