City of Long Prairie, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0504

City of Long Prairie,
Respondent,

vs.

Ronald J. Schneider,
Appellant.

Filed December 13, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Todd County District Court
File No. 77-CV-20-603

Kenneth H. Bayliss, Joseph A. Krueger, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Gregory M. Erickson, Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal, & Erickson, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
After appellant-homeowner refused to allow respondent-city to install a new water
meter at appellant’s residence as part of a city-wide upgrade, respondent filed a complaint

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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for injunctive relief and later moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion and ordered appellant to allow respond ent to install a new water meter at his
residence. In this appeal, appellant argues that (1) the district court erred when it concluded
that city ordinances authorized replacement of the meter and (2) genuine issues of material
fact regarding appellant’s affirmative defe nse preclude summary ju dgment. Because the
district court did not err in its interpretation of the ordinances and appellant did not properly
raise his affirmative defense below, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are undisputed. Respondent City of Long Prairie (the city) is a
municipal corporation that operates a city -wide water system. Appellant Ronald J.
Schneider owns a residence in Long Prairie that is served by the city’s water system.
Beginning in 2018, the city began a progra m of replacing all water meters in its
system. The city undertook the system-wide upgrade after determining that its existing
water meters and data-collection systems were outdated. According to the city, the existing
water meters no longer provided a cost-effici ent manner by which to gather water-usage
data. The city provided new water meters at no cost to residents.
The city was able to replace all the wate r meters on the city’s system except for
Schneider’s meter. Between June and October 2019, the city sent four notices to Schneider
regarding replacement of the water meter at his residence. Schneider did not allow the city
to enter his property to install a new water meter.
In December 2019, the city filed a comp laint seeking injunctive relief to allow
installation of a new water meter at Schneider’s residence. The city alleged that Schneider
3
refused to allow the city to upgrade his water meter as part of the city’s system-wide
upgrade. The city further alleged that Schneider’s refusal would result in the city incurring
additional and unnecessary costs in gathering water-usage data from Schneider’s property.
The city sought an order allowing it to install a new meter at Schneider’s residence on the
basis that the ordinances governing the opera tion and maintenance of the city’s water
system authorized the city to replace Schneider’s meter.
Representing himself, Schneider answered the city’s complaint with a letter. In the
letter, Schneider stated that he wanted to “opt out” of having a new meter installed.
Schneider explained that he had a doctor’s note “excusing any smart meters in [his] house”
because of his “electrosensitivity disability.” He wrote that “[t]o force me in harm’s way
to put this in my house would be discrimi nation . . . you would have a law suit [and] I
would be suing for damages,” and the “Americans Disability Act [sic] would definitely be
involved.” Schneider further asserted that his existing mete r “works great” and that he
would “pay extra” to keep using it. Schneider’s answer also included a note from a doctor.
The note indicated that the doctor worked at an urgent-care center. The note, in its entirety,
reads as follows: “Please do not install a smart water meter or electric smart meter as Ron
is diagnosed with a Electrosens itivity Disorder at this time. He is concerned about his
health and safety as a result of these installations.”
In May 2020, the city served Schneider with requests for admissions that asked
Schneider to admit to a series of factual a llegations which were ve ry similar to those
included in the complaint. The requests for admissions also asked Schneider to admit that
“[e]lectro-sensitivity [d]isorder” is not a disability under the Americans with Disabilities
4
Act (ADA) or a medical condition recognized by any Minnesota court. Schneider did not
respond to any of the requests for admissions within the time required by the rules of civil
procedure or at any other time. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 36.01.
The city moved for summary judgment. It argued that, because Schneider did not
respond to the requests for admissions, he ad mitted by default each matter for which the
city sought an admission under rule 36.01. Given these admissions, the city argued that no
issues of material fact existed and that the city was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because it had the right and obligation to re place Schneider’s meter under the ordinances
governing the city water system.
At the initial hearing on the city’s motion, Schneider requested a continuance. He
indicated that he had recently retained an attorney but the attorney was not available on the
date of the hearing. The district court granted the request.
About a week later, the district cour t held another hearing on the city’s
summary-judgment motion. Schneider’s attorney argued that the district court should deny
the city’s motion for summary judgment. He disagreed with the city’s interpretation of its
ordinances. The attorney cited the language in the city ordinances that requires the city to
install new water meters “if necessary” and argued that because Sc hneider’s meter still
works, an issue of material fact exists as to whether replacing it is “necessary.” In response,
the city argued that replacing Schneider’s meter is necessary because Schneider’s old meter
is incompatible with the city’s new automated water-usage monitoring and billing system.
The city emphasized that city personnel can only read Schneider’s existing meter manually
with a handheld device in close proximity to the meter.
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The parties subsequently subm itted letter briefs to the district court addressing
whether city ordinances allow the city to replace a water meter that does not connect to the
new system but is otherwise in working order. The city argued that the ordinances give it
sole authority to operate a nd maintain its water system, which includes replacing
Schneider’s meter. It reiterated that effec tive operation of its new system requires using
new water meters. Schneider distinguished between the city ’s authority to install and
maintain water meters and the right to remove otherwise functioning ones. In his letter
brief, Schneider did not raise a defense to the city’s summary-judgment motion based on
the ADA or even discuss the ADA. Nor did he raise such a defense at any other point
during the summary-judgment proceedings.
In a written order, the district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment
and injunctive relief and enjoined Schneide r from interfering with installation of a new
meter at his residence. The district court concluded there were no disputed issues of
material fact, basing its decision on its legal interpretation of the city’s authority under the
relevant ordinances. The district court determined that the ordinances “allow [the city] to
upgrade the water meters to a newer, more e fficient model” and do “not require that the
old system be inoperable before being repl aced.” In closing, the district court
acknowledged Schneider’s discomfort and not ed that it was “not unsympathetic to
[Schneider’s] medical plight.”
Schneider appeals.
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DECISION
Schneider argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the
city. A district court must grant summary ju dgment if no genuine issue of material fact
exists and a party is entitled to judgment as a matte r of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
Summary judgment is “inappropriate when reasonable persons might draw different
conclusions from the evidence presented.” Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to th e party against whom summary judgment was
granted. Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Minn. 2020).
Schneider raises two issues on appeal, each of which he contends requires reversal
of the district court’s grant of summary judgme nt to the city. First, he argues that the
district court’s decision is ba sed on an erroneous interpreta tion of the city ordinances
governing water-meter installation and maintena nce. Second, he argue s that, even if the
district court properly interpreted the city or dinances, issues of material fact related to
Schneider’s affirmative ADA defense preclude summary judgment. We address each issue
in turn.
I. The district court did not err by int erpreting the relevant ordinances as
authorizing the city to replace Schneider’s meter.

