In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. J. S. and C. L., Parents.

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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0515

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. J. S. and C. L., Parents.

Filed November 1, 2021
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Big Stone County District Court
File No. 06-JV-20-211

John E. Mack, New London Law, P.A., New London, Minnesota (for appellant mother
A.J.S.)

Joseph P. Glasrud, Big Stone County Attorney, Ortonville, Minnesota (for respondent Big
Stone County Family Services)

Susan Marsolek, Ortonville, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal involving an involuntary termination of parental rights (TPR),
appellant-mother argues that the district court erred by determining that (1) the county met
the statutory basis of engaging in reasonable efforts, under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(5), to support reunification and (2) termination was in the “best interests of the child.”
We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant A.J.S. (mother) gave birth to S.S. (child) in May 2020. Immediately after,
both mother and child tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine,
tetrahydrocannabinol (a psychoactive compound found in cannabis also known as THC),
and alcohol. Tests also showed that mother had exposed child to drugs during the second
and third trimesters of her pregnancy. Big Stone County (the county) filed a child in need
of protection or services (CHIPS) petition. At three days old, child went from hospital
observation to out-of-home placement with a foster parent.
The county worked with mother to develop a six-month case plan, which she signed
on July 17, 2020, two days after she admitted to the CHIPS petition. Mother did not follow
the case plan, and the c ounty filed a TPR petition on November 25, 2020. The county
alleged the statutory basis for termination that reasonable efforts failed to correct the
conditions that led to child’s out-of-home placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(5). The district court issued an order on February 18, 2021, following a CHIPS review
hearing, requiring mother to complete an updated chemical-use assessment. Mother failed
to follow the case plan and the February 2021 court order. The district court found that the
presumption had been met that reasonable efforts to reunite the family failed under section
260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), because (1) child has resided out of the parental home for more
than six months and mother has not complied with the out-of-home placement plan; (2) the
district court approved the plan; (3) the county made reasonable efforts to support
reunification; and (4) those efforts failed to correct the conditions giving rise to child’s out-
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of-home placement. The district court also found that TPR was in child’s best interests.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
On appeal from a district court’s TPR decision, this court reviews “the district
court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its
determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental
rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805
N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “A finding is
clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750
N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted) ; see In re Commitment of Kenney ,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 -22 (Minn. 2021) ( “[t]he clear-error standard of review is familiar
because it applies across so many contexts”). The district court abuses its discretion if its
decision stems from a misapplication of the law or contradicts the facts or logic. Hesse v.
Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Minn. App. 2009). “Considerable deference is due to the
district court’s decision because a district court is in a superior position to assess the
credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county
proved by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to
reunite mother with child under Minn. Stat § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).

Mother first argues that the statutory ground for TPR is not met because the county
did not engage in reasonable efforts by focusing on her addiction without considering
potential mental-health issues. We disagree.
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A district court may terminate a parent’ s rights to a child if “following the child’s
placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed
to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(5) (2020). A district court presumes that reasonable efforts have been made if: (1) the
“child has resided out of the parental home under court order for a cumulative period of 12
months”; (2) “the court has approved the out-of-home placement plan”; (3) the “conditions
leading to the out-of-home placement have not been corrected” as shown by the parent not
“substantially [complying] with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan”; and
(4) “reasonable efforts have been made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the
parent and reunite the family.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(i) -(iv). Absent an
enumerated exception, the district court “ shall make findings and conclusions as to the
provision of reasonable efforts” in a TPR pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). In
making these findings, the district court must consider whether the services were:
(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child;
(2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family;
(3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible;
(5) consistent and timely; and
(6) realistic under the circumstances.

Id. The ultimate purpose of making these efforts is to “assist in alleviating the conditions
that gave rise to the dependency adjudication.” In re Welfare of H.K ., 455 N.W.2d 529,
532 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). The petitioner must establish by
clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground exists to support the TPR . In re
Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996).
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Here, the district court found that the county engaged in the following efforts to
reunite mother with child under the case plan:
• The county and mother developed a case plan in May
2020;
• The plan sought to help mother with her chemical
addiction;
• The county brought child to regular visits with mother;
• The plan authorized child to be placed with mother if
she entered an accommodating in -patient chemical -
treatment program;
• Mother had many treatment program opportunities;
• The county arranged for mother’s assessments,
including four chemical-use assessments;
• The county helped arrange mother’s admission dates
and treatment beds to multiple treatment programs;
• Mother’s social worker communicated with mother
often, discussing mother’s options with her,
encouraging mother, and informing mother of the
consequences should she continue to avoid treatment;
• The social worker offered transportation options to
mother; and
• The social worker helped set up and reschedule
mother’s parenting assessment.

The record supports the district court’s findings that the county presented clear and
convincing evidence that it engaged in reasonable efforts to reunite mother with child.
Mother does not argue that the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Rather, she
appears to argue that the district court abused its discretion by determining that those efforts
were reasonable. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 322-23 (Minn. App.
2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015) (using two-part standard of review: clear error for
district court’s underlying findings of fact and abuse of discretion for district court’s
determination of whether efforts were reasonable). In D.L.D., the mother failed to
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articulate how the county’s reasonable efforts failed to address the condition that led to the
child’s removal from the mother’s home. Id. Similarly here, mother fails to articulate how
the county’s reunification efforts failed to address her potential mental -health issues.
Mother’s case plan called for her to complete a parenting assessment, which included a
psychiatric examination specifically for a mental -health evaluation. The county helped
arrange the assessment. Mother cooperated with the interview portion of the assessment
but left before finishing the psychiatric portion of the exam. And though the county made
an effort to help mother reschedule the remaining portion, mother never went back to
complete the assessment. Even still, the assessor diagnosed mother with bipolar disorder
and recommended mother maintain sobriety first in order to fully deal with the mental -
health issues. Additionally, mother’s social worker discussed mother’s potential mental -
health issues with her and referred her to a clinic for mental-health services. Accordingly,
we conclude that the district cou rt did not clearly err in its findings identifying the efforts
the county made to assist in reunification. And because the county addressed mother’s
addiction in a case plan that mother agreed to, provided services to mother which included
a parenting ass essment with a psychiatric evaluation, and deferred to the parenting
assessor’s recommendations, which clearly discussed mother’s mental health and need to
maintain sobriety, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court ’s determination
that these efforts were reasonable.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of child.

