Jason Lee Bolstad

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-0511

Kanabec County District Court Moore, III, J.

Jason Lee Bolstad

Appellant,

vs. Filed: November 10, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.
________________________

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota, for
appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General, Saint
Paul, Minnesota; and

Barbara McFadden, Kanabec County Attorney, Mora, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. The district court did not err when it treated appellant’s motion to correct his
sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 as a third petition for postconviction relief
because his motion implicated more than just his sentence.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the appellant’s
third petition for postconviction relief was untimely.
Affirmed.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
2
O P I N I O N

MOORE, III, Justice.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether the district court erred when it
construed appellant Jason Lee Bolstad’s motion to correct his sentence as an untimely third
postconviction petition. Because Bolstad’s motion implicates more than his sentence and
was not brought within the timeframe required by the postconviction statute of limitations,
we affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of April 2, 1996, Bolstad’s father was shot several times and
ultimately killed by blunt trauma to the head. 1 He was found with the lining of his front
pants pocket, where he typically carried large amounts of cash, turned out and his wallet
missing from his back pocket. The initial investigation revealed that Bolstad allegedly
offered a friend money to kill his father and had on a few occasions stated that he wished
his father dead. After his father’s death, Bolstad inherited a total of $87,222.02. Bolstad
told investigators that on the date of the offense, he was in an apartment in Hudson,
Wisconsin, the entire day, and two alibi witnesses corroborated his story.
The investigation stalled for several years until the police received information that
one of Bolstad’s alibi witnesses had been lying. In January of 2002, the witness admitted
to investigators that Bolstad left the Hudson apartment for several hours on the date of the

1 Only the facts relevant to this appeal are recited here. More details about Bolstad’s
conviction are set forth in his direct appeal, State v. Bolstad (Bolstad I), 686 N.W.2d 531,
534–38 (Minn. 2004), and in his second postconviction petition appeal, Bolstad v. State
(Bolstad II), 878 N.W.2d 493, 494–95 (Minn. 2016).
3
offense. This revelation led investigators to contact Bolstad’s second alibi witness, who,
after negotiating an offer of immunity, retracted his statement from 1996 and delivered the
gun used to kill Bolstad’s father to investigators. Analysis by the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension revealed that the bullets and casings recovered at the scene of the crime were
fired by the gun delivered by the second alibi witness and contained traces of blood that
matched the DNA profile of Bolstad’s father.
A Kanabec County grand jury indicted Bolstad on March 13, 2002 on four counts:2
first-degree felony murder (while committing or attempting to commit aggravated
robbery), see Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2020); first-degree premeditated murder, see
Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a) (1) (2020); second -degree intentional murder, see Minn. Stat.
§ 609.19(1) (2020); and second-degree felony murder (while committing or attempting to
commit assault in the second degree), see Minn. Stat. § 609.19(2) (2020). Bolstad’s jury
trial began March 18, 2003.
During deliberations, the jury came back with a question about the fourth element
of the first-degree felony murder charge: “Can the robbery of the victim take place after
the death and take place as a second thought, not as motive to kill?” The State and Bolstad
made arguments about how to respond to the question; ultimately the district court agreed

