In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0495

In re the Marriage of:

Pamela Delice Skeens, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Adel R. Baqir,
Respondent.

Filed April 18, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-FA-08-2117

Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Roselyn J. Nordaune, Nordaune & Friesen, PLLC, Wayzata, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant
Pamela Delice Skeens’s (wife’s) motions for maintenance modification and attorney fees.
FACTS
Wife married respondent Adel R. Baqir (h usband) in 1994. In 2008, the parties
dissolved their marriage throu gh a stipulated agreement. During the marriage, husband
was the primary earner while wife supporte d him in his career and attended to the
household. Husband earned $248,000 and $277,000 respectively in the two years before
the dissolution. In the dissoluti on, the parties stipulated that (1) wife had no income and
necessary monthly living expenses of $8,00 0, and (2) husband had an income of
approximately $181,000, plus a bonus over which he had no cont rol, and necessary
monthly living expenses of $7,000.
The parties agreed that wife was in ne ed of spousal maintenance “on a temporary
basis only.” Accordingly, the parties agreed that husband would pay wife $7,000 per
month from November 2008 to December 2015. Then, the pa rties agreed that husband
would pay wife $6,000 per month from January 2016 to December 2022. Further, husband
agreed to give wife 48% of his annual bonus until 2013, a nd then 23% of his bonus until
2018.
Subsequent modifications
The parties modified the original dissoluti on order three times before wife’s current
motion. In 2009, husband was laid off at work. He rece ived a severance payment of
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$168,270.34. The parties stipulated that husband would pay wife $84,000, a prepayment
of one year of spousal maintenance, in exchange for his temporary maintenance obligation
ending in December 2020 in stead of 2022. The agre ement required husband to
recommence paying spousal maintenance one year from the date of the prepayment.
In 2011, husband moved to modify his spousal maintenance obligation retroactive
to July 1, 2010—the date his maintenance obligation resumed. Wife opposed the motion.
The district court found that husband was earning $90,000 annually and that wife appeared
to have remained unemployed. The court fo und that husband’s monthly expenses were
$2,792, and wife’s were $4,970. Reviewing the parties’ needs and resources, the court
granted husband’s motion to modify spous al maintenance and reduced his monthly
obligation to $3,500.
In 2014, wife moved, among other thin gs, to modify the spousal maintenance
obligation back to $7,000 per month. The court found that wife was unemployed with
monthly expenses of $5,689 and that husband’s income for the purposes of calculating his
obligation was $125,000 with monthly expenses of $3,370. The court concluded that the
current maintenance award was unreasonable in light of husband’s increased income and
modified his monthly obligation to $6,000, to be paid through December 31, 2020.
Wife’s rehabilitation attempts
In 2015, wife took a sales position. Bu t even after taking a refresher course on
computers at a technical college, she was unable to master the technological aspects of the
job. Wife quit the position afte r two months of substandard pe rformance. In 2017, wife
formed a consulting business called Mold Solu tion Experts. Earlier, wife had problems
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with mold in her own home. The business was meant to assist others who had mold in
their houses, but wife could not focus on the work and closed the business in 2018.
Wife’s motion to modify spousal maintenance
In November 2020, wife moved the district court to modify the temporary award to
grant her permanent spousal maintenance, and she sought an increase in husband’s monthly
obligation to $8,000. Wife argued that two substantial changes in circumstances had
occurred that rendered the award unreasonable and unfair: (1) her inability to become self-
supporting; and (2) husband’s increased income. She attached a report from a vocational
evaluator in support of her motion, who concl uded that she was not ab le to work. Wife
also sought $30,000 in need-based attorney fees. In an affidavit, wife outlined her health
issues, current expenses, and lack of inco me other than income from the maintenance
payments. Husband opposed the motion.
In February 2021, the district court de nied wife’s motion to modify spousal
maintenance. The court found that the parties’ stipulated agreement for temporary spousal
maintenance was reasonable because the 12-year term 1 gave wife ample time to become
fully or partially self-supporting, and the agreement’s step-down provisions evidenced the
parties’ intent that wife would become se lf-supporting by 2020. The court found that
wife’s medical issues were not debilitating, th at wife knew of most of her medical issues
when she stipulated to temporary maintenance, and that wife was capable of supporting
herself. Finally, the court found that wife’s failure to rehabilitate evidenced bad faith.

