Jesus Daniel Ibarra, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0516

Jesus Daniel Ibarra, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 24, 2022
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Watonwan County District Court
File No. 83-CR-17-333

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Stephen J. Lindee, Watonwan County Attorney, St. James, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction re lief seeking
withdrawal of his guilty plea. He argues that the plea was unintelligent and involuntary
and that the district court therefore abused its discretion in denying his petition. We affirm.
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FACTS
In June 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jesus Daniel Ibarra
with first-, third-, and fifth-degree assault. The complaint alleged that Ibarra approached
an 80 -year-old man who was fixing a bicycle in his front yard and that , after the man
cautioned Ibarra to get rid of a bag of mariju ana, Ibarra assaulted him. The man suffered
multiple broken bones and a subdural hemorrhage, and ultimately had to be airlifted from
a local medical clinic to North Memorial Medical Center for trauma care.
In August 2018, Ibarra pleaded guilty to first -degree assault pursuant to a plea
agreement. During the plea colloquy, Ibarra stated that he did not have a full recollection
of the assault and that he was under the influence of a controlled substance when it
occurred. He admitted, however, t hat he remembered hitting and hurting the man, and
agreed that the man was severely injured and suffered a broken nose, broken wrist, and
subdural hemorrhage from the assault. Ibarra advised the district court that he was taking
prescription medication to treat his depression and reduce anxiety, but stated that he was
thinking clearly, understood the rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty, and wished
to plead guilty. The district court accepted the guilty plea.
Based on the sentencing guidelines, the presumptive sentence was an executed
prison term of 98 months, with a presumptive guidelines range of between 84 and 117
months. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2016). Under the terms of the plea agreement, Ibarra
agreed to plead guilty to first -degree assault and the state agreed to a stayed 117-month
sentence and dismissal of the remaining charges. The agreement therefore contemplated a
top-of-the-box sentenc e duration, but a downward dispositional departure to probation.
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The district court held a sentencing hearing in September 2018 and sentenced Ibarra , in
accordance with the plea agreement , to 117 months in prison for first -degree assault, but
stayed execution of the sentence and placed Ibarra on probation for 15 years.
In January 2019, Ibarra’s probation officer filed a report that alleged Ibarra had
violated the conditions of his probation by failing to contact his probation officer as
directed, report an address or telephone number change within 72 hours, and report to his
probation officer as directed. The district court issued an arrest warrant, and Ibarra was
arrested a few days later. Following his arrest, Ibarra submitted to a drug test and tes ted
positive for benzodiazepines, opiates, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), and
methamphetamine. Ibarra met with his probation officer and admitted to using marijuana
one to two times per day since his release from jail, and to using Xanax, a benzodiazepine,
about five times since his release. He denied using opiates or methamphetamine and
claimed that he had recently been injected with a syringe at a party but did not know what
was in the syringe.
In February 2019, Ibarra appeared before the district court on the alleged probation
violations. At that time, his counsel expressed serious concerns over Ibarra’s mental health
and requested that the district court order Ibarra to undergo a competency evaluation.
Counsel explained that Ibarra had been diag nosed with post -traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) that was not properly treated, and that he believed that Ibarra had “an overarching
paranoia that is almost suicidal.” Counsel later filed an affidavit to support his request for
a competency evaluation that explained that Ibarra “was severely sexually abused as a
minor while in drug treatment” and that the abuse “produced a very damaged individual
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with a very immature outlook on the world and reality.” Counsel also stated that he
believed that Ibarra’s mental capacity had been diminished by years of drug use. Counsel
later withdrew his request based on Ibarra’s request to proceed, but nonetheless believed it
was important to make a record concerning Ibarra’s mental-health history.
In March 2019, the dist rict court held a probation -revocation hearing. Ibarra
admitted that he violated the conditions of his probation by using chemicals, failing to
report to and maintain contact with his probation officer, and being terminated from his
community-service prog ram. He argued that his probation should not be revoked, and
instead requested the opportunity to seek treatment for his mental -health and chemical -
dependency issues. He recounted his history of mental -health issues, including previous
suicide attempts a nd hospitalizations, and testified that he was sexually abused by other
juveniles at a juvenile-detention center when he was about 13 years old. He testified that
his chemical -dependency issues were related to that abuse. The district court revoked
Ibarra’s probation and executed his prison sentence. Ibarra appealed the revocation of his
probation, but this court affirmed, and the supreme court denied review. State v. Ibarra,
No. A19-0899, 2019 WL 7049937, at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 23, 2019), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 17, 2020).
In September 2020, Ibarra petitioned for postconviction relief. Ibarra sought to
withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his plea was unintelligent because he did not
understand the rights he was waiving and the consequences of ple ading guilty. He also