2 Because the murder occurred in Apr il 1996, Bolstad was charged under the 1995
version of each statute that was in effect at the time of the offense. The legislature has
since amended and reorganized each of the statutes Bolstad was convicted of violating.
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 2, 1996, ch. 409, art. 4, § 8, 1996 Minn. Laws 605, 655–56. However,
because the portions of each statute relevant to this case remain substantively unchanged,
we cite the current version of each statute. Compare, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1)
(2020), with Minn. Stat. § 609.185(1) (Supp. 1995).
4
with the State and added a sentence to the instruction explaining that “the aggravated
robbery and the murder [must be] parts of a single continuous transaction.” The jury found
Bolstad guilty on all four counts. On April 2, 2003, the court convicted Bolstad of
first-degree premeditated murder and imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of
release. The court did not convict him of any other offense. On direct appeal, we affirmed
Bolstad’s conviction of first-degree premeditated murder. Bolstad I, 686 N.W.2d at 534.
Between 2007 and 2014, Bolstad filed two petitions for postconviction relief, both
of which the district court denied. We affirmed the denial of his second postconviction
petition in 2016. Bolstad II, 878 N.W.2d at 495–98. In December 2020, Bolstad filed a
motion to correct his sentence. The district court construed the motion to correct his
sentence as a third postconviction petition that was untimely.3 Bolstad now appeals.
ANALYSIS
Bolstad asserts a three-part argument in support of his contention that the district court
erred in denying his motion to correct his sentence. First, Bolstad contends that the jurors’
question regarding the first-degree felony murder charge allegedly shows that reasonable
doubt existed about the degree of murder of which he was guilty. As result, he argues,
Minnesota Statutes § 611.02 (2020)—which provides that when “there exists a reasonable
doubt as to which of two or more degrees the defendant is guilty, the defendant shall be
convicted only of the lowest”—required the district court to convict him of second- degree

3 In the alternative, the district court found that the postconviction petition was
procedurally barred by Knaffla and a meritless second or successive petition for similar
relief. Because we conclude that the third postconviction petition is untimely, we need not
address these alternative theories or reach the merits of Bolstad’s claim.
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murder, the lowest degree of murder alleged in the complaint. Second, Bolstad argues that
a sentence of life without the possibility of release is not authorized for the offense of
second-degree murder. Third, Bolstad claims that the district court erred when it treated his
motion to correct his sentence as a third postconviction petition because he was merely
challenging his sentence. For the following reasons, we conclude that the district court
properly treated Bolstad’s motion to correct his sentence as a postconviction petition that
was untimely.
I.
We first address the district court’s treatment of Bolstad’s motion to correct his
sentence as a postconviction petition. The standard for reviewing a district court’s decision
to treat a motion to correct a sentence under Rule 27.03 as a postconviction petition under
Minnesota Statutes Chapter 590 remains an open question. In State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d
477, 479 (Minn. 2015), we applied the de novo standard of review when considering the
issue because the arguments of the parties required that we interpret the text of a statute
and a procedural rule. But in Wayne v. State, we declined “to adopt a definitive standard
of review because, regardless of the amount of deference, if any,” the district court was
entitled to, we decided “that the court did not err when it treated Wayne’s motion as a
petition for postconviction relief.” 870 N.W.2d 389, 391 n.2 (Minn. 2015) ; see also
Johnson v. State, 877 N.W.2d 776, 779 n.3 (Minn. 2016) (declining to adopt a standard of
review because we would have affirmed “regardless of the standard of review that
applies”).
6
Like the argument in Coles, Bolstad’s argument requires that we consider the
language of statute, namely section 611.02. Consequently, the standard of review is
arguably de novo. But as in Wayne and Johnson, Bolstad’s argument fails regardless of
the standard of review and, therefore, we need not resolve the issue here.
A “court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.03, subd. 9. A sentence is unauthorized when it is “contrary to law or applicable
statutes.” State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2015). The two-year time limit
in the postconviction statute does not apply to a motion to correct a sentence. Reynolds v.
State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2016). Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, however, “is limited
to sentences, and the court’s authority under the rule is restricted to modifying a sentence.”
Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 480. A motion to correct a sentence that in fact challenges the
underlying conviction cannot “circumvent the procedural requirements of the
postconviction statute” simply because a defendant labeled it differently. Wayne, 870
N.W.2d at 391. If the motion “implicates more than simply [the] sentence,” it is properly
treated as a postconviction petition. Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 482.
In his motion to correct his sentence, Bolstad argued that under section 611.02, he
could not be convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and therefore his sentence of
life without the possibility of release was unlawful. Observing that his motion “does not
challenge the validity of the guilty verdict,” Bolstad asserts that his motion falls within the
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scope of Rule 27.03, subdivision 9.4 But as explained below, the plain language of section
611.02 contradicts Bolstad’s assertion.
Section 611.02 deals with convictions; it states that when reasonable doubt exists as
to which of two or more degrees of an offense a defendant is guilty, the defendant “shall
be convicted only of the lowest offense.” Minn. Stat. § 611.02 (emphasis added). And on
more than one occasion, we have treated a motion under Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, that
raises a claim under section 611.02 as a postconviction petition because the statute deals
with convictions and therefore implicates more than sentencing. See, e.g., Munt v. State,
920 N.W.2d 410, 415–16 (Minn. 2018); Rossberg v. State, 932 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Minn. 2019).
Bolstad argues that section 611.02 can be used to correct a sentence, citing State v.
Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1990). Bolstad’s reliance on Moore is misplaced. In
Moore, we stated that we “might be inclined to reduce the conviction to second degree
manslaughter” pursuant to section 611.02 had a new trial not been the “more appropriate
remedy.” Id. at 95 (emphasis added) . Nothing in Moore suggests that the defendant’s
sentence could be reduced without first reducing his conviction. Thus, even if we applied
section 611.02 as contemplated in Moore, we would still have to reduce Bolstad’s
conviction, not merely modify or correct his sentence.