The parties agree that the question of wh ether the city has authority to replace
Schneider’s water meter requires interpreting th e city’s ordinances. Interpretation of an
ordinance is a question of law that we review de novo. Meleyco P’ship No. 2 v. City of W.
St. Paul, 874 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. App. 2016).
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To interpret city ordinances, we apply the rules of statutory construction.
Chanhassen Ests. Residents A ss’n v. City of Chanhassen , 342 N.W.2d 335, 339 n.3
(Minn. 1984). Our goal is to determine and execute the in tent of the city council. See
Hayden v. City of Minneapolis , 937 N.W.2d 790, 795-96 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 14, 2020) (providing that “[t]he court’s duty is to interpret the policy that the
[l]egislature has already determined in th e statutory language at issue” (quotation
omitted)). As a first step, we look to whet her an ordinance is clear or ambiguous,
construing its words and phrases according to the rules of grammar and to their common
and approved usage. See id. at 795; Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020); see also Long Prairie,
Minn., City Code (LPCC) § 1.301(1) (2020) (specifying that words and phrases used in the
city ordinances are to be c onstrued according to rules of grammar and according to their
common and approved usage). An ordinance is only ambiguous when it is subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation. See Hayden, 937 N.W.2d at 795. In determining
whether an ordinance is clear or ambiguous, we read the ordinance as a whole and
“interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting
interpretations.” See Am. Fam. Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000)
(applying this principle to interpret a Minnesota statute). We also interpret ordinances “to
avoid absurd results and unjust consequences.” See id. at 278. If an ordinance is
unambiguous, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. Frank’s Nursery
Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1980).
8
With these principles in mi nd, we consider the releva nt city-ordinance sections
relating to the water system. They provide:
6.101. City Water System. The City of Long Prairie
shall construct, operate, and maintain a water system for the
benefit of the residents of the city.