alleged that his plea was involuntary because his attorney provided ineffective assistance
of counsel. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, at which Ibarra testified that his
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trial counsel did not adequately explain the r ights he was waiving or the consequences of
pleading guilty. Ibarra acknowledged that he had extensive experience in juvenile court .
He asserted, however, that as a juvenile, he had “numerous [probation] violations ,” but
would be sent back home with “a s lap on the wrist” and “no serious custody time.” He
testified that based on his experience as a juvenile he “didn’t think that [he] would be
serving these 117 months on a first violation,” particularly because he did “not pick[] up
any new charges.” He also testified that he was unaware that the state had offered a plea
deal for him to serve 84 months in prison, a bottom-of-the-box sentence, and that he would
have taken that offer “[i]n a heartbeat.”
The district court denied the petition for postconvi ction relief. The district court
determined that it was “satisfied that [Ibarra] was well aware at the time of sentencing of
the consequences of violating his probation .” The district court reasoned that “[i]t is
incredible to suggest . . . that [Ibarra] would have accepted an 84-month commit to prison”
rather than the plea agreement that included a downward dispositional departure to
probation, which allowed him to avoid prison so long as he abided by the probation
conditions. Ibarra appeals.
DECISION
“When a criminal defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 15.05, after
the defendant has been sentenced, the motion to withdraw the plea must be raised in a
petition for postconviction relief.” James v. St ate, 699 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. 2005).
We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Riley
v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district
6
court’s “decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record. ” Id. “The burden is on the petitioner at a post -conviction proceeding to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the facts which would warrant withdrawal of his
guilty plea.” Doughman v. State , 351 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. App. 1984), rev. denied
(Minn. Oct. 16, 1984).
A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05 , subd. 1,
provides that “the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely
motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.” “[A] manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. To be valid,
a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d
821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). Ibarra argues that his guilty plea
is not valid because it was not intelligent and not voluntary.
Claim that Plea Was Not Intelligent
We turn first to Ibarra’s claim that his guilty plea was not intelligent. “The purpose
of the requirement that the plea be intelligent is to insure that the defendant understands
the charges, understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty, and understands the
consequences of his plea.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). The supreme
court has observed that when a criminal defendant is represented by counsel, that counsel
plays a key role in ensuring that the plea is intelligent by explaining the nature of the
charges, the rights a defendant is waiving, and any consequences that will result. Taylor,
887 N.W.2d at 823.
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Ibarra argues that his plea was not intelligent because his counsel did not adequately
explain the rights that Ibarra was waiving or the consequences of pleading guilty. He
asserts that his counsel repeatedly told him that he was facing 20 years 1 in prison and that
because of “the traumatic experiences of [his] past” while in custody, he “would have done
just about anything to be released from custody.” He argues that when his counsel cal led
to tell him about the plea offer he was in a “diminished mental state” and only understood
that under the agreement he would not go to prison. He asserts that at that time he “was
told 15 years’ probation but did not know what that meant” and that if he had known that
he “could go to prison for 117 months if [he] violated [the] conditions of probation, [he]
would not have accepted the plea deal.”
At the time of the guilty plea, Ibarra signed a “petition to enter plea of guilty.” The
petition states that Ibarra had sufficient time to discuss his case with counsel, that his
counsel had discussed with him the possible defenses and the evidence against him, and
that Ibarra had the right to a jury trial. The petition explains that if Ibarra were to have a
trial then the state would have to present witnesses in open court and that he could question
the witnesses, that he would have a right to present favorable witnesses, and that the jury
would presume him innocent until his guilt was proven beyond a reaso nable doubt. The
petition contains the following paragraph with a description of the plea agreement:
I have been told by my attorney and I understand:
a. That my attorney discussed this case with one of
the prosecuting attorneys and that my attorney and the
prosecuting attorney agreed that if I entered a plea of guilty,

1 Twenty years is the statutory maximum sentence for the offense of first -degree assault.
Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2016).
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the prosecutor will do the following: I will plead guilty to
Count I [first-degree assault] with an agreed stay of execution
on a commitment to prison but if upon violation of my
probation I a m determined by [the district court to ] lose my
stay of execution my sentence will be at the top of the box, 117
months. Probation to include at [the district court’s] discretion
one (1) year in County Jail with credit for time served. Counts
II [third-degree assault] and III [fifth-degree assault] dismissed
with prejudice. Other conditions of probation left to the
discretion of the [district] Court.