4 Minnesota Statutes § 609.02, subd. 5 (2020), defines “conviction” as a guilty verdict
that the district court accepts and records. The parties do not dispute that the district court
accepted and recorded the guilty verdict in this case. By referring to the “guilty verdict,”
Bolstad tries to obscure the fact that his section 611.02 claim necessarily challenges his
conviction of first-degree premeditated murder.
8
In sum, even if we apply the standard of review most favorable to Bolstad, the
district court properly treated his motion to correct his sentence as a third postconviction
petition because his section 611.02 claim necessarily challenges his conviction, not merely
his sentence.

II.
Having determined that the district court did not err in treating Bolstad’s motion as a
third postconviction petition, we consider next whether the court erred in summarily denying
the petition. We review a district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief for
an abuse of discretion. Hannon v. State, 957 N.W.2d. 425, 432 (Minn. 2021). The district
court abuses its discretion when it “exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary or capr icious
manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or [makes] clearly erroneous
factual findings.” Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).
The availability of and procedure for postconviction relief is governed by Minn.
Stat. §§ 590.01‒.11 (2020). Particularly, section 590.04, subdivision 1, requires courts to
set a hearing on the petition “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding
conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” An evidentiary hearing on a
postconviction petition is required “where there are material facts in dispute that were not
resolved at trial and must be resolved to rule on the merits of the issues raised.” Rhodes v.
State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016). “But a postconviction evidentiary hearing is
not required when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant
the requested relief.” Id. The refore, a petition asserting claims that are untimely and not
9
subject to an exception may be summarily denied. Bolstad II, 878 N.W.2d at 496.
The postconviction statute requires petitions to be filed within two years of the entry
of a judgment of conviction or sentence, or an appellate court’s disposition on direct appeal,
whichever comes later. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a). Bolstad’s conviction became
final before August 1, 2005, the date the statute of limitations went into effect, so he had
two years from that date—until July 31, 2007 —to file a petition. 5 Bolstad II, 878 N.W.2d
at 496.
Bolstad argues that his claim is not subject to the time bar because it falls properly
within the scope of a motion to correct his sentence, and such motions are not subject to
the postconviction statute or its restrictions. He does not make any arguments in the
alternative that his claims are timely, or that any exception to the time bar applies.
Bolstad’s argument fails because, as explained above, his section 611.02 claim falls outside
the scope of a motion to correct a sentence. Moreover, because Bolstad filed his third
postconviction petition in December 2020, more than 15 years after the date the 2-year
statute of limitations went into effect, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it summarily denied Bolstad’s petition as untimely.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.

5 The 2-year limitations period imposed by Minn. Stat. § 590.01 subd. 4(a) became
effective on August 1, 2005; the law gave defendants whose convictions were final before
that date “two years after the effective date of [the] act to file a petition for postconviction
relief.” Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1098.