. . . .

6.123. Installation of Meters. The city shall install and
maintain all meters subject to the following conditions: . . .
[T]he city shall main tain the meter and , if necessary, install a
new meter at no cost to the consumer.

LPCC §§ 6.101, 6.123 (2020) (emphasis added ). The ordinances do not define the key
terms used in these two sections.
The district court concluded that these sections, read together, unambiguously allow
the city to upgrade its water meters to a more efficient model. Starting with section 6.101,
the district court concluded that the term “mai ntain” as used in that section does “not
require that the old system be inoperable befo re being replaced, or that a new system be
exactly the same as the old.” The district c ourt further concluded that the city’s duty to
“maintain” its water system can include improvements to make the system more efficient.
The district court next applied the language in section 6.123 to conclude that because the
city had implemented an entirely new system, it was “readily necessary for [Schneider’s]
meter to be exchanged to fit the new system used in the rest of the city.” Finally, the district
court concluded that construing these pr ovisions too narrowly would produce
“unreasonable outcomes” like preventing th e city from upgrading to new technology
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except when meters no longer function at all, a result “antithetical to the intentions of the
ordinance authors.”
On appeal, Schneider does not dispute the ci ty’s authority to operate and maintain
the water system under section 6.101. Instead, he argues that because his old meter is fully
functional, a new meter is not strictly “necessary” under the plain meaning of section 6.123.
He argues that section 6.123 should be narrowly construed to allow the city to install a new
meter only when an existing meter is comple tely nonfunctional and, consequently, the
district court erred when it granted summary judgment to the city. We are not persuaded.
Reading section 6.123 in light of its surrounding sections and the city ordinances as
a whole, we conclude that the city has br oad authority to replace its water meters.
Specifically, section 6.101 gives the city its mandate to “operate and maintain” the water
system. The word “maintain” means “[t]o keep in a condition of good repair or efficiency.”
The American Heritage Dictiona ry of the English Language 1058 (5th ed. 2018); see
Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 173 (Minn. 2021) (stating that when
interpreting a statute containing undefined terms, courts “may refer to dictionary
definitions to discern its plain meaning”). Installing new water meters as part of a city-wide
system upgrade to implement automated data collection and billing is consistent with
keeping the system efficient and in good repair. Section 6.123 goes on to require the city
to “install and maintain” all meters and “if necessary” install new meters. LPCC § 6.123.
The word “necessary” means “[n]eeded or required.” American Heritage, supra, at 1177.
In this context, installing new meters is necessary because it is needed or required for the
efficient functioning of the city’s water system. Reading the sections together, the broader
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definition of “maintain” in s ection 6.101 supports a broader definition of “maintain” in
section 6.123 and unambiguously authorizes the city to determine whether replacing a
water meter is “necessary” for purposes of maintaining the system as a whole.
This interpretation is reinforced by another section of the city’s utility ordinances—
section 6.201—which defines certain terms us ed in the ordinances governing the city’s
public sewer system. Statutory definitions of words used elsewhere in the same chapter can
be “authoritative evidence” of intent and meaning. All Parks All. for Change v. Uniprop
Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. Income Fund , 732 N.W.2d 189, 194 (M inn. 2007). Section
6.201(24) defines “[o]peration and [m]aintenance” as “[a]ctivities required to provide for
the dependable and economical functioning of the treatment works.” LPCC § 6.201(24)
(2020). The definition furthe r provides that “operation and maintenance” includes
“replacement.” Id. This definition of “operation a nd maintenance” supports interpreting
the city’s authority to “operate” and “maintain” its water system under sections 6.101 and
6.123 as including replacement of existing wa ter meters when necessary to improve the
economical functioning of the city’s water system.
Finally, the practical outcome of reading the city’s water ordi nances too narrowly
makes the city’s authority clear. Courts pres ume that drafters do not “intend a result that
is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreas onable” and “favor the public interest as
against any private interest.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1), (5) (2020). As the district court
concluded, it would be unreasonable to interpret the water ordinances to preclude the city
from upgrading its system and to only allow the city to replace a water meter when it breaks
down completely as urged by Schneider. We agree that the drafters of the city ordinances
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cannot have intended such an unreasonable result. We therefore conclude that the district
court did not err in interpreting the city ordinances to give the city the authority to replace
Schneider’s water meter.
II. Schneider did not properly raise an affirmative ADA defense below.
Schneider also argues that we should revers e the district court’s grant of summary
judgment because he has an affirmative defense based on the ADA to the city’s claim for
injunctive relief and a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding that defense. The city
counters that Schneider’s argument is not pr operly before this court because Schneider
failed to raise this affirma tive defense in response to the city’s motion for summary
judgment. We agree with the city.
We generally consider “only those issues that the record shows were presented
and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v. Stich ,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). A party challenging a district