Finally, the plea petition reflects that Ibarra had been hospitalized in a psychiatric unit in
April 2018 due to a suicide attempt and that he was taking prescription medication that
“gives [him] a clear head and reduces anxiety.”
At the plea hearing, the district court questioned Ibarra about the contents of the
plea petition. The district court asked Ibarra if he understood the rights explained in the
petition and Ibarra responded, “Yes.” The district court then went through the trial rights
that Ibarra was waiving by pleading guilty, and Ibarra said that he understood those rights.
The district court also questioned Ibarra about his hospitalization and prescription
medication, and asked Ibarra if he was clear -headed, understood what was going on and
what the plea of guilty meant, and wished to plead guilty. Ibarra responded “Yes” to each
question. The district court also confirmed with the attorneys and Ibarra that the agreement
was for a 117 -month, top-of-the-box sentence, w ith execution stayed, probation, county
jail time with credit for time served, and the dismissal of the third- and fifth-degree assault
charges.
Ibarra argues that the “descriptions of the plea agreement are vague at best” and did
not explain how long he would be on probation, what a stay of execution was, how the stay
9
could be revoked, and that he would receive a 117 -month prison sentence if the stay was
revoked. He claims that he challenged the legitimacy of his guilty plea “ only after his
probation was revoked because that is when he learned that serving a 117-month sentence
for violating probation was a consequence of his plea.” He asserts that this establishes his
plea was unintelligent. We are not persuaded.
In the affidavit accompanying the p etition for postconviction relief, Ibarra
acknowledged that before he entered his guilty plea he “was told 15 years’ probation .”
Ibarra argues that most of his experience with probation , however, was as a juvenile, and
that, while on probation as a juveni le, he committed numerous probation violations and
received only minor punishments as consequences for those violations. He claims this led
him to believe that his probation would not be revoked after a first violation and expected
that he would be given more chances. While this may be true, it is not enough to establish
that he lacked the knowledge that his probation could be revoked, particularly since Ibarra
had previously experienced a probation revocation. At the evidentiary hearing, Ibarra
acknowledged that he was sentenced to probation in 2016 for fleeing a peace officer and
that, after he violated the conditions of probation, his sentence was executed and he was
sent to jail. See State v. Wiley , 420 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Minn. App. 1988) ( considering
appellant’s plea petition and experience with the criminal justice system when determining
whether a plea was intelligent), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 1988).
Moreover, the description of the plea agreement in the signed plea petition states
that a consequence of a violation of the conditions of his probation could include a sentence
“at the top of the box, 117 months.” This further undermines Ibarra’s assertion that he did
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not know that the possible consequences of violating his probation included having to serve
117 months in prison.
On this record, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that
Ibarra was aware of the consequences of hi s guilty plea and the rights he was waiving by
pleading guilty. The guilty plea was therefore intelligent.
Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim
Ibarra next argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary because he received
ineffective assistance of co unsel. “In order for a guilty plea to be valid, it must be made
voluntarily.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 1994). Ineffective assistance of
counsel renders a guilty plea involuntary. Sames v. State , 805 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Minn.
App. 2011) , rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 21, 2011) . “When an accused is represented by
counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 718
(quotations omitted).
A two-part standard applies to Ibarra’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, Ibarra must show that his
counsel’s “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-
88. Second, Ibarra must establish that he was prejudiced as a result. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d
at 718. Prejudice can be shown by demonstrating there is a “reasonable probability that
but for the alleged errors of his counsel, he would not have pleaded guilty.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
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Ibarra argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel
did not adequately explain the proceedings and consequences of pleading guilty in a way
that Ibarra could understand, did not fully advise the district court of Ibarra’s mental-health
issues, and “did not even discuss [Ibarra’s] waiver of the right to an intoxication defense.”
But as discussed above, the record shows that counsel did explain the rights Ibarra was
waiving and the consequences of pleading guilty, which Ibarra confirmed when questioned
by the district court during the plea hearing. Ibarra was also questioned by the district court
at the plea hearing about his medication and mental health and stated that he was thinking
clearly, understood the proceedings, and wished to plead guilty.
The record further indicates that Ibarra’s counsel did discuss a potential intoxication
defense with Ibarra. When counsel questioned Ibarra to establish a factual basis for the
plea, Ibarra stated that he did not have a full recollection of the assault and that he was
under the influence of a controlled substance. The following exchange then occurred
between the district court and Ibarra:
Q: And then if I could just fol low up with —[counsel] had
indicated to you—you went through a bunch of different
defenses for your case? Correct?
A: Yes.