Mother argues that the district court’s best -interests findings were not independen t
from the statutory grounds for termination. Mother’s argument fails.
In analyzing the best interests of the child, the district court must consider and
balance “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s
interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the
child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); Minn. R. Juv. Prot.
P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). “ During this balancing process, the interests of the parent and child are
not necessarily given equal weight. ” R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4. “Competing interests
include health considerations, a stable environment, and the child’s preference.” In re
Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012); see also In re Welfare of K.T., 327
N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982) (“In considering the best interests of a child, stability is a
factor which must be given high priority”). If the parent’s and child’s interests conflict,
“the interests of the child are paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. “Because the
best-interests analysis involves credibility determinations and is generally not susceptible
to an appellate court’s global review of a record, we give considerable deference to the
district court’s findings.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (quotation omitted). A district court
must make findings on the best interests of the child. In re Welfare of Children of R.W. ,
678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004) (holding that findings regarding best in terests of child,
without findings on existence of at least one statutory ground, was inadequate to support
involuntary termination). Finally, “ [appellate courts] review a district court’s ultimate
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determination that termination is in a child’s best inter est for an abuse of discretion.”
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
Here, in addition to presenting separate legal standards under separate headings of
“reasonable efforts” and “best interests of the child,” the district court made separate
factual findings.
The district court made detailed findings regarding the county’s efforts to support
reunification and determined that those efforts were reasonable . The district court also
found that mother exposed child to drugs while pregnant and, as a result, child was bo rn
with those drugs in its system. Accordingly, the district court found that the county had
correctly identified mother’s addiction issues and the need for sobriety before reunification
with child. Finally, the district court addressed mother’s failure to obtain sobriety despite
mother knowing that her continued drug use could lead to termination of her parental
rights: mother minimized her addiction at trial; mother denied her drug use harmed child;
mother failed to complete a parenting assessment; moth er refused on at least seven
occasions to enter a chemical -dependency-treatment program; mother failed to complete
two outpatient programs; mother failed numerous drug tests; and mother admitted to using
methamphetamine two weeks before trial.
In considering the child’s best interests, the district court found that child needed to
have a safe and stable home. Further, the district court noted that child has lived in the
same foster home and mostly has had consistent visits with mother. And although the
district court noted mother’s interest in having a relationship with child, it found mother
used drugs while pregnant, continued to use drugs after child had been placed out-of-home,
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refused to seek treatment, failed to understand the harm her addiction pose s, and placed
her desires over child’s needs.
Mother next argues, without citing to any legal authority for the proposition, that
the district court could not use the same findings in its “reasonable efforts” and “best
interests of the child” analysis. We may decline to reach issues that are inadequately
briefed. See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480,
480 (Minn. 1997); see In re P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n.1 (Minn. App. 2003) (applying
Wintz in TPR appeal); State v. Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App.
1997) (holding appellate courts may decide not to entertain an argument when party fails
to cite legal authority unless prejudicial error is “obvious on mere inspection” ).
Nevertheless, this argument fails on the merits. There is a certain amount of overlap in the
district court’s findings on reasonable efforts and best interests. But this overlap is
inevitable given how intertwined the issues are. That is, some facts establishing how the
county’s reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out -of-
home placement are also necessary facts to consider in a best-interests analysis.
Mother also appears to argue that the district court’s analysis was inad equate
because it failed to consider best -interests factors outside of Minn. R. Juv. Prot.
P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). Mother fails to cite caselaw to support her argument. Mother also
ignores both established Minnesota caselaw and a rule which set forth the proper factors a
district court must consider when analyzing the best interests of the child in a termination
proceeding. See R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4 (holding district court’s best -interests analysis
must balance “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the p arent-child relationship; (2) the
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parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest
of the child”); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (identifying same factors as factors that
must be considered when distric t court addresses whether to terminate parental rights) .
Here, the district court correctly analyzed the appropriate best-interests factors under Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) and Minnesota caselaw.
Alternatively, mother argues that the district court failed to make findings on her
fitness in the foreseeable future. Mother’s argument is difficult to understand, but it
appears she is trying to insert a statutory factor into the best -interests analysis. Mother
once again fails to provide legal support for this assertion.
In In re Welfare of Chosa, the Minnesota Supreme Court held “evidence relating to
termination must address conditions that exist at the time of the hearing . . . and that it must
appear that the present conditions of neglect wil l continue for a prolonged, indeterminate
period.” 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980). The supreme court addressed Chosa’s
holding in In re Welfare of P.R.L. , noting that respondent’s long history of refusing to
correct the conditions that led to the child’s out -of-home placement “suffices to meet any
such requirement that might exist.” 622 N.W.2d 538, n.8 (Minn. 2001). Consequently,
the supreme court affirmed the district court’s determination that a presumption under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(ii), had been met because respondent repeatedly
failed to comply with the district court’s orders and an approved case plan. Id. at 545
(“There is no indication that . . . the condition that led to P.R.L.’s out-of-home placement,
has changed”).
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Here, the district court properly found that the presumption had been met and was
therefore not required to explicitly consider mother’s fitness in the foreseeable f uture.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining
that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child.
Affirmed.