court’s grant of summary judgment cannot argue issues on appeal that were not raised in
opposition to the summary-judgm ent motion before the district court. Morton v. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 223 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn. 1974); Woody v. Krueger, 374 N.W.2d 822, 824
(Minn. App. 1985).
A careful review of the record shows that Schneider did not raise an ADA defense
in opposition to the city’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Schneider relies on
the following documents include d in the summary-judgment record to contend that he
asserted an affirmative defense based on the ADA: his answer to the city’s complaint, the
two-sentence note from his urgent-care doctor, and the city’s requests for admissions.
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Schneider’s reliance on these documents is misplaced because Schneider did not argue
during the summary-judgment proceedings that these documents supported a defense based
on the ADA. And Schneider did not actually file these documents in opposition to the
city’s motion for summary judgment. Rather, the city filed these documents in support of
its motion for summary judgment as exhibits to an affidavit from its attorney. The only
document filed by Schneider in response to the city’s motion for summary judgement was
a letter brief, which containe d no reference to the ADA or to his electrosensitivity
diagnosis. And at no point during the summary-judgment hearings did Schneider orally
raise a defense based on the ADA. In sum, Schneider did not raise an ADA defense during
the summary-judgment proceedings, either orally or in writing.
Nor did the district court address a defe nse based on the ADA in its order. The
district court did acknowledge and express sympathy for Schneider’s discomfort and
“medical plight.” But that thoughtful acknowledgment does not constitute consideration
of a legal defense based on the ADA, as evidenced by the lack of any legal analysis or
mention of the ADA by the district court in its order. Because Schneider did not raise an
ADA defense during the summary-judgment proceedings a nd the district court did not
address the question, the issue is not properly raised on appeal.
Schneider next contends that we should consider whether there exists a genuine
issue of material fact regarding his ADA defense even if we conclude the defense was not
raised before the district court on summary judgment. He contends that the issue is
properly before us because it fi ts into a “well-established” exception to the general rule
against considering issues raised for the first time on appeal. He notes that an appellate
13
court may choose to consider an issue that was not raised or decided by the district court
when the issue is “p lainly decisive of the entire controversy on its merits.”
Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n , 566 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. 1997) (quotation
omitted). But the issue that he raises on appeal is not plainly decisive of the entire
controversy because even if we were to conclude that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to his defense, that conclusion wo uld not resolve the entire controversy on the
merits. Instead, it would result in a remand to the district court for a trial.
Finally, even assuming we were to address the issue, we would not reach the result
that Schneider seeks. Instead, we would conclude that Schneider did not present sufficient
evidence to preclude granting su mmary judgment to the city. At the summary-judgment
phase of a proceeding, the no nmoving party has th e burden of alleging specific facts to
support an affirmative defense. Kessel v. Kessel, 370 N.W.2d 889, 895 (Minn. App. 1985).
To establish a genuine issue of material fa ct, the nonmoving party cannot rely on “mere
averments.” Hagen, 963 N.W.2d at 172 (quotation om itted). And no genuine issue of
material fact exists when the nonmoving party presents evidence that creates only a
“metaphysical doubt” about a fact issue. McBee v. Team Indus., Inc. , 925 N.W.2d 222,
230 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Rather, the nonmoving party must present evidence
that is “sufficiently probative” of an essential element of a claim to allow
reasonable persons to reach different conclusions ab out facts in dispute. McIntosh Cnty.
Bank v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 745 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
As the nonmoving party, Schneider had the burden of presenting evidence sufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact to support the elements of his ADA defense. In
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his brief on appeal, Schneider framed his ADA defense as a failure-to-accommodate
defense—namely, that the city refused to accommodate Schneider’s asserted
electrosensitivity condition by allowing him to continue using his existing water meter.
Schneider argues that the doctor’s note he incl uded with his answer met his evidentiary
burden. We are not persuaded.
Title II of the ADA protects qualifie d individuals with a disability from
discrimination by a local government or exclusion from its services, programs, or activities.
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018). The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.”
Id. § 12102(1)(A) (2018).1 Federal regulations implementing Title II further specify that a
public entity must “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures
when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimi nation on the basis of disability ,
unless the public entity can demonstr ate that making the modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, progra m, or activity.”
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) (2021) (emphasis added). “The failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation can constitute discrimination.” Selene v. Legislature of Idaho ,
514 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1256 (D. Idaho 2021) (q uotation omitted). Thus, to raise a
failure-to-accommodate defense under Title II of the ADA, Schneider must allege plausible
facts indicating that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) the city—a public