Q: And you had talked about it at the time that you were taking
a controlled substance. Is that correct?
A: Yes.

Q: And did [counsel] explain to you an intoxication defense?
Did you go through that?
A: Yes.

Q: Alright. And is it even though you may have that, if you’ve
discussed that, you’re waiving your right to present an
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intoxication defense and plead[ing] guilty pursuant to this plea
agreement? Is that correct?
A: Yes.

Thus, Ibarra confirmed at the plea hearing that counsel did explain and discuss an
intoxication defense, and that Ibarra understood that he was waiving the right to present an
intoxication defense by pleading guilty.
Finally, Ibarra argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
counsel failed to communicate a plea offer from the prosecutor to plead guilty to first -
degree assault and receive an executed sentence of 84 months, a bottom -of-the-box
sentence. In general, “counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the
prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”
Eason v. State , 950 N.W.2d 258, 268 (Minn. 2020) (quoting Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S.
134, 145 (2012)). Ibarra argues that if counsel had communicated the offer to serve 84
months, he would have taken it “[i]n a heartbeat.”
We first note that the record contains evidence that Ibarra was aware of the previous
plea offer from the state. In July 2018, the district court held a pretrial hearing. At that
hearing, the following exchange occurred:
PROSECUTOR: I think I’m also obliged to put in the record
that my offer, at least at this point, to—to settle is that [Ibarra]
would plea to [first -degree assault], [and] be sentenced to the
bottom of the box on that, which is 84 months.
THE COURT: Okay.
PROSECUTOR: Which it sounds like he’s not going to take
that. But I think I’m obliged to put that on the record . . . .
THE COURT: Okay, And [ defense counsel], you went over
the—the plea offer so far with—with your client?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: And it’s his decision not to accept and proceed
to trial?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Correct.

Ibarra was present at this hearing. He was not asked to confirm that his counsel had
communicated and discussed the plea offer with him, but at the very least he was present
when the offer was formally put on the record.
The district court also determined that Ibarra’s assertion that he would have
accepted the plea offer for a sentence of 84 months in prison was not credible. Ibarra argues
that this credibility determination is clearly erroneous. See Bobo v. State, 860 N.W.2d 681,
684 (Minn. 2015) (stating that appellate courts review credibility determinations made by
the district court during p ostconviction proceedings “under the clearly erroneous
standard”). We disagree.
As the district court noted, counsel ultimately secured a favorable plea agreement
that allowed Ibarra to serve probation rather than receiving a presumptive executed prison
term. Ibarra made it very clear during both the initial and postconviction proceedings that
he was traumatized by his experience while in custody as a juvenile and that, above all else,
he wished to avoid prison time. The affidavit accompanying his petition for postconviction
relief states that “[d]ue to the traumatic experiences of [his] past as well as the trauma [he]
experienced after [his] arrest; [he] would have done just about anything to be released from
custody.” Ibarra further revealed that when counsel told him about the plea agreement that
allowed him to avoid going to prison, “[t]hat settled [his] anxiety.”
On this record, we discern no clear error in the district court’s finding that Ibarra’s
assertion that he would have accepted the plea agreement for an 84 -month executed
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sentence was not credible. Ibarra has therefore failed to establish that but for the allegedly
deficient representation there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded
guilty. We thus conclude that Ibarra’s plea was voluntary.
Because Ibarra’s plea was valid, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.