1 We note that the term was originally 14 years, but in 2009 wife agreed to reduce the term
to 12 years, and thus to become self-supporting two years earlier than originally planned.
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Based on these findings, the district court concluded that wife had not shown a substantial
change in circumstances that made the aw ard unreasonable and unfair, and that wife’s
motion was an extension of her bad-faith failure to rehabilitate. Wife appeals.
DECISION
Wife contends that the district court a bused its discretion by (1) denying her motion
to modify spousal maintenance, and (2) denying her motion for need-based attorney fees.
We consider each claim in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying wife’s motion to
modify spousal maintenance.
A party seeking to modify a spousal-maintenance award must demonstrate (1) that
a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, and (2) the substantial change renders
the original award unreasonable and unfair. Hecker v. Hecker , 568 N.W.2d 705, 709
(Minn. 1997); see also Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (2020) (controlling modification of
maintenance orders generally). District courts have broa d discretion regarding spousal
maintenance. Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2021). A district court abuses
its discretion when it makes findings of fact that are not supported by the record, misapplies
the law, or resolves the discretionary question in a manner that is contrary to logic and the
facts on record. Id.
The failure of a recipient spouse of te mporary maintenance to become self-
supporting may constitute a substantial change in circumstances. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at
709-10. But a recipient spouse has a duty to make reasonable efforts to become self-
supporting. Youker v. Youker, 661 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn.
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Aug. 5, 2003). If a spouse does not make a sufficient attempt to rehabilitate, that spouse’s
ultimate failure to become self-supporting ma y not constitute a change in circumstances
rendering the original award unreasonable and unfair. Id. at 270-71.
Here, the district court concluded that wi fe had not shown a substantial change of
circumstances that rendered the original award unreasonable an d unfair because her
attempts to become self-supp orting were not reasonable. Youker supports the district
court’s conclusion. In Youker, the district court awarded the wife temporary spousal
maintenance for three years in its dissolution order. Id. a t 2 6 8 . A t t h e t i m e o f t h e
dissolution, wife worked at a department store. Id. She looked into several educational
programs during the maintenance period, bu t she did not enroll in any degree-granting
program. Id. In the last month of the maintenance period, wife moved to modify spousal
maintenance to make th e award permanent. Id. The district cour t granted the motion
because it concluded that wife’s failure to rehabilitate was a substantial change in
circumstances. Id. But on appeal, we reversed. Id. at 271. Noting that wife was obligated
to make reasonable attempts to rehabilitate, we concluded that wife’s investigation into
educational programs, without more, was “ins ufficient to demonstrate the substantial
change in circumstances necessary for spousal-maintenance modification.” Id. at 270.
The district court found here that, like in Youker, wife’s two attempts to rehabilitate
were not reasonable. And the record supports this determination. The court determined
that the fact that wife only made two at tempts, in 2015 and 2017, in the 12-year
maintenance period evidences an intent to rely on permanent spousal maintenance instead
of becoming self-supporting. And as the court noted, wife failed to obtain any new
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education or training, except for a “refresher course” on computers, but she did not gain
any new degrees, certificates, or vocational skills during the maintenance period. Further,
the district court found that wife left the one job that she obtained after just two months
and provided almost no information about the business that she avers she performed work
for from 2017-2018. The wife in Youker was at least employed during the maintenance
period and was the primary caret aker of the parties’ child. Id. at 268. By contrast, the
district court found that wife here had no such obligations and failed to remain employed
for any meaningful period of time.
Because wife did not show a substantial change in circumstances for lack of
reasonable rehabilitation efforts, she has no t met her burden to support her spousal
maintenance modification motion. Minn. Stat . § 518A.39, subd. 2. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion.
Wife asserts that Hecker supports her argument that the district court abused its
discretion by denying her motion to modify spousal maintenanc e. But the district court
distinguished Hecker. The court found that unlike the wife in Hecker, wife here did not
have children to take care of or any other ob ligations that prevented her from working.
And the court found that wife did not obtain employment save her two brief efforts in 2015