1 The ADA also defines “disability” as “a reco rd of such impairment” or “being regarded
as having such an impairment .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B)-(C ) (2018). These alternative
definitions are not at issue here.
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entity—discriminated against him by fa iling to make a reasonable accommodation
regarding his water meter, and (3) such di scrimination was base d on his disability. See
Folkerts v. City of Waverly, 707 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2013) (describing the elements of
a prima facie Title II violation).
The only record ev idence relied on by Schneider to support his failure-to-
accommodate defense is a two-sentence note from an urgent-care doctor.2 The note states
only that Schneider “is diagnosed with a Electrosensitivity Disorder at this time” and that
“[h]e is concerned about his health and safety as a result of these installations.”
The doctor’s note is insufficient to create a ge nuine issue of material fact as to the
essential elements of Schneider’s failure-to-accommodate defense under the ADA. First,
the note fails to demonstrate that Schneide r has a “disability” within the meaning of the
ADA because the note provides no information to demonstrate that Schneider’s condition
“substantially limits one or mo re major life activities of su ch individual. ” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(A). And, even if the doctor’s note were suffi cient to demonstrate that
Schneider has a disability, the note fails to provide evidence that Schneider has a need for
an accommodation by the city . The doctor’s note cites only Schneider’s own general
concern about the potential health effects of an electronic meter, stating that “[h]e is
concerned about his health and safety as a result of these installations.” Schneider’s doctor

2 In his appeal brief, Schneider also cites to a number of websites and articles discussing
electronic or electromagnetic hypersensitivity . These materials are not part of the
summary-judgment record. Conseque ntly, we do not consider them. See Thiele ,
425 N.W.2d at 582-83 (“An appellate court may not . . . consider matters not produced and
received in evidence below.”).
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does not offer a medical opinion that installing an electronic meter would have any adverse
effect on Schneider’s health. Because Schneider provided no evidence to demonstrate that
he has a “disability” within th e meaning of the ADA or that any accommodation by the
city is necessary as a result of his condition, Schneider did not present sufficient evidence
to create a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment based on his ADA
defense.
In sum, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judg ment and injunctive
relief to the city. We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the city
has the authority to replace Schneider’s water meter, and Schneider forfeited any
affirmative defense under the ADA by faili ng to raise it during summary-judgment
proceedings before the district court. Even if he had pr operly raised such a defense,
Schneider failed to meet his burden to presen t evidence sufficient to preclude granting
summary judgment to the city.
Affirmed.