Elliott Lamar-Seccer Pierson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0532

Elliott Lamar-Seccer Pierson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 28, 2022
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-26101

Elliott Pierson, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Self-represented appellant ch allenges a district court’s denial of his motion to
correct a sentence, arguing on appeal that it erred by imposing consecutive, rather than
concurrent, sentences without clarifying the consequences of viol ating a presentencing
2
release condition. Appellant also argues that the district court improperly injected itself
into the plea-bargaining process. Respondent contends that appellant’s motion to correct
a sentence is a statutorily time-barred and pr ocedurally barred petition for postconviction
relief. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 5, 2014, respondent Stat e of Minnesota charged appellant Elliot
Pierson with two counts of first-degree aggr avated robbery under Mi nn. Stat. § 609.245,
subd. 1 (2014), after two gas-station-employe e victims notified police that appellant had
robbed their gas station with a knife. On January 30, 2015, appellant submitted a petition
to enter a Norgaard plea1 with no agreement regarding sentencing as to both counts of first-
degree aggravated robbery.
At the plea hearing, the district cour t imposed various conditions of release,
including that appellant abstain from alcoho l and unprescribed drugs and remain law
abiding. Although the district court noted that “there is never a guarantee” when it comes
to sentencing, the district court discussed its intention to impose a concurrent sentence if
appellant followed the conditions of release and appeared in district court for sentencing.
However, the district court warned appellant th at if he violated any of the conditions of

1 “A plea constitutes a Norgaard plea if the defendant asse rts an absence of memory on
the essential elements of the offense but pleads guilty because the record establishes, and
the defendant reasonably believes, that the state has sufficient ev idence to obtain a
conviction.” Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 21, 2009); see State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1961).
3
release, or if he failed to appear in c ourt for sentencing, it could impose guidelines-
permissible consecutive sentences for the two counts of first-degree aggravated robbery.
On February 12, 2015, appellant submitted to a random urine analysis and tested
positive for cocaine. The distri ct court then issued a cond itional-release revocation order
and bench warrant for appellant’s arrest. Officers arrested appellant pending sentencing.
On March 30, 2015, the district court he ld a violation hearing and a sentencing
hearing. The district court sentenced appella nt to 165 months in prison: 108 months on
the Count I aggravated robbery and 57 months on the Count II aggravated robbery, to be
served consecutively. This court affi rmed his appeal from his conviction in State v.
Pierson, No. A15-1057, 2016 WL 596433, at *5 (Minn. App. Feb. 16, 2016), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 27, 2016).
On October 14, 2020, appellant filed a mo tion to correct his sentence under Minn.
R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. On January 25, 2021, the district court denied appellant’s
motion on the merits. It did not address the state’s argumen t that appellant’s motion to
correct a sentence is a statutorily time-barr ed and procedurally barred postconviction
petition. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant makes two arguments to support reversal. First, he argues that the district
court failed to clarify the cons equences of viola ting a presentencing release condition.
Second, appellant argues that the district c ourt improperly injected itself into the plea-
bargaining process. However, we begin by addressing the state’s alternative argument
because it is dispositive.
4
The state argues that appellant’s motion to correct a sentence is a postconviction
petition that is statutorily time-barred and procedurally barred. Although the district court
did not consider the state’s arguments and denied appellant’s motion on the merits, we may
affirm a district court’s decision on alternative grounds not decided by the district court if
there is factual and legal support for the arguments, “and the alternative grounds would not
expand the relief previously granted.” State v. Grunig, 660 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003).
Here, the record contains sufficient fa cts to address the postconviction-petition
arguments, the state advances legal authority for its position on appeal, and addressing the
arguments will not expand the relief granted to the state. We therefore consider the state’s
argument.
I. Appellant’s motion to correct his sentence is a postconviction petition.

The state argues that appellant’s motion to correct his sentence is in fact a petition
for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. §§ 590.01-.11 (2020) because appellant did not
argue that his sentence was unauthorized by law.2 We agree.
“[A]n offender may challenge his sentence either by filing a petition for
postconviction relief under chapter 590 of the Minnesota Statutes or by filing a motion to
correct sentence pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9.” Washington v. State, 845 N.W.2d
205, 210 (Minn. App. 2014). However, rule 27.03, subdivision 9, does not apply “if a party
has challenged a sentence on the ground . . . that a district court otherwise erred by

2 We note that appellant did not address this argument in his principal brief filed with this
court, nor did he file a reply brief addressi ng any of the state’s alternative arguments.
However, we also note that the state raised this issue before the district court.
5
selecting one among two or more sentences that are authorized by law.” Id. at 213. “[A]n
offender may not avoid the requirements of the postconviction act by simply labeling a
challenge as a motion to correct a sent ence under rule 27.03, subdivision 9.” Id. at 212;
see State v. Amundson , 828 N.W.2d 747, 751-52 (Minn. App. 2013) (stating motion to
correct sentence is not subject to same limitations as postconviction petitions).
Here, appellant argues that the district court should have imposed concurrent rather
than consecutive sentences. However, the law undisputedly authorizes both sentences. See
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a.(1)(ii) (2014). Appellant also argues that the district court
interfered with the plea-bargaining process, a challenge that does not involve his sentence.
See State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn. 2015) (stating that “the plain language of
Rule 27.03 is limited to sentences”). We therefore conclude that rule 27.03 does not apply
and consider appellant’s moti on to correct a sentence to be a petition for postconviction
relief.
II. Appellant’s postconviction petition is statutorily time-barred.

The state argues that appellant’s petition is statutorily time-barred. We again agree.
When reviewing a denial of a postconvic tion petition, we review legal issues de
novo. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). A petition for postconviction
relief must be filed within two years after “the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence
if no direct appeal is filed” or “an appe llate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct
appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2020). Appellant filed a direct appeal on
February 16, 2016, and the supreme court denied review on April 27, 2016. Appellant had
until April 27, 2018, to file tim ely his petition for postconvicti on relief. It is undisputed
6
that appellant did not file the current pe tition for postconviction relief until October 14,
2020. Appellant’s petition is therefore untimely.
However, untimely petitions may still be considered if the petitioner establishes that
he meets one of five listed statutory exceptions. Id., subd. 4(b). The petitioner bears the
burden of proving that he meets one of the statutory exceptions. State v. Rainer , 502
N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn. 1993). Appellant does not assert an exception to the statutory
time-bar, nor are we aware of an applicable exception. We conclude that appellant’s
petition is statutorily time-barred. We are therefore not required to consider whether
appellant’s claims are procedurally barred. See Onyelobi v. State , 966 N.W.2d 235, 239
n.5 (Minn. 2021) (declining to address a ppellant’s procedural-bar argument after
concluding that appellant’s postconviction petition is time-barred without exception).
Because we affirm on this alternative grou nd, we need not consider the merits of
any of appellant’s substantive arguments.
Affirmed.