and 2017, as opposed to the wife in Hecker, who at least worked part-time through almost
the entire initial spousal-maintenance period.
To persuade us that the distri ct court should have looked to Hecker, rather than
Youker, wife argues that the district court ba sed its conclusions on clearly erroneous
findings of fact. A district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous when they are
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“manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn.
2021) (quotation omitted). In applying this standard, we view the evidence in a light
favorable to the findings. Id. And harmless errors do not require reversal. Minn. R. Civ.
P. 61. With this standard in mind, we cons ider wife’s allegations of clearly erroneous
findings.
First, wife argues that the district court clearly erred by concluding that the record
does not support her claim that she is unable to work. The court reasoned that, looking at
the record as a whole, the evidence showed that some of wife’s medical issues had
improved since 2014. In particular, the cour t found that the record showed that wife’s
depression, migraines, and ba ck pain had improved. Wife argues that the vocational
assessment and neuropsychological evaluati on contradict these findings. But the
neuropsychological evaluation showed only mild impairment and suggested that with
treatment and therapy, wife’s condition coul d improve. And the court did not find the
vocational assessment credible because its conclusion was contradicted by the medical
reports that indicated only minor, not debili tating, impairment. Finally, the court noted
that most of wife’s medical issues predated 2008, and thus the parties stipulated to
temporary maintenance with full knowledge of the medical issues. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the findings, Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221, wife has not shown
that the district court clearly erred by concluding that the record did not support her claim
that she was not able to work.
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Second, wife argues that the district c ourt clearly erred by setting aside the 2014
court’s findings. In 2014, husband argued that the district court should impute reasonable
income to wife because she had failed to wo rk. The 2014 court re jected this argument
because the stipulation evid enced the parties’ belief that wife would become
self-supporting by 2020. Because wife still had six years left in the temporary maintenance
period, the court declined to impute reasonable income to her. Wife argues that the district
court here clearly erred by finding that he r failure to seek empl oyment from 2008-2014
was evidence of bad faith, because the court in 2014 refused to impute income to her on
that same basis. But the issue before the 2014 court was whether hus band’s increase in
income justified wife’s motion to return the maintenance awar d to the amount originally
contemplated in the decree (because the mont hly award had been re duced in 2012). The
2014 court returned the amount of the maintenance award to the stipulated amount. Here,
the district court, with the benefit of revi ewing the entire maintenance period, concluded
that the stipulation was still fair and reasona ble under the circumstances. Wife has not
shown that the court clearly erred in this regard.
Third, wife argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that her attempts to
rehabilitate were not reasona ble. Wife argues that he r 2015 attempt was reasonable
because she got a sales position in the marine industry, which was the field in which she
worked at the beginning of the marriage. She contends that he r failure to succeed at this
job, despite her “refresher course,” is due to the changes in technology between 1997 and
2015. But wife provided little information about the “refresher course,” and does not claim
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to have sought out any other training. Further, wife did not attempt to find a different job
after she quit.
Then, wife asserts that her attempt to start a business was reasonable. The district
court disagreed, finding that the wife had no previous training, experience, or education in
the field, and that the business was “beyond her qualifications.” Wife argues that “there is
no evidence that [she] did not possess the requisite expertise,” and instead asserts that her
medical problems were the cause of the business’ failure. But wife provided no evidence
that she was qualified to run a mold-remedi ation business. The only evidence wife
presented is her statement in her affidavit that she “could not focus, and did not have the
stamina to continue with th e work.” Because wife pres ented no evidence of her
qualifications, she has not shown that the court erred by concluding that her business was
not a reasonable attempt at rehabilitation. In light of the 12-year period of maintenance,
the district court did not clearly err by finding wife’s two attempts were not reasonable.2
In sum, wife has not shown that the distri ct court abused its discretion by denying
her motion to modify spousal maintenance or clearly erred in its findings.3 Wife relies on

2 Wife also contends that the district cour t clearly erred in its findings about her work
history. In particular, wife asserts that the court erred by finding that she earned a base
salary of $80,000 in 1998. Bu t wife conflates multiple finding s, and even if the district
court erred by finding that wife ’s last employment was in 19 98, wife has not shown that
the court’s decision to deny her motion was based on its finding about the last date that she
worked. The error, if any, did not affect wife’s substantial rights and must be disregarded.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 61.

3 Finally, wife asserts that the district court clearly erred by finding that she did not submit
evidence that she applied for jobs. But wife misrepresents the court’s finding. The court
noted that wife made no effort to seek em ployment from 2008-2020 except for her 2015
job and 2017 business. In describing th e periods in which wife was not seeking
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Hecker to support her abuse-of-discretion claim, but she misunderstands the discretionary
nature of the standard of review. That the Hecker court did not abuse its discretion by
awarding permanent spousal maintenance does not mean that the district court here abused
its discretion by declining to do so under a di fferent set of facts. And wife’s position is
different than the wife in Hecker because she has no children, and she did not work for the
vast majority of the maintena nce period. Further, like in Youker, because wife failed to
reasonably attempt to rehabilitate, her present lack of employment is not a substantial
change in circumstances. 661 N.W.2d at 270-71.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying wife’s motion for
need-based attorney fees.
A district court “shall” award a party need-b ased attorney fees if (1) the fees are
necessary for the good-faith assertion of the party’s rights, (2) the other party has the means
to pay the fees, and (3) the requesting party does not have the means to pay the fee. Minn.
Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2020). This court reviews an award, or the denial of an award, of
attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Muschik v. Conner-Muschik , 920 N.W.2d 215,
225 (Minn. App. 2018).
Here, the district court denied wife’s motion for need-based attorney fees because it
concluded that wife’s modification motion was not a good-faith assertion of her rights. The
court concluded that wife had acted in bad faith by failing to reasonably attempt to become

employment, the court found that wife “did not submit evidence that she ever applied for
jobs or even looked for jobs for which she was qualified.” Because wife did not submit
any evidence of searching or applying for jobs beyond the two attempts acknowledged by
the district court, this finding is not clearly erroneous.
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self-supporting. The court reasoned that wife’s motion to modify spousal maintenance was
“an extension of her bad faith as it appears she intended, all along, to convert temporary
spousal maintenance in to permanent maintenance.” Fina lly, the court fo und that wife
could pay her attorney fees because she has savings and very little debt. Accordingly, the
court concluded that wife was not entitled to attorney fees.
Wife argues that the court abused its discretion by concluding that she acted in bad
faith and that whether she acted in bad faith is irrelevant. She further argues that the court
abused its discretion by denying her need-based fees because she did not act in bad faith.
But she does not explain why the court’s conclusion that she acted in bad faith is irrelevant;
Minnesota Statutes section 518.14, subd. 1(1) makes a party’s “good faith assertion of the
party’s rights” a prerequisite to an award of need-based fees. Wife concedes that she had
a duty to attempt to b ecome self-supporting. Youker, 661 N.W.2d at 269. The court’s
conclusions regarding wife’s efforts in this respect are relevant to its ultimate determination
to deny wife’s motion.
Further, wife has not shown that the di strict court abused its discretion by
concluding that she acted in bad faith. Wife relies on cases holding that a court must find
that an obligee has acted in bad faith before imputing r easonable income to them.
Walker v. Walker, 553 N.W.2d 90, 95 n.1 (Minn. App. 1996). But that same case supports
the district court’s consideration of wife’s bad faith in determining whether to modify
maintenance. Id. at 95. And wife presents no argume nt as to why she did not act in bad
faith here, except to assert that her rehabilitation efforts were reasonable. But, as discussed
above, the district court did not clearly er r by concluding that her attempts were not
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reasonable. Accordingly, wife has not shown that the district court abused its discretion
by denying her motion for need-based attorney fees.
Affirmed.